Citation NR: 9717592 Decision Date: 05/20/97 Archive Date: 05/29/97 DOCKET NO. 94-13 634 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Lincoln, Nebraska THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Stephen Eckerman, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from April 1970 to April 21, 1971. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 1993 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Lincoln, Nebraska, which denied the veteran’s claim seeking entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia. The RO initially denied this claim in an appealed decision dated May 1973. After new and material evidence was submitted, the RO reopened and denied the claim on the merits in May 1994. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL The veteran essentially claims that the RO erred in not granting the benefits sought on appeal. He maintains, in substance, that he has a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, as a result of his service. The veteran reports that he first experienced symptoms of a psychiatric disorder, such as the hearing of voices, while in service. Thus, a favorable determination is requested. DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is the decision of the Board that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia. FINDING OF FACT No currently diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, is shown to be causally or etiologically related to the veteran’s period of service. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, was not incurred or aggravated during active duty, and a psychosis may not be presumed to have been so incurred. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309 (1996). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION I. Background The veteran’s service medical records include induction and separation examinations, dated April 1970 and April 1971, respectively, that are negative for a psychiatric disorder. Both examinations show that the veteran was clinically evaluated as being in normal psychiatric condition. The remainder of the service medical records are negative for complaints of, or treatment for, a psychiatric condition. Post-service medical records include an outpatient report from St. Joseph’s Hospital, dated April 28, 1972, that indicates that the veteran was admitted for ingestion of approximately 60 pills, including about 40 aspirins. The veteran has identified the other pills as muscle relaxers. The records show that he was discharged after about three hours. The diagnosis was acetylsalicylic acid intoxication. In June 1972, the veteran was admitted to St. Joseph’s Hospital in a withdrawn and disorganized state. The records of this hospitalization indicate that the veteran complained that for “the last several months” he had been experiencing problems with his memory and organization, and that he did not know what to say to people. The veteran reported that he had been using marijuana recently, and that he had used both speed and LSD up until the last two months. The diagnosis was adjustment reaction to adolescence, and cystitis. The records include a personality evaluation report which indicates that the veteran had previously been admitted for an intentional overdose of drugs. The examiner stated that the veteran’s test scores indicated that the veteran had a seriously maladjusted personality. The report concluded that, the veteran was “a very confused and mixed up individual. This may be due to the drugs which he has recently been taking.” The final diagnosis was adjustment reaction to adolescence. The veteran was admitted to a VA facility from March to May of 1973. The hospital summary indicates that the veteran had been treated at that facility in November 1972 for multiple drug use. The veteran complained of difficulty concentrating, interacting with others, and of being depressed. The examiner noted that the veteran “was preoccupied with his hallucinatory episodes of the past when using drugs.” The veteran was oriented in all spheres and his affect was appropriate. The report indicates that the veteran was given a two week “trial visit” after he was offered a job. He did well, and was given another two weeks absence, at the end of which he informed the VA that “he had gotten married, was working steadily, and felt that he was getting along well.” He was subsequently discharged. The diagnosis was immature personality. The veteran was admitted to a VA facility from December 1985 to March 1986, after he presented himself at the gate of an Air Force Base, and demanded to speak with the president. He was determined to have an exacerbation of a schizo-affective disorder. The report from the veteran’s initial interview indicates that he was previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder, atypical. The examiner suggested that when the veteran became less psychotic it would be important to try to determine the extent to which substance abuse may have contributed to his psychosis. Progress notes include diagnoses of disorganized type schizophrenia, chronic schizo- affective disorder, and polysubstance abuse. The discharge summary notes that the veteran had an “extensive history of hospitalizations for psychiatric disability.” The Axis I diagnoses were chronic schizo-affective disorder, and multiple substance abuse, in remission. He was discharged to an outpatient, nonbed care program. Based on statements taken from the veteran’s two hearings, from his letters in the record, and from his claims forms, the veteran essentially asserts that he began hearing voices during his service, in late 1970. The veteran reported that, among other things, the voices accused him of being homosexual, and that he did not report that he was hearing voices because he feared that others would think that he was a homosexual. He stated that during his last day in service, he was approached by two psychiatrists who suggested that he agree to be admitted to the hospital for a two week observation because they thought that he might have a psychiatric disorder. He asserts that he did not agree because other sailors told him that he would be strapped down, immobilized and given shots if he went to the hospital. The veteran stated that he began using marijuana and LSD after his separation from service, and admitted that, “I did blow my mind real well back in 1970--when was it 1973 or something and I quit all drugs for nine months and got better.” (transcript at p. 12, March 11, 1996). He argues that his suicide attempt of April 28, 1972, which was slightly over a year after his April 21, 1971 separation from service, is sufficient proof that he had a psychiatric disorder within a year of discharge. Clinical records from the 1990’s reveal continuing diagnoses of schizophrenia, and a schizo-affective disorder. II. Analysis As a preliminary matter, the Board finds that the appellant's claim is "well grounded" within the meaning of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). See Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 55 (1990). That is, the Board finds that the appellant has presented a claim which is not implausible when his contentions and the evidence of record are viewed in the light most favorable to his claim. The Board is also satisfied that all relevant facts have been properly and sufficiently developed. In this regard, after the hearing in March 1996, the undersigned Member delayed action on the veteran’s appeal for 30 days in order to allow him time to gather more evidence. The veteran, however, was apparently unable to obtain any supporting documentation, and to date no additional records have been proffered. Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1996). In addition, certain chronic diseases, including psychoses, may be presumed to have incurred during service if they become disabling to a compensable degree within one year of separation from active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Personality disorders are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of applicable legislation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (1996). In this case, the veteran has failed to provide competent medical evidence establishing that he had a psychiatric disorder during service, that he had a compensably disabling psychosis within one year of his separation from active duty, or that any current psychiatric disorder is linked to his active duty service. Rather, the record shows that the veteran not treated for a psychiatric disorder while on active duty; that he was treated for a drug overdose more than a year following separation from active duty; that an adjustment reaction to adolescence was diagnosed about fourteen months postservice; and that his current disabilities, schizophrenia and a schizo-affective disorder, were not presented clinically until the 1980’s, and again, neither has been linked to the appellant’s active duty. Accordingly, in the absence of competent evidence linking any current psychiatric disorder to the appellant’s active duty service, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the instant claim, and that service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, is not warranted. In reaching this decision the Board considered the veteran’s argument that he was hearing voices during his service, and that two military psychiatrists believed that he had a psychiatric disorder and asked him to submit to an evaluation. He has also argued that he tried to commit suicide in April 1972, and that this is proof that he had a psychiatric disorder within a year of separation from service. Significantly, however, there is no independent corroboration for the claim that in service psychiatrists believed that the appellant had a psychiatric disorder. Moreover, merely because the veteran became intoxicated on aspirin and muscle relaxers approximately 53 weeks after separation from active duty does not constitute competent evidence that he had a compensably disabling psychosis within a year of service, or that the appellant incurred an acquired psychiatric disorder while on active duty. Finally, even assuming that the veteran did hear voices while on active duty does not ipso facto mean that the appellant incurred or aggravated an acquired psychiatric disorder while in service. Such a finding could only be made if there was competent evidence in support thereof. Simply put, the veteran, as a lay person untrained in the fields of medicine and psychiatry, is not competent to offer an opinion as to the etiology of any current psychiatric disability. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492 (1992). Hence, these arguments do not provide a factual predicate upon which service connection may be granted. Finally, the Board considered the argument that the veteran aggravated a personality disorder while on active duty, and that service connection is therefore warranted under VAOPGCPREC 82-90 (O.G.C. Prec. 82-90); 56 Fed. Reg. 45711 (1990). Significantly, however, while the General Counsel opinion in question does provide authority to grant service connection for the aggravation of a preexisting familial or hereditary disease, that opinion does not lift the regulatory bar precluding grants of service connection for congenial or developmental defects. As 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (1996) clearly provides that personality disorders are developmental defects, the Board finds that direct service connection for a personality disorder is barred as a matter of law. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.9, 4.127 (1996); Beno v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 439 (1992). In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt, however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the appellant’s claim, the doctrine is not for application. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49 (1990). ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include schizophrenia, is denied. DEREK R. BROWN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals 38 U.S.C.A. § 7102 (West Supp. 1996) permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996), a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988). The date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals. - 2 -