Citation Nr: 0840013 Decision Date: 11/20/08 Archive Date: 11/25/08 DOCKET NO. 99-09 618 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in New Orleans, Louisiana THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: David E. Boelzner, Attorney WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The veteran, B.J. & L.W. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Christopher Maynard, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active service from May 1970 to November 1971. By rating action in June 1987, service connection was denied for a psychiatric disorder. The veteran was notified of this decision and did not appeal. In February 1995, the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) denied service connection for PTSD. This matter initially came before the Board on appeal from a February 1998 decision by the RO which found that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen the claim of service connection for PTSD. In April 2001, the Board reopened the veteran's claim and remanded the appeal for additional development. The Board remanded the appeal for additional development in September 2004. In August 2005, a hearing was held at the RO before the undersigned member of the Board. In February 2006, the Board denied service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, and the veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (hereinafter, "the Court"). In August 2007, the Court vacated and remanded the February 2006 Board decision. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All evidence necessary for adjudication of this claim have been obtained by VA. 2. The veteran's current psychiatric disorder, diagnosed as psychosis not otherwise specified, was not present in service or until more than one year after discharge from service. 3. The preponderance of the credible medical evidence establishes that the veteran does not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. 4. The veteran does not currently have PTSD as a result of his period of active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW A psychiatric disorder, including PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by service nor may a psychosis be presumed to have been so incurred. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it must notify the claimant of the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate a claim, which information and evidence VA will obtain, and which information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. VA must request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to a claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2006); see also Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Such notice must include notice that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if there is a favorable disposition of the claim. Id; 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.326; see also Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). Since the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is adverse to the veteran's claim of service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, any questions as to the appropriate disability ratings or effective dates to be assigned are rendered moot, and no further notice is needed. See Dingess/Hartman, 19 Vet. App. 473. VA law and regulations also indicate that part of notifying a claimant of what is needed to substantiate a claim includes notification as to what information and evidence VA will seek to provide and what evidence the claimant is expected to provide. Further, VA must ask the claimant to provide any evidence in her or his possession that pertains to the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)-(c) (2007); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). In this case, a letter dated in June 2003 was sent by VA to the veteran in accordance with the duty to notify provisions of VCAA. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). Although the letter was not sent prior to initial adjudication of the veteran's claim, this was not prejudicial to him, since he was subsequently provided adequate notice, the claim was readjudicated, and supplemental statements of the case (SSOC) were promulgated in February and August 2004. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) recently held that a statement of the case or SSOC can constitute a "readjudication decision" that complies with all applicable due process and notification requirements if adequate VCAA notice is provided prior to the SOC or SSOC. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Mayfield III]. As a matter of law, the provision of adequate VCAA notice prior to a readjudication "cures" any timing problem associated with inadequate notice or the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication. See Mayfield III, (citing Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d at 1328, 1333-34). Here, the veteran was notified of the evidence that was needed to substantiate his claim, what information and evidence that VA will seek to provide and what information and evidence the veteran was expected to provide, and that VA would assist him in obtaining evidence, but that it was ultimately his responsibility to provide VA with any evidence pertaining to his claim. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). The veteran was notified of his responsibility to submit evidence which showed that he had a disability at present which had its onset in or was otherwise related to service, of what evidence was necessary to establish service connection, and why the current evidence was insufficient to award the benefits sought. The veteran's service medical records and all VA and private medical records identified by him have been obtained and associated with the claims file. The veteran was examined by VA during the pendency of the appeal and testified at a hearing at the RO before the undersigned member of the Board in August 2005. Based on a review of the claims file, the Board finds that there is no indication in the record that any additional evidence relevant to the issue to be decided herein is available and not part of the claims file. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Mayfield III]. The Board thus concludes that any deficiency in the notice to the veteran or the timing of any notice is harmless error. See Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427, 435 (2006) (finding that even though the Board erred by relying on various post-decisional documents to conclude that adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice had been provided to the appellant, the evidence established that the veteran was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate in the adjudication of his claim, and the error was harmless). Additionally, there has been no prejudice to the veteran in the essential fairness of the adjudication. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005); rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed Cir. 2006). Service Connection: In General Service connection may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred or aggravated in active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be demonstrated either by showing direct service incurrence or aggravation or by using applicable presumptions, if available. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Direct service connection requires a finding that there is a current disability that has a definite relationship with an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143 (1992); Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992). Where a veteran served continuously for ninety (90) days or more during a period of war or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and a psychosis becomes manifest to a degree of ten percent within one year from the date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 1112, 1113 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2007). A disorder may be service connected if the evidence of record, regardless of its date, shows that the veteran had a chronic disorder in service or during an applicable presumptive period, and that he still has such a disorder. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494- 95 (1997). Such evidence must be medical unless it relates to a disorder that may be competently demonstrated by lay observation. Id. For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Disorders diagnosed after discharge may still be service connected if all the evidence, including pertinent service records, establishes that the disorder was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Medical evidence of a "chronic" disease should set forth the physical findings and symptomatology elicited by examination within the applicable period. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(b); Oris v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 95, 96 (1992). A chronic disease need not be diagnosed during the presumptive period but characteristic manifestations thereof to the required degree must be shown by acceptable medical and lay evidence followed without unreasonable time lapse by definite diagnosis. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c); Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). An important factor in the factual question of reasonableness in lapse of time from manifestation to diagnosis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c) is the difficulty in diagnosing the disability and the strength of the evidence establishing an identity between the disease manifestations and the subsequent diagnosis. A strong evidentiary link tends to ensure the disease is not due to "intercurrent cause" as set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Cook v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 231, 238 (1993). The lapse in time from manifestation to diagnosis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(c) "is ultimately a question of fact for the Board to address." Bielby v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 260, 266 (1994). Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition, (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed, in-service stressor actually occurred, and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed, in-service stressor. The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a stressor during service to support a diagnosis of PTSD will vary depending upon whether the veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy" as established by official records, including recognized military combat citations, or other supportive evidence. If the VA determines that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the alleged stressor is combat-related, then the veteran's lay testimony or statement is accepted as conclusive evidence of the stressor's occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence is required, provided that such testimony is found to be "satisfactory," i.e., credible, and "consistent with the circumstances, conditions or hardships of service." See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 164 (1996); West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). If, however, the VA determines that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy or that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, but the alleged stressor is not combat-related, the veteran's lay testimony, by itself, is insufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain credible supporting evidence that corroborates the veteran's statements or testimony. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1993). In adjudicating a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, the Board is required to evaluate the supporting evidence in light of the places, types, and circumstances of service, as evidenced by the veteran's military records, and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2007); see also Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993). The Board must analyze and weigh the probative value and assess the credibility of the relevant evidence and provide a statement of reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence. See Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 26 (1991); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164, 169-70 (1991); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 59 (1990). The Board may not base a decision on its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions but, rather, may reach a medical conclusion only on the basis of independent medical evidence in the record or adequate quotation from recognized medical treatises. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991). Governing VA regulations provide that personality disorders are not diseases within the meaning of applicable legislation providing for payment of VA disability compensation benefits. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9, 4.127 (2007). Accordingly, service connection for any personality disorder would not be warranted. Factual Background & Analysis In the Memorandum Decision, the Court found, in essence, that the Board's analysis of the veteran's claim was deficient on three counts. First, that in dismissing two favorable medical opinions on the basis that the veteran's inconsistencies or uncorroborated testimony rendered the medical opinions worthless, the Board misinterpreted the Court's holdings in Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229 (1993) and Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993). Second, that the Board reasoning that the veteran's medical evidence is incompetent because the veteran's statements were uncorroborated and that his corroborating evidence did not need to be examined because there is no competent medical opinion was circular, and did not provide the veteran with a clear explanation as to the precise reasons for its decision. Third, that the Board failed to make a credibility determination as to the veteran's testimony concerning his service stressors. Initially, the Board is aware of the Court's instructions in Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 394, 397 (1991), to the effect that a remand by the Court is not "merely for the purposes of rewriting the opinion so that it will superficially comply with the 'reasons or bases' requirement of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d)(1)." A remand is meant to entail a "critical examination of the justification for the decision." The Board's analysis has been undertaken with that obligation in mind. After review of all the evidence of record, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against a favorable disposition of the veteran's appeal. As will be discussed in greater detail in the decision below, the Board finds that the veteran is not a reliable historian as to the purported stressors in this case. His varying accounts of the circumstances of his claimed stressors are inconsistent with the objective record on several significant counts. Although it is asserted on the veteran's behalf that such inconsistencies are minor and should be "reasonably expected" given that they were reported eight years apart, the Board disagrees. The veteran's inconsistent statements are not limited to just the circumstances surrounding two mortar attacks, but also his duty stations, assignments, and other stressor related contentions. When first seen by a private psychologist in July 1989, the veteran complained of sleep disturbance, flashbacks, depression, anger, and being socially withdrawn. He described his childhood history and reported that he started drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana and using heroin when he was in Vietnam. He reported that he saved a friend's life during a mortar attack in Vietnam, and said that he had feelings of self hatred for having killing a "Gook." Additional private medical records, received in August 1997, show that the veteran was hospitalized with paranoid ideations and violent tendencies in April 1975. The veteran was started on anti-psychotic medications for overt psychotic symptomatology and responded well. The discharge diagnoses included schizophrenia, paranoid type. In a letter received in October 1990, the veteran reported that his first duty assignment was with the 122nd Infantry Company (122nd Inf Co) at Phu Hiep. He said that he was assigned to that unit for five months pulling guard duty and going on patrols in the surrounding hillside. He said that the base was under constant mortar fire "every other night" and that after the first few nights, he saw what a mortar round could do because a guy got hit, but did not die. While he did not provide any specific timeline, he said that his unit received orders to abandon the base at Phu Hiep and move to Tuy Hoa Air Force base (AFB), and that he was transferred to the 180th Aviation Company at Tuy Hoa as a supply clerk. He said that the night before they pulled out, the base came under heavy attack and that there were about 24 casualties in all, though he did not know any of them personally. The veteran described three stressor incidents that occurred at Tuy Hoa. He reported that he saved the life of another soldier during a mortar attack while on guard duty and said that they vacated the structure just before a mortar round destroyed the tower. Two weeks later, he reportedly was firing his rifle at some dogs while on guard duty when his rifle backfired and blew up in his face injuring his right ear. Later that month, his unit came under mortar attack and few soldiers from the 125th were injured. He also reported that he was given a General discharge from the service for being AWOL from his unit when he went to town without a pass. In a statement received two years later, in April 1992, the veteran reported that he and another soldier were on guard duty in a tower in Phu Hiep with the 122nd Inf Co when they came under mortar attack. He reported that mortars were falling everywhere, and that the two of them got out just before the tower was destroyed by a mortar round. The veteran reported that the next tower down from the one he was in was also destroyed by a mortar round during the attack, and that two soldiers in that tower were killed. On VA examination in October 1997, the veteran described two mortar attacks, one when he first arrived at Tuy Hoa, and the second when he was at Phu Hiep. The first incident involved a mortar attack while he was on guard duty in a tower. He said that no one was injured in the attack but that he was extremely frightened and began to experience symptoms of psychosis right after the attack. The second incident was a mortar attack while he was guarding ammunition at Phu Hiep. He said that mortar rounds fell very close to him and he thought he was going to die, and that other soldiers were wounded in the attack. On a stressor statement, received in January 2002, the veteran reported three incidents that he believed caused his psychiatric problems. The first stressor was when his unit (122nd Inf Co) came under mortar attack outside the city of Phu Hiep. The two other incidents occurred at Tuy Hoa AAF. One incident was when his weapon jammed and back fired while on guard duty, causing deafness in his right ear. The other incident involved a mortar attack while he was on guard duty in a tower. The veteran's service personnel records showed that he served in Vietnam from November 1970 to November 1971. He was initially assigned to Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 17th Combat Aviation Group (HHC, 17th Cbt Avn Gp) as a security guard from November 16, to December 16, 1970, and was reassigned to the 180th Avn Co (ASH) as a supply clerk on December 16, 1970. He was sent back to the States on November 9, 1971, and given an administrative discharge under general conditions. Regarding his initial duty assignment of security guard, while it is possible that the veteran may have pulled guard duty with the 122nd Inf Co, the records showed that he was never officially assigned to the 122nd Inf Co. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the veteran was temporarily assigned to the 122nd Inf Co at Phu Hiep from HHC, 17th Cbt Avn Gp when he arrived on November 6, 1970, the records showed that he was transferred to the 180th Avn Co on December 16, 1970, and that his duty assignment was changed from security guard to supply clerk. Thus, his assertions that he was assigned to the 122nd as a security guard for five months is contradicted by the service personnel records which showed that he worked as a security guard for one month before he was reassigned to the 180th Avn Co at Tuy Hoa AFB as a supply clerk. Concerning the mortar attacks at Phu Hiep and Tuy Hoa, a report from the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) (formerly U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (USASCURR)) in June 2003, included extracts of a unit history for the 268th Aviation Battalion (268th Avn Bn); the higher headquarters of the 180th Avn Co, for the period 1967 to 1972, a history of the 17th Cbt Avn Gp from December 1965 to January 1972, and an Operational Report Lessons Learned from November 1970 to April 30, 1971. The latter report included significant engagements for various artillery units in and around Phu Hiep. The report showed two incidents involving incoming mortar rounds and small arms fire at Phu Hiep, the first one was on December 29, 1970, and the other on January 28, 1971. However, neither incident was shown to have involved the 122nd Inf Co or any unit from the 17th Cbt Avn Gp, including HHC. Moreover, the veteran's personnel records showed that he was reassigned to the 180th Avn Co at Tuy Hoa AAF on December 16, 1970, 13 days prior to the first mortar attack at Phu Hiep. Therefore, the veteran's presence at Phu Hiep during the one and only mortar attack during the months of November and December 1970, was physically impossible. The fact that there were no mortar attacks at Phu Hiep between November 16, and December 16, 1970 (when the veteran was transferred to Tuy Hoa AAF) contradicts further, his assertions that he came under mortar attack at Phu Hiep, or that Phu Hiep was under constant mortar attack "every other night" when he was stationed there. Historically, the unit history for the 268th Avn Bn (the higher headquarters of the 180th Avn Co) showed that enemy attacks on Phu Hiep AAF increased between August 27, and September 4, 1970, including one attack that caused significant structural damage and resulted in 25 casualties. The 268th Avn Bn moved from Phu Hiep to Tuy Hoa AFB (renamed Tuy Hoa Army Airfield (AAF)) between October 25, and November 9, 1970. The veteran reported that when he was transferred to the 180th Avn Co, the unit was at Tuy Hoa AAF. Thus, it would appear that the 180th Avn Co moved to Tuy Hoa at the same time as the parent unit. In any event, the official service records showed that the veteran was reassigned as a supply clerk to the 180th Avn Co at Tuy Hoa AAF on December 16, 1970. As to the veteran's assertion that there was an all out mortar and rocket assault on his base the night prior to leaving Phu Hiep that resulted in dozens of casualties, the official service records clearly contradict this assertion. As noted above, the official service records do not show any enemy attacks at Phu Hiep between November 1, and December 29, 1970. The Board does note that official reports document a major attack on the 268th Avn Bn a couple of months prior to the veteran's arrival in Vietnam. In any event, the official unit records do not show any attacks at Phu Hiep from the time the veteran arrived in Vietnam to December 29, 1970, nearly two weeks after he was reassigned to supply at Tuy Hoa AAF on December 16, 1970. The unit history for the 268th Avn Bn indicated that during the post-Tet period of 1971 (late January), enemy activities in Phu Yen Province reached a moderate level, with the highpoint occurring on April 25, 1971 when Tuy Hoa AAF was subject to a combined mortar, rocket, and ground attack. Five rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulted in no friendly casualties or damage, and one bunker was damaged by a B40 rocket. The enemy retreated when reaction forces were deployed to the scene. The veteran's service personnel records showed that he was stationed at Tuy Hoa AAF at the time of the April 1971 attack. While the Court has held that being subject to incoming mortar rounds may be sufficient to satisfy the stressor element necessary to establish service connection, the mere fact that an individual was physically present in an area during a mortar attack is not, by itself, conclusive evidence that he engaged in combat with the enemy under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154. Section 1154, requires that the veteran have actually participated in combat with the enemy, meaning participated in events constituting an actual fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality. Section 1154 does not apply to veterans who served in a general "combat area" or "combat zone" but did not themselves engage in combat with the enemy. See VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (October 1999). In this case, although the veteran was asked to provide detailed information concerning the alleged stressors on several occasions, he has never provided any specific information as to the approximate dates of the claimed events. The veteran described two stressor incidents involving mortar attacks that he reportedly experienced in Vietnam and said that the first incident occurred shortly after he arrived in Vietnam. The veteran did not offer any timeline for the second stressor, though he did provided a more detailed account of the events of the second incident. Because the veteran has not been able to provide information concerning the approximates dates of the alleged stressor events, the Board must attempt to reconcile his account of his alleged stressors with the official service records to determine, first, if he is a credible historian and if so, whether his activities constitute combat with the enemy under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154 and consistent with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In this regard, the veteran asserted that Tuy Hoa AAF came under heavy attack while he was on guard duty, and that the tower he was in was destroyed by a mortar round. He also reported that mortar rounds were falling "everywhere" and that two soldiers in the guard tower just down from his were killed in the same attack when that tower was destroyed by a mortar round. As noted above; however, the unit history reports showed that the "highpoint" of enemy activity in the entire province surrounding Tuy Hoa after January 1971, was an attack on April 25, 1971, and involved only five incoming mortar rounds and one B40 rocket. The report noted that, other than damage to one bunker, there was no structural damage of any kind and, more importantly, no casualties. In this case, there is no evidence to support the veteran's version of the events during the only confirmed mortar attack on Tuy Hoa AAF during the time that he was assigned to that facility. The Board does not dispute the fact that the veteran was stationed at Tuy Hoa AAF on the date of the mortar attack. However, while the record generally confirms that there was a mortar attack at Tuy Hoa while the veteran was stationed there, the official unit history contradicts much of the veteran's account of the event. The official record confirmed that the base received six incoming rounds, none of which caused any significant damage and no casualties. Under the circumstances, the Board finds that the veteran's description of constant mortar rounds, two towers destroyed and at least two casualties, is not supported by the credible evidence. The Board is cognizant of the holdings in Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002) and Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997), cases in which there were additional independently verified evidence of the stressor incident. In this case, the official unit history contradicts the veteran's version of the attack and the severity of injuries and damage. The veteran's description of the mortar attack and damages that he allegedly experienced at Tuy Hoa is incompatible with the official unit records and undermines his assertions of personal involvement. The Board does not expect that every single detail of a claimant's reported stressor would be described exactly the same, and that some minor discrepancies would not be unusual. See Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997. However, in this case, the veteran's descriptions of his claimed stressors were not only at variance with the official unit histories, but varied significantly and materially over the years. For instance, as noted above, the veteran initially asserted to a private psychologist in 1989, that he killed a Vietnamese. Yet, the veteran never mentioned this stressor or any ruminations of the alleged event at any time since the initial private evaluation in 1989. Subsequent to the prior Board decision, the veteran's attorney argued that there was no inconsistency in the fact that the veteran "omitted" to mention the killing and that this was just a minor oversight that should be expected. However, the fact that the veteran never reported this stressor incident again, and has never provided any information as to the circumstances of the claimed killing raises serious questions as to his ability to provide accurate and reliable information. The evidence showed that the veteran was on security guard duty for one month during his time in Vietnam. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that the incident would have occurred during that time frame. However, the unit history reports showed that there were no attacks at Phu Hiep during the period that the veteran was assigned to security guard duty. Since the veteran's duty assignment during his remaining period of service in Vietnam was that of a stock clerk at a major installation which had its own dedicated security, it is unlikely that the claimed incident would have occurred when he was a clerk. Since the veteran has not provided any information as to the approximate dates of this claimed stressor, the Board is unable to confirm his allegations and is constrained to consider his contentions in light of the objective evidence of record. Since the veteran is not shown to have engaged in combat with the enemy, his bare allegations are insufficient to establish occurrence of a claimed in-service stressor and must be corroborated by official service records or other credible supporting evidence. Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91 (1993); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994). In this case, while there is general corroborating evidence of a mortar attack at Tuy Hoa AAF, the Board finds the veteran's description of the event not to be credible given the significant discrepancies in the reported details. The Board has considered the "buddy statement" from a fellow soldier but finds that it does not offer any probative information concerning the veteran's claimed stressors. The letter and a copy of one page of the soldier's DA Form 20 indicated that he was assigned to HHC 17th Avn Gp from November 14, 1970 to February 18, 1971. The soldier also stated that he pulled security guard duty with the 122nd Inf Co in Phu Hiep. The question of whether the veteran was assigned to HHC 17th Avn Gp and served in Phu Hiep is not in dispute. Although the buddy statement indicated that they were assigned to the 122nd Inf Co, the official service records for both soldiers showed that they were assigned to HHC 17th Avn Gp. Whether or not assignment to the same unit involved security guard duty with the 122nd Inf Co is not material to the veteran's claim. The letter did not provide any information which would serve to confirm any of the veteran's claimed stressors, and merely showed that both soldiers were assigned to the same unit for a short and overlapping period of time. The evidence favorable to the veteran's claim consists of a July 1989 private psychological evaluation report, an October 1997 VA psychiatric examination, and statements and testimony by family members. The Board considered the statements and testimony by family members to the effect that the veteran was not the same person when he came home from Vietnam, and that he was nervous, anxious, irritable, paranoid, restless, talked to himself, didn't sleep much, and could not hold a job for very long. However, the Board finds that such statements are not probative of the matter at issue. That is, while these individuals can describe their observations, none have demonstrated competency to render a diagnosis or etiology of a psychiatric disorder. The family members are not shown to possess any medical expertise in the field of psychiatry, and any interpretation of their observations for purposes of a medical diagnosis, would be purely speculative. Turning to the two favorable medical opinions, the Board finds that both examiner's relied primarily on the veteran's self-described history. As explained above, the Board finds that the veteran is not a credible or reliable historian and that any opinion based on his unsubstantiated stressors is of little probative value. Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 427 (2006). The only stressors mentioned in the July 1989 private examination report was saving his friend's life during the mortar attack on the guard tower and killing a Vietnamese. The stressors reported on the October 1997 VA examination included the mortar attack on the guard tower at Tuy Hoa, and another mortar attack after he was sent to Phu Hiep. As discussed above, the veteran's description of the alleged stressor incidents were not only inconsistent with, but were contradicted by the unit history reports as there is no corroborating evidence that the veteran killed anyone in Vietnam, and no corroborating evidence that the guard tower the veteran was in "blew up", and no official verification that the veteran was involved in a mortar attack at Phu Hiep in which soldiers were wounded. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). At the time of the examination, the veteran reported that the attack at Phu Hiep was especially traumatic to him because he saw other soldiers who were wounded and killed by enemy fire. This aspect of the veteran's purported stressors, as not above, is clearly contradicted by the official service records. It is apparent that neither examiner reviewed the claims file. As was evident to the later VA panel psychiatrists, there were a number of discrepancies in the veteran's self- described stressor accounts. Although the panel report did not include a discussion of the specific inconsistencies; they are, as indicated above, readily apparent upon review of the claims file. The panel report included a detailed description of the veteran's medical history, including the two favorable medical reports, and provided a rational explanation for finding that the veteran did not meet the full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. The panel diagnosis was that of a psychosis not otherwise specified. Further, the examiners opined that the veteran's psychosis was not related to service and was most likely related to his history of drug and alcohol abuse. The report indicated that the veteran was questioned in detail about each of the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, and that his stressor exposure under Category A was marginal, at best. Even assuming that Category A was satisfied, they concluded that the veteran did not meet the criteria for the remaining Categories for a diagnosis of PTSD. The attorney for the veteran argued before the Court that the Board's reliance on the fact that the veteran denied any history of psychiatric symptoms at the time of his service separation examination should not be "taken seriously" because it would require him to "properly and persuasively diagnose himself." The attorney then went on to assert that the veteran was perfectly competent to testify about matters of which he had personal knowledge and which do not require specialized training, namely his own symptoms and the occurrence of events." (Appellant's brief, p. 13-14). However, the Board does not concur that the veteran's denial of any history of symptoms such as, depression or excessive worry, trouble sleeping, nightmares, memory loss, or nervous trouble of any sort on Reports of Medical History for separation in October and November 1971, should be disregarded. Such evidence is clearly relevant to the issue at hand since the veteran now claims that he had psychiatric symptoms in service and that he was discharged because of psychiatric problems. The fact that he reported that he was given a general discharge because he tested positive for drug use, notwithstanding (see February 1991 VA examination report), his DD 214 showed that he was administratively discharged under general conditions for unsuitability because of character and behavioral problems. There is no credible evidence in the service medical records that the veteran experienced any psychiatric problems during service. The fact that the veteran denied any history of psychiatric symptoms during service, but years later claimed that he had psychiatric symptoms goes directly to the question of credibility. The Board does not dispute that a claimant is competent to offer testimony concerning symptoms he has experienced, but any such assertions must be weighed against other contradictory statements of record. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Maxon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453, 459 (1999), affirmed sub nom Maxon v. Gober, 230 F. 3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [it was proper to consider the veteran's entire medical history, including a lengthy period of absence of complaints]; see also Forshey v. Principi, 284 F. 3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ["negative evidence" could be considered in weighing the evidence]. The October 1997 VA examiner's conclusion that the veteran manifested psychotic symptoms in service secondary to PTSD could only have been based on the veteran's self-described history, as there were no objective findings or any contemporaneously recorded subjective complaints in the service medical records or until several years after service. Furthermore, the veteran has not offered any explanation as to why he didn't report any of the symptoms that he now alleges were present from the very beginning of his tour of duty in Vietnam. Under the circumstances, the Board finds that the October 1997 VA opinion relating the veteran's current psychiatric disorder to service is of limited probative value. On the other hand, the Board finds the November 2003 VA panel opinion persuasive as it was based on a longitudinal review of all the evidence of record, including the two favorable opinions, and included a detailed discussion of all relevant facts. The panel considered other possible diagnoses, and offered a rational and plausible explanation for concluding that the veteran does not have an acquired psychiatric, including PTSD which is related to service. The panel even stated that even if one allowed category A, the veteran clearly did not meet criteria B, C, or D for a diagnosis of PTSD. Thus, to the extent that there is "marginal" corroboration of the veteran's exposure to a traumatic event since there is corroboration that there was one mortar attack at Tuy Hoa while the veteran was stationed there, the veteran still does not meet the remaining criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. While the veteran believes that his current psychiatric problems are related to service, as a layperson, he is not competent to offer an opinion as to medical causation or etiology. Epps v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 341 (1996); Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). See also Franzen v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 235 (1996). The first evidence of any psychiatric problem, diagnosed as schizophrenia, was on a private hospital report in April 1975, more than three years after discharge from service. As there was no credible evidence of a psychosis in service or within the one year of discharge from service, and no credible evidence relating any current psychosis to military service, the Board finds no basis to grant service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, other than PTSD. As there is no evidence of a psychiatric disorder in service, no basis for consideration of presumptive incurrence or aggravation of a psychosis, and no current diagnosis of PTSD based on an independently verifiable in-service stressor and the constellation of symptoms associated with that disorder, service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD is denied. ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD is denied. S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs