Citation Nr: 0201851 Decision Date: 02/26/02 Archive Date: 03/05/02 DOCKET NO. 91-50 344 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Honolulu, Hawaii THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Michael Martin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active service from October 1963 to September 1965. This matter came before the Board of Veterans' Appeals on appeal from a decision of October 1990 by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Regional Office (RO). In April 1994, the Board entered a decision which confirmed the denial of service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. The veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) which, pursuant to a joint motion, vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case to the Board for further action. In October 1995 and again in July 1996, the Board remanded the case to the RO for further development. In September 1997, the Board again denied the appeal. The veteran again appealed to the Court. The Court issued an order in June 2000 which vacated the Board's decision and remanded the case for further action. The Board remanded the case to the RO in May 2001 for further development. The requested development has since been completed, and the case is again before the Board for appellate review. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All evidence necessary for review of the issue on appeal has been obtained, and the VA has satisfied the duty to notify the veteran of the law and regulations applicable to his claim and the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim. 2. The veteran was not involved in combat during service. 3. The existence of an in-service stressor has not been corroborated by service records or other credible evidence. 4. The veteran's accounts of his claimed stressors during his active service are not credible. 5. The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder is not supported by credible evidence of an in-service stressor. CONCLUSION OF LAW Post-traumatic stress disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.304(f) (2001). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Preliminary Matter: Duty to Assist The veteran contends that he is entitled to service connection for PTSD as the result of traumatic incidents during his active duty service. The veteran has reported being involved in the Tet Offensive while serving as a merchant seaman. He also contends that he went undercover as a prisoner in a Marine brig, during which time he witnessed people being beaten and that he himself was mistreated. He contends that following his release from the brig he continued to work for the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), searching for contraband in body bags returning from Vietnam. He states that he inspected the corpses of individuals he had seen being sent to Vietnam, that he handled dead bodies, and observed their mutilations. During the pendency of this appeal, on November 9, 2000, the President signed into law the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000). The Act is applicable to all claims filed on or after the date of enactment, November 9, 2000, or filed before the date of enactment and not yet final as of that date. See Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991). The new law eliminates the concept of a well-grounded claim, and redefines the obligations of the VA with respect to the duty to assist claimants in the development of their claims. First, the VA has a duty to notify the claimant and his representative, if represented, of any information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102 and 5103 (West Supp. 2001). Second, the VA has a duty to assist the claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West Supp. 2001). The VA has promulgated revised regulations to implement these changes in the law. See 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001) (to be codified as amended at 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a)). The intended effect of the new regulations is to establish clear guidelines consistent with the intent of Congress regarding the timing and the scope of assistance the VA will provide to a claimant who files a substantially complete application for VA benefits, or who attempts to reopen a previously denied claim. The Board finds that the VA's duties under the law and recently revised implementing regulations have been fulfilled. The veteran was provided adequate notice as to the evidence needed to substantiate his claims. The Board concludes the discussions in the rating decisions, the statement of the case (SOC), the supplemental statements of the case (SSOCs), and letters sent to the veteran informed him of the information and evidence needed to substantiate the claim and complied with the VA's notification requirements. The RO also supplied the veteran with the applicable regulations in the SOC and SSOCs. The VA has no outstanding duty to inform the appellant that any additional information or evidence is needed. The Board also finds that all relevant facts have been properly developed, and that all evidence necessary for equitable resolution of the issue on appeal has been obtained. The veteran has had hearings. All relevant evidence identified by the veteran was obtained and considered. The claims file contains the veteran's service medical and personnel records. The post-service treatment records have also been obtained. The veteran has been afforded disability evaluation examinations by the VA to assess the nature of his disabilities. With regard to the adequacy of the examinations, the Board notes that the examination reports reflect that the examiners recorded the past medical history, noted the veteran's current complaints, conducted examinations, and offered appropriate assessments and diagnoses. The RO has also made repeated efforts to verify the veteran's claimed stressors. These efforts are discussed in more detail below. For the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that all reasonable efforts were made by the VA to obtain evidence necessary to substantiate the veteran's claim. The Board is unaware of any additional evidence which exists but has not been obtained. Therefore, no further assistance to the veteran with the development of evidence is required. In the circumstances of this case, a remand to have the RO take additional action under the new Act and implementing regulations would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on the VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on the VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). The VA has satisfied its obligation to notify and assist the veteran in this case. Further development and further expending of the VA's resources is not warranted. Taking these factors into consideration, there is no prejudice to the veteran in proceeding to consider the claim on the merits. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). II. Background Pre-service medical records reveal that the veteran was treated for head injuries at the Northgate General Hospital as the result of an automobile accident. At his enlistment examination in August 1963, no disability associated with this condition was revealed. Service medical records reveal no treatment for a psychiatric disability and no stressful events are noted. A neurology evaluation in March 1964 noted no psychiatric disorder. At his separation examination in September 1965, his psychiatric evaluation was normal. The veteran was discharged that month. Service personnel records indicate that the veteran underwent a special court-martial in September 1964 for wrongfully appropriating three surf boards. He was sentenced to two months at hard labor, of which he served one month. He was reduced in grade, and forfeited $55 dollars. Service personnel records indicate no combat or combat-related citations. The veteran has submitted a certificate of training from the Department of the Navy, indicating that he completed a course in criminology in November 1964 at Barber's Point, Oahu, Hawaii. A detailed review of service personnel records indicates no reference to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) or, as contended below, that his incarceration at Barber's Point, Oahu, Hawaii, was part of any undercover operation. The veteran's DD 214 shows that he was discharged in September 1965. His military occupational specialty was airport serviceman. He did not have any decorations, medals, badges, commendations, citations or campaign ribbons. It was further stated that he had no wounds received as a result of action with enemy forces. In January 1974, more than eight years after the veteran's active service, he was hospitalized for drug abuse. At this time, it was noted the veteran's behavior was erratic. He attended one assessment group session and was uncontrollable and disruptive. It is noted that the local sheriff's office took the veteran into custody on a warrant from the Federal Marshall in Seattle, Washington, less than 48 hours after this admission. In October 1974, the veteran was referred to a hospitalization program for support therapy. The veteran was diagnosed with schizophrenia, chronic, undifferentiated type, with alcohol and drug abuse. This was manifested in religious delusions, delusions of grandeur, auditory hallucinations, flat affect, and poor concentration. The veteran was living at the Pioneer Cooperative, a half-way house for drug abusers, on probation for distributing cocaine. No reference was made to the veteran's active service or to any stressful events during the veteran's active service. In July 1975, the veteran submitted an original claim for disability compensation. He reported that since getting out of the navy he had been an alcoholic, and had been committed for being psychotic and a drug addict. He said that he believed that his mental condition and physical need for drugs started when he was in the Marine Corps Brig at Pearl Harbor and told that his only crime was getting caught. He also stated that he was severely beaten and treated for 28 days. In a rating decision of December 1975, the RO denied service connection for a psychosis with alcoholism and drug abuse. In a March 1976 statement, the veteran confirmed that during his active service he was imprisoned for misappropriating surf boards. The veteran contended that he was injured in service and that he had been told he could be discharged for disability or accept a light-duty assignment. The veteran has indicated that he decided to take a light-duty assignment as a Provost Marshal's aid. The veteran stated, in pertinent part: I took light duty as a Provost Marshalls aide. I was young [and] stupid so I got caught for misappropriating surf-board [and] was sent to the Pearl Harbor Brig . . . After I got out of the brig I was a cargo- handler. . . No reference in this statement is made to the CID or body- bags. In October 1976, the veteran was treated for problems the veteran associated to his pre-service head injury. Again, no reference to stressful events during the veteran's active service was indicated. In September 1985, the veteran filed a claim for VA benefits for a back injury. At this time, he made no reference to any stressful event or psychiatric difficulties during his active service. In a November 1986 statement to United States Senator Daniel J. Evans, the veteran thanked the Senator for helping him to get out of a Mexican jail. The veteran also noted his difficulties, including a physical injury while a merchant seaman. He mentioned having spent 28 days in the brig, and stated that he spent the rest of his tour loading airplanes for Vietnam. In a March 1988 statement, the veteran noted being involved in the Tet Offensive while serving as a merchant seaman in 1967, 1968, and 1969 (the Board will refer to this as "stressful event one"). The veteran has submitted a series of statements related to injuries he allegedly suffered while a merchant seaman. Sometime between February and May 1990, the RO received a letter which the veteran had sent to the President. In the letter, the veteran reported that he had post-traumatic stress from being on a ship in combat. In May 1990, the veteran was evaluated by the VA for his contention that he had PTSD. The mental status examination report shows that at this time, the examiner stated, in pertinent part: The actual reason for his current exam derives from a psychiatric syndrome of symptoms which the veteran stated started around February 1968, when he was a merchant marine sailor, whose ship was unloading at the port of Da Nang in the Republic of South Vietnam. It was in January or February 1968 the Tet offensive began and the veteran reports that his ship was under particularly bad bombardment. As a result, the sailors were evacuated to shore every night but brought back to the ship to continue their unloading in the daytime. Based apparently on the events cited above, the examiner diagnosed the veteran with PTSD, chronic, mild. The examiner related this disability to a catastrophic life-threatening stressor in "battle in Da Nang" and to a brain injury. In an August 1990 statement, the veteran indicated that he worked in the Provost Marshall's Office at Barber's Point and became an undercover CID agent to determine who was stealing personal items off airplane flights. The veteran also again noted the stressful events he associated to his service as a merchant seaman. In a decision of October 1990, the RO denied service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder on the basis that his service records were negative for any evidence of a traumatic or life threatening situation, and that Merchant Marine service, other than during World War II, was not considered to be active duty for VA purposes. At a hearing held before a hearing officer at the RO in January 1991, the veteran noted that he was required to search body bags for the CID, after his incarceration, in order to look for stolen goods being sent back to the mainland of the United States (stressful event number two). He noted that individuals would steal stereos and hide them in coffins, body bags and in different parts of airplanes used to ship the bodies of deceased service members. The veteran also appears to testify that his imprisonment during active service in the Marine brig at Barber's Point, Oahu, Hawaii, was a "cover" for his position