Citation Nr: 0122524 Decision Date: 09/14/01 Archive Date: 09/19/01 DOCKET NO. 94-10 997 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Seattle, Washington THE ISSUE Service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Chaplin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty with the Army from March 1959 to May 1961 and from April 1964 to April 1967. He served in Vietnam from December 1966 to April 1967. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a February 1993 rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Seattle, Washington, which, in relevant part, denied entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Board remanded the claim in July 1997 for additional development. Pursuant to the veteran's request, a Travel Board hearing was scheduled in connection with the matter on appeal. However, in a Report of Contact, the representative reported that the veteran had advised him in a telephone conversation that he could not appear for his hearing. There was no request to reschedule it. Regulations provide that a veteran's representative may withdraw a hearing request with the consent of the veteran. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.704(e) (2000). The record reflects that in January 2001, while the case was at the RO in remand status, the veteran underwent a VA psychiatric examination in conjunction with a claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits, which the RO granted. The RO did not consider the examination report as evidence in the pending PTSD claim inasmuch as the Board remand had instructed that the veteran should be examined only if the record established an in-service stressor, which it did not. Although the January 2001 examination resulted in a diagnosis of PTSD, such was based on stressors previously reported or too vague to be capable of corroboration. Thus, the RO's consideration of the examination report only in respect to the pension claim was not prejudicial to the veteran. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. VA has satisfied its duty to notify and assist the veteran in respect to his claim of service connection for PTSD. 2. The veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy. 3. The veteran has diagnoses of PTSD, which are remote from service and based on his allegations of uncorroborated in-service stressors. 4. The veteran is not credible; his claimed Vietnam stressors are uncorroborated, untrue or too general to be capable of corroboration. CONCLUSION OF LAW PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103A (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2000). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Factual Background The veteran's service personnel records reflect that he served in Vietnam with Company B, Transportation Corps Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, that he was attached to that unit from December 21, 1966 to April 6, 1967, and that he was en route to the United States on either April 6 or April 7. He was discharged from the Army on April 8, 1967. His military occupational specialty was aircraft electrician, which was his principal duty in Vietnam. His service records reflect that he was not credited with service in any campaigns and that the only awards and decorations he received were the Vietnam Service Medal, National Defense Service Medal, and Sharpshooter Rifle M14 badge The veteran's service medical records show that he sprained his left ankle in November 1960 and that while stationed in Europe, prior to going to Vietnam, he sprained his right big toe. On December 25, 1966, a few days after arriving in Vietnam, he complained of having injured his right foot when he jumped off a "connox (sic) container." His right foot was to be X-rayed. Another entry of the same date notes "Admit for ice and elevation." The next entry is in March 1967 for an unrelated problem. The service medical records do not contain any findings of a psychiatric disorder. In October 1991 the veteran filed his initial claim for VA compensation for multiple disorders including PTSD. In response to instructions to identify treatment during or since service he wrote "N/A." In a statement of February 3, 1992, H. Grossman, MA/PHC, reported that since returning from Vietnam the veteran had been in constant turmoil, with failed marriages, employment and school problems, and being isolated. It was reported that he was plagued with nightmares, sweats, survivor guilt, anger, relationship and authority problems, fear of crowds and problems with alcohol. Mr. Grossman reported that, while in Vietnam, the veteran was exposed to "nightly mortar attacks" and became convinced that he was going to die. The diagnoses (under DSM III) given were PTSD, chronic, and alcohol abuse in remission. Psychosocial stressors were identified as constant nightmares of being rocketed and mortared every night in Vietnam; death, dying and wounded, believes he would be killed there. The veteran underwent a VA PTSD examination in April 1992, at which time he reported having been an aircraft electrician in Vietnam and recalled that "[T]hey were constantly mortaring us" and on one occasion "Hong Kong Mountain" was overrun. He reported having been scared most of the time while in Vietnam, particularly of dying while he was asleep, and of having been alienated since returning from Vietnam. He stated that he thought of Vietnam all the time, and had nightly nightmares of running and not making it to the bunker. Reportedly, he was easily startled, avoided crowds, was alienated and had poor relationships. The examiner noted the odor of alcohol. Following a mental status examination, the diagnostic impressions were PTSD, chronic and severe, and history of alcohol abuse, currently active. The examiner noted that Dr. Grossman's letter supported the diagnostic impression. In a letter of September 1992, the RO requested the veteran to provide information regarding his Vietnam service, including the exact name of his unit, the name of the base where he was stationed, the dates of incidents of mortaring, and the names of causalities. In a September 