Citation Nr: 0534818 Decision Date: 12/27/05 Archive Date: 01/10/06 DOCKET NO. 04-26 072 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in No. Little Rock, Arkansas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for liver cancer for purposes of accrued benefits. 2. Entitlement to service connection for hepatitis C for purposes of accrued benefits. 3. Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the veteran's death. 4. Entitlement to burial benefits. 5. Entitlement to nonservice connected death pension benefits. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. J. Wells-Green, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from February 1957 to December 1960, December 1967 to October 1969 and from December 1969 to September 1983. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a January 2003 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Little Rock, Arkansas. In July 2005, the appellant testified at a hearing at the RO before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. The issues of entitlement to service connection for liver cancer for purposes of accrued benefits, entitlement to service connection for the cause of the veteran's death and entitlement to burial benefits are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran died in April 2001. 2. At the time of the veteran's death, almost 18 years after service, the only claims pending were claims for service connection for liver cancer and hepatitis C; he was not service-connected for any disabilities. 3. The competent medical evidence of record does not show that the veteran had a diagnosis of hepatitis C in service or at the time of his death. 4. The appellant's income, less allowable expenses, exceeds the maximum annual rate of improved death pension for a single surviving spouse with one dependent. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. For the purpose of accrued benefits, the veteran did not have hepatitis C as the result of disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active duty, and incurrence or aggravation during such service may not be presumed. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1116, 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.311, 3.316, 3.1000 (2005). 2. The income criteria for improved death pension benefits have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1503, 1541 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.23, 3.271, 3.272 (2005). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claim Assistance Act (VCAA) The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) is applicable to this appeal. To implement the provisions of the law, the VA promulgated regulations codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a)). The Act and implementing regulations provides that VA will assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim but is not required to provide assistance to a claimant if there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. It also includes new notification provisions. In the present case, the appellant's claim for burial benefits was received in April 2001 and her claims for service connection for the cause of the veteran's death and for accrued benefits and nonservice-connected pension benefits were received in May 2001. In letters dated in April 2001 and January 2004, the appellant was informed of the requirements of VCAA as they pertained to VA's obligation to assist her in completing her claims and notifying her of the progress of her claims and the ongoing duties of VA. By these letters, the appellant was notified of what evidence, if any, was necessary to substantiate her claims and they indicated which portion of that evidence the appellant was responsible for sending to VA and which portion of that evidence VA would attempt to obtain on her behalf. Clearly, from submissions by and on behalf of the appellant, she is fully conversant with the legal requirements in this case. Thus, the content of these letters complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In short, the appellant is well aware of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate her claims; she is familiar with the law and regulations pertaining to her claims; she does not dispute any of the material facts pertaining to her claims, and she has not indicated the existence of any outstanding information or evidence relevant to her claims. See Desbrow v. Principi, No. 02-352 (U.S. Vet. App. May 4, 2004); Valiao v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 229, 232 (2003) (holding that failure to comply with VCAA constitutes nonprejudicial error "[w]here the facts averred by a claimant cannot conceivably result in any disposition of the appeal other than affirmance of the Board decision"). Therefore, to decide the appeal would not be prejudicial error to the appellant. With respect to VA's duty to assist the appellant, the Board notes that pertinent medical records from all relevant sources identified by the appellant, and for which she authorized VA to request, were obtained by the RO. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A. In this regard the Board notes that the record contains the pertinent service medical records, private treatment records and death certificate. In this respect, the Board notes that the RO made several attempts to secure additional service medical and personnel records, but was informed by the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) that an extensive and thorough search of the records was made and that they were unable to locate any requested records. NPRC concluded that the records either did not exist or that they did not have them and that further efforts to locate them would be futile. The appellant has not alleged that there are any other obtainable outstanding medical records with regard to these issues. The Board consequently finds that VA's duty to assist the appellant in obtaining records in connection with the instant appeal has been fulfilled. In sum, the facts relevant to this appeal have been properly developed and there is no further action to be undertaken to comply with the provisions of the VCAA or the implementing regulations. Therefore, the appellant has not been prejudiced as a result of the Board proceeding to the merits of the claims. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392-94 (1993). Factual Background The veteran died in April 2001. During his lifetime, he was not service-connected for any disability. At the time of his death, the veteran's claims, received in January 2001, for entitlement to service connection for liver cancer and hepatitis C, to include as the result of exposures to Agent Orange, asbestos, mustard gas and ionizing radiation, remained unadjudicated. The RO subsequently reviewed the veteran's claims and denied service connection for both liver cancer and hepatitis C. In April and May 2001, the appellant filed claims for accrued benefits, service connection for the cause of the veteran's death, entitlement to nonservice-connected death pension benefits, and entitlement to burial benefits. The veteran's DD Form 214 indicates that he was awarded several medals for service in Vietnam, including the Vietnam Service Medal with combat operation insignia. His available service medical records show that he had tattoos on his chest and left lower leg as early as December 1967. His July 1983 retirement medical examination report also shows that he had a tattoo on his left cheek. From September to November 1981, the veteran was treated for diagnosed alcohol abuse. A November 1981 narrative summary indicates diagnoses of alcohol dependence and probable cirrhosis with ascites. There are no complaints, findings, treatment or diagnoses associated with hepatitis C. Private treatment records, dating from May 1998 to March 2001, relevantly show that the veteran complained of anorexia, weight loss and fatigue and an October 2000 abdominal CT scan was suspicious for malignancy for an area of the right lobe of the liver. A November 2000 referral indicated that the veteran was at high risk for hepatocellular carcinoma. Subsequent treatment records show that he was diagnosed with inoperable hepatocellular carcinoma and that there were no medical options available. A March 2001 treatment record shows that the veteran's information was forwarded to a private hospice. There are no complaints, findings, treatment or diagnoses associated with hepatitis C. His death certificate reveals that the veteran died at the age of 62 at his residence. The immediate cause of death was liver cancer. No other significant condition contributing to his death was listed and no autopsy was conducted. A supplemental report of cause of death, dated in May 2004 and signed by the registered nurse who signed the original death certificate, indicates that other significant conditions contributing to death but not resulting in the underlying cause included previous exposure to Agent Orange, hepatitis C, Type II diabetes, and cirrhosis of the liver. During a September 2004 personal hearing, the appellant testified that the veteran had been in the service more than 20 years and that he had served in Vietnam. She testified that he initially got 4 tattoos while in service and that he was diagnosed with probable cirrhosis of the liver with ascites in 1981. Prior to his death he was diagnosed with diabetes, hepatitis C, cirrhosis of the liver, arthritis and obstructive sleep apnea. She testified that he was first diagnosed with hepatitis C in November or December 2000. She also testified that she had known the veteran for 12 years prior to his death and that he was not an intravenous drug user. Although he previously drank a lot, he had quit. She believed that his diabetes and hepatitis C significantly contributed to his liver cancer and death. She felt that the tattoos he acquired in Vietnam and other toxins he was possibly exposed to in Vietnam contributed to his death. She admitted that she had no medical opinion that either hepatitis or cirrhosis caused the veteran's liver cancer. In September 2004, a VA physician reviewed the veteran's service medical records and claims file. The physician noted that the veteran was treated for alcoholism in service. At that time, he had abnormal liver function studies and there was a question of ascites, but it was not a definite diagnosis. A definite diagnosis of cirrhosis was never made and the veteran did not have a liver biopsy. Therefore, the physician opined that the service medical records were insufficient to justify a diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver, although there was evidence of chronic liver disease related to his chronic alcoholism. The physician also notes that a 2000 CT scan of the abdomen revealed no evidence of cirrhosis. The physician opined that the medical evidence of record did not confirm a hepatitis C diagnosis. Therefore, he was unable to establish a relationship between hepatitis C or cirrhosis to the veteran's death, although he acknowledged that liver cancer is more common in people who have had hepatitis C and cirrhosis. He also opined that the veteran's diabetes mellitus did not contribute to his liver cancer or made it worse and hastened the onset of death. A May 2005 letter from a private physician notes that getting a tattoo is a well established risk factor for transmission of hepatitis C. During her July 2005 travel board hearing before the undersigned, the appellant testified that the veteran served two tours of duty in Vietnam. She testified that he had diabetes, PTSD and hepatitis C. She stated that she was with the veteran when he was told that he had both liver cancer and hepatitis C. He was given both diagnoses at the same time. She further testified that the veteran did not file a claim for diabetes mellitus because he was unaware that it was a presumptive condition. A private physician had told the veteran and appellant that he believed the veteran had PTSD and she believed that his PTSD played a role in his not seeking treatment and in his alcohol consumption. She testified that the veteran got 4 tattoos during his military service. She testified that he did not have any blood transfusions in service or use any intravenous drugs. She stated that the hospice nurse who signed the veteran's original death certificate and was in attendance at the time of his death amended it because the appellant wanted the death certificate to reflect the contributing factors. The appellant testified that the nurse reviewed all the records before she amended the certificate. She also testified that the veteran was first diagnosed with