as a secret agent for the CID. He indicated he was exposed to people with guns who assaulted him during his imprisonment (stressful event number three). The veteran also noted stressors associated with his service as a merchant seaman (stressful event number one). He specified that two individuals named G.W. and B.H. could confirm that he worked undercover. At a second hearing held before a hearing officer at the RO in April 1991, the veteran reiterated his previous contentions. He indicated he had not reported his work with the CID during his May 1990 VA evaluation due to a loyalty oath he took during service not to divulge any information related to his service with the CID. He indicated he served with the CID for over a year. He also indicated difficulties with his memory due to brain dysfunction. In an undated statement, the veteran maintained that he served aboard a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ship, the American Hawk, during the 1968 Tet Offensive. He noted that the sounds of helicopters make him remember the heavy fire and "horrible atrocities to American fighting men" he witnessed during his service as a merchant seaman. In January 1991, a VA physician at the Hilo Primary Care Clinic stated that he had treated the veteran since March of 1989. The physician indicated that the veteran suffered from a number of disabling conditions, partially due to an automobile accident prior to his military service. He stated that due to injuries and stressors, as well as other factors, both before, during and after his military service, he was suffering from atypical PTSD, a seizure disorder, and an organic personality disorder, paranoid schizophrenia and an orthopedic condition. The physician concluded that the veteran presented a "very complicated clinical picture of physical and psychiatric disorder[s] due to stress and other factors and any simplification of his medical/psychiatric picture will only result in a distorted understanding of his present condition." In a May 1991 statement, the physician cited above reiterated his belief that the veteran had PTSD. He indicated that the veteran's PTSD appeared related to stressors of a significant, but not life-threatening nature, while in military service, including unloading body bags of recently killed soldiers and stressors of a life-threatening nature while serving as a merchant seaman and becoming stranded in South Vietnam during a period of intense combat action. In August 1992, the Board remanded the case to the RO for additional development. In a December 1992 neuropsychiatric evaluation, the veteran reiterated his previous contention that he was recruited by the CID as a secret agent. During this time with the CID, he stated he was responsible for what he described as "snitching" on other soldiers who were involved in theft and dealing drugs. He described this as being very dangerous and of being frequently threatened. He also described his incarceration during his active service as an undercover assignment. During this period he indicated he was pistol-whipped by guards. He also described an incident where he witnessed a man trying to hang himself. The investigation of body bags for narcotics was also noted. The veteran was diagnosed with PTSD with evidence of a mild organic brain disorder. In April 1994, the Board denied the veteran's claim for entitlement to service connection for PTSD on the basis that it had not been demonstrated that he had a stressor which occurred in service. The veteran appealed to the Court, and the case was subsequently returned to the Board in accordance with a joint motion. Within the joint motion it was noted that the veteran had identified three individuals who he said could corroborate the veteran's claim that he was a CID agent. Two alleged CID agents stationed with him at Barber's Point during his military service named G.W. and B.H. were noted. The veteran had also identified a Judge M., who was the "Brig Reform Chief" at Pearl Harbor during the period the veteran was confined to the brig. The Board was ordered to attempt to obtain lay statements that could corroborate the veteran's alleged stressors. The Board was also ordered to include in its decision an analysis of the credibility or probative value of the examiner's findings that the veteran suffered from PTSD primarily related to his active duty stressors. The Board remanded the case in October 1995 to comply with the joint motion. In December 1995, the RO requested from the veteran the current addresses of the two alleged CID agents and the Judge in order to obtain lay statements that could corroborate his claim. In a December 1995 reply, he indicated that one individual, G.W., was in the phone book and that he was unable to ascertain Judge M.'s or B.H.'s whereabouts. That month, the RO determined that a person named G.W. lived in the area. A letter was sent from the RO to the person at his home address later that month. No reply was received. The veteran and his representative at the Board were notified that the man had not replied to the March 1996 letter. No additional information has been supplied by the veteran. In June 1996, the Board contacted the General Counsel's office to determine if the General Counsel had been given any additional information from either the veteran or his representatives regarding the location of B.H., G.W., and Judge M. The General Counsel's office indicated that no additional information had been sent by the veteran to the General Counsel's office. The Board again remanded this case to RO in July 1996. At that time, it was noted that a Westlaw computer search for the Judge (performed by the Board to assist the veteran in the development of his claim) revealed that a man by that name was a Judge in Washington. Whether this was the individual the veteran believes could confirm his stressors at that time was unclear (the veteran has never provided the first name of the Judge). Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the duty to assist and the mandates of the joint motion, the RO was instructed to contact the Judge in a "last attempt to confirm the veteran's stressors." The veteran was to be examined "[i]f, and only if, the RO determines that the record establishes the existence of a stressor or stressors in service based on any new evidence received". In July 1996, the RO contacted the veteran and his representative and requested that he provide any additional information regarding the whereabouts of B.H. or any other information he may have which could confirm his stressors during his active service. That month, the RO also wrote to the Judge based on the address supplied by the Board in our July 1996 remand. The Judge was asked if he served with the veteran from January 1963 through January 1965. If this was correct, the Judge was also requested to describe the veteran's duties while in service and responsibilities, specifically CID involvement. It is unclear why the RO chose the period of January 1963 through January 1965. However, this would encompass at least part of the time period that the veteran alleges he was detailed to the CID and the entirety of his period of incarceration. In an August 1996 response, Judge M. stated that he did not serve with the veteran in the military between the dates of January 1963 to January 1965. A Supplemental Statement of the Case was issued by the RO in October 1996. The Supplemental Statement of the Case informed the veteran and his representative of Judge M.'s August 1996 response. In an October 1996 statement, the veteran stated that the proof that he was in combat was in the medical log from the 101st medivac hospital in "DaNang [sic] during the Tet of 68 or How Chi Minhs [sic] birthday fourteen months later where I was on the American Hawk and Garden City delivering ammo the ammo pier [sic] compression grenades red tracer bullet fir [sic] green sometime." The veteran also appears to indicate that he was "snitching" on marines who were in the brig while he was incarcerated. In a November 1996 statement, the veteran's representative contended that VA's letter to Judge M. was inadequate and another letter clarifying the veteran's contentions should be sent. In order to completely fulfill the duty to assist, a second letter was sent by the RO to Judge M. in November 1996. The second letter asked the Judge if he recalled any association with the veteran between January 1963 through January 1967, in respect to his work with the CID. The questions to Judge M. were as follows: Specifically, do you recall any association with the veteran between January, 1963 through January, 1967 in respect to his work for the Criminal Investigation Division? If yes, please provide his duties while in service specifically to CID involvement. What did he actually do during service which could have a traumatic effect on him? If you do not know this person, please so state and return a completed form to us. In response to the November 1996 letter, Judge M. in December 1996 stated, in pertinent part: I recall [the veteran] and have a recollection of his assignment with the CID at Barber's Point. I do not however, recall any association with [the veteran] and his CID work between the dates of Jan. 1963 and Jan. 1967. If I did, [the veteran] might assist my recall. If he does, and do then have my recollection refreshed, I would be pleased to so advise. A Supplemental Statement of the Case was issued by the RO immediately after Judge M.'s December 1996 statement was received by the VA. The Supplemental Statement of the Case informed the veteran and his representative of Judge M.'s most recent response to the inquires from the RO. In June 1997, the veteran's representative contended that the VA's attempts to fulfill the duty to assist were "of a cursory nature and further development is needed." The veteran's representative stated, in pertinent part: Just as the VA submits statements to the U.S. Army Joint Environmental Support Group, to help verify a veteran's claims of stressors, the VA should have invited [the veteran] to submit a statement to Judge [M.] or taken excerpts from the [Court] and or [the Board's] Remand Order, and requested Judge [M.] to confirm or deny his knowledge of [the veteran's] contentions. Instead, the VA chose to send a letter asking Judge [M.] to submit a statement to identify the veteran's traumatic event. Additional argument was submitted by the veteran's representative in July 1997. No additional evidence or statements were submitted by the veteran or his representative. The Board again denied the veteran's claim in a decision of September 1997 on the basis that no in-service stressor had been verified. Subsequently, however, that decision was vacated by the Court in a decision of June 2000. The Board was instructed, in essence, to provide an account of the veteran's claimed stressors to Judge M. for the purpose of refreshing his recollection and allowing him to attempt to provide corroboration of the claimed stressors. Subsequently, in May 2001, the Board remanded the case to the RO for the purpose of carrying out such instructions. The remand specified that the RO should provide the following account of the veteran's claimed stressors to the judge: This matter involves the veteran's claim that he has a disability, post-traumatic stress disorder, which was caused, in part, by stressors to which he was exposed while he was on active duty, working undercover for the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Available service department records, however, do not specifically confirm that he worked for CID. He served on active duty in the United States Navy from October 1963 to September 1965. Personnel records show that after training in San Diego, he was assigned to Barber's Point Naval Air Station in January 1964. In March and April 1964, he was evaluated at Tripler Army Hospital; the requesting organization was noted to be "Security Department, NAS, Barber's Point." He was found fit for full duty with no restrictions, and returned to Barber's Point. According to a report of a special court- martial in September 1964, the veteran was found to have wrongfully appropriated three surfboards, valued at about $300, in conjunction with four other men. As a result, he was confined in the Pearl Harbor brig from September 4, 1964, to October 5, 1964, after which he was returned to Barber's Point, where he served until he was transferred to CONUS, to serve the remainder of his enlistment. In responses to Judge [M.]'s request to have his recollection refreshed, the veteran states that Judge [M.] was the Brig Reform Chief at the Pearl Harbor brig during his confinement. From January 1991 to October 1997, he presented several accounts of his inservice experiences working for CID; he testified that he did not previously mention these experiences because he had been bound by a loyalty oath, which prohibited him from discussing any of his experiences while working for CID. He testified that he has now been released from that oath. Although his accounts contain some variations, in substance, he asserts that he was recruited to work undercover for CID, and, in that capacity, informed on other soldiers involved in theft and drug dealing. As part of his undercover work, he states that he was confined in the brig at Pearl Harbor for a month, in order to provide the Brig Reform Chief with information regarding mistreatment of prisoners by the guards. In addition to the stress caused by the fear of what would happen to him if he was caught informing, he stated that he was pistol whipped, beaten up, forced to do sit-ups with a guard standing on his chest, and otherwise abused and terrorized by guards. In addition, he claims that he witnessed an attempted murder and an assault, and was threatened with sexual assault. The second series of stressors reportedly occurred after his release from the brig, when he was assigned to investigate thefts from or drugs arriving by airplanes from Vietnam. He states that he was required to search in returning body bags containing the bodies of soldiers killed in combat for these items, which was very stressful. In addition, he was suspected of being an informer, and was threatened and once beaten up because of that. Judge [M.] is requested to indicate whether the above information is sufficient to refresh his recollection. If so, he should provide a signed statement setting forth his recollections regarding the events reported by the veteran. If the information does not refresh his memory, and he indicates that additional information may refresh his memory, he should be provided with such information as is feasible, and in accordance with Privacy Act requirements. (Consent to release the above information to Judge [M.] has been provided by the appellant's motion to have the case vacated and remanded specifically to provide Judge [M.] with additional information to refresh his recollection.) In June 2001, the RO wrote to Judge M. and provided the account of the veteran's claimed stressors. In response, the Judge wrote back stating that I am in receipt of your letter of June 8, 2001, a copy of which is enclosed. In answer to your inquiry contained in that letter, I have no knowledge of any of the facts stated therein. Specifically, I was not "the Brig Reform Chief at the Pearl Harbor brig during his confinement" or at any other time. Meanwhile, the veteran called the RO and stated that the VA should call G.W. to confirm the veteran's statement of having PTSD symptoms due to seeing dead bodies in body bags which he had to inspect for stolen equipment. He stated that G.W. was the CID agent who supervised the veteran. A report of contact dated in August 2001 shows that the RO contacted G.W. by telephone. It was explained to him what the veteran was contending regarding undercover work such as searching body bags for stolen equipment. G.W. stated that his memory was fuzzy. To the best of his recollection he did remember the veteran, but stated that the veteran was in a clerical position in the security unit in which he worked. G.W. said his own job consisted of routine law enforcement activities such as traffic investigations and that he never did any undercover work except for one time when he was looking for a peeping tom in Navy Officer housing. He stated that he could not remember the veteran doing undercover work. He again mentioned that he had a fuzzy memory and was not absolutely sure what the veteran did, but that he was sure about the clerical position that the veteran was assigned to. III. Criteria Service connection may be granted for disability due to disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001). If a chronic disease such as a psychosis is manifest to a compensable degree within one year after separation from service, the disorder may be presumed to have been incurred in service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2001). Establishing service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder requires (1) a current medical diagnosis of post- traumatic stress disorder; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Anglin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 361, 367 (1998); Cohen v Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997). The Board notes that the regulation pertaining to claims for service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder was revised during the course of this appeal. See 64 Fed. Reg. 32807-32808 (1999). Pursuant to Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991), where a law or regulation changes after the claim has been filed or reopened and before administrative or judicial review has been concluded, the version most favorable to the veteran applies unless Congress provided otherwise or permitted the VA Secretary to do otherwise and the Secretary did so. Prior to March 7, 1997, governing regulations provided that service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder required medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. If the claimed stressor is related to combat, service department evidence that the veteran engaged in combat or that the veteran was awarded the Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat citation will be accepted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as conclusive evidence of the claimed inservice stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). However, on June 18, 1999, and retroactive to March 7, 1997, that regulation was amended to read as follows: Service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with Sec. 4.125(a) of this chapter, a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, and hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. If the evidence establishes that the veteran was a prisoner-of-war under the provisions of Sec. 3.1(y) of this part and the claimed stressor is related to that prisoner-of-war experience, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions and hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (effective March 7, 1997). If the diagnosis of a mental disorder does not conform with American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) or is not supported by the findings on the examination report, the rating agency shall return the report to the examiner to substantiate the diagnosis. 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a). In adjudicating a claim for service connection for PTSD, the VA is required to evaluate the supporting evidence in light of the places, types, and circumstances of service, as evidenced by service records, the official history of each organization in which the veteran served, the veteran's military records, and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), 3.304; see Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993). The Board notes that if the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Where the claimed stressor is not related to combat, "credible supporting evidence" is required and "the appellant's testimony, by itself, cannot as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a noncombat stressor." See Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). The requisite additional evidence may be obtained from sources other than the veteran's service records. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (table). In Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997), the Court clarified the analysis to be followed in adjudicating a claim for service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. The Court pointed out that the VA has adopted the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) in amending 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.125 and 4.126. See 61 Fed. Reg. 52695-52702 (1996). Therefore, the Court took judicial notice of the effect of the shift in diagnostic criteria. The major effect is that the criteria have changed from an objective ("would evoke ... in almost anyone") standard in assessing whether a stressor is sufficient to trigger post- traumatic stress disorder, to a subjective standard. The criteria now require exposure to a traumatic event and response involving intense fear, helplessness, or horror. The question of whether a claimed stressor was severe enough to cause post-traumatic stress disorder in a particular individual is now a clinical determination for the examining mental health professional. See Cohen, supra. Nothing in Cohen, however, negates the need for a noncombat veteran to produce credible corroborating and supporting evidence of any claimed stressor used in supporting a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. Id.; Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996). The corroboration may be by service records or other satisfactory evidence. See Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). In Doran, a veteran's service records had been lost due to fire; however, his account of in-service stressors was corroborated by statements from fellow servicemen. The Court has stressed the necessity of complete development of the evidence if a PTSD claim is based on an alleged personal assault. See Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272, 276 (1999). In Patton, the Court pointed out that there are special evidentiary development procedures for PTSD claims based on personal assault contained in VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c) (Feb. 20, 1996), and former MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 7.46(c)(2) (Oct. 11, 1995). The general M21-1 provisions on PTSD claims in 5.14 require that in cases where available records do not provide objective or supportive evidence of the alleged in-service stressor, it is necessary to develop for this evidence. MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(b)(2). As to personal-assault PTSD claims, more particularized requirements are established regarding the development of "alternative sources" of information as service records may be devoid of evidence because many victims of personal assault, especially sexual assault and domestic violence, do not file official reports either with military or civilian authorities. MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c). Further, the provisions of subparagraphs (7) and (8) indicate that "[b]ehavior changes that occurred at the time of the incident may indicate the occurrence of an in-service stressor", and that "secondary evidence may need interpretation by a clinician, especially if it involves behavior changes" and that "[e]vidence that documents such behavior changes may require interpretation in relationship to the medical diagnosis by a VA neuropsychiatric physician." When read together, the Court states that the subparagraphs show that in personal-assault cases the Secretary has undertaken a special obligation to assist a claimant in producing corroborating evidence of an in-service stressor. Also in Patton, the Court qualified prior statements contained in other Court decisions indicating that "something more than medical nexus evidence is required to fulfill the requirement for 'credible supporting evidence'," and that "[a]n opinion by a mental health professional based on a post-service examination of the veteran cannot be used to establish the occurrence of the stressor." The Court stated that these quoted categorical statements were made in the context of discussing PTSD diagnoses other than those arising from personal assault. See Cohen, supra; Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). To that extent, the Court found that the above categorical statements in Cohen and Moreau, and other cases where that may have been in accordance, are not operative. In addition, the Court noted that in two places MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14, appeared improperly to require that the existence of an in-service stressor be shown by "the preponderance of the evidence." The Court clearly stated that any such requirement would be inconsistent with the benefit of the doubt doctrine which is applicable where the evidence is in equipoise. Patton, 12 Vet. App. at 280. IV. Analysis The veteran contends that the RO made a mistake by denying his claim for service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. He asserts that he currently suffers from that disorder as a direct result of stressors which he experienced during active service. As to the requirement under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) that there be medical evidence diagnosing post-traumatic stress disorder, the Board finds that in reviewing the veteran's psychiatric history, at least some of the medical evidence which has been obtained reflects that the veteran has been given a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. Significantly, however, the evidence which is of record does not establish that the veteran was exposed to a stressor in service. In the present case, the veteran reported his claimed stressors on various occasions. Based on a review of the veteran's statements and testimony, the veteran's alleged stressors can be encapsulated into three specific events or categories. The first category of stressors, the events alleged to have occurred during his service as a merchant seaman, cannot, as a matter of law, form the basis of his claim for PTSD. As noted in the joint motion for remand, the veteran's traumatic experiences while a merchant seaman during the Vietnam War, assuming they actually occurred, cannot be used to support his claim for service connection for PTSD, since his service as a merchant seaman is not active military service under either 38 C.F.R. § 3.1 or 3.7(x)(15). This is especially significant in that most, if not all, of the evaluators who have diagnosed PTSD have based such medical opinion on his accounts of events that he alleges occurred during his employment after service discharge as a merchant seaman. For example, the May 1990 evaluator made only references to events occurring during the veteran's service as a merchant seaman. At this time, the veteran himself made no reference to his active service from October 1963 to September 1965. The veteran has never contended he served in Vietnam while in the United States Navy. The veteran has also indicated that he searched and moved "body bags" of dead American members of the service during the Vietnam war, which the Board has designated as the second stressor claimed. However, he has provided no corroborating evidence to support the assertion that he was ever involved in the searching of "body bags" during his active service and his service personnel records do not support this assertion. In addition, he has provided no specific details from which meaningful research could be performed to confirm this stressor. In the case of Dizoglio, 9 Vet. App. 163, the Court, finding that there was no corroborating evidence in the record to support the veteran's contention that he had been assigned to unload "body bags" from an Army truck, supported the Board's determination denying his claim based on this stressor. Consequently, in light of Dizoglio and based on the evidence received, the occurrence of this alleged stressor is not supported by credible evidence and cannot form the foundation of his claim for PTSD. The veteran has reported being an undercover agent for the CID during his imprisonment at Barber's Point, Oahu, Hawaii, in 1964, witnessing beatings, and being assaulted by inmates and/or guards, which the Board has described as the third stressor cited by the veteran. At the request of the joint motion for remand, the Board was to contact the three individuals identified by the veteran in an attempt to obtain lay statements that could corroborate this stressor. This attempt has failed for one of the three individuals. For reasons noted above, Judge M. was located and contacted; however, such contact did not corroborate any alleged stressor. Although he had some recollection of the veteran, he denied knowledge of the stressors claimed by the veteran. Additionally, B.H. was contacted, and provided information that the veteran worked doing clerical duties rather than as an undercover agent. Thus, the evidence in this case, unlike the evidence in Doran, does not include any lay statements from other servicemen corroborating the veteran's account of his claimed stressors. The veteran's available service records do not demonstrate that he engaged in combat with the enemy. The veteran's DD Form 214 and other service personnel records show that his military occupational specialty was airport serviceman. This is not an occupational specialty which necessarily involves exposure to combat or any other stressful activity. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991) (in which the Court held that an appellant's military specialty of cannoneer did not demonstrate that his duties exposed him to a more than ordinary stressful environment). See also Hayes v. Brown, 3 Vet. App. 7 (1991) (in which the Court held that in light of the veteran's noncombat assignment to a construction engineering company, it was reasonable for the Board to require corroboration of the veteran's claimed stressors). The DD 214 does not show that he received any commendations or medals awarded exclusively for combat. The Board also notes that the veteran's service medical records do not contain any indication that he was involved in combat, that he was treated for injuries sustained due to an assault in jail, or that he developed a chronic psychiatric disorder during service. The Board also notes that the service medical and personnel records do not contain information which could confirm a personal assault during his detention in the brig such as (a) visits to a medical or counseling clinic or dispensary without a specific diagnosis or specific ailment; (b) a sudden request for change of MOS or duty station; (c) increased use of leave without an immediate reason; (d) changes in performance evaluations; (e) episodes of depression, panic attacks or anxiety; (f) increased or decreased use of prescription medication; (g) increased use of over-the-counter medication; (h) alcohol or substance abuse; (i) disregard for military or civilian authority; (j) obsessive behavior such as overeating or undereating; (k) tests for HIV or sexually transmitted diseases; (l) unexplained economic or social behavior changes; (m) treatment for physical injuries around the time of the claimed trauma; or (n) breakup of a primary relationship. Although the service personnel records reflect that he received low performance evaluations and had disregard for military authority, this had been the case even prior to the dates of his claimed stressors as is evidenced by his conviction for stealing surfboards. Thus, the veteran's service personnel and medical records do not provide any support for his claim for post-traumatic stress disorder as they do not demonstrate that he engaged in combat and do not provide any verification of any of his claimed stressors. The Board also notes that the veteran has not cited any alternative sources of evidence which could provide such corroboration. In light of the lack of evidence of behavior changes, interpretation by a clinician is not required. MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c). In reviewing the veteran's contentions and statements since his active service, as will be discussed subsequently, the Board finds that his assertions regarding his claimed stressors are not credible. Service personnel records clearly reveal that the veteran underwent a special court- martial in September 1964 for wrongfully appropriating three surfboards. He was confined at hard labor for one month, reduced in grade, and forfeited $55 dollars. In a March 1976 statement, the veteran specifically and unequivocally stated that, during his active service, he was imprisoned for misappropriating surf boards. He stated that he had committed this offense because he was "young and stupid," and not as part of an undercover operation or otherwise as part of his official duties. This account is wholly consistent with the service personnel records on file and was made at a time that the veteran was not seeking compensation for claimed PTSD. The assertion, first made in conjunction with the present claim, that the veteran's incarceration was based on a fabricated story of surfboard misappropriation which served as "cover" for his assignment as a secret agent for the CID and that the veteran could not provide a truthful account of these events for years following service because he signed a "loyalty oath" are uncorroborated and incredible. The veteran has submitted a certificate of training from the Department of the Navy revealing that he completed a course in criminology in November 1964 at Barber's Point, Oahu, Hawaii. This certificate does not support his contention that he worked for the CID or, more importantly, that he was incarcerated as an undercover CID agent. Based on a review of the record, it appears that the veteran completed this course during or after his incarceration, following his court martial in September 1964. This sequence of events is inconsistent with the contention that the course was taken in order to become an undercover investigator. Moreover, a detailed review of service personnel records indicates no reference to the CID. Neither these records nor the evidence as a whole shows that his incarceration at Barber's Point was part of any undercover operation. The veteran's own March 1976 statement, made at a time when a claim for compensation for PTSD was not at issue, shows that the veteran's incarceration was punishment for his misconduct and nothing else. The earliest allegation of undercover CID service of record is contained in an August 1990 statement, in which the veteran stated that he was an "undercover CID to find out who was stealing personal items of service men off of airplane flights . . ." No reference was made to undercover activities or abusive incidents while incarcerated. No reference was made to unloading or searching body bags for contraband. At a RO hearing in January 1991, the veteran testified that he underwent criminology training "on his own time" and further stated that "then they wanted me to go undercover and find out who was stealing surfboards and stuff like that." He stated that he did so and "was exposed to the Marine Corps Brig when I was involved with the surfboards." He went on to state that he was asked to provide information "about the mistreatment people experienced in the [brig]" and stated that he was "exposed to people with 45's that were beating on me and people standing on my chest screaming at me to do more sit ups when I had four compressed fractures of my spine." He reported that, on release from the brig, he was returned to a "security division" to investigate theft of items on flights returning from Vietnam. He stated that he was required at that time to sign a "loyalty oath" that he would "never say anything about it." He then stated, for the first time, that he was required to look in all body bags that contained the remains of service men, some of whom he knew, who died in Vietnam. Reportedly, he signed another "loyalty oath" of silence at that time. In later statements, the veteran indicates that he worked for the CIA. The only corroborated event is that the veteran was incarcerated for misappropriation of surfboards. There is no credible evidence to support the assertion that he was an undercover agent at any time or that he unloaded or searched the contents of body bags. There is no corroboration that the veteran was precluded from alluding to these events because of a claimed "loyalty oath" of secrecy. No logical explanation has been offered as to why such an eternal oath of silence would be required for performing the duties that the veteran claims he performed. In juxtaposition to these statements are the veterans earlier statements to the RO, in which he made no reference to his work as a special agent for the CID, loyalty oaths, or body bags. His March 1976 statement, confirming that he was imprisoned for misappropriation of surf boards (with no reference made to the CID) directly conflicts with his current statements that his incarceration was a cover for his work with the CID. In September 1985, he again makes no reference to any stressful event or psychiatric difficulties during his active service. The Board finds the veteran's account of in-service stressors during his incarceration for theft or during his active service to be without credibility. These stressors all are unconfirmed. Accordingly, the Board concludes that no such identified stressor occurred. Further attempts to verify the claimed stressors would be futile. Without exception, all of his earlier statements to the VA prior to his claim of PTSD conflict directly or indirectly with his current contentions. Service personnel records do not support the veteran's assertions that he ever served with the CID or CIA or that his incarceration was anything but punishment. When asked for specific information, he has either ignored the request or provided vague statements without referencing the names, places, dates, unit assignments, or any information which could lead to meaningful research to support these alleged stressors. His most recent assertions, contained in an evolving and ever-changing series of assertions, that he served aboard a CIA ship while a merchant seaman and that his incarceration was a "cover" for his work with the CID, are inconsistent with prior statements and without credibility. For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds that there is no credible corroborating evidence that the veteran was exposed to an in-service stressor. The Board finds that the evaluations which diagnosed PTSD relied on stressors outside the veteran's period of active service or were based on unconfirmed stressors which are grounded on the veteran's statements that are not credible. The May 1990 examiner clearly based the diagnosis of PTSD on alleged unconfirmed stressors that are contended to have occurred outside of the veteran's active service. The examiner related this disability to a catastrophic life-threatening stressor in the "battle in Da Nang" and to a pre-service brain injury. The VA physician at the Hilo Primary Care Clinic related the veteran's PTSD to the unloading of body bags of recently killed soldiers and stressors of a life-threatening nature while serving as a merchant seaman and becoming stranded in South Vietnam during a period of intense combat action. The March 1992 psychiatric evaluation again made a diagnosis of PTSD based on unconfirmed stressors or stressors which occurred outside the veteran's period of active service. In summary, the record does not corroborate the veteran's accounts of his stressful incidents he claims he was exposed to during his active service. The Board has been directed to include in its decision an analysis of the credibility or probative value of evaluators' findings that the veteran suffers from PTSD primarily related to his active duty stressors. In this regard, while PTSD has been diagnosed, the question of whether he was exposed to a stressor in service is a factual determination and VA adjudicators are not bound to accept the veteran's statements of exposure to combat simply because treating medical providers have done so. Wood, 1 Vet. App. at 193. There are no confirmed stressors. The statements from the veteran have been found to be not credible. As a result, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), the diagnoses of PTSD cannot form the groundwork necessary to support the veteran's claim. In the absence of a verified stressor, the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder is not sufficient to support the claim. An opinion by a mental health professional based on a post-service examination of the veteran cannot be used to establish the occurrence of the stressor. See Cohen 10 Vet. App. at 145 (citing Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996)). The only exception to this rule, namely an opinion pursuant to MANUAL M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c) that a personal assault occurred in service based on the presence of behavior changes at the time of the claimed incident, is not applicable as there is no evidence of such behavioral changes. The Board is not required to accept an unsubstantiated diagnosis that the alleged post- traumatic stress disorder had its origins in the veteran's active service. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 192 (1991); West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 78 (1994). Since the veteran's claimed stressors have not been verified, the diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder were based on a questionable history that is inadequate for rating purposes, and may not be relied upon by the Board. See West, 7 Vet. App. at 78. The reasonable doubt doctrine is not applicable in this case as the evidence is not evenly balanced. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2001). Accordingly, the Board concludes that post-traumatic stress disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by service. ORDER Service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder is denied. JEFF MARTIN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals IMPORTANT NOTICE: We have attached a VA Form 4597 that tells you what steps you can take if you disagree with our decision. We are in the process of updating the form to reflect changes in the law effective on December 27, 2001. See the Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-103, 115 Stat. 976 (2001). In the meanwhile, please note these important corrections to the advice in the form: ? These changes apply to the section entitled "Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims." (1) A "Notice of Disagreement filed on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer required to appeal to the Court. (2) You are no longer required to file a copy of your Notice of Appeal with VA's General Counsel. ? In the section entitled "Representation before VA," filing a "Notice of Disagreement with respect to the claim on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer a condition for an attorney-at-law or a VA accredited agent to charge you a fee for representing you.