Office of Inspector General
Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 1997 - September 30, 1997
It is my pleasure to submit the semiannual report on the activities of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the period ended September 30, 1997. This semiannual report is being issued in accordance with the provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. OIG audits, investigations, inspections, and reviews identified over $157 million of actual and potential monetary benefits and resulted in 36 convictions and 127 administrative actions during the semiannual reporting period. OIG coordinated efforts with the Office of Acquisition and Materiel Management, Veterans Health Administration (VHA) and the General Counsel to recover $28 million resulting from contractor overcharges on VA contracts for drugs and medical equipment. While the OIG continues to provide the best possible coverage of VA programs and activities within available resources, the continuing decline in appropriated dollars has made it increasingly difficult to provide an acceptable level of oversight. Staffing levels for the OIG are currently far below the statutory floor of 417. A VA request to Congress to remove the statutory floor was not acted upon. Since the statutory floor remains, our position is that the mandate should be complied with. My belief is that the statutory floor was established as the minimum level needed to provide an acceptable level of oversight over the second largest Department in the Federal government. Continued funding below the statutory floor creates possible oversight vulnerabilities for Congress and the Department.
/s/ WILLIAM T. MERRIMAN Deputy Inspector General |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| Page | ||
| EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW | i | |
| SUMMARY OF OIG OPERATIONS | v | |
| I. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES | ||
| Procurement Programs | 1-1 | |
| Medical Care Programs | 1-5 | |
| Benefit Programs | 1-14 | |
| Financial Management | 1-20 | |
| Information Resources Management | 1-23 | |
| Employee Integrity and Other Issues | 1-25 | |
| II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT OIG ACTIVITIES | ||
| Hotline | 2-1 | |
| Forensic Document Laboratory | 2-4 | |
| Review of Legislation and Regulations | 2-5 | |
| Hammer Award Recipient | 2-6 | |
| OIG Management Presentations | 2-6 | |
| OIG Congressional Testimony | 2-8 | |
| Freedom of Information/Privacy Act/Other Disclosure Activities | 2-8 | |
| Obtaining Required Information or Assistance | 2-9 | |
| III. FOLLOWUP ON OIG REPORTS | ||
| OIG Role and Responsibility | 3-1 | |
| Resolution of OIG Recommendations | 3-1 | |
| Summary of Unresolved and Resolved OIG Audits | 3-2 | |
| IV. VA AND OIG MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES | 4-1 | |
| APPENDIX A - | REVIEWS BY OIG STAFF |
| APPENDIX B - | CONTRACT REVIEWS BY OTHER AGENCIES |
| APPENDIX C - | EXTERNAL CONTRACT AUDIT REPORTS FOR WHICH A CONTRACTING OFFICER DECISION HAD NOT BEEN MADE FOR OVER 6 MONTHS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 |
| APPENDIX D - | REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL |
EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
This semiannual report highlights the activities and accomplishments of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the 6-month period ended September 30, 1997. During this reporting period, 81 audit, review, and inspection reports were issued; 2 settlement agreements were completed; and 115 investigations were closed. These initiatives identified actual and potential recoveries of $30.9 million and made operational recommendations which could result in better use of an estimated $126.5 million. In addition, as a deterrent to fraud, waste, and mismanagement, our investigations and other reviews resulted in 62 indictments, 36 convictions, and 127 administrative actions against third parties, VA employees, and benefit recipients.
Our audits, reviews, inspections, and investigations this period focused on VA's major program areas, as summarized in the following paragraphs.
PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
Contractor Overcharges
VA recovered over $32 million during FY 1997, with $28 million recovered during the last 6 months, due to our identification of overcharges by Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) companies. In one case, an FSS contractor paid VA $22.1 million, the largest settlement in VA's history under the FSS program.
Review of FSS Proposals
We completed 17 preaward reviews of FSS proposals from pharmaceutical companies, with costs questioned totaling $30.2 million. These reviews assist VA contracting officers in negotiating the best possible prices for VA.
Procurement Fraud
As the result of a joint investigation and contract review, a medical corporation that provided health examination equipment to VA acknowledged liability under the False Claims Act for submitting false and fraudulent billings. A $3 million judgment was entered against the corporation and the corporation agreed to permanent exclusion from Government contracting and programs. A joint investigation with two other Federal agencies resulted in an ambulance company owner being sentenced to over 5 years in prison and ordered to pay restitution of over $1 million for submitting inflated billings for ambulance services provided.
MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS
Resource Utilization
We audited VHA's initiative to implement mobile laboratory carts at selected VAMCs and found that over $10 million earmarked for the initiative was used for other purposes or had been spent on equipment that was never used. Our review of VA's downsized inpatient substance abuse treatment program concluded that VHA had established adequate housing and social support resources for homeless veterans and other frequent users prior to the downsizing, but additional actions are needed to ensure these users have access to inpatient and outpatient care when needed.
Fee Basis Program
Our audit of the fee-basis program concluded that VHA had established controls to ensure payments for fee-basis treatment were appropriate, but additional actions were needed to reduce the rates paid and avoid duplicate or erroneous payments. In addition, $1.8 million could be reduced annually by establishing benchmarks for fees and formal contracts with fee providers.
Quality of Health Care
Our assessment of VHA's compliance with quality standards for mammography services required by law concluded that VHA health care facilities are prepared to provide high quality services either in-house or through contract facilities. The review also concluded that actions were needed to inform female patients of mammography service availability, increase mammography equipment use, and establish quality assurance programs. Our oversight review of VAMCs' implementation of External Peer Review Program (EPRP) requirements concluded that VAMC's used EPRP review results to develop better treatment methods, with action recommended for increased use of EPRP review results to strengthen the program.
Patient Care Inspections
Five of our healthcare inspection reports concluded that the VAMCs involved needed to take actions to improve patient care. In one case, our inspection agreed with a clinical peer review which concluded that providers should have ordered medical tests and more closely monitored a patient that died. In another case, appropriate care was provided for a terminal patient, but an uninformed physician did not comply with the patient's request for heroic measurers and he died. In a third case, a patient's scheduled operation was cancelled twice by a surgeon without sufficient justification. In the other two cases, the alleged patient abuse or patient harm was not substantiated, but programmatic changes were needed at one VAMC to improve the quality of care for their spinal cord injury unit and another VAMC needed to improve its credentialing and privileging process.
