Citation Nr: 0117864 Decision Date: 07/06/01 Archive Date: 07/05/01 DOCKET NO. 00-14 364 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Cleveland, Ohio THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Douglas E. Massey, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from June 1960 to August 1964. His claim comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an April 2000 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Denver, Colorado, which denied service connection for PTSD and depression. The case has since been transferred to the RO in Cleveland, Ohio. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All evidence necessary for an equitable resolution of the issue on appeal has been obtained, and no further development is necessary to comply with the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000. 2. The veteran's statements concerning his in-service stressors are not credible. 3. The veteran is not shown to have engaged in combat with the enemy during his period of active military service, and none of his alleged stressors have been verified. 4. No medical evidence establishes that the veteran's depression is related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1154, 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f) (2000). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The veteran claims that he suffers from PTSD and depression as a result of incidents which occurred during his period of active duty service. He maintains that he witnessed the shooting death of a prisoner while incarcerated in Japan, that he was sexually assaulted while incarcerated, that Japanese civilians stormed the brig after a U.S. soldier killed a Japanese national in an automobile accident, that his left eye was ripped out of its socket, that he was involved in fighting a deck fire after a plane crashed, that he was involved in combat while serving in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and that he was a prisoner of war (POW) for nineteen days in Vietnam. I. Duty to Assist As a preliminary matter, the Board is satisfied that all requested assistance to the veteran by VA has been provided as required by law. On November 9, 2000, the President signed the "Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000," Pub. L. No. 106-475 (2000) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5100- 5103A, 5106-7, 5126) (VCAA), which modified the circumstances under which VA's duty to assist claimants applies, and how that duty is to be discharged. The law affects a claim such as this because the claim was pending on the date of enactment of the new law. This law eliminates the concept of a well-grounded claim, redefines the obligations of VA with respect to the duty to assist, and supersedes the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) in Morton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 477 (1999), withdrawn sub nom. Morton v. Gober, No. 96-1517 (U.S. Vet. App. Nov. 6, 2000) (per curiam order) (holding that VA cannot assist in the development of a claim that is not well grounded). The new law also includes an enhanced duty to notify a claimant as to the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim for VA benefits. First, VA has a duty to notify the veteran and his representative of any information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 2096, 2096-97 (2000) (to be codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102 and 5103). The Board finds that the statement of the case and supplemental statements of the case, provided to both the veteran and his representative, specifically satisfy the requirement of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 of the new statute in that they clearly notify the veteran and his representative of the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim; specifically, these documents notify the veteran of the need for evidence corroborating his claimed stressors, which was the basis for the RO's denial. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the notification requirement has been satisfied even though the RO did not have an opportunity to apply the specific provisions of the VCAA. Secondly, VA has a duty to assist the veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate his claim. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 2096, 2097-98 (2000) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5103A). The RO sent the veteran's stressor information to the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (USASCRUR) in an attempt to verify his stressors. The veteran was also afforded a VA psychiatric examination in October 1999 to determine the nature and etiology of his psychiatric disorder. The RO also obtained private treatment reports for healthcare professionals identified by the veteran. The veteran has not referenced any unobtained evidence that might aid his claim or that might be pertinent to the bases of the denial of his claim. As will be discussed, the veteran has alleged that service medical and personnel records have either been destroyed or have been "red flagged" and will not be available until the year 2045. The Board finds, as did the RO, that no such records exist and that the veteran's statements are not credible. As a result, the Board finds that any attempt to obtain any such records would be futile. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 2096, 2097-98 (2000) (stating that the efforts to obtain outstanding relevant records shall continue until the records are obtained unless it is reasonably certain that such records do not exist or that further efforts to obtain those records would be futile.) The Board thus finds that VA has done everything reasonably possible to assist the veteran and that no further action is necessary to meet the requirements of the VCAA. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, a remand would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). II. Legal Criteria Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. "Generally, to prove service connection, a claimant must submit (1) medical evidence of a current disability, (2) medical evidence, or in certain circumstances lay testimony, of in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury." Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection for PTSD requires the following three elements: [1] medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disorder; [2] credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and [3] a link, established by the medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 137 (1997). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a stressor during service to support a claim for PTSD will vary depending on whether the veteran was "engaged in combat with the enemy." Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993). If it is determined through military citations or other supportive evidence that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, and the claimed stressors are related to combat, the veteran's lay testimony regarding the reported stressors must be accepted as conclusive evidence as to their actual occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence will be necessary, provided that the veteran's testimony is found to be satisfactory, e.g., credible, and "consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such service." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), (f). However, if it is determined that a veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, or the claimed stressor is not related to combat, the veteran's lay testimony alone will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. In such cases, the record must contain some corroborative evidence which substantiates or verifies the veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. Such corroborative evidence cannot consist solely of after- the-fact medical nexus evidence. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). In reviewing the veteran's PTSD claim, the Board notes that since several of the veteran's claimed stressors are not combat-related, the record must contain evidence which corroborates the veteran's claim as to the occurrence of these claimed stressors. The Board observes that, during the pendency of the veteran's appeal, the Court issued a decision in Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272, 277 (1999), in which it noted that in the particular case of claims of PTSD due to a personal assault, VA has established special procedures for evidentiary development. These procedures, which became effective in February 1996, take into account the fact that since personal assault is an extremely sensitive issue, many incidents of personal assault are not officially reported, and victims of this type of in-service trauma may find it difficult to produce evidence to support the occurrence of the stressor. These procedures thus acknowledge the difficulty veterans face in establishing the occurrence of the stressor through standard evidence, and the need for development of alternate sources of evidence. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 (hereinafter Manual M21- 1), Part III, paragraph 5.14c (Feb. 20, 1996) (substantially enlarging on the former Manual M21-1, Part III, paragraph 7.47c(2) (Oct. 11, 1995)). Alternate sources that may provide credible evidence of an in-service personal assault include (1) medical or counseling treatment records following the incident, (2) military or civilian police reports, (3) reports from crisis intervention or other emergency centers, (4) statements from confidants or family, and (5) copies of diaries or journals, or behavior changes documented or observed at the time of the incident. M21-1, Part III, 5.14(7). Examples of behavior changes that might indicate a stressor include, but are not limited to: (a) sudden requests that the veteran's military occupational series or duty assignment be changed without other justification; (b) lay statements indicating increased use or abuse of leave without an apparent reason such as family obligations or family illness; (c) changes in performance and performance evaluations; (d) lay statements describing episodes of depression, panic attacks or anxiety but no identifiable reasons for the episodes; (e) increased or decreased use of prescription medications; (f) increased use of over-the-counter medications; (g) evidence of substance abuse such as alcohol or drugs; (h) increased disregard for military or civilian authority; (i) obsessive behavior such as overeating or undereating; (j) increased interest in tests for HIV or sexually transmitted diseases; (k) unexplained economic or social behavior changes; (l) treatment for physical injuries around the time of the claimed trauma but not reported as a result of the trauma; and (m) breakup of a primary relationship. M21-1, Part III, 5.14(7). Evidence that documents any such behavioral changes may require interpretation by a VA neuropsychiatric physician to determine whether such evidence bears a relationship to the medical diagnoses. See M21-1, Part III, para. 5.14(c)(9). Furthermore, these provisions recognize that the standard PTSD stressor letter may be inappropriate for this type of PTSD claim, and thus state that if the claimed stressful incident is a personal assault, a stressor development letter specifically tailored for personal assault cases should be sent to such veterans. See M21-1, Part III, para. 5.14(c)(6). In addition, the Court in Patton noted that in two places the MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c)(3) and (9), appears improperly to require that the existence of an in- service stressor be shown by "the preponderance of the evidence" and holds that any such requirement, however, would be inconsistent with the benefit of the doubt, or equipoise, doctrine contained in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). Therefore, the evidence need only be in relative equipoise to prevail on the question of the existence of the stressor. The Court has held that the provisions in M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c), which address PTSD claims based on personal assault are substantive rules which are the equivalent of VA regulations, and are binding on VA. Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 137; YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 398-99 (1998); Patton, 12 Vet. App. at 272. III. Background After the veteran filed his PTSD claim, the RO issued a May 1999 letter notifying him of the specific information needed to prove a claim for PTSD secondary to personal assault. The RO also enclosed a PTSD questionnaire specifically drafted for victims of a personal assault. The veteran completed the questionnaire and submitted additional written statements in which he described various in-service stressors. According to the veteran, several alleged stressors occurred while he was incarcerated in the brig following a court martial in which he was convicted for being AWOL for a period of 28 days. He said one incident involved witnessing the shooting death of a prisoner who attempted to escape. He said the prisoner's guts were splattered all over a fence. The veteran was unable to identify any other witnesses and could not recall the name of the victim or the shooter. However, he indicated that a Marine sergeant by the name of Golden, Goldin or Goldben was in charge at the time. The second incident involved a sexual assault in which he was allegedly sodomized by three men with a broom handle. According to the veteran, the three men threatened to kill him if he told anyone. He said he could not recall the perpetrators names. He expressed the pain of carrying this secret for over 30 years until 1998 when he told a treating psychiatrist. Finally, he related an incident in which Japanese civilians stormed the gate in protest after a U.S. soldier had been incarcerated for killing a Japanese nationalist in an automobile accident. The veteran could not recall the name of the U.S. soldier or the victim of the automobile accident. The veteran also stated that he had three tours in Vietnam from 1966 through 1969 and was detained as a POW for nineteen days during his second tour. He explained that he was told at the time of his discharge that he would not be compensated for his time as a POW because he had not been detained for over 30 days. He later explained that he had been trained as a Navy SEAL and was involved in covert operations in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. He claimed that these events occurred during a second period of active duty from 1964 until 1968. He stated that his memory concerning this period was "very vague." He also explained that he could not verify these stressors because service records for his second period of active duty service had been "red flagged" and would not be available until the year 2045. The veteran's fifth wife also submitted statements in which she reiterated the veteran's allegations. The veteran claimed that while aboard the USS MIDWAY an antenna caught his left eye and popped it out of the socket. He said he was assisted to sickbay by an airman, whose name he could not identify, where his eye was placed back into the socket. He said his left eye was sutured and then later resutured after it was apparently crossed. He reported that this incident occurred in December 1960 or early 1961 while enroute to Hawaii. Finally, the veteran related an incident in which he was involved in fighting a fire after a plane crashed on the ship's deck. He said he could not recall the name of the pilot who died in the crash. The veteran also submitted a statement in which he listed nine individuals who had served with him from 1960 to 1964. However, at no time did he indicate that any of these individuals could verify his claimed in-service stressors. The veteran's wife also submitted statements in support of the veteran's claim. She indicated that she was a registered nurse and had recently retired from the Denver VA Medical Center. She said that they had been married for approximately five years. She opined that the veteran suffered from PTSD as a result of events that occurred during his period of active duty service, as alleged by the veteran. The veteran's DD Form 214 shows that he was discharged under honorable conditions at the rank of E-3 after serving from June 1960 to August 1964. It was noted that he had served aboard the USS HORNET and USS MIDWAY, and did not receive any decorations, medals, badges, or commendations during his period of service. In a May 1961 personnel report, it was noted that the veteran was not in the correct field of endeavor. Analysis of the veteran's capabilities were unable to be evaluated due to his immaturity. It was noted that he was a very good typist, but that he could not remember the simplest routine clerical procedures in preparing correspondence. His immaturity was evidenced by the inconsistencies in his stories when involved in minor disciplinary infractions at the divisional level. At the time of his separation in 1964, he was transferred to the Navy Reserves in Bainbridge, Maryland. None of the veteran's service personnel records show that he ever served in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, nor do they show that he was ever detained as a POW. Although it appears that he served in the Reserves, no active duty service is shown after his separation in August 1964. What Navy records do show is that he was convicted in a special court martial proceeding for being absent without leave (AWOL) from February 8. 