1992 reply, the RO was provided a copy of the veteran's service personnel records along with an explanation that while being hospitalized for "broken feet" after a mortar attack, the veteran watched men on each side of him die from wounds and that this went on for "two weeks." Reportedly, "to this day," he still had dreams of those men dying next to him. It was noted that he was not able to remember any names but that the individuals died around the first part of January 1967 at An Khe. Additionally, the veteran requested a copy of his claims file and one was sent to him by the RO in October 1992. Of record is a statement from Mr. Grossman, dated in February 1992 and received at the RO in November 1992, indicating the fee scale of his office for various reports and records. Private medical records dated in August 1992 are in regard to physical disorders, including foot/toe complaints. In the initial entry the veteran was noted to state that his right foot had been broken in Vietnam in "1968" and that both feet were actually broken. His foot problems apparently were attributed by the treating physician to gout. The veteran was afforded a VA social and industrial survey for PTSD in October 1992. He reported that his duties in Vietnam were repairing helicopters and that he injured both feet at An Khe when he jumped 20 feet to a concrete floor while working in a warehouse when sirens went off signaling that there were incoming rockets and mortars. The veteran reported having been hospitalized between two men who were severely wounded and who eventually died while still beside the veteran. The veteran claimed that there were other traumatic events, particularly rocket and mortar attacks, and that he had been afraid of being killed by them. He reported that the only post-service counseling he had received was with Mr. Grossman and that he had been given medication by a physician with whom Mr. Grossman practiced. It was noted that the veteran claimed to spend much time vividly recalling his experiences in Vietnam, wondering what the result would have been had he done things differently there, and that he was awakened at night by nightmares of rocket attacks in Vietnam. He claimed to feel guilty, wondering if he did enough in the effort there. He reported various difficulties, including anger, being easily startled, emotional detachment, and fear of crowds. In September 1992 the veteran wrote to the VA for a copy of his medical records. His request was answered in January 1993. By a February 1993 rating decision the RO denied service connection for PTSD on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of a stressor and insufficient details of any specific events. In February 1993 the RO received a letter addressed to the veteran's representative service organization by the U. S. Army & Joint Services Environmental Support Group (ESG), stating that to provide information regarding a mortar attack the veteran had to provide the date of the incident within seven days, the location, names of casualties and other identifying information. ESG reported that it was unable to verify that the veteran had been wounded, injured or hospitalized during his tour n Vietnam but that such information could be obtained form his military records and could be ordered from another office. The ESG provided a copy of the 1966 history of the veteran's unit in Vietnam, the 15th Transportation Corps Battalion. That history shows, in pertinent part, that on February 20, 1966, the Vietcong obtained control of Hon Con Mountain and launched a mortar attack from that position. It was also noted that on September 3, 1966, Camp Radcliff (where the unit was stationed) sustained a mortar attack, with five battalion members killed and 56 wounded. About two weeks prior to Christmas it was learned that a Vietcong battalion was in the area with the mission of wiping out Camp Radcliff, but a sweep of the perimeter ("Operation Murphy") produced negative results. It was also noted that in preparation for Christmas, a 24 foot Christmas card had been received from employees of a corporation and that on Christmas day, after outstanding meals in the mess hall, some awards were presented and an officer appeared in a Santa Claus outfit and provided beer for everyone. The battalion was reported to have welcomed in the New Year in the "traditional fashion." In February 1993 the RO notified the veteran as to the decision reached in his claim for disability benefits, including for PTSD, of the basis for denying the claim and of the information or evidence that was missing. In an October 1993 rating decision the RO addressed the ESG letter and unit history discussed above, noting in particular that no mortar attack was verified for December 1966. The veteran was provided a copy of the rating decision later that month. Following submission of his notice of disagreement, he was provided a statement of the case in January 1994 that addresses in detail the evidence, proves the law and regulations, and explains the basis for the decision. In February 1994 the veteran testified at a hearing before a hearing officer at the RO. A transcript is in the claims file. He stated that at least once a month his base was subjected to mortar and artillery barrages and that at least once a week they were "harassed in one way or another." He stated that artillery was going 24 hours a day and one never knew if the rounds were coming in or where they were coming from. He further stated that his compound did not suffer many fatalities but that in other areas people got killed and that "Hong Kong" mountain was overrun. When asked if he had been directly assaulted by the enemy on the ground, he replied "Yeah, they overran what we call Hong King [M]ountain." He explained that "They made the mistake of overrunning that hill, because then they could really mortar the crap out of us ...." He stated that from there "they had complete control of the whole damn compound, they could have really ripped us, but we just blew them all to hell." He gave additional details of the event and reported that one man finally stopped the enemy by firing a grenade launcher round into a bladder tank containing fuel for helicopters and that then "we leveled that sucker with gunships [and] blew the top right off her, and that "we never let them get that close to us again." When asked the date this occurred he stated that he did not know why but he "just can't remember." When asked what he was doing at the time of the incident, he explained that he was "just down, protecting my area," "making sure my choppers were okay," and getting into his assigned bunker. The veteran also testified about hurting his feet, stating that he jumped 20 feet from a connex container when there was an artillery alert and he had to get to his bunker. He claimed that he was hospitalized for five days and was in a bed between two dying men. After he was hospitalized the pattern (presumably of rocket and mortar fire) was all the time and he slept in his boots and flak jacket so he would not be killed in his sleep. He testified that he currently had nightmares of being killed by Vietnamese and of his buddies lying all around and of crashing in an aircraft. He indicated that he did not fly much in Vietnam, just going up a few times to check instruments. Regarding his duty station in Vietnam, he said it was called "Barbed Wire City and that women were brought in as if it were a military whorehouse. He testified that he was receiving Social Security (SSI) benefits and that he had been examined by Dr. Blackwell. (Other information in the file reflects that Dr. Blackwell treated the veteran for his feet.) The representative asked that the case be developed to establish the names of the servicemen who died in the same area of the hospital that the veteran was located. In August 1994 the RO received a reply from the Social Security Administration (SSA) in response to a request for the veteran's records, including all medical records. SSA advised that its files contained only the veteran's application and no other records. A hearing officer's decision was issued in October 1994 advising the veteran, in part, of the reply from SSA and of the recent evidence. Later that month a supplemental statement of the case was issued. In the fall of 1996 the RO attempted to obtain Morning Reports for the veteran's period of service in Vietnam. In about October 1996, the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) provided some reports and advised that they constituted all of the entries pertaining to the veteran. One dated December 20, 1966, shows that the veteran was attached and joined pending EDCSA NVAL. The reporting unit was Company B, 15th Transportation Company Battalion. A Morning Report dated December 26, 1966, by the same unit indicates that the veteran was assigned and joined from the 15th Admin Company and that the effective date of change of strength accountability (EDCSA) was 21 December 1966. The third Morning Report, by the same unit, is dated April 6, 1967 and shows that the veteran's status was changed from duty to departure pending. In February 1997 the veteran was provided another supplemental statement of the case explaining the evidence received and the reason for the continued denial of his claim. Pursuant to a July 1997 remand by the Board, a copy of which was sent to the veteran and apparently not returned as undeliverable, the RO wrote to the veteran in November 1997 requesting additional stressor information and any medical evidence, and advising him that the RO would assist him in obtaining the medial evidence if he authorized the release of his records. Annotations on the letter reflect an address obtained from the veteran's representative and that the letter was resent to that address in April 1998. A VA examination was scheduled and the veteran was notified using the new address. He failed to report for the examination. The record does not reflect that notice or correspondence to the veteran was returned as undeliverable. A computer printout shows that he had not visited the clinic since May 1993, that he had been "missing" since September 1993 and that VA medical records showed no visits after 1993. In June 1998 the RO obtained from the NPRC additional copies of the December 10 and December 26, 1966, Morning Reports described above. The RO had requested reports showing that the veteran was hospitalized during the period of December 25, 1966, to January 1, 1967. NPRC replied that the only reference to the veteran in the reports was on December 20, 1966 when the veteran was assigned to a unit and on December 26, 1996 when he was assigned and joined the unit. NPRC requested additional information regarding any claimed hospitalization. The US Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (USASCRUR) (previously the Environmental Support Group (ESG)) responded in February 1999 to an inquiry from the RO asking for any information regarding the veteran's claim of constant mortar and rocket attacks, the overrunning of Hong Kong Mountain, and his having been surrounded by seriously wounded soldiers when hospitalized. USASCRUR provided a copy of the unit history that was already of record and a copy of the Operational Report-Lessons Learned from the 1st Cavalry Division for the period ending April 30, 1967. In addition to the information from the unit history reported above, those records reflect that Camp Radcliff was mortared on the night of April 8 - 9 and on April 9 there was an attack on the complex with mortars and ground forces. In a cover letter, USASCRUR noted that the records documented the units' mission, activities, base camp location (Camp Radcliff), participation in combat operations, and attacks on Camp Radcliff. USASCRUR further noted that although the records showed that in February 1966 the VC gained control of Hon Con Mountain and launched a mortar attack, the veteran's records showed him arriving in Vietnam in December 1966. In April 1999 the RO issued another supplemental statement of the case advising the veteran of the additional evidence and of the laws and regulations, and explaining its decision. The RO explained that although an examination had been scheduled and the veteran failed to report, one was not rescheduled inasmuch as the Board, in its remand, had requested that an examination be performed only if stressor verification was obtained. The veteran was subsequently was to appear at a Travel Board hearing scheduled for December 13, 2000. He was notified of the hearing by a letter of November 8, 2000. Thereafter, the representative advised the veteran had stated he was too sick to appear. There was no request to reschedule the hearing. Preliminary Matters There has been a significant change in the law during the pendency of this appeal. On November 9, 2000, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.A. § 5100 et seq. (West Supp. 2001)) became law. This law redefined the obligations of VA with respect to the duty to assist and included an enhanced duty to notify a claimant as to the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim for VA benefits. This law also eliminated the concept of a well-grounded claim and superseded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Morton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 477 (1999), withdrawn sub nom. Morton v. Gober, No. 96-1517 (U.S. Vet. App. Nov. 6, 2000) (per curiam order), which had held that VA could not assist in the development of a claim that was not well grounded. This change in the law is applicable to all claims filed on or after the date of enactment of the VCAA, or filed before the date of enactment and not yet final as of that date. VCAA, § 7(a), 114 Stat. at 2099-2100 ; see also Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991). Additionally, VA has now issued final rules to amend adjudication regulations in order to implement the provisions of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub.L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000). 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001) (to be codified as amended at 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a)). In this case, the RO advised the veteran of the VCAA in March 2001 and has satisfied the requirements of the VCAA and the new regulations. The RO has written the veteran numerous letters of notification and provided a statement of the case and multiple supplemental statements which, in combination, apprised him of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim, advised him of the evidence of record and that which was lacking, informed him of the laws and regulations governing his claim, and provided the rationale for denying his claim. Additionally, he has been asked for information that would help to substantiate his claim and he was afforded a copy of the detailed July 1997 Board remand. The RO has assisted the veteran by obtaining his service medical and personnel records, obtaining military historical records and unit Morning Reports from USASCRUR and affording him an examination and a hearing. Although the RO did not have the opportunity to consider the new regulations, the Board's consideration of the VCAA regulations in the first instance is not prejudicial to the veteran since they merely implement the VCAA and do not provide rights other than those provided by the VCAA. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); VA O.G.C. Prec. Op. No. 16-92 (July 24, 1992) (published at 57 Fed. Reg. 49,747 (1992)). Legal Criteria Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Subsequent to initiation of the veteran's appeal, the specific regulation pertaining to service connection for PTSD, 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), was revised. In accordance with the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) in Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991), if a regulation changes after the claim has been filed but prior to the conclusion of the appellate process, the provision that is more favorable to the veteran applies. VA's General Counsel has held that where a law or regulation changes during the pendency of an appeal, the Board should first determine which version of the law or regulation is more favorable to the veteran. In making that determination it may be necessary for the Board to apply both the old and the new versions of the regulation. Prior to the effective date of the change in the regulation, the Board can apply only the original version of the regulation. VAOPGCPREC 3- 2000. Prior to the initial promulgation of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) in 1993, entitlement to service connection for PTSD was determined by applying the provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Administration Manual M21-1 (hereafter Manual M21- 1), which required essentially the same elements as those included in the 1993 version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997), citing Manual M21-1, Subchapter XII, 50.45 (Jan. 25, 1989). The Manual M21-1 provisions relied upon the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R), which defined and required specific symptomatology and stressors in diagnosing PTSD. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) as it was initially promulgated in 1993, service connection for PTSD required medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in- service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. The regulation made no reference to any criteria, in terms of the sufficiency of the symptomatology or stressor, to be applied in determining if the veteran has PTSD. As noted in Cohen, the required corroboration of the occurrence of an in-service stressor need not be found only in service records, as the Manual M21- 1 had required before the adoption of § 3.304(f) (see e.g., Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.46(f) (Sept. 21, 1992); Manual M21-1, Subch. XII, 50.45(d) (1989)) "but may be obtained from other sources." Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.46.c (1995); see Moreau, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). In 1999, 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) was revised to bring it into conformance with the Court's holding in Cohen. Direct Service Connection (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), 64 Fed. Reg. 32,807 (June 18, 1999) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)). The change in the regulation was effective March 7, 1997, the date of the Court's decision in Cohen. According to the revised regulation, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); a link, established by medical evidence, between the current symptoms and an in- service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2000). If the veteran did not serve in combat, or if the claimed stressor is not related to combat, corroborating evidence showing that the stressor actually occurred is required. Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 128. Effective in November 1996, VA adopted the diagnostic criteria of DSM-IV for evaluating mental disorders. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. The Court has held that the DSM-III-R criteria, and by deduction the DSM-IV criteria, cannot be read in a manner that imposes requirements over and above those included in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Therefore, a "clear diagnosis" of PTSD by a mental health professional, regardless of whether the diagnosis is based on DSM-III-R or DSM-IV, must be presumed to concur with the applicable diagnostic criteria for that disorder in terms of the adequacy of the symptomatology and the stressor. If the Board finds that the diagnosis does not comply with the applicable diagnostic criteria pertaining to the adequacy of the symptomatology or the severity of the stressor, remand of the case for clarification of the diagnosis or additional examination is required. Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 140. Where the stressor in question is not related to combat or there is no service department evidence of combat, the veteran's lay testimony is not sufficient to establish the occurrence of the stressor and the stressor must be corroborated by credible supporting evidence. Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). In general, credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an in-service stressor cannot consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 396 (1996). If the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy while in active service, VA shall accept as sufficient proof of service connection of any disease or injury alleged to have been incurred in such service satisfactory lay or other evidence of service incurrence, if the lay or other evidence is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of such service. Service incurrence may be found even though there is no official record of such incurrence in service, and every reasonable doubt shall be resolved in favor of the veteran. Service connection may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); Collette V. Brown, 82 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Analysis The veteran's claim has been denied on the basis there is no corroborating evidence for the claimed stressors. The Board notes that the veteran has been asked to provide or identify information/evidence supporting his claimed stressors, but has not done so. He has also been provided the opportunity to submit additional arguments pertaining to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. The Board finds, therefore, that even though he was not specifically apprised of the change in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), it may consider the revised regulation without prejudice to the veteran. See Bernard v Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); see also Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994). Determinations regarding service connection are to be based on review of the entire evidence of record. See Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Once the evidence is assembled, the Board is responsible for determining whether the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. If so, the claim is denied; if the evidence is in support of the claim or is in equal balance, the claim is allowed. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107, as amended by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, § 4, 114 Stat. 2096, 2099 (2000); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). It is clear from the record that the veteran has received multiple post-service diagnoses of PTSD. Thus, there is competent evidence of the claimed disability. However, he served as an aircraft electrician in Vietnam, in keeping with his military occupational specialty; was awarded no decorations indicative of combat; and is not otherwise shown to have engaged in combat with the enemy. Thus, his statements as to claimed stressors, without some credible supporting evidence, are not sufficient to establish that the stressful incidents actually occurred inasmuch as he is not a combat veteran. The initial evidence of record of PTSD is decades after service and is in the form of a letter by Mr. Grossman, who diagnosed PTSD under the criteria of DSM III. In his February 1992 statement, Mr. Grossman mentioned only one stressor - that while in Vietnam the veteran was exposed to "nightly mortar attacks." The veteran's account to Mr. Grossman of nightly mortar attacks is found to be grossly inaccurate and exaggerated. At the VA examination in April 1992, his account of such attacks was revised to "constant" and he spoke of "Hong Kong Mountain" having been overrun. To this point there was no mention of any hospital-related experiences. It was not until the RO asked the veteran to provide details of the claimed rocket and mortar attacks that he answered with allegations of traumatic experiences while being hospitalized for two weeks rather than providing the requested information regarding the attacks. Whereas he previously he had spoken of nightmares of rocket and mortar attacks, he was now claiming nightmares of his hospitalization, with no mention of this by Mr. Grossman or the VA examiner. Significantly, there is no corroborating evidence at all that the veteran was exposed to rocket and mortar attacks. Military historical records provided by USASCRUR do mention some attacks on Camp Radcliff, where the veteran's unit was stationed, but those attacks were prior or subsequent to the veteran's tour in Vietnam. Additionally, he has not provided detailed information or identified other individuals or other evidence that would support the alleged attacks. Military records show that Camp Radcliff sustained a mortar attack that killed five battalion members and injured 56 others; however, the attack was in September 1966, prior to the veteran's arrival in Vietnam. An attack also occurred in April 1997, but that was shortly after the veteran was detached from his unit to return to the United States. The military historical records provide no conformation of any rocket or mortar attacks on Camp Radcliff while the veteran was stationed there and the veteran has not identified anyone or any other evidence that would lend support to his account. Thus, we have only the veteran's inconsistent statements regarding rocket and mortar attacks and they are is insufficient to establish the claimed incidents as a Vietnam stressor. The veteran also has identified as a stressor a Vietcong attack on "Hong Kong" Mountain. At his personal hearing he could not recall when the incident occurred, but testified as to what happened and what he did during the attack (he was protecting his helicopters and getting into his assigned bunker). This incident was considered by the April 1992 VA examiner in reaching a diagnosis of PTSD. Although there is evidence in the form of military records confirming that the Vietcong obtained control of Hon Con Mountain and launched a mortar attack from that position, this occurred in February 1966, almost a year before the veteran went to Vietnam. Thus, while there is corroboration that Hon Con Mountain was overrun, clearly it was long before the veteran was assigned to Vietnam. Accordingly, his testimony that he was a witness to some of the events can not be true and his attempt to use that incident as a stressor in support his claim for PTSD effectively destroys his credibility. The veteran also claims as a stressor his having been hospitalized next to dying servicemen in late December 1966, when he injured his foot on jumping from a Connex container in response to an artillery alert. The service medical records do show that on December 25, 1966, the veteran complained of having injured his right foot when jumping off such a container. However, the unit historical records do not confirm that there was an artillery alert on that date, even though there is a December 25 entry. Although it appears from the service medical records that he was to be admitted to a hospital for ice and elevation of his foot, Morning Reports do not confirm that he was absent from his unit and hospitalized. The Board notes with interest that it was not until the veteran was pressed for details regarding the claimed mortar and rocket attacks that he mentioned hospitalization as a stressor, at first claiming it was for two weeks and later, at his hearing, for only five days. This is a significant discrepancy and while he might not recall whether it was for nine days or ten or three or four, the difference between five days and two weeks is too great to attribute to innocent vagaries of memory. The crux of the veteran's allegation as to a stressor is that while he was being treated with elevation and ice for an apparently minor foot injury (with no competent evidence of claimed fractures of both feet), he was placed between two severely wounded men and witnessed them die, along with observing others who were severely injured. As previously noted, the veteran apparently did not report this alleged stressor to either Mr. Grossman or the 1992 VA examiner, has changed the duration of hospitalization from two weeks to five days, and has not provided any information as to the identity of his fellow patients. Additionally, unit Morning Reports do not confirm that he was absent from his unit for even five days. In view of these facts and since the veteran has already been shown to be not credible, his account of alleged traumatic experiences in the hospital need not be accepted as accurate. Absent his ability or willingness to provide identification of individuals with whom he was hospitalized or who could provide credible and probative information to support his claim, which he was requested to provide, we have only the veteran's allegation that his hospitalization for a minor foot injury resulted in his being placed among severely traumatized and dying men and insufficient facts to try to obtain corroborating evidence. Although the Board has considered whether this claim should otherwise be remanded to the RO for a further attempt at stressor verification, the veteran either has failed to provide specific dates, names, and other identifying information for the incidents in question or, to the extent that he has been specific, his accounts have been incorrect. To the extent that he has provided general information, such affords no meaningful basis to submit this case once again for stressor verification. Additionally, there is no need to obtain a psychiatric examination under the criteria of DSM IV for service connection purposes. The problem with the veteran's case is not that he has no PTSD diagnosis, or that his claimed in- service stressors have been deemed of insufficient gravity (under the more stringent DSM III-R) to cause PTSD. Rather, the problem is that the veteran clearly is not a combat veteran and his claimed stressors are untrue, uncorroborated, or incapable of corroboration due to his inconsistent stories and his failure to provide detailed information. These facts would not be changed by another examination since a stressor corroborated by credible evidence is still a requirement for service connection for PTSD under the current criteria. Another examination would not provide that and would be pointless. Thus, the preponderance of the probative and credible evidence is against the claim of service connection for PTSD. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is denied. JANE E. SHARP Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals