Citation Nr: 0205871 Decision Date: 06/05/02 Archive Date: 06/13/02 DOCKET NO. 98-00 420 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Columbia, South Carolina THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression. 2. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The appellant and her spouse ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD D. J. Drucker, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from July 1990 to October 1992. The issue of entitlement to service connection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression, was previously denied by Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) rating decisions of October 1995 and January 1996. The veteran did not appeal the decision within one year of notification in February 1996. This current matter came before the Board of Veterans' Appeals on appeal from rating decisions of the Columbia VARO. By rating action in March 1997, the RO denied the veteran's claim of service connection for a nervous disorder. In June 1997, the RO denied the veteran's claim of service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The veteran and her spouse appeared at a hearing before a Hearing Officer at the RO in January 1998, at which time they offered testimony regarding the claims for a nervous disorder and PTSD. A transcript of that hearing is of record. Supplemental statements of the case (SSOC's), regarding a nervous disorder and PTSD, were issued in January 1998 and April 1998. In September 2000, the Board denied the veteran's claims of service connection for a nervous disorder and PTSD, and remanded her claim for an increased rating for a back disability to the RO for further evidentiary development. The veteran appealed the Board's September 2000 decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). In that litigation, a Motion for Partial Remand and to Stay Proceedings was filed by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, averring that remand was required due to the recent enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Public Law No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000). In an Order of June 2001, the CAVC vacated the Board's decision (other than the remand portion thereof) and remanded the matter, pursuant to the Secretary's motion. As set forth in detail below, the VCAA substantially amended existing law regarding the requirement of a well-grounded claim, and the notice and assistance to be afforded claimants for VA benefits. A copy of the CAVC's Order in this matter has been placed in the claims file. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The RO denied the veteran's claim for service connection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression, in October 1995 and January 1996. She was notified of each denial, and did not appeal. 2. The evidence submitted since the January 1996 rating decision, consisting of the veteran's contentions regarding a nervous disorder in service or within one year of service, is not new, because similar evidence was considered in January 1996 and the new evidence that was submitted since January 1996 is not so significant that it must be considered to fairly decide the merits of the claim for service connection for a nervous disorder. 3. The veteran has a current medical diagnosis of PTSD, and several medical providers have related the diagnosis to her claimed in-service sexual assault/rape. 4. The veteran's claimed in-service stressor is not related to combat. 5. The occurrence of the veteran's claimed in-service sexual assault/rape is not supported by credible corroborating evidence. 6. The current diagnosis of PTSD is based upon unsubstantiated reports of a stressor as provided by the veteran, which stressor has been rebutted by the evidence of record. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The January 1996 rating action is final, and evidence submitted since that decision does not constitute new and material evidence to reopen the veteran's claim of service conection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 3.156(a) (2001). 2. PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated during, or as a result of, active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100- 5103A, 5106-7 (West Supp. 2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 45,630-632 (Aug. 29, 2001) (to be codified as amended at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f) (2001); 67 Fed. Reg. 10,330 (March 7, 2002), (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. New and Material Evidence A. Preliminary Matters-Veterans Claims Assistance Act There has been a significant change in the law during the pendency of this appeal, with the enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Public Law No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100-5103A, 5106-7 (West Supp. 2001)). This new statute eliminated the requirement of a well-grounded claim and redefined the obligations of VA with respect to the duty to assist claimants in developing evidence in support of their claims. The VCAA also enhanced VA's duty to notify a claimant as to the information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim for VA benefits. See 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001) (regulations implementing VCAA). The change in the law is applicable to all claims filed on or after the date of enactment, November 9, 2000, or filed before the date of enactment and not yet final as of that date. VCAA § 7(a), 114 Stat. 2096, 2099; 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 Note (Effective and Applicability Provisions) (West Supp. 2001). See generally Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 280 (2001); see also Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991) and infra. In this case, even though the RO did not have the benefit of the explicit provisions of the VCAA when the current claim was filed, VA's duties have been adequately fulfilled during the pendency of the claim. Of significance in the present matter, is language in the new statute that provides: Rule with respect to disallowed claims.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the Secretary to reopen a claim that has been disallowed except when new and material evidence is presented or secured, as described in section 5108 of this title. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(f) (West Supp. 2001). Clearly, therefore, to whatever extent the new legislation has changed the approach to developing evidence in claims, it has not modified the longstanding requirement that a previously denied claim may not be reopened and readjudicated unless, and until, there has been a finding that new and material evidence has been submitted. Amendments to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) that define new and material evidence are effective prospectively for claims filed on or after August 29, 2001. See 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620, 45,630 (Aug. 29, 2001) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a)). Since the veteran's request to reopen her claim was filed in March 1997, the regulations in effect prior to August 29, 2001, are for application. B. New and Material Evidence to Reopen the Claim In order to establish service connection for a disability, there must be objective evidence which establishes that such disability either began in or was aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110 and 1131. Certain chronic diseases will be considered to have been incurred in service, under certain circumstances, even though there is no evidence of such disease during service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a) (2001). Psychosis is defined by law as a chronic disease, and the presumptive period is one year; thus, a psychotic disorder will be considered to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of it in service, if it became manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after separation from service. Id. As noted above, the January 1996 rating decision was final based upon the evidence then of record. However, a claim will be reopened if new and material evidence is submitted. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). If the Board determines that the evidence is new and material, the case is reopened and evaluated in light of all the evidence, both new and old. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 145 (1991). In making this determination, the Board must look at all of the evidence submitted since the time that the claim was finally disallowed on any basis, not only since the time that the claim was last disallowed on the merits. In the present case, this means that the Board must look at all the evidence submitted since the January 1996 decision which was the final adjudication that disallowed the veteran's claim. New and material evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under consideration which is neither cumulative nor redundant and which by itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d. 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Evidence that is solely cumulative or repetitious in character will not serve as a basis for reconsideration of a previous decision. The Federal Circuit Court has held that the regulatory standard alone must be the test of materiality. Hodge, supra. Therefore, the ruling in Hodge must be considered as easing the veteran's evidentiary burden in seeking to reopen a previously and finally denied claim. In determining whether new and material evidence has been presented, VA must initially decide whether evidence submitted since the prior final denial is, in fact, new. As indicated by the regulation cited above, and by judicial caselaw, "new" evidence is that which was not of record at the time of the last final disallowance ("on any basis" - merits or otherwise) of the claim, and is not "merely cumulative" of other evidence that was then of record. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 283-285 (1996). This analysis is undertaken by comparing newly received evidence with the evidence previously of record. After evidence is determined to be new, the next question is whether it is material. Although, Hodge overruled Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991) and its progeny as to the materiality test, it does not appear that the analysis as to what is new evidence has been overruled. See Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321, 326 (1999), noting that Hodge did not deal with the test for determining whether the evidence is new, which is a determination separate from whether it is material. See also Anglin v. West, 203 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("nothing in Hodge suggests that the understanding of 'newness' as embodied in the first prong of the Colvin test is inadequate or in conflict with the regulatory definition of new and material evidence"). As to the materiality standard, the Federal Circuit's holding in Hodge has been further interpreted by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims: "Hodge provides for a reopening standard which calls for judgments as to whether new evidence (1) bears directly or substantially on the specific matter, and (2) is so significant that it must be considered to fairly decide the merits of the claim." Fossie v. West, 12 Vet. App. 1, 4 (1998), motion for recon/review denied, 12 Vet. App. 234 (1999). In determining whether newly submitted evidence is material under the caselaw discussed above, we are further guided by the Federal Circuit Court's discussion of the "uniquely pro-claimant" quality of the veterans' benefits system such that, although "not every piece of new evidence is 'material' . . . we are concerned . . . that some new evidence may well contribute to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a veteran's injury or disability, even where it will not eventually convince the Board to alter its ratings decision." Hodge v. West, supra, at 1363. The credibility of new evidence is assumed for the limited purpose of determining whether it is material. Evans, supra; Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510 (1992). This principle has been reaffirmed by the Court. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999) (per curiam). As noted above, under the precedent decision of the Court in the Evans case, supra, in order to reopen a previously and finally denied claim there must be new and material evidence entered into the record since the most recent denial on any basis, either on the merits or on an attempted reopening. Id. at 285. When the claim for service connection for a nervous disorder was last denied by the RO in January 1996, the record consisted of the service medical records, a May 1995 private hospital report, a report of a September 1995 VA compensation examination, private treatment reports, dated from May 1995 to August 1995, and private treatment reports, dated from February 1993 to January 1996. Essentially, the veteran's service medical records are completely silent regarding any findings or diagnosis of a nervous disorder. While private treatment reports indicate that the veteran was followed by a social worker and, in February 1993, was diagnosed as suffering from an adjustment disorder (not shown to be a chronic disease and not identified as a psychosis as required for service connection under the law), the records do not reflect hospital admission or treatment for a nervous disorder within one year after her discharge from service. The medical evidence of record in January 1996 shows that the veteran was first diagnosed with a chronic nervous disorder in May 1995, more than one and one-half years following her discharge from service. By a rating action in January 1996, the RO denied the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include major depression and anxiety, based upon a finding that the service medical records did not reveal the presence of any psychiatric disorder during service. The RO received the veteran's request to reopen her claim in March 1997. The evidence received since the January 1996 decision, which was the final, unappealed determination regarding her claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, essentially consists of a November 1996 VA treatment report; VA medical records and reports, dated from September 1996 to January 1998; an April 1997 statement; an April 1997 medical statement; an October 29, 1997 report of contact (on VA Form 119); service medical records, dated from December 1991 to October 1992; a copy of a report from the United States Criminal Investigation Command dated from September 1992 to October 1992; the veteran's testimony offered at the personal hearing before a hearing officer at the RO in January 1998; and a March 1998 lay statement. In sum, the newly received medical records reflect findings of major depression and PTSD. While this evidence is new, it is not material as to the issue of major depression, as it merely shows that the veteran currently suffers from a psychiatric disorder but has no bearing on the issue of whether a psychiatric disorder was present in service or whether a psychosis was present within one year of service. While the new service medical records reflect that the veteran was seen at the community mental health service from September 1991 to October 1992, where she received counseling for "situational stress" and marital discord, they do not report any finding of a psychiatric disorder during service. In fact, during a clinical visit in October 1992, it was noted that the veteran's mood displayed no evidence of depression, although she had said that she was feeling depressed and it was noted that she displayed a normal behavior pattern. Therefore, these records are not so significant that they must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the case. According to the April 1997 statement from the clinical staff chaplain at the psychiatric unit, at the Dorn VA Medical Center, dated in April 1997, the veteran was his patient during the months of November and December 1996, during which time her diagnosis was extreme depression with suicidal ideations. This document can only be viewed as a confirmation that the veteran suffers from a psychiatric disorder, currently diagnosed as depression, a fact that was previously considered in January 1996. Thus, it is not so significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits of the claim for service connection. The veteran's testimony at her January 1998 personal hearing at the RO reiterates her contentions that she developed a psychiatric disorder during military service. Such evidence is not new, because similar contentions were made at the time of the January 1996 rating decision. The Board notes that the lay statements from the veteran's husband and friend are new, insofar as they were not previously considered by the RO; however, the statements are not material because they are silent as to any indications that the currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder had its onset in military service or within one year thereof. Thus, the Board finds that the evidence received subsequent to the January 1996 rating action is not new and material, and does not serve to reopen the veteran's claim for service connection for a nervous disorder, to include depression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (1999). Accordingly, the benefit sought on appeal must be denied. The Board further notes that, in its June 1997 statement of the case, the RO cited to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156, the regulation discussed with approval in Hodge, and quoted that regulation's pertinent language as it relates to new and material evidence claims. The RO's analysis, however, by concluding that "[t]o justify a reopening of a claim, on the basis of new and material evidence, there must be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, both new and old, would change the outcome," appears to be predicated, in part, upon language found impermissible by Hodge. It is, therefore, unclear whether the RO has appropriately considered the veteran's claim under the language of section 3.156. This raises the question as to whether the case should be remanded in order to protect the veteran's due process rights, by ensuring that the RO did consider the case using the correct interpretation of the law. With respect to the veteran's current appeal, the Board finds that our proceeding to a decision, without remanding to the RO, does not unduly prejudice the veteran. In reaching this conclusion, we note that the evidence submitted by the veteran does not "bear directly or substantially on the specific matter under consideration." As indicated above, the veteran has submitted evidence that is either duplicative or cumulative of the evidence considered in the previous final decision. Therefore, after careful review of the record, the Board can find no reason that a remand of the veteran's appeal, for reconsideration by the RO under the Hodge new-and-material-evidence standard, would be judicially expedient or otherwise result in a different finding. Thus, such a remand would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran. The Court has held that such remands are to be avoided. See Winters v. West, 12 Vet. App. 203 (1999) (en banc), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Winters v. Gober, 219 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). Accordingly, as the veteran has not presented new and material evidence to reopen her previously denied claim of entitlement to service connection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression, that claim may not be reopened. II. Service Connection For Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder A. Preliminary Matters-VCAA The appellant has requested for service connection for PTSD. Before addressing this issue, the Board notes, as briefly discussed above, the enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, which substantially modified the circumstances under which VA's duty to assist claimants applies, and how that duty is to be discharged. The VCAA revised the former section 5107(a) of title 38, United States Code, to eliminate the requirement that a claimant must come forward first with evidence to well ground a claim before the Secretary of Veterans Affairs is obligated to assist the claimant in developing the facts pertinent to the claim. Judicial caselaw is inconsistent as to whether the new law is to be given retroactive effect. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has held that the entire VCAA potentially affects claims pending on or filed after the date of enactment (as well as certain claims that were finally denied during the period from July 14, 1999, to November 9, 2000). See generally Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 280 (2001); see also Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308 (1991). That analysis would include cases which had been decided by the Board before the VCAA, but were pending in Court at the time of its enactment. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently held that only section 4 of the VCAA (which eliminated the well-grounded claim requirement) is retroactively applicable to decisions of the Board entered before the enactment date of the VCAA, and that section 3(a) of the VCAA (covering duty-to-notify and duty-to-assist provisions) is not retroactively applicable to pre-VCAA decisions of the Board. Bernklau v. Principi, No. 00-7122 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2002); See also Dyment v. Principi, No. 00-7075 (Fed. Cir. April 24, 2002). Although the Federal Circuit appears to have reasoned that the VCAA may not retroactively apply to claims or appeals pending on the date of its enactment, the Court stated that it was not deciding that question at this time. In this regard, the Board notes that VAOPGCPREC 11-2000 (Nov. 27, 2000) appears to hold that the VCAA is retroactively applicable to claims pending on the date of its enactment. Further, the regulations issued to implement the VCAA are expressly applicable to "any claim for benefits received by VA on or after November 9, 2000, the VCAA's enactment date, as well as to any claim filed before that date but not decided by VA as of that date." 66 Fed. Reg. 45,629 (Aug. 29, 2001). Precedent opinions of the chief legal officer of the Department, and regulations of the Department, are binding on the Board. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(c) (West 1991). Therefore, for purposes of the present case, the Board will assume that the VCAA is applicable to claims or appeals pending before the RO or the Board on the date of its enactment. VA has published regulations to implement many of the provisions of the VCAA. See 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001) (to be codified as amended at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, and 3.326(a)). The intended effect of these regulations is to establish clear guidelines consistent with the intent of Congress regarding the timing and scope of assistance VA will provide a claimant who files a substantially complete application for VA benefits. These new regulations also provide guidelines regarding VA's duties to notify claimants of necessary information or evidence and to assist claimants in obtaining evidence. The regulations, which in pertinent part are effective as of the date of enactment of the VCAA, interpret and implement the mandates of the statute, "and do not provide any rights other than those provided by the VCAA." 66 Fed. Reg. 45,629. For the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that the requirements of the VCAA and the implementing regulations, to the extent they are applicable, have been satisfied in this matter. Changes potentially relevant to the appellant's appeal include the establishment of specific procedures for advising the claimant and his or her representative of information required to substantiate a claim, a broader VA obligation to obtain relevant records and advise claimants of the status of those efforts, and an enhanced requirement to provide a VA medical examination or obtain a medical opinion in cases where such a procedure is necessary to make a decision on a claim. Clearly, substantial compliance with the VCAA has been achieved in the present case. There can be no question as to the veteran's awareness of the provisions of the legislation, since she was served with a copy of the Secretary's Motion for Partial Remand and to Stay Proceedings that was filed with the CAVC after the bill became law. In addition, she was provided, by the Court, a copy of the Order remanding her case. Moreover, the Board afforded the veteran ample time in which to proffer evidence and/or argument after the case was returned from the Court, and her service organization representative indicated, in a Written Brief Presentation in May 2002, that the case, including the CAVC's Order, had been carefully reviewed. Otherwise, no response has been received to the Board's letter, in October 2001, soliciting any additional argument or evidence which the veteran or her representative might wish to submit. We note that, even before the VCAA was enacted, the appellant was advised, by virtue of a detailed statement of the case (SOC), and supplemental statements of the case (SSOC's), issued during the pendency of this appeal, of the pertinent substantive law, and what the evidence must show in order to substantiate her claim. We, therefore, believe that appropriate notice has been given in this case. The Board notes, in addition, that a substantial body of lay and medical evidence was developed with respect to the appellant's claim, and the SOC and SSOC's issued by the RO clarified what evidence would be required to establish service connection for PTSD. The appellant responded to the RO's communications with additional evidence and argument, thus curing (or rendering harmless) any previous omissions. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 393-94 (1993), infra; VAOPGCPREC 16-92 (57 Fed. Reg. 49,747 (1992)). Accordingly, the Board believes that VA has no outstanding duty to inform the appellant or her representative that any additional information or evidence is needed to substantiate her claim. VCAA § 3(a), 114 Stat. 2096, 2096-97 (now codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5103). Likewise, it appears that all obtainable evidence identified by the appellant relative to her claim has been obtained and associated with the claims files, and that she has not identified any other pertinent evidence, not already of record, which would need to be obtained for an equitable disposition of this appeal. Further, the Act also requires VA to provide a medical examination when such an examination is necessary to make a decision on the claim. See VCAA § 3(a) (now codified at 38 U.S.C. 5103A(d)). The Board is satisfied that all relevant facts have been properly and sufficiently developed, and that the appellant will not be prejudiced by our proceeding to a decision on the basis of the evidence currently of record regarding her claim for service connection for PTSD. Of necessity, because the RO did not have the opportunity to adjudicate the veteran's claim pursuant to the VCAA, the Board has considered the applicability of Bernard v. Brown, supra. In Bernard, the Court held that, before the Board addresses in a decision a question that has not been addressed by the RO, it must consider whether the claimant has been given adequate notice of the need to submit evidence or argument, an opportunity to submit such evidence or argument, and an opportunity to address the question at a hearing, and whether the claimant has been prejudiced by any denials of those opportunities. As discussed in detail above, the Board has reviewed the evidence of record and determined that all notification and development actions required by the new legislation appear to have been completed to the extent necessary under the circumstances. Accordingly, we find that VA has satisfied its duty to assist the veteran in apprising him as to the evidence needed, and in obtaining evidence pertaining to his claims, under both former law and the new VCAA, to the extent it is applicable. The Board, therefore, finds that no useful purpose would be served in remanding this matter for yet more development. Such a remand would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA, with no additional benefit flowing to the appellant. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has held that such remands are to be avoided. See Winters v. West, supra; Soyini v. Derwinski, supra; Sabonis v. Brown, supra. In fact, the Court has stated, "The VCAA is a reason to remand many, many claims, but it is not an excuse to remand all claims." Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165, 178 (2001) (en banc). It is the Board's responsibility to evaluate the entire record on appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001). When there is an approximate balance in the evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2001); VCAA § 4, 114 Stat. 2096, 2098-99 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)). In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims held that a veteran need only demonstrate that there is an "approximate balance of positive and negative evidence" in order to prevail. The Court has also stated, "It is clear that to deny a claim on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim." Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert. B. Factual Background The records indicate that the veteran served on active duty from July 1990 to October 1992. Service medical records indicate that she was seen for counseling in January 1992, at which time it was noted that she was 24 weeks pregnant, with marital discord and apparent adjustment problems. It was noted that the veteran was under stress due to her problems with her marriage; she was reported to be motivated and willing to go through counseling at the mental health service for stress management. No suicidal or homicidal ideations were noted, but she complained of not eating or sleeping. No pertinent diagnosis was reported. Service medical records, dated from December 1991 to October 1992, were received in October 1997, and show that the veteran was followed at the community mental health service while on active duty. A problem list indicated that the veteran's major problems were situational stress, pregnancy (back problems), and marital discord. During a clinical visit in October 1992, it was noted that the unit reported that the veteran had a pending Field Grade Article 15 (non- judicial punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice) per adultery charges. The veteran related that she and a male, not her husband, had become good friends over the course of two months, and had engaged in sexual activity on three occasions. The veteran explained that she was upset after receiving information that her husband had cheated on her while he was stationed in Panama; as a result, she became enraged and wanted to "pay her husband back." These records do not reflect any finding or diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD. Also of record is the September 1992 report of an investigation conducted by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command. The report indicates that the office was notified by the Military Police (MP) of a rape which reportedly occurred on the 12th of that month. During the interview with the veteran, she related the incident that occurred on the day in question. In his statement, the named individual admitted that he and the veteran did have sexual relations several times on the night in question; however, he claimed that it was consensual. Following interviews with the veteran and the named subject, the Special Agent in Charge determined, on September 19, 1992, that there was not enough evidence to believe that the individual named had committed the crime of rape. The Special Agent also determined that, based upon statements rendered by both parties, there was enough probable cause to believe that both the veteran and the individual named had only committed the crime of adultery. The investigation was terminated on that date, on the basis that no crime was committed within the investigative purview of USACIC. An October 1992 Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action indicates that an Article 15 action was taken against the veteran based on a charge of adultery. According to post-service medical records, outpatient treatment reports from the Gorgas Army Community Hospital, dated from February 1993 to January 1996, indicate that the veteran had received eight sessions of individual and family counseling beginning on February 22, 1993. The veteran's treatment was centered on communications, marital problems, and problem solving. During a clinical visit in February 1993, the veteran was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and marital problems. During a clinical visit in March 1993, she reported problems with depression and being physically abused by members of her own family. During a subsequent visit in July 1993, the veteran reported that she had been sexually assaulted, but she did not want to talk about it. Private medical records, dated from May to August 1995, indicate that in May the veteran was referred to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. At that time, she indicated that she had been depressed since 1991 and realized that she could not function well. She stated that she had problems with her functioning at home and that she often became irritated with her husband and her children. The veteran related that she sometimes screamed at her kids, and had been crying every day. It was noted that she had seen a counselor from November 1992 to July 1994, at which time she was treated for several medical problems, including depression. She admitted to suicidal ideations since age twelve, and stated that past traumatic events included being raped in September 1992. The veteran reported that she was unable to tolerate stress and screamed at her husband and kids; she had lost friends and was currently isolating herself from others. On mental status evaluation, it was observed that the veteran's affect was sad; she easily cried throughout the interview, with decreased intensity in range of affect. She suffered from hopelessness and helplessness; her mood was very depressed, and she said she frequently cried three or four times a day. Her thoughts were mood congruent. She had recurrent suicidal ideation, with poor judgment and reasoning. She had a lack of motivation and lack of energy, suffered from anhedonia, and also had been withdrawn due to losing her friends. She was easily irritable, screaming at home at the children for no reason at all and then feeling very guilty about doing that. She stated that she had enough insight to know that she needed help and that she had "been depressed for too long of a time and needed some help now." The examiner indicated that the veteran was in need of hospitalization at time. She was oriented to time, place, and person. She appeared to be in good contact with reality. Her thoughts showed no delusional system, no hallucinations, no signs of psychosis, and no clouding of consciousness. The veteran suffered from no acute confusion, and she did not appear to be detoxifying, or in withdrawal from any substances. She denied the use of substances, and admitted to drinking only occasionally. The diagnostic impression was major depression with anxiety and insomnia. The veteran underwent VA examination in September 1995. The examination report reflects evaluation of a physical disability but does not describe any complaints or findings of a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. The veteran's initial claim for service connection for PTSD was received in November 1996. Submitted in support of the claim was a VA treatment report, dated in November 1996, indicating that she was followed on an outpatient basis for borderline personality disorder, with episodes of psychotic decompensation and PTSD. According to an October 29, 1996, report of contact (VA Form 119), the veteran was treated at the Columbia Vet Center for PTSD. The record notes that she was referred to the VAMC mental hygiene clinic for medication assessment for the anxiety and depression that accompanied the PTSD. VA outpatient treatment reports, dated from September 1996 to March 1997, show that the veteran received clinical evaluation and treatment for several disabilities, including a psychiatric disorder variously diagnosed as PTSD, depression, and borderline personal disorder. Treatment records indicate she was followed on an outpatient basis for borderline personality disorder with episodes of psychotic decompensation and PTSD. The records indicate that the veteran was referred to the mental health clinic on November 7, 1996, due to anxiety and depression; she indicated that she continued to experience suicidal ideations and was receiving marital counseling. The assessment was depressive disorder secondary to rape in 1992. The veteran was next seen on November 22, 1996, when it was noted that she was seen in the emergency room the night before. It was noted that the veteran had a history of PTSD secondary to assault while in service; she also suffered from borderline personality and depressive-type psychosis. The assessment was PTSD secondary to assault. A December 1996 treatment note indicates that a friend brought the veteran to the emergency room; she was tearful and upset; she admitted to striking herself in the face, but denied any suicidal or homicidal ideations. The diagnosis was depression. In March 1997, the veteran submitted a PTSD questionnaire in which she reported that, while on active duty at Fort Irwin, California, on September 12, 1992, she had invited some friends to her house to watch a boxing match on television; she indicated that she was ill at the time and was taking medications for back pain. The veteran stated that the medications sedated her and she went to sleep; she woke up to discover that a person who was a "friend" had forcibly had sexual relations with her while she was unconscious. She noted that he had had intercourse with her for five hours before she became alert enough to know what he was doing; she stated that she was in excruciating pain. The veteran explained that she told the person to stop, and she had to push him repeatedly until he got off her; they then engaged in an argument when she threatened to call the MP's, and he threatened to kill her and her family. The veteran indicated that, although her friend told her to go to the hospital and call the MP's, she was in so much pain and fear of retaliation that she did not follow the friend's advice; she noted that the individual subsequently stalked and threatened her. The veteran stated that, when she finally called the MP's, the man got in a car and tried to flee, but he was later caught and brought to custody. VA outpatient treatment reports, dated from April 1997 to November 1997, document that the veteran received clinical evaluation and treatment for several disabilities. These records also reflect that the veteran continued to attend and participate in weekly group sessions at the Women's clinic, where she discussed sources of stress in her life, and ways in which to handle those sources of stress. In an April 1997 written statement, the veteran's husband expressed having personal knowledge of his wife's condition after she was sexually assaulted in September 1992. He recalled being stationed in Panama on September 30, 1992, when the Red Cross notified him that his wife had been sexually assaulted by another soldier; he had no words to express how he felt upon hearing that news. He stated that his wife was in a lot of distress, both physically and mentally, at that time; he explained that the veteran did not seek immediate medical attention due to threats made by the assailant. He indicated that he brought the veteran back to Panama, where she was very depressed and cried every day; there was a complete change in her behavior towards him and the children, which caused marital problems. He reported that they subsequently sought psychological treatment, and learned that the veteran was suffering from depression and anxiety attacks. He also reported that the veteran continued to experience problems with depression, and was subsequently hospitalized in 1995; he noted that, in 1996, she was admitted to a VA hospital in South Carolina where she was diagnosed with PTSD, borderline personality disorder, and psychosis. According to an April 1997 medical statement from a clinical staff chaplain at the Dorn VAMC, the veteran was his patient at the psychiatric unit during the months of November and December 1996. The chaplain reported that the veteran's diagnosis was that of extreme depression with suicidal ideations; he stated that she was given a combination of medicine and group therapy in attempts to alleviate her symptoms. The chaplain said that he counseled the veteran privately on several occasions and noticed a frightened and angry patient who related several instances in her life when she was the victim of sexual attacks by both family members and a military soldier. The veteran indicated that the family member attacks happened at a very young age, but the traumatization never really came to a head until she was raped by a military member while on active duty; in her terms, "it was the straw that broke the camel's back." The chaplain noted that the veteran suffered from recurring nightmares and flashbacks from the rape, which stifled her mental and spiritual growth and caused her obsessive anger and fear; he stated that counseling and medicine only seemed to give her a temporary cure for a problem so deep and psychological that it will be years before she is able to function normally. Received in October 1997 were VA progress notes dated from November 1996 to October 1997, which show that the veteran continued to receive ongoing clinical evaluation, brief periods of hospitalization, and treatment for several disabilities, including symptoms of a psychiatric disorder. She attended and participated in a Women's group, in which they discussed stress and how it impacted upon the individuals, as well as the losses that they experienced. During a clinical visit in April 1997, it was noted that the veteran continued to struggle with her feelings of shame, fear, and guilt that had been a part of her life since she was a victim of acquaintance-rape while in the military. During a clinical visit in June 1997, the veteran expressed feelings of anxiety and depression. In July 1997, it was noted that she remained upset that the rape charges in service were dropped; she stated that it was "eating her up" every day. At her January 1998 personal hearing at the RO, the veteran reported that, although she had been to the mental health clinic while in service, she had not been seen by a psychologist prior to being sexually assaulted in September 1992. The veteran indicated that the reason she did not seek medical assistance after her assault is because she was much too scared. She stated that, although she reported the incident and a preliminary investigation was conducted, the charges were dropped without her knowledge; she only became aware that the charges had been dropped when she was charged with adultery. The veteran related that she did not seek any assistance from the civil authorities because she did not realize that she had a right to do that. The veteran's husband offered testimony regarding his knowledge of the incident, similar to that related in his statement dated in April 1997. He related that, after the incident, she had begun to experience flashbacks, nightmares, and crying spells; he stated that they both eventually went to counseling, at which time the doctor indicated that the veteran's problems were related to the sexual assault. VA treatment reports, dated from December 1997 to January 1998, show that the veteran received clinical evaluation and treatment for several disabilities, including a psychiatric disorder. In March 1998, the RO received a lay statement from an individual who reported having known the veteran for over a year, and having noted a constant change in her mental and physical health. She reported taking the veteran to an emergency room because of panic attacks resulting from the incident in service; she noted that the veteran cried in her sleep, seldom went out, and was a very scared person. It was the veteran's friend's belief that the veteran's current mental condition was a direct ramification of her rape that occurred on September 13, 1992, and that her family suffered because of that incident. C. Legal Analysis Pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110 and 1131, a veteran is entitled to disability compensation for disability resulting from personal injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by service. "A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service." Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993). The veteran seeks service connection for PTSD. Establishing service connection for PTSD requires (1) a current medical diagnosis of PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Anglin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 361, 367 (1998); Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353, 357 (1998), Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997); Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997). The diagnosis of PTSD must comply with the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV). See generally Cohen v. Brown, supra; 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (2001). The evidence required to support the occurrence of an in-service stressor varies "depending on whether or not the veteran was 'engaged in combat with the enemy'. . . . Where . . . VA determines that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy . . . the veteran's lay testimony, by itself, will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor." See Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). The requisite additional evidence may be obtained from sources other than the veteran's service medical records. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996), aff'd, 124 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (table); see also Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. at 98. Prior to March 7, 1997, governing regulations provided that service connection for PTSD required medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in- service stressor. If the claimed stressor was related to combat, service department evidence that the veteran engaged in combat or that the veteran was awarded the Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat citation would be accepted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as conclusive evidence of the claimed inservice stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1996). However, on June 18, 1999, and retroactive to March 7, 1997, that regulation was amended to read as follows: Service connection for [PTSD] requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with § 4.125(a) of this chapter; a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. If the evidence establishes that the veteran was a prisoner-of-war under the provisions of § 3.1(y) of this part and the claimed stressor is related to that prisoner-of- war experience, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions and hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in- service stressor. 64 Fed. Reg. 32,807 (June 18, 1999), now codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2001) (effective March 7, 1997). That amendment implemented the Cohen decision, which that had held that 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) did not adequately reflect the law of the governing statute, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b). The effective date of the amendment was March 7, 1997, the date the Cohen decision was issued by the Court. More recently, section 3.304(f) was again amended, with specific regard to PTSD claims based upon personal assault. The regulation now reads: Service connection for [PTSD] requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with § 4.125(a) of this chapter; a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. Although service connection may be established based on other in-service stressors, the following provisions apply for specified in-service stressors as set forth below: (1) If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. (2) If the evidence establishes that the veteran was a prisoner-of-war under the provisions of § 3.1(y) of this part and the claimed stressor is related to that prisoner-of-war experience, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in- service stressor. (3) If a [PTSD] claim is based on in-service personal assault, evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records may corroborate the veteran's account of the stressor incident. Examples of such evidence include, but are not limited to: records from law enforcement authorities, rape crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians; pregnancy tests or tests for sexually transmitted diseases; and statements from family members, roommates, fellow service members, or clergy. Evidence of behavior changes following the claimed assault is one type of relevant evidence that may be found in these sources. Examples of behavior changes that may constitute credible evidence of the stressor include, but are not limited to: a request for a transfer to another military duty assignment; deterioration in work performance; substance abuse; episodes of depression, panic attacks, or anxiety without an identifiable cause; or unexplained economic or social behavior changes. VA will not deny a [PTSD] claim that is based on in-service personal assault without first advising the claimant that evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records or evidence of behavior changes may constitute credible supporting evidence of the stressor and allowing him or her the opportunity to furnish this type of evidence or advise VA of potential sources of such evidence. VA may submit any evidence that it receives to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for an opinion as to whether it indicates that a personal assault occurred. 67 Fed. Reg. 10,330 (March 7, 2002), to be codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The effective date of the amendment was March 7, 2002, the date of its issuance as a final rule. When regulations are changed during the pendency of an appeal, the veteran is entitled to a decision on the claim under the regulation most favorable thereto. See Fischer v. West, 11 Vet. App. 121, 123 (1998), quoting Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 312-313 (1991). Here, we observe that the RO, in its discussion of PTSD in the January 1998 SSOC, referred to the obsolete, "clear diagnosis" version of the regulation. If the present case turned upon the diagnosis, we might be compelled to remand this issue for the RO to reconsider the matter under the new regulation. However, because the Board is not directly questioning the diagnosis of PTSD, we believe that remand would simply delay the resolution of this claim unnecessarily, with no benefit to the veteran. See Winters, Soyini, Sabonis, supra. Moreover, the 2002 amendment to section 3.304(f) also does not require further development of this case, because there is no unresolved factual issue as to the occurrence of the scenario which constitutes the claimed personal assault "stressor" in service. As will be discussed below, the record documents that the asserted physical contact in service was not nonconsensual assault, and the veteran has not alluded to any additional information which would counter that evidence. The Board notes that the veteran has contended that another soldier raped her while she was on active duty in September 1992, and that he subsequently threatened her and her family. There has been a medical diagnosis of PTSD, attributed to the alleged stressor incidents, made by VA physicians at the Columbia VAMC. Accordingly, the Board finds that there is evidence of a stressor incident or incidents in service, evidence of a current disability, and also seemingly competent evidence that the current disability is a "residual" of the stressor experienced in service. With that in mind, the Board must review the claim on its merits and account for the evidence that it finds to be persuasive and unpersuasive and provide reasoned analysis for rejecting evidence submitted by or on behalf of the claimant. Gilbert, supra. For a claim to be denied on its merits, the evidence must preponderate against the claim. Alemany v. Brown, supra. As noted above, the Board is not directly questioning the diagnosis of PTSD in this claim. However, by law, the evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service to support a diagnosis of PTSD will vary depending upon whether the veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy." See Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353 (1998) (Board must make a specific finding as to whether the veteran engaged in combat). If the claimed stressor is not combat related, the veteran's lay testimony, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain credible supporting evidence from any source that corroborates the veteran's testimony or statements. YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 397 (1998); Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 147. In the particular case of claimed personal assault, VA has established special procedures for evidentiary development. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 (hereinafter Manual M21-1), Part III, paragraph 5.14c (Feb. 20, 1996) (substantially enlarging on the former Manual M21-1, Part III, paragraph 7.47c(2) (Oct. 11, 1995)). These procedures take into account the difficulty establishing the occurrence of the stressor through standard evidence, and the need for development of alternate sources of evidence. The provisions of M21-1 dealing with PTSD are substantive rules that are the equivalent of VA regulations; VA is therefore required to follow these provisions. Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272, 277 (1999); YR, supra, 11 Vet. App. at 398-99; Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 139. Moreover, the 2002 amendments to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), quoted above, have augmented the substantive law pertaining to such claims. The final requirement of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) for service connection of PTSD is medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service stressor and the current disability. In cases of claimed personal assault, VA recognizes that some evidence may require interpretation by a clinician to establish a relationship to the diagnosis, per Manual M21-1, Part III, paragraph 5.14c(9). Accordingly, the general rule that post-service medical nexus evidence cannot be used to establish the occurrence of the stressor is not operative in such cases. Patton, 12 Vet. App. at 280. See Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 145; Moreau, 9 Vet. App. at 396. The starting point for any determination with regard to PTSD is whether there is a "stressor." Under all versions of the controlling regulation, there must be credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor(s) actually occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The question of whether the veteran was exposed to a stressor in service is a factual determination, and VA adjudicators are not bound to accept such statements simply because treating medical providers have done so. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991), aff'd on reconsideration, 1 Vet. App. 406 (1991); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614 (1992). The existence of an event alleged as a stressor that results in PTSD (though not the adequacy of the alleged event to cause PTSD) is an adjudicative, not a medical determination. See Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91 (1993). As the veteran does not allege that she engaged in combat, and as her reported stressor is not related to combat, her assertions, standing alone, cannot, as a matter of law, provide evidence to establish that an in-service event claimed as a stressor occurred. See Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163 (1996); West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994). Furthermore, service department records must support, and not contradict, the claimant's testimony regarding non-combat stressors. Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994). This does not mean that she cannot establish that the alleged in-service events occurred, it only means that other "credible supporting evidence from any source" is necessary. See Cohen. Since there is a diagnosis of PTSD here, it must be determined whether there is credible supporting evidence of the veteran's alleged stressor, i.e., whether service records or other independent credible evidence corroborates the alleged stressor. See Dizolgio, supra. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has held repeatedly that, where there is a current diagnosis of PTSD, it must be presumed that the physician(s) making the diagnosis accepted the sufficiency of the in-service stressor(s). Nevertheless, since the diagnostician does not generally have firsthand knowledge of whether a stressor actually occurred, credible evidence is required to verify that element. Pentecost v. Principi, ___ Vet. App. ___, No. 00-2083, slip op. at 3 (May 24, 2002). Based upon a review of the entire record in this case, and in view of the factors discussed above, the Board finds that the veteran's allegation of a rape in service has not been corroborated by the evidence of record. The record contains a statement from a clinical chaplain who treated the veteran at the psychiatric unit of the Dorn VAMC, indicating that the veteran suffered from extreme depression and suicidal ideations as a result of a rape in service. The record also contains a statement from the veteran's husband attesting to the fact that he was called by the American Red Cross and informed that the veteran had been raped in September 1992. Contravening the above evidence is the veteran's admission, noted in October 1992 near the time of her separation from service, that she had engaged in consensual sexual relations with the same individual, not her husband, on several occasions, to "get back" at her husband for reported infidelity on his part. The Board does not presume that the mere fact of an ongoing illicit sexual relationship with a man other than her husband would preclude the possibility of the veteran's being raped by him at a later time. However, further rebuttal of her rape allegation appears in the report of the investigation conducted by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command Office, which determined that there was insufficient evidence to believe that the individual named by the veteran had committed the crime of rape. Moreover, the chronology of the above events indicates that, the month after the alleged rape, the veteran was telling a clinician that she had engaged in sexual activity with the same man, on three occasions, because she was angry with her husband, and she did not state that any rape had taken place. Likewise, medical statements that accept a claimant's reports as credible and relate his/her PTSD to events experienced in service do not constitute the requisite credible evidence of a stressor. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). As noted above, several VA treatment reports reflect that the examiners have related that the veteran's currently diagnosed psychiatric disorders, particularly PTSD, were due to sexual assault/rape. Clearly, those treating physicians did not have review the veteran's service records, but based their premises of in-service sexual assault solely upon the veteran's statements to them. The filtering of the veteran's account of her military service through her physician does not transform the veteran's account into competent medical evidence, or an accurate account of those experiences, merely because the transcriber happens to be a medical professional. See Leshore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995). In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the record does not support the veteran's assertion that she was raped in service. Thus, although the foundation for the diagnosis of PTSD in this case was the veteran's account of having been raped, we must conclude that the claimed stressor has not been satisfactorily established as having occurred. The veteran may very well consider events that occurred in conjunction with her sexual relationship with the individual in service to have been stressful, but no medical professional has indicated that such a situation qualifies as a valid PTSD stressor under pertinent diagnostic criteria, i.e., DSM-IV. Thus, while the veteran does have a diagnosis of PTSD based upon her purported in-service stressor, that stressor is not shown by satisfactory evidence to have occurred. With all due respect to the veteran, we find that her testimony in this claim is not reliable, and is of little evidentiary weight. Having so concluded, the Board finds that the preponderance of the credible evidence is against the claim, and that neither a VA psychiatric examination nor further interpretation by a clinician of the in-service symptoms/behavior is necessary. See M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c); Patton v. West, supra, at 280. Since the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (old and new versions); Gilbert v. Derwinski, supra. ORDER New and material evidence not having been submitted to reopen a claim for service connection for a nervous disorder, to include major depression, the appeal is denied. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder is denied. ANDREW J. MULLEN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals IMPORTANT NOTICE: We have attached a VA Form 4597 that tells you what steps you can take if you disagree with our decision. We are in the process of updating the form to reflect changes in the law effective on December 27, 2001. See the Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-103, 115 Stat. 976 (2001). In the meanwhile, please note these important corrections to the advice in the form: ? These changes apply to the section entitled "Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims." (1) A "Notice of Disagreement filed on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer required to appeal to the Court. (2) You are no longer required to file a copy of your Notice of Appeal with VA's General Counsel. ? In the section entitled "Representation before VA," filing a "Notice of Disagreement with respect to the claim on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer a condition for an attorney-at-law or a VA accredited agent to charge you a fee for representing you.