diabetes in 1993 and that his condition progressively worsened, with his later development of peripheral neuropathy and cardiac problems. He was eventually placed on insulin. His physicians indicated to the appellant that the veteran's general physical health was not good enough for him to be a transplant candidate. She testified that the veteran was drinking heavily in December 1989 when they married. She stated that his heavy drinking was often triggered by nightmares or when he was in a lot of physical pain. She testified that she did not have a lot of medical expenses that could be counted to reduce her income. Analysis Accrued Benefits Upon the death of a veteran, periodic monetary benefits to which he or she was entitled at death under existing ratings or decisions, or those based on evidence in the file at the date of death, due and unpaid for a period of not more than two years prior to death, may be paid to certain persons such as the veteran's surviving spouse, children, or dependent parents. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000 (2005). Applications for accrued benefits must be filed within one year after the date of death. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121(c); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(c). In order for a claimant to be entitled to accrued benefits, the veteran must have had a claim pending at the time of death. See Jones v. West, 136 F.3d 1296, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As noted above, the veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for liver cancer and hepatitis C were the only claims pending at the time of his death. He also claimed that both disabilities were the result of in-service exposures to Agent Orange, mustard gas, asbestos and ionizing radiation. The Board first notes that the veteran's death certificate, the September 2004 VA physician's evaluation report and the May 2005 private physician's statement were added to the record following his death. These records may not be considered in addressing the accrued benefits claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a), (d)(4) (2005). Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred or aggravated during active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2005). Service incurrence of liver cancer (except if cirrhosis or hepatitis B is indicated) during wartime service may be presumed if manifested to a compensable degree within one year of the veteran's discharge from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2005). Diseases associated with exposure to certain herbicide agents used in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era will be considered to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(1) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6). The presumption requires exposure to an herbicide agent and manifestation of the disease to a degree of 10 percent or more within the time period specified for each disease. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii). A veteran who served in Vietnam from January 9, 1962 to May 7, 1975 is presumed to have been exposed to herbicides, even without diagnosis of a presumptive disease, absent affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(f) (West 2002). The following diseases are associated with herbicide exposure for purposes of the presumption: chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, Hodgkin's disease, multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy, porphyria cutanea tarda, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea), certain soft-tissue sarcomas, and Diabetes Mellitus (Type II). 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e). See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(b)(1) (permitting the Secretary to determine by regulation diseases subject to the presumption in addition to those listed at 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(2)). Based on studies by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (Secretary) has determined that a presumption of service connection based on exposure to herbicides used in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era is not warranted for any condition for which the Secretary has not specifically determined a presumption of service connection is warranted. See Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 42600 (2002). Therefore, the veteran's alleged hepatitis C is not presumed by law to have been incurred in service as a result of herbicide exposure. 38 U.S.C.A. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6). Exposure to the specified vesicant agents during active military service under specified circumstances together with the subsequent development of any of the indicated conditions is sufficient to establish service connection for that condition: (1) Full-body exposure to nitrogen or sulfur mustard during active military service together with the subsequent development of chronic conjunctivitis, keratitis, corneal opacities, scar formation, or the following cancers: Nasopharyngeal; laryngeal; lung (except mesothelioma); or squamous cell carcinoma of the skin; (2) Full-body exposure to nitrogen or sulfur mustard or Lewisite during active military service together with the subsequent development of a chronic form of laryngitis, bronchitis, emphysema, asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; and (3) Full-body exposure to nitrogen mustard during active military service together with the subsequent development of acute nonlymphocytic leukemia. 38 C.F.R. § 3.316(a). However, service connection will not be established if the claimed condition is due to the veteran's own willful misconduct or there is affirmative evidence that establishes a non-service- related supervening condition or event as the cause of the claimed condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.316(b). Initially, the Board notes that hepatitis C is not among any of the recognized conditions associated with mustard gas or other vesicant agents. 38 C.F.R. § 3.316(a). Moreover, there is no evidence that the veteran was exposed to mustard gas or other vesicant agents in service. Therefore, there is no presumption of service connection for hepatitis C under these provisions. Id. Service connection for a condition, claimed to be attributable to ionizing radiation exposure during service, may be established in one of three ways. First, the VA has identified certain diseases which are presumed to be the result of radiation exposure. Such a presumption, of course, must be based upon a finding that the veteran was, in fact, exposed to radiation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(c); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d). Second, there are other radiogenic diseases which may be service connected directly under the special framework set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.311. The list of radiogenic diseases, however, is not exclusive. The veteran may provide competent scientific or medical evidence that the disease claimed to be the result of radiation exposure is, in fact, a radiogenic disease. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(4). Third, even if the disease in question is not listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 or is not a radiogenic disease under § 3.311, the veteran is not foreclosed from proving direct service connection by establishing direct actual causation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (2005) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2005). See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994 When a veteran, who was exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of participation in the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, develops a radiogenic disease, and such disease first becomes manifest 5 years or more after exposure, the case will be referred to the VA Under Secretary for Benefits for consideration. If any of the foregoing requirements has not been met, it shall not be determined that a disease has resulted from exposure to ionizing radiation under such circumstances. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311. Hepatitis C is not a listed radiogenic disease. There are no specific statutory or regulatory criteria governing claims of entitlement to service connection for residuals of asbestos exposure. McGinty v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 428, 432-33 (1993). Likewise, applicable criteria provide no presumption of service connection for asbestos exposure claims. See Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 145 (1999) (holding that M21-1 does not create a presumption of exposure to asbestos solely from shipboard service). However, VA has provided guidelines for the adjudication of asbestos exposure claims in the Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 (M21-1), Part VI, Par. 7.21. The VA General Counsel has held that these M21-1 guidelines establish claim development procedures which adjudicators are required to follow in claims involving asbestos-related diseases. VAOPGCPREC 4-2000; 65 Fed. Reg. 33422 (2000). Specifically, these guidelines provide that VA must determine whether military records demonstrate evidence of exposure to asbestos in service and whether there is pre- or post-service evidence of asbestos exposure. Then, VA must determine the relationship between the claimed diseases and such asbestos exposure, keeping in mind latency and exposure information provided in M21-1, Part VI, Par. 7.21(b). This information provides that the latency period varies from 10 to 45 years between first exposure and development of the disease. The exposure to asbestos may be brief (as little as a month or two) or indirect (bystander disease). VA recognizes that inhalation of asbestos fibers can produce fibrosis and tumors. The most common disease is interstitial pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis). Asbestos fibers may also produce pleural effusions and fibrosis, pleural plaques, mesotheliomas of pleura and peritoneum, lung cancer, and cancers of the gastrointestinal tract. Veterans Benefits Administration Manual M21-1, part VI, paragraph 7.21(a)(1). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination, the benefit of the doubt is afforded the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Prior to his death, the veteran contended that he currently had hepatitis C as a result of his in-service exposure to herbicides, asbestos, mustard gas and ionizing radiation from explosives in Vietnam. At her July 2005 travel board hearing, the appellant contended that the veteran developed hepatitis C as a result of tattoos he got while stationed in Vietnam. A review of all the evidence of record at the time of the veteran's death reveals that there is no competent medical evidence that the veteran had any diagnosed hepatitis C from the time of his service until his death. Although the appellant argues that the veteran acquired hepatitis C as a result tattoos he acquired in service, there was no objective evidence of record of any current diagnosis. Service connection is not in order in the absence of any residuals or evidence of a disability currently. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for hepatitis C for the purposes of accrued benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. While the appellant believes the veteran had hepatitis C as a result of his service, she is not competent to provide evidence that requires medical knowledge. Grottveit v. Brown, supra.; Espiritu v. Derwinski, supra. Accordingly, the claim for service connection for hepatitis C for the purposes of accrued benefits must be denied. Nonservice-connected Death Pension Benefits The appellant filed a claim for death pension, and the RO denied her claim on the basis of excessive income. In order to receive death pension benefits as a surviving spouse, the appellant must be the surviving spouse of a veteran who had the requisite wartime service, and her income must be less than the statutory maximum rate of death pension. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1541. A surviving spouse who meets these requirements will be paid the maximum rate of death pension, reduced by the amount of her countable income. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1541; 38 C.F.R. § 3.23. In determining income for this purpose, payments of any kind from any source are counted as income during the 12-month annualization period in which received unless specifically excluded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1503; 38 C.F.R. § 3.271. Exclusions from income include the expenses of the veteran's last illness and burial and for the veteran's just debts (debts not incurred to secure real or personal property), if paid by the appellant. 38 C.F.R. § 3.272(h). Such expenses may be deducted only for the 12- month annualization period in which they were paid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.272(h). Exclusions from income do not include Social Security disability benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.272. In her application filed in May 2001, the appellant reported that her only income consisted of Social Security benefits in the monthly amount of $482, and $540 for the couple's minor child. She reported deductible expenses of $3,650 in funeral and burial expenses. Records received from the Social Security Administration indicate that the appellant received monthly benefits of $532 in April 2001 and that the dependent child received monthly benefits of $857. For the 12-month period beginning in December 2000, the maximum annual rate of pension for a surviving spouse with one dependent was $8,507.00. Effective in December 2001, this amount was raised to $8,389.00. The appellant's monthly income of $532 results in an annual income of $6,384, and her son's monthly income of $857 results in an annual income of $10,284, for a combined income of $16,668. The combined family income, reduced by the amount of the funeral expenses paid by the appellant, still leaves $13,018 in annual income, which exceeds the maximum allowable rate. The maximum countable income is set by statute, which the Board is not free to disregard. The relevant facts are not in dispute, and it is the law which determines the outcome of this case. The appellant is not entitled to death pension benefits because of excess countable income; as a matter of law, the claim must be denied. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). ORDER Service connection for hepatitis C for accrued benefits purposes is denied. Entitlement to nonservice-connected death pension is denied. REMAND In his claim, filed in January 2001, the veteran contended that his liver cancer was caused by exposure to ionizing radiation, Agent Orange, asbestos, or mustard gas. He contended that he was exposed to ionizing radiation in Vietnam from explosive residuals in the air. Under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.3111(a), in all claims involving rating exposure other than those based on participation in atmospheric nuclear testing or participation in the American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan, prior to July 1, 1946, "a request will be made for any available records concerning the veteran's exposure to radiation. These records normally include but may not be limited to the veteran's Record of Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation (DD Form 1141), if maintained, service medical records, and other records which may contain information pertaining to the veteran's radiation dose in service. All such records will be forwarded to the Under Secretary for Health, who will be responsible for preparation of a dose estimate, to the extent feasible, based on available methodologies." 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(a). In view of the foregoing, the Board determines that an explicit, quantitative dose estimate (even if it is zero) should be obtained for the veteran's claimed exposure to ionizing radiation while stationed in Vietnam. The Board finds that the appellant's claims for service connection for the cause of the veteran's death and for burial benefits are inextricably intertwined with the issue of entitlement to service connection for liver cancer for purposes of accrued benefits and must be initially considered by the RO before further appellate action can be taken on the these claims. See Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180, 183 (1991). Therefore, the appellant's claim for service connection for liver cancer for purposes of accrued benefits must be resolved prior to further appellate action on these issues. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following actions: 1. The claims file must be reviewed to ensure that all notice and development action required by 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A (West 2002), 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2005) and applicable judicial precedent are fully complied with and satisfied. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2005). 2. The RO should contact the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) and the service department (Navy) to obtain copies of all available service personnel records, showing the veteran's assignments and duties during active duty while stationed in Vietnam. 3. Thereafter, claims file should be forwarded to the VA Under Secretary for Health with a request that a quantitative estimate of ionizing radiation exposure for the veteran be obtained for the veteran for his service in Vietnam, in view of the veteran's service records and his contentions. This should be an explicit estimate, even if it is zero. With the dose estimate, any other indicated development under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 should then be undertaken. 4. Thereafter, the RO should review the record and with consideration of all evidence added to the record readjudicate the claims for service connection for liver cancer due to exposure to ionizing radiation, Agent Orange, asbestos or mustard gas in service, for purposes of accrued benefits, service connection for the cause of the veteran's death and entitlement to burial benefits. 5. If the benefits sought on appeal remain denied, the RO should issue a supplemental statement of the case, and the appellant and her representative should be provided an opportunity to respond. Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board, if in order. The Board intimates no opinion as to the ultimate outcome of this case. The appellant need take no action unless otherwise notified by VA. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, § 707(a), (b), 117 Stat. 2651 (2003) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112). ____________________________________________ N. R. ROBIN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs