Citation Nr: 0215388 Decision Date: 10/31/02 Archive Date: 11/06/02 DOCKET NO. 94-27 333 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Los Angeles, California THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder to include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. J. Vecchiollo, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active service from June 1970 to October 1971. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 1992 rating decision by the RO. A hearing was held in September 1998 in Los Angeles, California, before John Ormond, who is a Board Member and was designated by the Chairman of the Board to conduct that hearing. At that hearing, the veteran presented testimony concerning his claim for service connection for PTSD. The Board remanded the claim for further development in February 1999. Another hearing was held in May 2002, before N. R. Robin, who is a Board Member and was also designated by the Chairman to conduct that hearing. At that hearing, the veteran presented testimony concerning his claim for service connection for PTSD. Under such circumstances, where testimony was heard by two separate Board Members, the appeal as to that issue must be decided by a panel of three Board Members, to include the two Members who conducted the hearings. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7102(a), 7107(c) (West 1991 & Supp. 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the veteran's appeal has been obtained. 2. A psychiatric disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by service, nor may such be presumed to have been incurred therein. 3. The record includes medical evidence showing a current diagnosis of PTSD based on the veteran's claimed in-service stressors involving combat in Vietnam. 4. During his service, the veteran did not serve in Vietnam and was not engaged in combat with the enemy. 5. The record does not include credible supporting evidence verifying the occurrence of the veteran's claimed in-service stressors. CONCLUSION OF LAW A psychiatric disorder to include PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, nor may a psychosis be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (1999 and 2001). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 Initially, the Board notes that during the pendency of the appellant's appeal, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was signed into law. In addition, regulations implementing the VCAA (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West Supp. 2001)), were published at 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620, 45,630-32 (August 29, 2001) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326). The VCAA and the implementing regulations pertinent to the issue on appeal are liberalizing and are therefore applicable to the issue on appeal. See Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 312-13 (1991). The Act and the implementing regulations essentially eliminate the requirement that a claimant submit evidence of a well-grounded claim, and provide that VA will assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim but is not required to provide assistance to a claimant if there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. They also require VA to notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim. As part of the notice, VA is to specifically inform the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of which portion, if any, of the evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which part, if any, VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. The record reflects that the RO has informed the veteran of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim. For example, in January 1995 and again in December 1997 the RO wrote to the veteran and told him that available records did not show that he had ever served in Vietnam. He was advised of the type of evidence to obtain to establish stressors and how he could proceed to have his military records corrected to reflect his alleged service in Vietnam. The RO also informed the veteran that it would assist him in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate his claim. Pursuant to Board remand, the veteran was requested to provide all information regarding any stressor he believed caused his PTSD. The veteran did not reply to this letter. The veteran was provided a supplemental statement of the case in September 2001 which furnished the provisions of the VCAA. The veteran has not identified and the Board is not aware of any outstanding evidence which could be obtained to substantiate his claim. Further he has been afforded VA examination. Because no additional evidence has been identified by the veteran as being available but absent from the record, the Board finds that any failure on the part of VA to further notify the veteran what evidence would be secured by VA and what evidence would be secured by the veteran is harmless. Cf. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Factual Background The veteran's DD Form 214 indicates that he had no foreign or sea service, nor was he awarded any awards or medals to indicate service in Vietnam. The veteran's service personnel records reflect that his military occupational specialty was helicopter repairman. He participated in various types of training in Fort Rucker, Alabama and Fort Ord, California until December 11, 1970, at which time his principal duty was listed as "casual." The organization and station or theater to which he was shown as assigned was "enroute" to USARPAC (U.S. Army Pacific), until January 29, 1971. Then he was listed as a repairman with an aviation unit at Fort Ord. Service personnel records also contain an entry in the "Remarks" section to the effect that the veteran was restricted from service in an HFZ (hostile fire zone), but that such restriction would not apply if the veteran volunteered for Vietnam or any other HFZ, or re-enlisted. Assignment to another overseas area, other than Vietnam, was not precluded. The veteran's service medical records reflect that an examination pursuant to Army Regulation 635- 212, Discharge-- Unfitness or Unsuitability was conducted in June 1971. The psychiatric portion of the examination was marked abnormal and a notation to see the "212" psychiatric evaluation. No such examination was contained in the veteran's service medical records. The Board also notes that his physical profile status (PULHES) at the time of the examination indicated a grade of "1" as to the mental stability, the "S" category of the acronym PULHES. This reflects minimal or no defect found relative to the veteran's psychiatric condition. None of the service medical record entries reflects any reference to service in Vietnam. Received into the record in 1975, in connection with a claim for VA education benefits, were letters written by the veteran that year in which he stated that during the winter of 1970 his brother was wounded in Vietnam and sent to a military hospital in California to recover. He (the veteran) was needed at home to care for his mother and received a 30 day pass from the Army to return to California. Because his brother's condition had not stabilized at that time he requested and was granted "permanent party" status at Fort Ord, California. He then received an early discharge. At the time of an August 1985 VA medical examination, conducted in connection with a claim for an unrelated benefit, the veteran was described by the examiner as being defensive, argumentative, slightly hostile, and unable or unwilling to directly answer questions. He responded very non-specifically to all questions, giving very vague responses suggesting a strong functional overlay. VA outpatient records compiled during the 1980s show treatment for a variety of symptoms; these records contain no references to psychiatric complaints or findings, a history of service in Vietnam or other stressor information. In connection with his March 1990 claim for service connection for PTSD, which the veteran reported was due to his service in Vietnam, he submitted a report of a private psychiatrist dated in February 1990. The examiner commented that no psychological tests were conducted, nor did he review any medical records in conjunction with his examination. He stated that the veteran had had difficulty maintaining full time employment for the past 20 years due to his difficulty in interacting with other people. The examiner noted that the veteran served in combat in Vietnam. Many of the veteran's friends died and that still affected him. In addition, the veteran noted that many of his friends and his brother returned home from Vietnam with emotional problems. The veteran also stated that he had flashbacks of his Vietnam experiences and had thoughts of Vietnam about 18 hours per day. When he looked at a room with empty chairs, he thought of those servicemen who died in Vietnam. The diagnosis was PTSD, attributed to combat stress, and bipolar disorder, mixed unspecified, by history. The severity of the psychosocial stressors were noted to have been severe, chronic unemployment and frequent job losses. In a letter dated in May 1991, the veteran stated that he served in Vietnam at Cu Chi, Tan Son Nhut and Parrot's Beak. The veteran stated that when he arrived at Tan Son Nhut, several helicopters dropped two body bags as the helicopters had no time to land. He also remembered drawing small arms fire and returning fire in a landing zone. When the attack was over, his unit found a Viet Cong soldier almost cut in half but still alive. The veteran wanted to help the enemy soldier but was ordered to kill the soldier. He became quite ill over killing the soldier. During another firefight the veteran remembers that his unit killed a farmer and small child. In a letter dated in September 1991 the veteran stated that he served in Vietnam from December 11, 1970, to January 29, 1971. He stated he served with the first and fifth airmobile units at Cu Chi, Tan Son Nhut and Parrot's Beak. He said that his duty was to ride side car and shoot people. He noted that hearing helicopters or sudden noises; or seeing Asian people, certain tree lines, red smoke, dense fog or heat, cause flashbacks to Vietnam. He avoids all things that remind him of the military, he has survivor guilt, avoids relationships, has suicidal feelings and feels numb. He also related the three combat incidents that he discussed in his May 1991 letter. A VA psychiatric examination was conducted in November 1991. It was reported that the veteran served in Vietnam for approximately 45 days from December 1970 to January 1971. The veteran was unable to discuss his Vietnam experiences but the May 1991 letter he wrote was available to the examiner. The examiner diagnosed PTSD, predominately on the veteran's comments made in the May 1991 letter. The examiner also stated that the veteran was "so guarded about discussing his Vietnam experiences" that symptomatology could not be substantiated by this examination. He commented that the veteran had "an extremely difficult time recounting his history." The examiner also made a tentative diagnosis of bipolar disorder or cyclothymic disorder as well as having a family history of significant psychiatric disorder. The examiner also noted that the treatment was recommended but, given the veteran's tendency to project blame on others and difficulty in actively participating, his prognosis must be considered guarded. The veteran was hospitalized in a VA facility from November 1993 to December 1993 due to complaints of increasing depression, thoughts of suicide, difficulty breathing, chronic backache, confusion, explosive labile mood, difficulty maintaining control, nightmares, flashbacks with social isolation, poor relationships, and difficulty with trust. It was noted that while the veteran was in his community, he presented the classic symptoms of PTSD, described as "chronic Vietnam war-related." The pertinent discharge diagnosis was PTSD with questionable major depression, and personality disorder, not otherwise specified. The psychosocial stressors were joblessness and social isolation with absence of stable living conditions. The RO advised the veteran in January 1995 that available military records did not show Vietnam service, much less combat service. In response he stated in February 1995 that he did not know the exact dates of his service in Vietnam. He also stated that he could not find any records that would place him in Vietnam, but was relying on his personnel records showing that he was attached to the Pacific Theater. He indicated that he did know, however, that he was quite sick in the hospital before and after his tour in Vietnam and he has recurring nightmares of events in Vietnam. He stated that he really believed that he was in Vietnam and he wanted to appeal his PTSD claim to determine once and for all where he was during this time period. A letter dated in October 1997 from N. Dexter Weed M.D., is of record. The physician stated that he had a conference with the veteran in September 1997. The veteran wanted a letter describing his mental condition approximately 25 years ago. The physician stated that his father was the veteran's family's medical doctor and that the physician's father mentored the veteran in high school when he had family, social and scholastic problems. The physician recalled, around 1971, that the veteran was distressed about remaining in the military and was under a great deal of stress. The physician could not recall if he gave the veteran medication but the veteran stated that he did, and the physician had no reason to question the veteran's recollection. The physician stated that he could not provide any other information regarding the veteran's physician or mental condition at the time in question and that his office records from that period no longer existed. A VA examination was conducted in November 1997. The veteran complained of sleeplessness, hypervigilance and inability to interact with people. The veteran recalled being treated for stress before going to Vietnam. While at Fort Ord, he recalled a training session in which he was subjected to direct fire and to tear gas and was rendered unconsciousness. The veteran recalled arriving in Vietnam at Tan Son Nhut Airport in service but had "amnesia" about other events in Vietnam. The examiner stated that it was doubtful that the veteran had any duties in Vietnam. The veteran's next recollection was being very ill at Fort Ord. The diagnosis was anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified, the psychosocial stressors were severe, unemployment, social isolation, finances, and homelessness. VA outpatient records compiled during the 1990s show treatment and evaluation for PTSD, an anxiety disorder, legal problems, unemployment and homelessness. The veteran was afforded a hearing before a Member of the Board in September 1998. The veteran's representative stated that the veteran's brother was permanently disabled as a result of his combat injuries in Vietnam and that this incident was the reason for the veteran's discharge from service. The representative argued that the veteran was diagnosed with PTSD in February 1990 due to his brother's severe injuries and the poor treatment that the veteran received when he returned home after service. The veteran stated that he felt bad when he was notified in service about his brother's injuries. He testified that he was angry about the injury to his brother and the way that the government lied to him about what the Vietnam war was about. When questioned directly about whether he had ever gone to Vietnam, the veteran stated that he remembered going to Vietnam but he had no recollection after the plane ride to Vietnam. He stated that he was aware that there were no official records of his service there and that he thought such was "very unfair." He also stated that he was seen by Dr. Weed for nervousness and anger in 1971. In February 1999, the Board remanded the claim to attempt to obtain a service psychiatric evaluation conducted around June 1971 and any Medical Examination Board (MEB) or Physical Evaluation Board (PEB). The veteran was to provide specific dates, the names of pertinent individuals involved, and the precise circumstances for each event which he claimed as a stressor for PTSD. Any incidents identified by the veteran were to be verified by the RO, to the extent possible. The importance of providing this specific information was to be emphasized to the veteran. In addition, a psychiatric evaluation was to be conducted. In March 1999 the RO sent the veteran a letter requesting the specific dates, names and circumstances pertaining to each of his PTSD stressors. He was also to provide a list of all health care providers who treated him for PTSD since December 1997. He was also informed that the RO was attempting to obtain a service psychiatric evaluation in 1971 and any MEB or PEB records which led to his discharge from service. If the veteran had any of these records in his possession, he was to submit them. The veteran did not reply to this letter. A psychiatric evaluation was conducted in March 1999. The veteran stated that he served in Vietnam for two weeks. The examiner noted that the veteran had previously reported that he served in Vietnam for 49 days from December 11, 1970, to January 29, 1971. The veteran stated that he had been a door gunner aboard a helicopter, and that he "was assigned to death-30 seconds of life expectancy." He related feelings of being frightened and helpless while in Vietnam and that his entire platoon died there. The veteran also noted that his brother was injured in Vietnam and he was returned home because of this injury. He also stated that he saw 500 body bags at San Francisco Airport before going to Vietnam. The veteran was homeless at the time. He had a tremendous fear of people and cannot get along with people. He did not sleep well. He did not care about living. Regarding his PTSD symptoms, the examiner stated that the veteran always bad dreams about Vietnam, and that there was no time that he did not think about Vietnam. The diagnosis was PTSD, depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, personality disorder, not otherwise specified. The diagnosis of PTSD was predicated on his alleged stressors while serving in Vietnam. The psychosocial stressors were factors related to depression, unemployment, personality disorder and PTSD. The examiner stated that he had a difficult time reaching the veteran's diagnosis of PTSD, depression, and personality disorder. The examiner stated that, just because the veteran could not remember the events that led to his PTSD, it did not mean that he did not meet the criteria [for a diagnosis] of PTSD. The examiner continued stating that the events listed in the May 1991 letter would be a good reason for the development of PTSD. The examiner noted that no one could tell what the veteran's personality would be like if he did not go to Vietnam. The examiner believed that the veteran was not making up these incidents because he used the same four words in describing one incident "empty chairs" and "body bags" almost 20 years apart in describing reaction to seeing a room with empty chairs. The examiner also stated that the veteran's most overlapping psychiatric problem was his personality disorder and that his PTSD symptoms were becoming more blurred over time. The veteran completed a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) in April 1999. The possible diagnoses were rule out adjustment disorder, schizophrenia, or schizoid personality disorder. In May 1999, the RO requested additional service medical records, including the psychiatric evaluation conducted in 1971 and any MEB or PEB records, but no pertinent records were found. An examination was conducted in December 2000 by the same examiner who conducted the March 1999 examination. The diagnosis was PTSD and personality disorder, not otherwise specified. The psychosocial stressors were factors related to PTSD and personality disorder. The physician stated that the traumatic events that the veteran experienced in Vietnam were the cause of his PTSD. The physician also concluded that the veteran's personality disorder was not caused by his military service but that it developed earlier in the veteran's life. The examiner also noted that the veteran was given a GAF of 50 for his personality disorder but during this examination, the veteran seemed as equally disabled by his PTSD. In a letter from the veteran's mother received in December 2001, she stated that she received a letter from the veteran when he was in Vietnam. In this letter, the veteran's first name was misspelled twice. The veteran was afforded a hearing before a Member of the Board in May 2002. The veteran testified, under oath, that he was stationed at Cu Chi and Tan Son Nhut in Vietnam. He stated that he remembered flying over to Vietnam and that he had a nervous breakdown when he heard about his brother's serious combat injuries. He claimed that a sergeant remembered seeing him in Vietnam but that such individual could not currently be located. In response to many of the questions posed, the veteran indicated that he just could not remember. Legal Analysis Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2001). In addition, service incurrence will be presumed for certain chronic diseases, including psychoses, if manifest to a compensable degree within one year after separation from active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. While this appeal was pending, the applicable regulations regarding service connection for PTSD, 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), were amended on June 18, 1999, effective March 7, 1997. See 64 Fed. Reg. 32807-32808 (June 18, 1999) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)). The amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) states that, if the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to this combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. Historically, under the old regulations, service connection for PTSD required: (1) a current, clear medical diagnosis of PTSD (presumed to include the adequacy of the PTSD symptomatology and the sufficiency of a claimed in-service stressor); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1997). Under the new regulations, service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing PTSD, (2) medical evidence establishing a link between current symptoms and an in-service stressor, and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2001); See 64 Fed. Reg. 32807-32808 (June 18, 1999). With respect to the first element (a diagnosis of PTSD), "a clear (that is, unequivocal) PTSD diagnosis by a mental- health professional must be presumed... to have been made in accordance with the applicable DSM [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders] criteria as to both the adequacy of the symptomatology and the sufficiency of the stressor." Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 139 (1997). Moreover, the Court concluded that "under the DSM-IV, the mental illness of PTSD would be treated the same as a physical illness for purposes of VA disability compensation in terms of predisposition toward development of that condition." Id. at 141 (incorporating the "eggshell plaintiff" rule to service connection awards). In interpreting the now third element (an in-service stressor), the evidence necessary to establish that the claimed stressor actually occurred varied depending on whether it could be determined that the veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991 & Supp. 2002). "Where it is determined, through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence, that the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressors are related to such combat, the veteran's lay testimony regarding claimed stressors must be accepted as conclusive as to their actual occurrence and no further development for corroborative evidence will be required, provided that the veteran's testimony is found to be 'satisfactory,' e.g., credible, and 'consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of [combat] service'." Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993); 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), (f) (2000); see also Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 113 (1998) (determination of whether veteran engaged in combat with enemy is particularly significant in PTSD cases). Finally, under the new regulations, the reference to combat citations is removed; nonetheless, if the "claimed stressor is not combat related, a veteran's lay testimony regarding in-service stressors is insufficient to establish the occurrence of the stressor and must be corroborated by 'credible supporting evidence'." Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 142 (citing Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994)). The determinative issue in this case is whether there is credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. For the reasons that follow, the Board finds that the veteran has not submitted credible evidence of the occurrence of a stressor. As an initial matter, the Board notes that the new PTSD regulations which became effective during the veteran's appeal do not change the requirement of credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. Many psychiatric examiners have made the diagnosis of PTSD. Such was predicated on a variety of stressors which overwhelmingly are linked to purported incidents in service in Vietnam, including combat. The veteran has repeatedly offered false stories of stressful Vietnam experiences, and most of the examiners have apparently accepted such stories as being true. On those few occasions when the veteran has been questioned about the details of these experiences, including during the hearings before the Board, he was unable to supply any details, claiming that he could not remember. He has been given the opportunity by the RO to submit written information that would help substantiate his claim of Vietnam service, but has not done so, with the exception of a letter purportedly from his mother who reported that she had received a letter from the veteran telling her that he was in Vietnam. In contrast to his allegations, the veteran's service personnel records indicate that he had no overseas service, much less service in Vietnam. He received no combat awards or decorations, and there are no other indicia of combat. Although the veteran, on occasion, has pointed to the period from December 1970 to January 1971 as the most likely time when he was in Vietnam (because of the notation that he was "enroute to USARPAC"), evidence in the file shows that this was the period during which the veteran received a period of leave, after the reported wounding of his brother, in order to return home to California and care for his mother. The veteran himself reported this scenario in 1975, in connection with another, unrelated claim. The totality of evidence most certainly compels the conclusions that the veteran did not serve in Vietnam and that all statements regarding such service, or incidents therein, are simply not credible. Likewise, the Board finds the unsworn statement of the veteran's mother that she received a letter from the veteran when he was in Vietnam not to be credible. Inasmuch as the PTSD diagnosis is uniformly based on a fabricated combat history which the examiners apparently accepted without critical analysis or reservation, such diagnosis is rejected. Where a veteran-claimant did not serve in combat or the stressor is not related to combat, his lay testimony, by itself, will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. See West (Carelton) v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994); see also Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. at 98. Instead, the record must contain evidence which corroborates his testimony as to the occurrence of the claimed stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), (f); see also VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1, Part VI, 11.38 (Aug. 26, 1996). Regarding non-combat stressors, "credible supporting evidence" means that the veteran's testimony, by itself, cannot, as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a non-combat stressor; nor can credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an in-service stressor consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996); and Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). The VA Adjudication Manual M21-1 (M21-1) provides that the required "credible supporting evidence" of a non- combat stressor "may be obtained from" service records or "other sources." See M21-1, part VI, formerly 7.46. In addition to his false claims of combat in Vietnam, on a few occasions, the veteran has alluded to his brother's injuries in Vietnam as a possible stressor. He was asked to provided information regarding any such stressor he experienced in a March 1999 letter but he did not respond. The duty to assist is not always a one-way street. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991), confirmed on reconsideration at 1 Vet. App. 406 (1991). Although the veteran has testified and stated that the above noncombat stressor occurred, the Court has held that the veteran's testimony, by itself, cannot, as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a non-combat stressor. See Dizoglio, 9 Vet. App. at 166. There must be independent evidence to corroborate the veteran's statement as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); see also Doran, 6 Vet. App. at 288-89. No such evidence has been submitted, despite extensive development of the evidence and a request to the veteran himself to provide same. The Board has considered whether further examination of the veteran, to explore the possibility of a link between claimed PTSD and this noncombat stressor, and determines that doing so would serve no useful purpose. The record, over the years, shows that the veteran has engaged in a pattern of manipulative and dishonest conduct while pursuing his claim for service-connected monetary benefits from VA. He presented a demonstrably false history of service in Vietnam, of stressful events and, it logically follows, of symptoms arising therefrom. Even if his account of his brother's wounding in Vietnam is accurate, the Board is simply not persuaded that any history the veteran might give as to his reaction to such event, including current symptoms, could be relied upon to reach a correct diagnosis. Further, the Board cannot ignore the fact that the diagnosis of PTSD in this case was reached by treating medical professionals and examiners who accepted fully his account of combat and other Vietnam stressors uncritically and at face value. The Board can only conclude that the veteran was able to skillfully mislead them with a false history and false symptoms in order to obtain compensation benefits. There is no guarantee that the veteran, if given the opportunity, would not again do so. As explained above, the evidence of record does not indicate that the veteran engaged in combat, and there is no credible evidence that his claimed stressors actually occurred, apart from his own statements. Consequently, the evidence does not show the veteran incurred PTSD as a result of his active duty service, or any incident therein, and the preponderance of the evidence is against entitlement to service connection for PTSD. With respect to whether a psychiatric disorder other than PTSD warrants service connection, the Board notes that the credible medical and other evidence of record does not show the presence of an acquired psychiatric disability, for example, a neurosis or psychosis, during the veteran's military service. Records do suggest that a psychiatric examination was conducted around the time of his discharge, but attempts to secure such have been fruitless. Nonetheless, his physical profile status at separation did not indicate the presence of any psychiatric defect and, moreover, there is no reliable suggestion in the record of any psychiatric symptoms until 1985, when he was examined for other reasons by VA. In this regard, the Board affords little probative weight to Dr. Weed's statement that he treated the veteran for nervousness during his service. The private physician relied on the history given by the veteran and he did not have contemporaneous medical records upon which to rely. Generally, when a medical opinion relies at least partially on the veteran's rendition of his medical history, the Board is not bound to accept the medical conclusion, as it has no greater probative value than the facts alleged by the veteran. Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993). In this case, the veteran has so frequently given a false history, that rendition of treatment as given to Dr. Weed must be deemed as not credible, inasmuch it too was provided for the purpose of receiving VA monetary benefits. There is no competent evidence of record which indicates that any other psychiatric disorder besides PTSD that the veteran may currently have is related to service. Various diagnoses have been rendered, including bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, adjustment disorder, schizoid personality disorder, schizophrenia and personality disorder of unspecified type. None is shown to have had its onset during service or within the year following service, or otherwise to be attributable to such service. Moreover, personality disorders are not disabilities for which service connection may be granted for VA compensation purposes. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9, 4.127 (2001). As there is no evidence of any in-service psychiatric condition and no evidence of any treatment for any psychosis within the one year presumptive period following service, or that the veteran currently has a psychiatric disorder related to active military duty, service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder, is not warranted. Because the evidence is not evenly balanced, the rule affording the veteran the benefit of the doubt does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). ORDER Service connection for psychiatric disability, to include PTSD, is denied. JOHN E. ORMOND, JR. D.C. SPICKLER Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals N. R. ROBIN Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals IMPORTANT NOTICE: We have attached a VA Form 4597 that tells you what steps you can take if you disagree with our decision. We are in the process of updating the form to reflect changes in the law effective on December 27, 2001. See the Veterans Education and Benefits Expansion Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-103, 115 Stat. 976 (2001). In the meanwhile, please note these important corrections to the advice in the form: ? These changes apply to the section entitled "Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims." (1) A "Notice of Disagreement filed on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer required to appeal to the Court. (2) You are no longer required to file a copy of your Notice of Appeal with VA's General Counsel. ? In the section entitled "Representation before VA," filing a "Notice of Disagreement with respect to the claim on or after November 18, 1988" is no longer a condition for an attorney-at-law or a VA accredited agent to charge you a fee for representing you.