BENEFIT PROGRAMS
Delivery of Benefits and Services
We reviewed four VBA areas: (1) compensation of VA beneficiaries who are also active military reservists, (2) compensation and pension (C&P) medical examination services, (3) appointment and supervision of fiduciaries, and (4) Fiduciary Beneficiary System (FBS) data. We estimated that active military reservists improperly received dual compensation payments of $21 million between fiscal years 1993 and 1995, with future dual payments totaling $8 million if corrections are not made. Our followup review on C&P medical examinations found that the rate of incomplete examinations had not changed significantly since FY 1993, and VHA and VBA coordinated efforts were needed to monitor and reduce the rate. Our two reviews of VBA's fiduciary program concluded that appropriate fiduciaries are appointed, but both improved supervision of fiduciaries and establishment of appropriate FBS records are needed to reduce the risk of theft or misuse of beneficiaries' funds.
Program Fraud
Investigations disclosed cases of loan guaranty, fiduciary, and compensation fraud. The owner of several real estate companies pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to defraud VA and HUD by acquiring and selling property by deceptive means and agreed to property forfeitures valued at over $2.7 million. A county veterans' service officer was sentenced to over 3 years in prison and fined $10,000 for his involvement in schemes to defraud over 17 disabled veterans for whom he acted as fiduciary. An individual and his spouse were sentenced to 10 years and 1 year, respectively, for a telemarketing scheme disclosed by a joint investigation that also disclosed he was improperly collecting VA disability benefits with a 100 percent disability rating.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Consolidated Financial Statements
We completed nine reviews as part of our audit of VA's Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS), with VA management officials informed of areas where actions are needed to improve accounting operations. Another financial-related review identified duplicate payments totaling over $1 million. None of the conditions identified had a material financial effect on the FY 1996 CFS.
Income Verification
Our review of VHA's procedures to verify self-reported veteran income for means tests found that over 87 percent of the cases reviewed did not have signed means test documents. In addition, VHA lost the opportunity to collect over $3 million because veterans were erroneously identified as exempt from co-payments.
INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Telephone Access Systems
Our review of VA's use of Personal Identification Number (PIN) telephone access systems found that three VAMCs with PIN systems had reduced their long distance telephone costs by an average 68 percent, with total annual savings nearly $1 million. We concluded that telephone costs could be reduced by over $10 million annually if all VAMCs installed PIN systems.
Security Controls Over Benefits Payments
We evaluated security controls at a Benefits Delivery Center that provides key automation support for payments to veterans and their families, totaling $20 billion. We identified a number of actions needed to make the facility more physically secure and less vulnerable to unauthorized electronic access of data.
EMPLOYEE INTEGRITY
Specialized Investigations
Specialized Investigations Regional Task Force (SIRTF) investigations disclosed instances of sales of controlled substances and workers' compensation fraud. One individual was sentenced to over 2 years in prison for the illegal sale of drugs. Four individuals had their workers' compensation benefits terminated, with one ordered to make restitution of $260,000, and another sentenced to 4 months' imprisonment. In all cases, the investigations disclosed that the individuals involved were working while receiving these payments.
Employee Misconduct
Investigations disclosed drug theft or diversion, workers' compensation fraud, and other employee misconduct. Two licensed practical nurses at different VAMCs received 4 year and 5 year probation sentences, respectively, for drug theft and diversion. A VAMC claims clerk was sentenced to 6 months in prison for workers' compensation fraud after illegally receiving benefits in excess of $159,000. A former VAMC resident, charged with making false statements on his application for a state university residency program, was able to dispense controlled substances while at a VAMC and, after being arrested, fled to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean officials subsequently charged him with five counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder of patients at a mission hospital. He is currently in the United States in Federal custody pending trial on charges of making false statements and for possession of controlled substances. Other instances of employee misconduct resulted in the resignation and removal of VA employees.
FOLLOWUP ON OIG REPORTS
Unresolved Reports
As of September 30, 1997, the OIG did not have any unresolved internal audit reports. A total of 21 external contract reports had been unresolved for over 6 months, with questioned and unsupported costs totaling $33.5 million. Resolution of external contract reports is pending contracting officers' decisions, with the contracting officer the sole decider in these cases.
SUMMARY OF OIG OPERATIONS
| Current 6 Months 4/1/97 - 9/30/97 |
FY 1997 10/1/96 - 9/30/97 |
||||
| (Dollars in Millions) | |||||
| OIG Reviews Completed and Resolution Action | |||||
| Reports Issued | 81 | 181 | |||
| Settlement Agreements | 2 | 4 | |||
| Value of Reports/Agreements | |||||
| Questioned Costs | $28.0 | $35.2 | |||
| Unsupported Costs | 1.5 | 5.8 | |||
| Recommended Better Use of Funds | 120.7 | 197.7 | |||
| Total | $150.2 | $238.7 | |||
| Reports Resolved (issued this and prior periods) | 34 | 79 | |||
| Value of Resolved Reports/Agreements | |||||
| Disallowed Costs. | $27.4 | $37.5 | |||
| Funds to Be Put to Better Use | 58.1 | 123.8 | |||
| Total | $85.5 | $161.3 | |||
| Unresolved Reports | |||||
| Over 6 Months as of 9/30/97: | |||||
| Internal Audit | 0 | N/A | |||
| External Contract | 21 | ||||
| Less than 6 Months as of 9/30/97: | |||||
| Internal Audit | 0 | ||||
| External Contract | 33 | ||||
| Total | 54 | ||||
| Value of Unresolved Reports: | |||||
| Questioned Costs | $4.5 | N/A | |||
| Unsupported Costs | 1.5 | ||||
| Recommended Better Use of Funds | 101.3 | ||||
| Total | $107.3 | ||||
| Investigation Activities | |||||
| Investigative Cases | |||||
| Opened | 88 | 229 | |||
| Closed | 115 | 245 | |||
| Pending | 333 | N/A | |||
| Impact of Investigations | |||||
| Indictments | 62 | 107 | |||
| Convictions | 36 | 110 | |||
| Probation (in years) | 127 | 313 | |||
| Prison Sentences (in years) | 33 | 131 | |||
| Fines, Penalties, Restitutions, and Civil Judgments | $2.2 | $3.7 | |||
| Investigative Recoveries and Savings | $5.0 | $13.9 | |||
| Administrative Sanctions | 98 | 178 | |||
| Current 6 Months 4/1/97 - 9/30/97 |
FY 1997 10/1/96 - 9/30/97 |
||||
| Audit Activities | |||||
| Reports Issued | |||||
| Internal Audits | 13 | 32 | |||
| Other Reviews | 9 | 16 | |||
| Total | 22 | 48 | |||
| Audit Workload | |||||
| Carry-Over Projects Completed | 18 | 34 | |||
| Planned Projects Initiated | 12 | 25 | |||
| New Projects Received | 11 | 16 | |||
| Total | 41 | 75 | |||
| Contract Review Activities | |||||
| Reports Issued/Settlement Agreements | |||||
| Contract Reviews by OIG Staff | |||||
| FSS Contracts | 28 | 37 | |||
| PL 102-585 Reviews | 1 | 4 | |||
| Other | 3 | 5 | |||
| Contract Reviews by Other Agencies | 11 | 46 | |||
| Total | 43 | 92 | |||
| Hotline and Special Inquiry Activities | |||||
| Hotline Cases | |||||
| Opened | 376 | 733 | |||
| Closed | 313 | 624 | |||
| Percent of Founded Allegations | 24% | 23% | |||
| Impact of Hotline Activities | |||||
| Administrative Sanctions | 29 | 57 | |||
| Special Inquiries Completed | |||||
| Reports Issued | 8 | 28 | |||
| Administrative Closures | 12 | 25 | |||
| Total | 20 | 53 | |||
| Special Inquiries Workload | |||||
| Carry-Over Projects | 25 | 41 | |||
| New Projects Received | 36 | 56 | |||
| Total | 61 | 97 | |||
| Healthcare Inspection Activities | |||||
| Projects Completed | |||||
| Inspection Reports Issued | 10 | 17 | |||
| QA/Patient Care Reviews | 30 | 52 | |||
| Clinical Consultations/Technical Support. | 69 | 130 | |||
| Total | 109 | 199 | |||
| Projects Pending | |||||
| QA/Patient Care Reviews | 51 | N/A | |||
| MI Case Evaluations | 0 | ||||
| Clinical Consultations/Technical Support | 26 | ||||
| Total | 77 | ||||
I. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES
PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
1. CONTRACTOR OVERCHARGES
| Issue: Contractor Overcharges for Medical Equipment, Medical Supplies, and Drugs Conclusion: Contract reviews identified contractor overcharges. Impact: VA recovery of over $32 million from Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contractors, with $28 million recovered this 6-month period. |
Postaward Reviews of FSS Contracts
Contract review efforts during FY 1997 resulted in the recovery of over $32 million from companies selling medical equipment, medical supplies, and drugs to VA and to other Government agencies. This compares favorably to FY 1996 recoveries of approximately $28 million. These recoveries from contractors represent the collective efforts of the Office of Acquisition and Materiel Management, the Office of General Counsel, Veterans Health Administration, and OIG working together, as a team, to produce these results. Some examples of these recoveries follow.
Preaward Reviews of Pharmaceutical Offers
VA's FSS pharmaceutical schedule, with FY 1996 sales of $1.3 billion, represents the largest dollar value, by far, of the 13 Federal Supply Schedules awarded and managed by VA's National Acquisition Center (NAC). During the period, our Contract Review Division auditors, in collaboration with NAC Pharmaceutical Service contracting officers, initiated a major project to conduct 46 preaward reviews of FSS offers from pharmaceutical companies. Due to the significant number of reviews and short time frame allowed for their completion (approximately 3 1/2 months), these auditors were assisted by ten auditors from our Office of Audit. Of the 46 preaward reviews planned, 17 were completed during the period ending September 30, 1997, and are listed in Appendix A. The other 29 are in process, with completion planned during the next period. These preaward reviews assist VA contracting officers in negotiating best possible prices by determining if an offeror's (i) commercial pricing and sales data disclosed in the offer are accurate, complete, and current, and (ii) proposed FSS prices/discounts are equal to or better than those offered to its most favored customers.
The reviews also identify customer classes (e.g., group purchasing organizations) that Government agencies can use to track price reductions during the life of an FSS contract. Additionally, these reviews identify and comment on pricing concessions, e.g. rebates that pharmaceutical manufacturers offer their commercial customers. When requested, our auditors provide assistance to contracting officers during negotiations with companies.
2. PROCUREMENT FRAUD
| Issue: Integrity of VA's Procurement Program Conclusion: Investigations disclosed third party fraud in VA's procurement program. Impact: Individuals and companies were either indicted, convicted, or sentenced. |
MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS
1. RESOURCE UTILIZATION
| Issue: Pathology and Laboratory Medicine Service (PLMS) Mobile Laboratory (Mobile Lab) Initiative Conclusion: Resources for mobile laboratories were not used as intended. Impact: Reassignment of $5.2 million in unused equipment to other facilities. |
Mobile Lab is a cart with eight testing instruments which can be moved throughout a hospital to perform the 25 most commonly ordered lab tests. It was developed and implemented at selected VAMCs in FY 1994 at a cost of $20.7 million. We conducted an audit of the Mobile Lab initiative to determine whether Mobile Lab implementation was performed in a cost-effective manner that ensured optimal utilization of funding and equipment.
Our review found that the Mobile Lab was not widely used because the instrument configuration on the cart was selected without consideration of the specific needs of individual laboratory operations and VAMCs had difficulty determining the best use for Mobile Lab. As a result, over $5 million was spent on equipment that was never used, and another $5 million provided for the Mobile Lab initiative was spent for other uses. We recommended that VHA reassign the unused equipment to facilities or activities that can utilize it. The Under Secretary concurred with the findings and established a task force to review all viable options to reassign the unused equipment. (Pathology and Laboratory Medicine Service (PLMS) Mobile Laboratory Initiative)
| Issue: Downsizing VA's Inpatient Substance Abuse Treatment Program (SATP) Conclusion: VHA managers and SATP officials successfully identified and established adequate resources to ensure that all patients continued to have secure living arrangements as they moved from inpatient status to outpatient status. Impact: Assurance of continuity of services for fragile patients. |
A rapidly evolving health care environment in which it is essential to provide high quality health care to more patients, with fewer resources, led the VA to reduce large numbers of beds (2,409 in FY 1995, and 2,255 during the first two quarters of FY 1996) and to increase its emphasis on the use of ambulatory care to treat many disorders, including substance abuse treatment. All VHA Networks drastically reduced the numbers of inpatient beds devoted to treating SAT patients, and substantially increased the capacity to treat these patients on an ambulatory care basis. This transition required VA clinicians to ensure that SAT patients have available the social and clinical support services they need to be successful in rehabilitation.
We conducted a program evaluation to assess the impact that decreasing the number of inpatient SATPS has had on access for homeless veterans and other frequent users and to determine whether VHA providers had identified and established adequate housing and social support resources before the downsizing began. We found that VHA managers and clinicians worked successfully to identify alternative living situations for SAT patients to ensure that they would have secure shelter during their treatment process, and that clinicians had continued to work with community resources to provide the necessary assistance to these patients. The evaluation also concluded that the following additional VHA actions would strengthen and improve the quality of, and access to, VHA's SATPs: (i) require each VISN to have a core of inpatient beds to accommodate mentally and physically impaired patients and those who experience acute relapses; (ii) require discussion and documentation of transportation needs to ensure that patients who do not have adequate resources have transportation to the treatment site; and (iii) develop accurate methods for reporting the number of patients who access SATP care in order to ensure the commitment of adequate resources to the treatment process at any given time.
The Under Secretary for Health concurred in our recommendations and implemented or planned appropriate actions to strengthen the ambulatory care SAT process. (The Impact of Downsizing Inpatient Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Programs on Homeless Veterans and Other Frequent Users)
2. VA'S FEE-BASIS PROGRAM
| Issue: VHA Internal Controls Over the Fee-Basis Program Conclusion: VHA can strengthen the fee-basis program by establishing additional management controls. Impact: Expenditures could be reduced by at least $1.8 million annually. |
Fee-basis treatment is inpatient care, outpatient care, or home health care received from non-VA health care providers at VA expense. During the period April 1, 1994 through March 31, 1995, VHA paid $237 million for fee-basis treatments provided to eligible beneficiaries, including $112 million for outpatient care, $94 million for inpatient care, and $31 million for home health care.
We conducted an audit to determine if VHA had established effective internal controls to ensure that payments for fee-basis treatment were appropriate. Overall, VHA internal controls provided reasonable assurance that payments for fee-basis services were appropriate. However, management controls could be improved by implementing procedures to avoid duplicate payments; notifying veterans when VA pays for fee-basis medical care; and improving procedures to prevent payments for services for decreased veterans. In addition, VHA could reduce fee-basis home health care expenditures by at least $1.8 million annually by establishing formal contracts with fee providers and benchmarks for determining reasonable rates. The Under Secretary for Health concurred with our findings and recommendations and provided acceptable implementations plans. (Internal Controls over the Fee-Basis Program)
3. QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
| Issue: Mammography Services for Women Veterans Conclusion: VHA has properly and successfully pursued actions to ensure that eligible woman veterans have consistently high quality mammography services available through its health care facilities. Impact: Assurance of high quality health care. |
In July 1995, the Under Secretary for Health issued a VHA directive requiring VA health care facilities to achieve substantial compliance with the Mammography Quality Standards Act of 1992, which established standards for mammography equipment, personnel, and practices, including quality assurance assessment. The objective of this directive was to ensure that women veterans have access to an equal quality of diagnostic services for detecting breast cancer as that which is available for women in the private sector.
We conducted a program evaluation to assess VHA facilities' compliance with the VHA directive. We concluded that VHA health care facilities are prepared to offer high quality mammography services to women patients, either with in-house facilities, or by means of contracting with private or academic health care facilities. Clinicians, however, do not always ask female patients if they wish to have a mammography, and do not always record in the medical record that they discussed this issue with the patient. Some medical centers that own mammography equipment have not as yet achieved the level of workload necessary to maintain employee expertise in its use (300 mammograms) and managers need to explore ways to increase the workload. Although clinicians recognized the importance of maintaining quality oversight of their mammography products, not all medical centers had developed quality assurance measures to systematically record outcome reviews, including the disposition of positive mammograms and surgical tissue correlation with radiological interpretations.
We made recommendations to address these three areas. The Under Secretary for Health concurred with the recommendations and implemented or planned appropriate actions to strengthen mammography procedures. (Assessment of the Veterans Health Administration's Status in Providing Mammography Examinations)
| Issue: Private Sector Contracted Review of VA Treatment Quality Conclusion: VAMCs have substantially implemented External Peer Review Program (EPRP) requirements, but additional actions are needed to strengthen the program. Impact: Improvements to the EPRP. |
In FY 1992, VHA replaced its 6-year-old Medical District Initiated Peer Review Organization with a private sector contract to obtain expert evaluation of the quality of health care provided in its 173 hospitals. VHA managers intended to use EPRP review results to assess the quality of veterans' care, and to pursue system-wide opportunities for improvement in the quality of care using retrospective medical record review.
We conducted a program evaluation to determine the process used to implement the EPRP and to assess EPRP information utilization at the VAMC level. We found that medical center managers generally communicated EPRP findings to the responsible practitioners and used EPRP findings to develop better treatment methods. We recommended actions to strengthen the program: contractor reporting of the magnitude of cases that do not fully comport with review criteria, contractor trending of EPRP review results by VAMC, and incorporation of EPRP review results into the respective VAMC quality management programs.
The Under Secretary for Health concurred with the recommendations and implemented necessary actions to strengthen the utility of the EPRP for using facilities. [Note: Subsequent to issuance of our report, VHA reported that the EPRP has been restructured, with a shift in focus from case-by-case assessment to a broad systems approach that emphasizes objective assessment of national VHA performance measures.] (Oversight Review of the Veterans Health Administration's External Peer Review Program)
| Issue: Nationwide Quality Program Assistance (QPA) Reviews Conclusion: VAMC top managers were individually and collectively involved in several actions that were focused on ensuring that eligible veterans have access to high quality, low cost health care. Impact: Advisory report to VAMC Management. |
We conducted a QPA review at VAMC Manchester, NH as part of our QPA development process. The QPA process is intended to add value to other external review activities that oversee VHA facilities. Review instruments assess the extent to which a VAMC meets VHA's four performance goals: cost-efficient care, high-quality care, improved patient access to care, and improved patient satisfaction.
We concluded that the VAMC's top managers were individually and collectively involved in several actions that were focused on ensuring that eligible veterans have access to high quality, low cost health care. Mid-level managers and operating employees expressed concern over the fast pace with which changes in the health care process and facility reorganization were being made, but they were aware of and supported management's treatment goals. Patients indicated that they were generally pleased with the care they received. (Quality Program Assistance Review, Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center Manchester, NH)
4. INSPECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL CASES OF PATIENT CARE
| Issue: Alleged Inadequate or Inattentive Care of Two Patients Conclusion: Clinicians had provided appropriate care to one patient, but had not been sufficiently aggressive in recognizing and following up on the other's medical needs. Impact: Improved procedures to prevent recurrence. |
We reviewed allegations that medical center clinicians did not provide attentive care for a Nursing Home Care Unit (NHCU) patient's respiratory distress, causing him to have unnecessary difficulty breathing, and that physicians did not properly respond to a psychiatry patient's lethargic condition, resulting in his ultimate death.
We concluded that clinicians had reacted properly and adequately treated the NHCU patient's respiratory condition. A clinician peer review had been conducted to determine whether the psychiatry patient's care had been appropriate. The review concluded that medical and psychiatric care providers should have ordered neurological and laboratory tests and been more aggressive in monitoring the patient's condition. We agreed with these conclusions and found that medical center managers had initiated appropriate corrective actions to ensure similar instances would not reoccur. They had not, however, discussed the facts of the psychiatry patient's care with their Regional Counsel office to determine the propriety of advising the patient's family of their prerogative to pursue VA benefits or file a tort claim, and we recommended that they do so. The Director agreed to obtain Regional Counsel advice. (Inspection of Alleged Inadequate Care and Nursing Incompetence on the NHCU, Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center Bronx, NY)
| Issue: Alleged Poor Care and Disregard for a Patient's Advance Directive Conclusion: Clinicians provided the patient with appropriate treatment for a terminal condition, but an uninformed clinician did not comply with the patient's wishes for end-of-life care. Impact: Re-emphasis on compliance with advance directive policy to prevent recurrence. |
We reviewed allegations that clinicians did not provide proper care for a patient who had a terminal heart condition and failed to comply with both the patient's and spouse's wishes that all necessary measures be pursued to keep the patient alive.
We found that clinicians had energetically and conscientiously sought to treat the patient's terminal heart condition even though they were fully aware that treatment could not improve the patient's condition or extend his life. Clinicians took great pains to keep both the patient and his spouse informed of his treatment progress and his ultimately poor prognosis, but both individuals wanted clinicians to exert heroic efforts when the patient needed resuscitation. Unfortunately, the patient's condition rapidly deteriorated during a tour of duty when the physician on duty was not familiar with his case or the family's desires for heroic measures. Using his clinical judgment, and based on the patient's clinical presentation, the physician on duty did not carry through with extensive resuscitative measures and the patient died.
We recommended that the VAMC Director take action to review the resuscitation and advance directives policies with medical center physicians and nursing employees in order to clarify the need to honor patients' requests, and adhere to established policies. We also recommended that local clinicians refer similar cases to the medical center's Ethics Committee for clarification and discussion of the most appropriate way to manage similar end-of-life wishes of future patients.
The Medical Center Director concurred with our recommendations and provided action plans that should improve the treatment process. Medical center managers also offered numerous referrals within the community to assist the patient's spouse in working through her grieving process. (Inspection of Alleged Poor Quality of Care and Disregard of Patient's Advance Directive for Life-Saving Measures at the Department of Veterans Affairs Puget Sound Health Care System, Seattle, WA)
| Issue: Alleged Inadequate Spinal Cord Injury Unit (SCIU) Clinical and Management Practices Conclusion: Medical center managers needed to focus on and define the SCIU's mission in order to ensure more consistent patient care for patients with chronic spinal cord injuries. Impact: Reassessment of SCIU mission and staffing to better focus on patient needs. |
In response to a VHA request, we conducted an independent inspection to further evaluate earlier VHA reviews that were conducted to review allegations of alleged patient abuse, instances of improper relationships between SCI patients and SCIU clinicians, and unprofessional activities among some clinical employees. We conducted the inspection in collaboration with VHA's Office of Medical Inspector, and convened a panel of nationally recognized SCI treatment experts in order to fully evaluate all aspects of this highly specialized treatment program. The panel developed independent findings and recommendations which we agreed with and which supported our findings.
We were unable to substantiate any of the allegations, but concluded that actions were needed to improve the quality of care for SCI patients. We found that medical center managers had initiated several measures to improve the SCI treatment process before our inspection began. Managers had reassigned ten employees to other areas of the medical center and began recruiting for qualified replacements, developed an effective cross-training program for all SCIU employees so that each employee was capable of managing more than one function, and established round-the-clock security. Managers and clinicians had also begun to deliberate on ways to bolster the interdiscisciplinary treatment team process, and to streamline the quality improvement team concept.
We made the following recommendations:
The Medical Center Director concurred with the recommendations and provided implementation plans and actions that properly responded to the issues. (Inspection of Selected Clinical Aspects of the Spinal Cord Injury Unit at the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center Hampton, VA)
| Issue: Alleged Improper Clinical Privileges and Resulting Patient Harm Conclusion: Local clinical managers did not adequately evaluate or validate a surgeon's training and experience and improperly awarded plastic surgery privileges. Impact: Assurance of properly skilled physician treatment. |
We reviewed allegations that medical center clinical managers had improperly awarded plastic surgery privileges and a plastic surgery fellowship position to a surgeon who did not have the requisite training or experience to qualify him to perform the functions of that position. The complainants also asserted that unnamed patients had been harmed in some way because the surgeon did not know what he was doing.
We found that the surgeon had sought a position as a plastic surgery fellow, and had requested surgical privileges to perform a wide range of plastic surgery procedures. He provided medical center clinical managers with a resume of the experience and training that he believed qualified him for the position. He asserted that much of the applied surgical experience had been received in a foreign country and could not be readily validated. Clinical managers accepted his credentials at face value and did not personally validate any of the information as required by VA policy. When nursing employees began to question the surgeon's skills, clinical managers reassessed the surgeon's qualifications and rescinded his privileges. He was subsequently terminated from his fellowship position. Multiple clinical reviews of his patients' medical records failed to elicit any evidence that the surgeon had in any way harmed any patients.
We recommended that the medical center strengthen its credentialing and privileging procedures by ensuring that the Chief of Staff or designee personally verify and validate reported experience and training. The Director concurred with our recommendation and initiated appropriate corrective actions. (Inspection of Alleged Misrepresentation of Medical Credentials at a Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center)
| Issue: Alleged Improper Cancellation of Planned Surgery Conclusion: A surgeon had twice canceled the patient's scheduled operation without sufficient justification. Impact: Improved scheduling procedures to prevent recurrence. |
We conducted an inspection to review allegations that a medical center surgeon scheduled a woman patient for a needed operation on two occasions and acted improperly by cancelling the operation both times.
We found that the patient had followed medical advice prior to admission to the medical center for the scheduled operation, and that the surgeon's supervisors and operating room employees all believed that the surgeon's explanations for canceling and rescheduling the operation may not have been legitimate. We concluded that the patient took proper control of her treatment process and scheduled her treatment at a private health care facility.
Prior to our inspection, the surgeon involved resigned and the VAMC Director convened a Board of Investigation to address the allegations. The Board recommended development of a policy on case cancellations, actions to improve operating room scheduling and equipment availability, and payment of the veteran's medical bills. We concurred with the recommendations which were immediately acted on by the Director, including providing an apology to the woman veteran. (Inspection of Alleged Refusal to Operate on a Woman Veteran, Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center Philadelphia, PA)
5. CONTROL OF DRUGS
| Issue: Employee Theft/Diversion of Drugs Conclusion: Investigations disclosed fraudulent acts by employees to obtain drugs. Impact: Former employees are held accountable for illegal acts. |
During the period, seven former VAMC employees were indicted or sentenced for theft or diversion of drugs. In one case, a licensed practical nurse (LPN) had, diverted Demerol, used to mitigate pain, and replaced it with saline solution. Another LPN had stolen Demerol and a pharmacy technician had stolen numerous types of medication. These individuals received sentences of two to five years' probation and fines ranging from $500 to $2,000. A more detailed summation of the seven cases is included in the section on Employee Integrity and Other Issues.
6. FEE-BASIS FRAUD
| Issue: Investigation of Suspected Fraudulent Claims Conclusion: Individuals submitted false billings and invoices for services not provided. Impact: Individuals are held accountable for illegal acts. |
BENEFIT PROGRAMS
1. DELIVERY OF BENEFITS AND SERVICES
| Issue: Procedures to Prevent Dual Compensation of VA Beneficiaries Who are also Active Military Reservists Conclusion: Procedures to prevent dual compensation need to be improved. Impact: Recovery of $21 million from current payments and prevention of future dual compensation payments totalling over $8 million annually. |
We conducted a review to determine whether VBA procedures ensure that disability compensation benefits paid to active military reservists are offset from training and drill pay as required by law. We determined VBA had not offset VA disability compensation to 90 percent of the sampled active military reservists receiving military reserve pay. We estimated that dual compensation payments of $21 million were made between fiscal years (FYs) 1993 and 1995 and, if the condition is not corrected, annual dual compensation payments estimated at $8 million will continue to be made. Dual payments occurred because procedures established between VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) were not effective or were not fully implemented. We recommended followup on FY 1993-1996 cases to offset either disability compensation or reservists' pay and actions to improve procedures and communication among VBA, DOD, and beneficiaries. The Acting Under Secretary for Benefits concurred with our findings and recommendation and provided acceptable implementation plans. (Review of Veterans Benefits Administration's Procedures to Prevent Dual Compensation)
| Issue: Medical Examination Services for Veterans with Pending Compensation and Pension (C&P) Disability Claims Conclusion: VBA and VHA can improve the quality of C&P medical examinations by establishing performance measures and working together. Impact: Better benefit claims service for veterans. |
We conducted a review to followup on the effectiveness of actions taken on our 1994 report on the timeliness of C&P medical examination services and to determine whether additional opportunities exist to further enhance the quality and timeliness of medical examination services. Our prior review found that, in FY 1993, 405,000 examination requests were processed, with 23.5 percent incomplete. In December 1994, VBA and VHA executed a Memorandum of Understanding to jointly improve processing procedures. Our current review found that, in FY 1996, the number of incomplete examinations had not changed significantly, with 21.9 percent of 361,000 requests incomplete. We recommended that VBA and VHA establish performance measures to reduce the rate of incomplete examinations and monitor progress, and that VBA and VHA facility directors be required to work together to reduce the percentage of incomplete examinations. The Under Secretary for Health and the Acting Under Secretary for Benefits concurred in principle with the recommendations and provided acceptable implementation plans. (Review of Compensation and Pension Medical Examination Services)
2. OTHER BENEFICIARY ISSUES
| Issue: VBA Controls Over Appointment and Supervision of Fiduciaries Conclusion: VBA appointed appropriate fiduciaries to manage funds of incompetent beneficiaries, but more effective supervision of certain fiduciaries was needed. Impact: Reduced risk of theft and improved service to the veteran. |
As a follow-up to a 1989 OIG report, we audited VBA controls over appointment and supervision of fiduciaries appointed to protect the incomes and estates of incompetent beneficiaries. As of September 30, 1996, VBA supervised fiduciaries of more than 110,000 incompetent beneficiaries with assets valued at over $1.4 billion.
Audit results showed that VBA appointed appropriate fiduciaries to manage the funds of incompetent beneficiaries, but more effective supervision of certain fiduciaries was needed to reduce the risk of theft or misuse of beneficiaries' funds. VBA needed to strengthen monitoring of fiduciaries who were required to submit periodic reports of income, expenses, and assets by following up on questionable or inconsistent data, independently verifying beneficiaries' assets, and requiring documentation supporting selected expenses reported by fiduciaries. We also concluded that the resources to perform supervisions of higher risk fiduciaries could be obtained by providing less supervision of estates of certain beneficiaries whose situations are stable and who are considered less vulnerable to fiduciary fraud. The Acting Under Secretary for Benefits agreed with or provided acceptable alternatives to our recommendations, and provided acceptable implementation plans. (Audit of Appointment and Supervision of Fiduciaries)
| Issue: Completeness of Data in VBA's Fiduciary Beneficiary System (FBS) Conclusion: Records needed to be established for additional beneficiaries. Impact: Reduce the risk of theft or misuse of incompetent beneficiaries' funds. |
The primary mission of VA's fiduciary program is to ensure that incompetent beneficiaries are well cared for, and their estates protected from fraud, waste, and abuse. We audited VBA's Fiduciary Beneficiary System (FBS) to determine if system data was complete. We concluded that some beneficiaries did not have records because VBA personnel overlooked, or were unaware of, applicable policies and procedures, and because of clerical errors. Establishing appropriate FBS records would help fiduciary program personnel monitor the financial affairs of incompetent beneficiaries, and reduce the risk of theft or misuse of the beneficiaries' funds.
We recommended that VBA establish the appropriate FBS records and periodically compare C&P data to the FBS to identify incompetent beneficiaries with no FBS records and establish FBS records when appropriate. The Acting Under Secretary for Benefits agreed with our recommendations and provided acceptable implementation plans. (Completeness of Data in the Veteran's Benefits Administration's Fiduciary Beneficiary System)
3. LOAN GUARANTY PROGRAM FRAUD
| Issue: Fraud in Loan Guaranty Program Conclusion: The Loan Guaranty Program remains vulnerable to fraud involving loan origination and equity skimming. Impact: Individuals are held accountable for illegal acts. |
Loan Origination Fraud
Equity Skimming
4. BENEFICIARY FRAUD
| Issue: Integrity of Beneficiary Programs Conclusion: Fraud continues in dependency and indemnity compensation, pension, fiduciary, insurance, education, compensation, and other programs. Impact: Individuals are held accountable for illegal acts. |
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation Benefits
Pension Fraud
Fiduciary Fraud
Insurance Benefits Fraud
Education Benefits Fraud
Compensation Fraud
Other
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
1. VA'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
| Issue: VA's Accounting Operations Conclusion: Additional management actions are needed to further improve accounting operations. Impact: Improved accuracy of financial information. |
For FY 1996, VA reported assets totaling $43.4 billion and expenses totaling $43.9 billion. As part of our ongoing work on the Audit of VA's Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS), we issued nine reports -- eight management letter reports resulting from OIG reviews of financial information and one report resulting from a contractor review of two Financial Management System (FMS) subsystems. The reports are intended to provide Department managers observations and advice for improving accounting operations and controls in day-to day operations. A summation of these reports follows.
The first management letter concluded that financial information processed at the Austin Finance Center was generally reliable for operations and transactions tested. However, operations could be enhanced by ensuring that (i) compensating controls were in place where prescribed separation of duty controls were impractical, (ii) user identifications in VA's FMS reflected each employees' current employment status, (iii) manual payroll accruals were reversed, (iv) reconciliation of the Minor Construction Appropriation with U.S. Treasury records was completed timely, and (v) staff emphasize accuracy when coding FMS disbursement transactions that could affect the reliability of management reports. (Management Letter - FY 1996 Selected Accounting Operations and Systems at Austin Finance Center)
The second management letter concluded that staff established required internal controls for monitoring financial information, and generally complied with VA policies and procedures based on audit tests made and had made improvements during the past year. However, there remained three areas in which further improvements would be beneficial. These concerned (i) improving data used to calculate the future liability for Compensation and Pension (C&P) benefits, (ii) improving the financial statement preparation process, and (iii) strengthening policies and procedures for contract counseling accounting. (Management Letter - Tests of Selected Veterans Benefits Programs Accounting Functions Performed at VA Central Office)
Three management letters concluded that much progress had been made in improving Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) reporting, but that continuing efforts were needed to further refine the accuracy of PP&E accounting information. The first management letter provided information and observations from our overall analysis of PP&E data in the general ledger and fixed asset subsystem, and encouraged VHA and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to improve internal controls by continuing efforts to oversee PP&E accounting activities, provide additional guidance and training, and to analyze PP&E accounts and provide operating facilities the results when adjustments are needed. The other two management letters described actions needed at the facility level to help ensure the accuracy of PP&E information in the general ledger. Actions needed included efforts to ensure: (i) reconciliations of property accounts are completed and appropriate adjustments are made, (ii) physical inventories are completed as required, and (iii) costs in the construction work-in-process are capitalized when the resulting building or improvement is put into service. (Three Management Letters - Management Oversight of Property, Plant, and Equipment Financial Information; Accuracy of Non-Expendable Equipment Financial Information; and Accuracy of Real Property Financial Information)
A sixth management letter concluded that staff established required internal controls for monitoring life insurance financial information, and generally complied with VA policies and procedures based on audit tests made. Of the eight conditions discussed in our prior year audit report, one had been overtaken by events, management had corrected two, and actions were in process to correct the other five. No new conditions were identified in this year's audit. (Management Letter - FY 1996 Financial Statement VA Life Insurance Programs)
A seventh management letter provided additional explanation and detail regarding a reportable condition in our previous report on VA's FY 1996 Consolidated Financial Statements to aid in establishing an effective corrective plan. We concluded stronger financial reporting controls were necessary to provide reasonable assurance that transactions continue to be properly reported, and that material misstatements would be prevented or detected in three areas: (i) the automation and integration of financial accounting and reporting systems, (ii) financial and credit reform accounting training of staff responsible for HCA financial data, and (iii) review of financial data and reports. (Management Letter - Tests of Selected VA Housing Credit Assistance Accounting Functions Performed at VA Central Office)
We conducted the eighth review at management's request. We evaluated accounting procedures used to resolve errors caused by data limitations in some total dollar fields resulting in truncation during the February 1997 transfer of active policy master records from the computer data base administered by the St. Paul, MN Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office and Insurance Center (VAROIC) to the VAROIC Philadelphia, PA data base. In our advisory, we concluded that management performed adequate adjustments to general ledger insurance accounts to resolve errors in certain fields which occurred during the first in a series of data transfers. In addition, management's procedures should adequately preserve the integrity of financial data transferred during the consolidation. (Adequacy of Procedures Used to Transfer Life Insurance Policy Data from VAROIC St. Paul, MN to VAROIC Philadelphia, PA)
The ninth report contained the results of a requested contractor review. The contractor concluded that application controls incorporated into the Accounts Receivable Subsystem and the Fixed Asset Subsystem of VA's FMS were adequate. However, the general controls over the information systems did not adequately ensure that computer programs and data files were protected from unauthorized access and modification. The review identified 9 reportable conditions and 15 significant but less important management letter comments. VA management agreed with all but two items. We will follow-up and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions and related compensating controls for all items in our Audit of VA's FY 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements (CFS). (Electronic Data Processing Controls in the Financial Management System Accounts Receivable and Fixed Asset Subsystems)
None of the conditions noted above for the nine reports had a material financial effect on the FY 1996 CFS, but correction of the conditions is considered necessary for effective operations. Where needed, appropriate adjustments were made to the financial statements.
2. OTHER FINANCIAL CONTROL ISSUES
| Issue: Duplicate Payments Conclusion: Collection actions should be pursued on duplicate payments Impact: Repayment of over $1 million. |
As part of our ongoing audit of VA's financial operations and reporting, we identified two duplicate payments made to a commercial vendor totaling over $1 million that had not been previously detected. VA Central Office financial staff promptly confirmed the overpayment and sent a collection letter, and the vendor paid the amount due. VA management officials agreed that collection efforts should be handled in a timely manner, and agreed to aggressively pursue collection of duplicate payments. (Duplicate Payments)
| Issue: VHA's Income Verification Procedures for Veterans Reporting No Income Conclusion: VHA facilities should obtain means test information from veterans, and conduct periodic reviews of zero income means tests. Impact: Improved compliance with means test and Privacy Act requirements. |
Each year, VHA's Health Eligibility Center (HEC) matches VA's records with the records of the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration based on income information provided by VHA facilities. During FY 1996, HEC matched 726,758 veteran records and identified 106,029 veterans whose incomes exceeded statutory thresholds, and who were potentially responsible for making medical care co-payments.
We reviewed VHA procedures for verification of veterans reporting no income on means tests, and assessed VHA compliance with means test and Privacy Act requirements. We found that over 87 percent of the cases reviewed had no signed means test documents to attest to the accuracy of income information reported or to certify receipt of the Privacy Act statement. We also found that VHA lost the opportunity to collect over $3 million because some veterans had been erroneously identified as exempt from co-payments. We recommended that VHA take action to improve compliance with means test and Privacy Act requirements, including ensuring that VHA facilities obtain means test and Privacy Act information, and requiring VISN Directors to conduct periodic reviews of zero income means tests. The Under Secretary concurred with the findings and recommendations and provided an acceptable implementation plan. (Means Testing and Income Verification Procedures)
INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
1. TELEPHONE ACCESS SYSTEMS
| Issue: Personal Identification Number (PIN) Telephone Access Systems Conclusion: VA could reduce overall telephone costs by installing the PIN system nationwide. Impact: Telephone costs could be reduced by over $10 million annually. |
In Fiscal Year 1996, VA medical centers spent about $22.4 million on long distance services (62 percent of VA's $36.1 million long distance costs). We evaluated the effectiveness of PIN telephone access systems used by three VAMCs. The three VAMCs had installed PIN access systems as a means of reducing telephone costs and improving accountability over telephone usage. They reported that system installation costs were minimal, accountability for telephone usage had improved, and long distance expenses had been reduced by an average of 68.9 percent, with total annual savings estimated at $934,000.
We contacted all 158 other VAMCs and found that 148 VAMCs did not have PIN systems or plans to install them. Based on the experience of the three VAMCs reviewed, we concluded telephone costs could be reduced by an estimated $10.1 million annually if all VAMCs installed PIN systems. In addition, VBA, NCS, and VA Central Office activities could benefit from installing PIN systems. We recommended that management officials inform facilities and activities about the benefits of PIN access and encourage installation in existing telephone systems, and/or integration of PIN access with new telephone systems or upgrades.
The Under Secretary for Health concurred with the recommendations and stated that VHA had initiated actions to install PIN systems at all VAMCs, as appropriate, with first-year start up costs expected to be about $10.8 million. The Acting Under Secretary for Benefits; Director, National Cemetery System; and Assistant Secretary for Management all expressed an interest and commitment to improving telephone system management and reducing long distance costs. (VA Use of Personal Identification Number Telephone Access Systems)
2. SECURITY CONTROLS OVER AUTOMATED BENEFITS PAYMENTS
| Issue: Adequacy and Appropriateness of Security Controls at Hines Benefits Delivery Center (BDC) Conclusion: The BDC needed to establish a proactive security program, and correct weaknesses identified by the audit. Impact: Improved security |
We evaluated the adequacy and appropriateness of security controls at the Hines Benefits Delivery Center (BDC), focusing on areas where management could strengthen physical and electronic access controls. In FY 1996, the BDC provided key automation support for processing over 40 million benefit payments totaling $20 billion to veterans and their families. The audit identified a number of key security enhancement opportunities needed to make the BDC facility more physically secure and less vulnerable to unauthorized electronic access of systems and data. The BDC Director concurred with our recommendations and agreed to: establish a proactive security program, complete a risk assessment, and implement necessary physical and electronic security controls to correct weaknesses identified by the audit. (Security Controls at the Hines Benefits Delivery Center)
3. INTEGRATION OF COMMERCIAL SOFTWARE IN VHA SYSTEMS
| Issue: Integration of Commercial Off-the-Shelf Software into VHA Systems Conclusion: VHA has made progress integrating commercial software. Impact: Improved compatibility between VHA computer software systems, resulting in better service to veterans. |
As part of our audit of the Veterans Health Information System and Technology Architecture (VISTA), we evaluated the effectiveness of VHA efforts to integrate commercial off-the-shelf software applications into VISTA. We found that VHA has been reviewing methods for integrating commercial software into VISTA, and has made progress assisting VAMC programmers in integration efforts. Three of the seven commercial software applications were successfully integrated with VISTA, and satisfactory progress had been made toward integrating the remaining four applications. A Message Routing and Translation System (MRTS) had been installed at one medical center, which allows commercial software to be recognized by VHA internal computer systems and has the potential to lessen the burden of adapting commercial software to VISTA.
We also found that nationwide use of MRTS technology has been delayed because VA management officials have differing opinions on deployment and funding strategies for MRTS. We recommended that VHA and the Office of Management determine whether to continue to use MRTS or develop another alternative approach to the system integration.
The Under Secretary for Health and the Assistant Secretary for Management concurred in principle and the Under Secretary agreed to establish a working group to review alternatives, including the MRTS. (Efforts to Integrate Commercially-Developed Software to Hospital Information Systems)
EMPLOYEE INTEGRITY AND OTHER ISSUES
1. SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIONS
| Issue: Specialized Investigations Regional Task Force (SIRTF) Investigations Conclusion: SIRTF investigations continue to disclose sales of controlled substances, workers' compensation fraud, and corruption. Impact: Individuals are held accountable for illegal acts. |
The SIRTF is an enforcement unit comprised of special agents from the VA OIG and VHA. Under the direct control of the VA OIG, SIRTF became operational in the spring of 1994, and has successfully investigated allegations of drug diversion, sales of controlled substances, sales and possession of firearms, and other criminal violations occurring at VAMCs in the New York metropolitan area.
SIRTF was created in response to concerns voiced by the directors of three New York area VAMCs over various criminal activities taking place at their facilities. The VA OIG's assistance was sought because federal agencies such as the DEA and the FBI have workloads and priorities which often preclude addressing criminal activity at VAMCs. In addition, VA Security Police lack the personnel and expertise to conduct these investigations, and local authorities were unable or unwilling to devote limited resources to what they perceived as a Federal problem.
In the three years that SIRTF has been operational, the unit has achieved a remarkable record of success. Initially targeted at the criminal activities mentioned above, the unit's role was expanded to include the investigation of workers' compensation fraud, a problem that was costing VA millions of dollars each year, funds that could be spent on our nation's veterans. This effort also enjoyed great success as indicated by the cases cited below.
Controlled Substances
Workers' Compensation Fraud
Corruption
2. EMPLOYEE AND THIRD-PARTY INTEGRITY
| Issue: Investigations of Misconduct and/or Illegal Acts by Employees and Third Parties Conclusion: Instances of thief, embezzlement, bribery, fraud, and other acts of misconduct were disclosed. Impact: Individuals are held accountable for illegal acts. |
Employee Theft/Diversion of Pharmaceuticals
Theft and Embezzlement
Acceptance of Gratuity
Workers' Compensation Fraud
Other Employee Misconduct