Citation NR: 9614102 Decision Date: 05/21/96 Archive Date: 05/31/96 DOCKET NO. 93-28 714 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Denver, Colorado THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to a temporary total disability rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.29 based upon VA hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993. 2. Entitlement to an increased evaluation for a neuropsychiatric disorder, currently rated 30 percent disabling. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Anthony D. Dokurno, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active military service from November 1976 to July 1990. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 1993 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). Because the issue of entitlement to an increased evaluation for a neuropsychiatric disorder requires additional development, it is addressed in the remand portion below. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL The veteran and his representative contend that he is entitled to a temporary total rating based on a period of VA hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993 for his service-connected neuropsychiatric disorder. They also contend that its severity warrants an evaluation higher than the current 30 percent. DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is the Board's decision that the evidence supports entitlement to a temporary total disability rating based on a period of VA hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran is service-connected, and currently rated 30 percent disabled, for a neuropsychiatric disorder, major depression; he has no other service-connected disorder. 2. The period of VA hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993 was required for treatment of manifestations of his service-connected neuropsychiatric disorder. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for a temporary total disability rating based on a period of VA hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993, have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 4.29. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The threshold inquiry in all cases is whether the claim is well grounded. One who submits a claim to VA has the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995). If this burden is carried, VA is then obligated to assist in developing facts pertinent to it. A well-grounded claim is one that is plausible, that is, capable of substantiation. Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990). There must be more than a mere allegation. The claim must be accompanied by evidence that justifies a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is plausible. Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 609, 611 (1992). After a review of the veteran's personal hearing testimony and pertinent medical documentation, the Board finds that his claim is well grounded. The statutory duty to assist in the development of facts has therefore arisen. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103(a), 3.159 (1996). With regard to the claim of entitlement to a temporary total disability rating, it appears that all necessary documentation has been acquired. A temporary total (100 percent) disability rating will be assigned without regard to other provisions of the rating schedule when it is established that a service-connected disability has required hospital treatment in a VA or an approved hospital for a period in excess of 21 days, or hospital observation at VA expense for a service-connected disability for a period in excess of 21 days. 38 C.F.R. § 4.29. The RO has assigned the veteran a 30 percent evaluation for a service-connected neuropsychiatric disorder, originally characterized as major depression. The veteran and his representative contend that the veteran's hospitalization from January 21 to April 5, 1993 was required for treatment of this service-connected disorder, and that he is therefore entitled to a temporary total rating for that period. Treatment records indicate the veteran admitted himself to a VA facility on January 21, 1993 for treatment of alcohol and cocaine abuse, as well as for treatment of severe depression and thoughts of suicide. After three days of detoxification, the veteran was transferred to another ward for evaluation of suicidal ideation and intent. Neuropsychological testing on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory revealed increased scales on psychopathology, paranoia, and schizophrenia, which to the examiner suggested a diagnosis of a character disorder as well as elevated depression. The profile suggested a major depressive episode of at least moderate severity. Although the examiner commented that the anxiety and depression symptoms could not clearly be differentiated from symptoms due to cocaine withdrawal, the veteran said that his depression was the "trigger" to cocaine and alcohol use. The patient was prescribed Zoloft for treatment of depression, and discharged on April 5. The diagnoses were severe alcohol and cocaine dependence, and a "depressive disorder" not otherwise specified. The interrelationship between alcohol and cocaine withdrawal, a major depressive disorder, and the suicidal ideation was not specifically delineated. The veteran testified during a May 1995 personal hearing at the RO that he was held in the detoxification unit for three days or less, and that the ward to which he was transferred and the treatment he received were entirely related to his service-connected depression. He stated he abused cocaine and alcohol to alleviate the symptoms of depression when they appeared. He also testified that because of his depression he had attempted suicide in March 1995 by ingesting ethylene glycol, a fact confirmed by a VA outpatient treatment note dated in April 1995. To control depression, the medication was changed from Zoloft to Prozac, with continuing use of Antabuse. In addition to his testimony, the veteran submitted a September 1993 statement from an acting Chief of VA Medical Administrative Service, to the effect that his VA hospitalization during the relevant time period was for treatment of "depression/nervousness" and that he was discharged with a supply of the antidepressant Zoloft. Substance abuse was not mentioned. The Board's opinion is that it appears at least as likely as not that the veteran's hospitalization during the time in question was essentially for treatment of symptoms and manifestations of his service-connected neuropsychiatric disorder, depression. Contemporary medical documentation substantiates the veteran's testimony regarding his quick transfer from detoxification to a separate psychiatric ward, where he was specifically prescribed medication for depression, which continues to the present day. In addition, his subsequent medical history suggests that it is in fact the veteran's symptoms of depression that appear to trigger his polysubstance abuse, and not the reverse. At the very least, on the evidence of record, it may not be said that he sought treatment during this period primarily for alcohol and cocaine abuse. Therefore, resolving all doubt in favor of the veteran, entitlement to this benefit is established. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to a temporary total rating based on a period of VA hospitalization from January 21 through April 5, 1993 is granted, subject to the regulations governing the payment of monetary awards. REMAND With regard to the veteran's claim for an increased evaluation for his service-connected neuropsychiatric disorder, the Board finds that the claim is well grounded, 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 1991), in that it is capable of substantiation. Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78 (1990). This finding is based on the veteran's assertion that the service connected disability has increased in severity. King v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 19 (1993); Proscelle v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 629 (1992). Once it has been determined that a claim is well grounded, VA has a statutory duty to assist the veteran in the development of evidence pertinent to the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107. It appears that further development in this instance is necessary. In determining an appropriate evaluation for a disability, VA applies a schedule of percentage ratings reflecting the average impairment of earning capacity in civil occupations, resulting from specific injuries or combinations of them. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. 4.1. A proper rating of a veteran's disability contemplates its entire history, 38 C.F.R. § 4.1, and must be considered from the point of view of the veteran working or seeking work. 38 C.F.R. § 4.2. Although the entire history of the disorder must be considered, if an increase in the disability rating is at issue the present level of disability is of primary concern. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 55, 58 (1994). The veteran is currently evaluated 30 percent disabled under 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Code 9207 (major depression). Under this code, a considerable impairment of social and industrial adaptability warrants a 50 percent evaluation. If the impairment is severe, a 70 percent evaluation is warranted. When there are active psychotic manifestations of such extent, severity, depth, persistence or bizarreness as to produce total social and industrial inadaptability, a 100 percent evaluation is assigned. The veteran was most recently examined by VA in May 1995. He was oriented to time, place, and person, demonstrated an intact recent and remote memory, and admitted no hallucinations. The examiner observed a mildly depressed appearance and mood. He noted the veteran had been hospitalized and detoxified as recently as March 1995, and that he continued to receive Prozac to ameliorate symptoms of depression. His vocational rehabilitation had reportedly been interrupted by the hospitalization, but he hoped to resume. The examiner diagnosed recurrent depressive disorder (in partial remission), alcohol abuse (in remission), and cocaine abuse (in remission), and characterized the veteran's impairment as moderate. He did not differentiate the degree of impairment due to substance abuse from impairment due to the service-connected disorder. With regard to the examiner's characterization of the veteran's impairment as "moderate," it should be noted that, as described above, 38 C.F.R. § 4.132 contains no such descriptive criterion. Moreover, in Hood v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 301, 303-304 (1993), the Court stated that the term "definite" in 38 C.F.R. § 4.132 was "qualitative" in character, whereas the other terms were "quantitative" in character, and invited the Board to "construe" the term "definite" in a manner that would quantify the degree of impairment for purposes of meeting the statutory requirement that the Board articulate "reasons or bases" for its decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(d)(1). The VA General Counsel has concluded that the term"definite" is to be construed as "distinct, unambiguous, and moderately large in degree." It represents a degree of social and industrial inadaptability that is "more than moderate but less than rather large." VA O.G.C. Prec. Op. No. 9-93 (Nov. 9, 1993). The Board is bound by this interpretation of the term "definite." 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(c). If service connection is in effect for one diagnosis involving certain symptoms, but additional diagnoses encompassing such symptoms are of record, there must be evidence to assist adjudicators in distinguishing which symptoms are manifestations of the service-connected disorder and which are not. See generally, Waddell v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 454, 456-57 (1993). This requirement is inherent in VA's duty to assist in the development of pertinent facts. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). In this case, examiners on more than one occasion, including the May 1995 VA examiner, have observed that the veteran manifests symptoms of both substance abuse and depression. None, however, has distinguished the degree to which the severity of the veteran's current impairment is due to the service-connected disorder from the severity due to substance abuse or any other neuropsychiatric disorder. It is the Board's opinion that such an assessment must be made by skilled medical professionals, so that an equitable, informed adjudication may be accomplished. See Hyder v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 221 (1991); Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 121 (1991); Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 90 (1990). The Board has also noticed that in a November 1994 VA outpatient treatment note, an examiner wrote that the veteran was in receipt of Social Security benefits. Where a well- grounded claim has been submitted, the statutory duty to assist requires VA to obtain medical records the existence of which has been called to its attention. See Murincsak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 363 (1992); EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991). It is therefore appropriate to seek any and all medical documentation accumulated by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in connection with this award. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following actions: 1. The RO should contact the SSA and request a copy of any decision granting disability benefits and copies of the medical records upon which such entitlement was based. The attention of the SSA should be invited to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5106. 2. The RO should obtain the names and addresses of all medical care providers who treated the veteran for any neuropsychiatric disorders since September 1993. After securing the necessary releases of medical information, the RO should obtain copies of all medical documentation (not already of record) and add them to the claims folder. 3. The RO should obtain the veteran's Chapter 31 vocational rehabilitation folder and any counseling records available, and they should be associated with the claims folder. 4. The RO should arrange for a VA psychiatric examination to determine with specificity and attention to the relevant rating criteria the identity and current severity of the veteran's service- connected neuropsychiatric disorder. The claims folder must be made available to the examiner for review in conjunction with the examination. Symptomatology relating to any other coexisting psychiatric disorders should be distinguished, if possible, from service- connected symptomatology. If it is impossible to so distinguish the symptoms, the examiner should so state. The examiner should assign Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores to each psychiatric disorder and explain what each score represents in compliance with Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119 (1993). The report of examination must include a complete rationale for all opinions. 5. The RO should then review the record, ensure that all the above actions have been completed, and readjudicate the claims of entitlement to an increased evaluation for a neuropsychiatric disorder. The RO should specifically document consideration of 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) in this connection. See Floyd v. Brown, No. 92-970 (U.S. Vet. App. Apr. 17, 1996) (the Board cannot make an extraschedular determination in the first instance). If the remaining benefits sought on appeal are denied, the veteran and his representative should be furnished a supplemental statement of the case and given an opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board for further consideration. J. F. GOUGH Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, 741 (1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995), a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988). The date that appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision that you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. Appellate rights do not attach to those issues addressed in the remand portion of the Board's decision, because a remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1996). - 2 -