1962, to March 8, 1962. The veteran's defense was that he was involved in an automobile accident and suffered from total amnesia during that period. Service medical records reveal that he was evaluated in March 1962 to determine the validity of his story. The veteran's complaints included pain, headaches, bad dreams, nervousness, shakiness, depression, and difficulty sleeping. However, the examining physician indicated that the veteran tended to exaggerate and was hypochondriacally preoccupied. Psychological testing revealed that he possessed passive- aggressive features and schizoid traits. He was also described as immature and moderately maladjusted, both of which existed prior to service. It was thus determined that the veteran was mentally capable of undergoing a court martial, and that administrative action was more appropriate than medical treatment. It was also determined that there were no physical or neurological bases for the veteran's complaints. Accordingly, court martial proceedings went forward and the veteran was convicted. His sentence involved three months of hard labor in a military brig in Yokosuka, Japan, forfeiture of $55 per month for three months, and a reduction in rank to the pay grade of E-1. The effective date of the sentence was April 30, 1962. A May 1963 personnel report noted that the veteran was a below average worker and tended to be lax and lazy. The personnel officer also observed that the veteran continually flouted authority and demonstrated an intense dislike for military life. It was noted that the veteran's unreliability was evidenced by his failure to pay acknowledged debts. In particular, the veteran reportedly owed over $450.00 to a creditor. The remainder of the veteran's service medical records make no reference to any psychiatric problems. There is also no evidence that the veteran was treated for a left eye injury or a perforated prostate or colon while in service. Of particular relevance, an examination performed in August 1964 noted that the veteran was psychiatrically normal. There is no evidence showing that the veteran ever returned to active duty after his separation in August 1964. Post-service evidence shows that the veteran was seen for psychiatric problems many years after service. In a February 1996 letter, Alan P. Aboaf, M.D., stated that the veteran was evaluated in his office in January 1996. Dr. Aboaf determined that the veteran suffered from depression and concomitant PTSD; however, Dr. Aboaf did not determine the date of onset for either condition and did not list any stressors underlying the diagnosis of PTSD. In an October 1998 letter, David B. Weiss, M.D., stated that the veteran suffered from depression which was a contributing factor to his filing disability documents on time. The veteran was seen by Thomas R. Giles, Psy.D., in 1999 for depression. In a January 1999 letter, Dr. Giles stated that the veteran met the diagnostic criteria for major depression, recurrent, severe. It was also noted that the veteran reported symptoms consistent with combat-related PTSD, although no specific stressors were listed. Dr. Giles noted that the veteran had a history of one suicide attempt eight years ago. In an April 1999 entry, Dr. Giles noted that the veteran's condition had not improved. The veteran was afforded a VA psychiatric examination in October 1999 to determine the nature and etiology of his psychiatric disorder. During the interview, the examiner indicated that the veteran was not sure when he completed his tour of duty. Although the veteran reported that he re- enlised in 1966, the examiner pointed out that his DD Form 214 indicated that he separated from the Navy in 1964. The veteran then explained that he was unable to answer the question because he suffered from short-term memory loss. The veteran discussed the circumstances surrounding his court martial which led to his incarceration. He told the examiner that he called the ship to notify military personnel that he would not be able to return on time because he had been involved in an automobile accident. He said he continued to call the ship each day he was gone. When he finally reported for duty, he was informed that he was 29 days late. The veteran also related the stressful incidents which allegedly occurred during his incarceration. He related the incident in which Japanese civilians stormed the brig after a U.S. soldier was arrested for killing a Japanese national in an automobile accident. He also described the incident in which he allegedly witnessed the shooting death of a prisoner while trying to escape. Finally, he related the incident in which three prisoners sexually assaulted him with a broom handle. He said he never told anybody about the assault until he talked to a psychiatrist in 1995. He said he was "tore up" after the assault but did not seek medical attention. He stated that some time after the assault he underwent a gastrointestinal series and was diagnosed with a perforated colon and prostate. The examiner explained that the veteran's alleged stressor seemed to have some historical correlation with his having been incarcerated in the brig after he was AWOL. It was noted that the details were sufficiently remembered to convince the examiner that the stressor occurred, and that the veteran had been diagnosed with PTSD based on this incident. The examiner indicated that there may be other stressors which were not service related, but he was not able to distinguish between the two. The examiner then concluded that it was as likely as not that the veteran's PTSD resulted from having been sexually assaulted while incarcerated in service. The Axis I diagnoses included PTSD and major depressive disorder, recurrent, secondary to PTSD. In an April 1999 letter, the RO requested verification from the USASCRUR concerning the veteran's involvement in fighting a deck fire after a plane crash. The information provided by the RO was that a plane crash occurred aboard the USS HORNET in which the pilot died. The RO indicated that the veteran could not recall the date of the incident or the name of the pilot. In a May 2000 letter, that agency responded and stated that it was unable to research this alleged incident because the veteran did not list the time period concerning the plane crash. The USASCRUR explained that the veteran needed to provide a date within a thirty-day period of the incident, the type and unit designation of the aircraft, and the name and unit designation of the casualty. In March 2000, the RO made a formal finding of fact that all efforts to obtain the needed service records and military information had been exhausted and that further efforts would be futile. It was thus determined that no additional service records were available. The veteran apparently conducted his own research with the assistance of the Stars and Stripes Library. In an attempt to verify the incident in which Japanese civilians stormed the brig during his incarceration, the veteran submitted several articles. In an article entitled "NCO Held In Traffic Death" it was reported that a sergeant W. R. had been taken into custody by U.S Air Force officials in connection with the accidental death of a Japanese woman. The victim was allegedly killed by an automobile which left the scene of the accident. The date of the article is not shown, although a handwritten notation of June 15, 1962 is listed on the article. The veteran submitted another article entitled "Japanese Killed In Head-On Crash" which reported that a Japanese man was killed after his car crashed head on with a car driven by Army sergeant J. M. The date of the article is not shown. Neither report indicates that the U.S. sergeants involved were ever incarcerated in the brig in Yokosuka, Japan. IV. Analysis After evaluating the merits of the case, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The claims file contains a diagnosis of PTSD, including an October 1999 VA examination report which includes a medical opinion relating the veteran's PTSD to his claimed sexual trauma during service. Obviously, the examiner arrived at the diagnosis of PTSD based on the veteran's recitation of his claimed in-service stressors. Thus, the record satisfies two of the three elements required under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The sole remaining element concerning credible supporting evidence that a claimed in-service stressor occurred is an adjudicatory question involving both consideration of the facts as presented and the credibility of the evidence contained in the record. The various medical evidence discussed above suggests a connection between the claimed in-service stressors and the veteran's PTSD. However, such a connection cannot consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus opinion. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 396 (1996). See Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992) (VA need not accept a physician's diagnosis "[j]ust because a physician or other health care professional accepted the appellant's description of his [wartime] experiences as credible and diagnosed the appellant as suffering from PTSD."). Thus, other sources of information must be consulted. The record does not contain evidence of any military police reports, reports from crisis intervention or other emergency centers, copies of diaries or journals, or medical or counseling treatment records following the alleged sexual assault. Indeed, the absence of such evidence is consistent with the veteran's statements that he told no one about the incident until 1995, approximately thirty years after his separation from active duty. The Board also points out that no behavior changes were documented or observed at the time of the alleged incident. Service medical and personnel records disclose that the veteran did indeed exhibit behavior problems in service. For example, the record shows that he was AWOL from February 8. 1962, to March 8, 1962, which is generally considered to be a sign of disregard for military authority. A May 1961 personnel report also noted that the veteran was immature, which was evidenced by the inconsistencies in his stories when involved in minor disciplinary infractions at the divisional level. The Board emphasizes that these behavior problems were documented prior to the veteran's incarceration and thus prior to the alleged stressors during his incarceration, including the sexual assault. Although a May 1963 personnel report noted that the veteran was a below average worker, that he tended to be lax and lazy, and that he continually flouted authority and demonstrated an intense dislike for military life, these findings represent no significant change and are consistent with his behavior prior to his incarceration. Likewise, the only psychological symptoms reported by the veteran occurred during a March 1962 psychiatric evaluation, several months prior to his incarceration. At that time, the veteran was found to be immature and moderately maladjusted, which existed prior to service. Indeed, the Board stresses that no significant behavior changes were noted during the period of time from the veteran's incarceration in April 1962 until his separation from active duty in August 1964. The Board has also considered the argument advanced by the veteran's wife that he exhibits obsessive behavior in the form of overeating, which is listed as a behavioral change in the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1. The Board agrees that the veteran suffers from compulsive eating. At his October 1999 VA psychiatric examination, the veteran stated that he ate constantly throughout the day and snacked at least eight times during the night. The examiner reported that the veteran was 6'2" and weighed 260 pounds. The Board emphasizes, however, that only behavior changes at the time of the alleged incident are to be considered. The fact that the veteran currently exhibits compulsive eating habits many years after service is not relevant in proving that he was sexually assaulted. See M21-1, Part III, 5.14(7). Finally, no evidence has verified the other two incidents which allegedly occurred during the veteran's incarceration. No evidence has been presented which substantiates the shooting death of a prisoner or the incident in which Japanese civilians stormed the brig. The articles reporting the death of two Japanese civilians by U.S. military personnel verify nothing. Neither report indicates that the U.S. sergeants involved were ever incarcerated in the brig in Yokosuka, Japan. The Board also finds that the veteran is not credible. See Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 235, 237 (1991) (determining the credibility of evidence is a function for the Board); Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 69-70 (1993), citing Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 192-193 (1992) (VA decision makers have the responsibility to assess the credibility of evidence and determine the degree of weight to give the evidence). The record demonstrates a pattern of dishonesty and immaturity dating back to service. As noted, in a May 1961 personnel report, it was documented that the veteran's immaturity was evidenced by the inconsistencies in his stories when involved in minor disciplinary infractions at the divisional level. At his court martial proceeding, the veteran's explanation for his absence was that he suffered from amnesia for 28 days following an automobile accident and was unable to return to duty. However, a medical evaluation to determine the validity of his story showed otherwise. Instead, it was determined that there was no physical or neurologic basis for his complaints. It was also noted that he tended to exaggerate and possessed passive-aggressive features and schizoid traits. He was described as immature and moderately maladjusted, which existed prior to service. It is also interesting to note that the veteran provided contradictory information during his October 1999 VA psychiatric examination when he stated that he notified the ship everyday following the automobile accident. Most perplexing is that the veteran claimed total amnesia during the period he was deemed AWOL but was able to remember making telephone calls back to the ship every day he was missing. The veteran's credibility is also undermined by his statements concerning other alleged stressors. None of the service medical records document that his left eye was ripped out it its socket. The veteran's statements concerning his detainment in Vietnam as a POW, as well as his involvement in combat operations in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as a Navy SEAL, are even more incredible. His DD Form 214 shows that he was discharged in August 1964 at the pay grade of E-3, and that he did not receive any decorations, medals, badges, or commendations during his period of service. Indeed, no evidence shows that he was ever in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos. The argument advanced by the veteran is that he served on active duty from 1964 until 1968, but that all records associated with that period have been "red flagged" and cannot be released until the year 2045. No evidence verifies this claim. It is also difficult to believe that the veteran, an E-3 with a history of disciplinary problems in service, would have been chosen by an elite military group such as the Navy SEALS. When questioned further about these events, the veteran's only response was that his memory was "very vague" for this period. Finally, the Board has considered the stressor concerning the veteran's alleged participation in fighting a deck fire after a plane crashed and killed the pilot. After the veteran was unable to identify the date of the incident, the name of the pilot, or the names of any witnesses involved, the USASCRUR explained that it was unable to research this incident. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that VA has made all necessary attempts to obtain the necessary details concerning this stressor. See Fossie v. West, 12 Vet. App. 1, 6-7 (1998) (holding no duty to assist where veteran's statements concerning in-service stressors were too vague to refer to the United States & Joint Services Environmental Support Group (ESG)). In the absence of confirmation of a stressful incident which supports a diagnosis of PTSD, the diagnosis of PTSD contained in the record is not supported by a verified stressor. As the veteran has failed to produce credible supporting evidence that a claimed stressor actually occurred, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. While the veteran and his wife may well believe he suffers from PTSD as a result of service, as laypersons without medical expertise, they are not qualified to address questions requiring medical training for resolution, such as a diagnosis or medical opinion as to etiology. See Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 494-95. The Board notes that the veteran's wife claims to be a Registered Nurse; however, there is no indication in the record that she has expertise in psychiatric nursing. See Black v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 279, 284 (1997) (nurse's statement held not to create nexus in claim of entitlement to service connection for heart disorder, where nurse was not shown to have cardiology expertise). Even assuming for discussion purposes that she has such training, the veteran's claim would still fail in the absence of a verified stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. In addition, the Board finds that no medical evidence of record has related the veteran's diagnosis of depression to service. No chronic disability pertaining to depression was indentified in service. The veteran reported feelings of depression when evaluated in March 1962 to determine the credibility of his story involving amnesia. However, the clinician explained that the veteran tended to exaggerate and was hypochondriacally preoccupied. Psychological testing revealed that the veteran possessed passive-aggressive features and schizoid traits. As a result, no Axis I diagnosis was provided. The record shows that the veteran was first diagnosed with depression in 1996, over thirty years after his separation from active duty. Furthermore, no medical professional has related the veteran's depression to his period of service or to any incident therein. Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the veteran's diagnosis of depression was incurred in service. The Board also finds that further examination at this time would serve no useful purpose. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000); Sabonis, 6 Vet. App. at 430. In conclusion, the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, must be denied. The Board has considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt; however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim, there is not an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence to which the benefit-of-the-doubt standard applies. VCAA, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 4, 114 Stat. 2096, 2098-99 (2000). Thus, the appeal is denied. ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder, is denied. WARREN W. RICE, JR. Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals