Citation Nr: 0731775 Decision Date: 10/09/07 Archive Date: 10/23/07 DOCKET NO. 05-30 120 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 2. Entitlement to service connection for blurred vision. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a neck disorder. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a right shoulder disorder. 5. Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral hip disorder. 6. Entitlement to service connection for heart disease with bypass surgery. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD John Kitlas, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from June 1974 to May 1980. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an April 2005 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Muskogee, Oklahoma, which denied the claims. The veteran provided testimony at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in April 2007. A transcript of this hearing has been associated with the veteran's VA claims folder. Following this hearing, the veteran submitted additional evidence directly to the Board, accompanied by a waiver of initial consideration of this evidence by the agency of original jurisdiction in accord with 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304. For the reasons addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below, the Board finds that additional development is required with respect to the veteran's tinnitus, blurred vision, and neck disorder claims. Accordingly, these claims will be REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. VA will notify the veteran if additional action is required on his part. As an additional matter, the Board notes that the veteran indicated at his April 2007 hearing that not all of the medical problems he identified in his original service connection claim had been adjudicated. This appears to be in reference to an August 2004 statement which identified his medical problems as not only the current appellate claims, but also a backache (upper, lower, and middle); leg cramps in both calves; numbness and tingling in both hands, both feet, and all fingers and toes; sinus problem; acid reflux; erectile dysfunction; fatigue; shortness of breath; swelling of both feet and both ankles; dizziness; sleeplessness; high cholesterol/triglycerides; snoring; nerves; arthritis of both knees, both wrists, both elbows, and fingers; hearing loss both ears; light stroke; hemorrhoids; headaches; and radiation exposure. However, in a subsequent January 2005 statement he indicated that he was only filing service connection claims for the issues currently on appeal. Nevertheless, he did indicate at his recent hearing that he wanted to seek service connection for these additional medical problems. He further indicated that he wanted to seek service connection for diabetes. These claims are referred to the RO for appropriate action. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All reasonable development and notification necessary for the equitable disposition of the issues adjudicated by this decision has been completed. 2. The preponderance of the medical and other evidence of record is against a finding that the veteran currently has a right shoulder disorder, bilateral hip disorder, and/or heart disease due to his period of active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Service connection is not warranted for a right shoulder disorder, bilateral hip disorder, and/or heart disease with bypass surgery. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Board notes at the outset that VA has an obligation to notify claimants what information or evidence is needed in order to substantiate a claim, as well as a duty to assist claimants by making reasonable efforts to get the evidence needed. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A and 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a); see Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims (Court) has held that adequate notice, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim for VA benefits. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120 (2004). Here, the veteran was sent pre-adjudication notice by a letter dated in February 2005, which is clearly prior to the April 2005 rating decision that is the subject of this appeal. In pertinent part, this letter informed the veteran of the evidence necessary to substantiate his current appellate claims, what information and evidence he must submit, what information and evidence will be obtained by VA, and indicated the need for the veteran to advise VA of or to submit any evidence in his possession that was relevant to the case. As such, this correspondence fully complied with the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), as well as the holding in Quartuccio, supra. Moreover, a subsequent March 2007 letter provided the veteran with the specific information regarding disability rating(s) and effective date(s) mandated by the Court's holding in Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, as service connection is denied for the issues decided herein, no rating or effective date is to be assigned and any error in timing of the notice is harmless error. All the law requires is that the duty to notify is satisfied and that claimants are given the opportunity to submit information and evidence in support of their claims. Once this has been accomplished, all due process concerns have been satisfied. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); Sutton v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 553 (1996); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (harmless error). In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that the veteran was notified and aware of the evidence needed to substantiate the claims decided herein and the avenues through which he might obtain such evidence, and of the allocation of responsibilities between himself and VA in obtaining such evidence. Accordingly, there is no further duty to notify. In addition, the duty to assist the veteran has been satisfied in this case regarding his right shoulder, bilateral hip, and heart disease claims. All available medical records pertinent to these issues on appeal are in the claims folder. Nothing indicates that the veteran has indicated the existence of any other relevant evidence that has not been obtained or requested. Further, he has had the opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his claims, to include at his April 2007 hearing. Although he has not undergone a VA medical examination regarding his claims, for the reasons detailed below the Board finds that no examination or opinion is warranted with respect to the right shoulder, bilateral hip, and heart disease claims. Consequently, for these reasons, the Board concludes that VA has fulfilled the duty to assist the appellant in regard to these issues. The Board notes that it has thoroughly reviewed the record in conjunction with this case. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence submitted by the appellant or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claims. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 129 (2000) (noting that the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the benefit of the doubt shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). When a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, such doubt will be resolved in the favor of the claimant. Reasonable doubt is doubt which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The question is whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the claimant prevailing in either event, or whether a fair preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which event the claim must be denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54 (1990). In this, and in other cases, only independent medical evidence may be considered to support medical findings. The Board is not free to substitute its own judgment for that of such an expert. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991). Here, nothing on file shows that the veteran has the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to render a medical opinion. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). Consequently, his contentions cannot constitute competent medical evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). Legal Criteria. Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Evidence of continuity of symptomatology from the time of service until the present is required where the chronicity of a condition manifested during service either has not been established or might reasonably be questioned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Regulations also provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Mercado-Martinez v. West , 11 Vet. App. 415, 419 (1998) (citing Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992)). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). The veteran initially contended that all of his claimed disabilities were due to in-service asbestos exposure. The Board notes that there is no specific statutory guidance with regard to asbestos-related claims, nor has the Secretary promulgated any regulations in regard to such claims. However, VA has issued a circular on asbestos-related diseases. DVB Circular 21-88-8, Asbestos-Related Diseases (May 11, 1988) (DVB Circular) provides guidelines for considering compensation claims based on exposure to asbestos. The information and instructions from the DVB Circular have been included in a VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1 (M21-1), Part VI, 7.21. Further, the Court has held that VA must analyze an appellant's claim to entitlement to service connection for asbestosis or asbestos-related disabilities under the administrative protocols under these guidelines. Ennis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App, 523, 527 (1993); McGinty v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 428, 432 (1993). The guidelines provide that the latency period for asbestos- related diseases varies from 10-45 years or more between first exposure and development of disease. M21-1, part VI, para. 7.21(b)(1) and (2). It is noted that an asbestos- related disease can develop from brief exposure to asbestos or as a bystander. The guidelines identify the nature of some asbestos-related diseases. The most common disease is interstitial pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis). Asbestos fibers may also produce pleural effusions and fibrosis, pleural plaques, mesotheliomas of the pleura and peritoneum, lung cancer, and cancers of the gastrointestinal tract. See M21-1, part VI, para. 7.21(a)(1). Cancers of the larynx and pharynx, as well as the urogenital system (except the prostate) are also associated with asbestos exposure. Thus, persons with asbestos exposure have increased incidence of bronchial, lung, pharyngolaryngeal, gastrointestinal and urogenital cancer. M21-1, Part VI, para 7.21(a). The Court has further held that in adjudicating asbestos- related claims, it must be determined whether development procedures applicable to such claims have been followed. See Ashford v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 120 (1997). The guidelines provide, in part, that the clinical diagnosis of asbestosis requires a history of exposure and radiographic evidence of parenchymal disease; that rating specialists are to develop any evidence of asbestos exposure before, during and after service; and that a determination must be made as to whether there is a relationship between asbestos exposure and the claimed disease, keeping in mind the latency period and exposure information. M21-1, part VI, para. 7.21(d)(1). Analysis. In the instant case, and for the reasons stated below, the Board finds that the veteran is not entitled to a grant of service connection for a right shoulder disorder, a bilateral hip disorder, and/or heart disease with bypass surgery. The Board observes, as an initial matter, that a review of the post-service medical records does not indicate the veteran has actually been diagnosed with a chronic disability of either hip. Although the Board does not doubt the sincerity of the veteran's subjective complaints of pain, based on the foregoing it must conclude that there is no competent medical evidence that he has a diagnosed disability of the hips. The Court has held that service connection is not authorized for pain alone, in the absence of a medical diagnosis. See Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999) ("pain alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition, does not in and of itself constitute a disability for which service connection may be granted."); dismissed in part and vacated in part on other grounds, sub. nom. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 239 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Congress specifically limits entitlement for service- connected disease or injury to cases where such incidents have resulted in a disability. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; and see Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). In Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997), it was observed that 38 U.S.C.A § 1131, as well as other relevant statutes, only permitted payment for disabilities existing on and after the date of application for such disorders. The Federal Circuit observed that the structure of these statutes "provided strong evidence of congressional intent to restrict compensation to only presently existing conditions," and VA's interpretation of the law requiring a present disability for a grant of service connection was consistent with the statutory scheme. Degmetich, 104 F.3d at 1332; and see Gilpin v. West, 155 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding VA's interpretation of the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A § 1110 to require evidence of a present disability to be consistent with congressional intent); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141 (1992) (the law limits entitlement for service-related diseases and injuries to cases where the underlying in-service incident has resulted in a disability). Simply put, in the absence of proof of present disability there can be no valid claim. The Board further notes that even if the veteran did have a current diagnosis of a bilateral hip disorder, he would still not be entitled to a grant of service connection for such a disability. See Holbrook v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 91 (1995) (The Board has the fundamental authority to decide a claim in the alternative.). In a January 2005 statement, the veteran indicated that all of his disabilities were due to in-service asbestos exposure. However, at his April 2007 hearing he testified that he had had recurrent right shoulder and bilateral hip problems secondary to an in-service injury that occurred when he was trying to lower a floor buffer. He testified that two guys had tied a rope to the buffer, which was very heavy; that they told him to hold the rope to lower it down through a hatch; that when they got it over the hole, they let go; and he was injured as a result of the resulting impact. Further, he maintained that he was treated for these injuries. With respect to his heart disease claim, he acknowledged at his hearing that he did not have heart problems while on active duty. Nevertheless, he believes he developed heart disease as a result of the diet and stress he experienced while in the military. Despite the veteran's contentions, the Board notes that a review of the service medical records does not indicate he was treated for problems regarding the right shoulder, either hip, or heart disease during active service. The Board acknowledges that he did indicate on an April 1980 Report of Medical History that he had experienced painful or "trick" shoulder or elbow. However, there is no indication on this Report that he specified right shoulder problems. In fact, records dated in April 1976 indicate evaluation of the left shoulder, and not the right shoulder. The service medical records do not otherwise indicate treatment for the right shoulder, or either of his hips. Further, his upper and lower extremities, as well as his heart, were all clinically evaluated as normal on his April 1980 discharge examination. Moreover, there is no indication that he was treated for injuries sustained as a result of lowering a floor buffer as he described at the April 2007 hearing. In addition to the foregoing, the Board observes that there is no indication of any treatment for any of these disabilities, if at all, until many years after his separation from service. For example, the first indication of heart disease is records dated in 2000, approximately 20 years after his separation from service, many years following the one year presumptive period which would permit a grant of service connection on a presumptive basis. Moreover, the veteran acknowledged at his April 2007 hearing that this is when he was first treated for his heart disease. Moreover, records dated in 2005 show findings of right shoulder impingement, which is approximately 25 years after his separation from service. The Court has indicated that the normal medical findings at the time of separation from service, as well as the absence of any medical records of a diagnosis or treatment for many years after service is probative evidence against the claim. See Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (affirming Board where it found that veteran failed to account for the lengthy time period after service for which there was no clinical documentation of low back condition); see also Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors concerning a claimant's health and medical treatment during and after military service, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability.); Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact). The Board further notes that no competent medical opinion is of record which relates a right shoulder disorder, a bilateral hip disorder, and/or heart disease to active service, to include asbestos exposure. Moreover, the Board concludes that no such development is warranted in this case. In the absence of evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of the claimed disabilities, referral of this case for an opinion as to etiology would in essence place the examining physician in the role of a fact finder. This is the Board's responsibility. In other words, any medical nexus opinion would not be supported by what actually occurred in service. Simply put, there is no relevant complaint, clinical finding, or laboratory finding for a clinician to link the claimed right shoulder, bilateral hip, and heart disabilities to the veteran's military service. The Court has held on a number of occasions that a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account of a claimant is of no probative value. See Godfrey v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 113, 121 (1995) (a medical opinion that is based on the veteran's recitation of medical history, and unsupported by clinical findings, is not probative). The Board further observes that the M21-1 guidelines for asbestos exposure cases do not indicate that the claimed disabilities are the type of conditions associated with such exposure, nor has the veteran presented any competent medical evidence which suggests otherwise. Thus, the Board concludes that no additional development is warranted, to include on the basis of the purported asbestos exposure. For the reasons stated above, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claims of service connection for a right shoulder disorder, bilateral hip disorder, and heart disease with bypass surgery. As the preponderance of the evidence is against these claims, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application in the instant case. See generally Gilbert, supra; Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Consequently, the benefit sought on appeal with respect to these claims must be denied. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a right shoulder disorder is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral hip disorder is denied. Entitlement to service connection for heart disease with bypass surgery is denied. REMAND The Board observes that, unlike the issues adjudicated above, the veteran's service medical records do indicate treatment for eye, ear, and neck problems. For example, it was noted that uncorrected visual acuity was 20/25 for the right eye and 20/30 for the left on his February 1974 enlistment examination. He also indicated on a concurrent Report of Medical History that he wore glasses. However, records from September 1977 indicate he had to have his prescription changed, and that he was found to have a convergence deficiency. On his April 1980 discharge examination, his uncorrected visual acuity was 20/40 for the right eye and 20/70 for the left. Moreover, he indicated on a concurrent Report of Medical History that he had experienced eye trouble. He testified at his April 2007 hearing that he had blurred vision while on active duty, and related the condition to his current cataracts for which he has undergone surgery. With respect to the tinnitus claim, he testified that it began while on active duty, and indicated that he had such problems when he had to get his ears flushed out. His service medical records confirm that he was treated in September 1978 for blockage of the right ear; that the ear was packed with cerumen; and that it was washed out. Further, he was previously treated for a sebaceous cyst of the left ear in February 1976. He contended at the April 2007 hearing that his tinnitus developed as a result of in- service noise exposure, and provided a description thereof. Finally, records dated in April 1976 confirm the veteran was treated for a neck injury, diagnosed as cervical strain. Despite these in-service findings, the Board observes that no medical examinations have been accorded to the veteran for the purpose of determining whether his claimed tinnitus, blurred vision, and neck disorder are causally related to the confirmed events of active service. The Board is of the opinion that such development is necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the claims. When the medical evidence of record is insufficient, in the opinion of the Board, or of doubtful weight or credibility, the Board must supplement the record by seeking an advisory opinion, ordering a medical examination, or citing recognized medical treatises that clearly support its ultimate conclusions. See Colvin, 1 Vet. App. at 175; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4) (An examination or opinion shall be treated as being necessary to make a decision on the claim if the evidence of record ... does not contain sufficient medical evidence for VA to make a decision on the claim.). Consequently, a remand is required in order to complete this development. Since the Board has determined that medical examinations are necessary in the instant case, the veteran is hereby informed that 38 C.F.R. § 3.326(a) provides that individuals for whom examinations have been authorized and scheduled are required to report for such examinations. The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 address the consequences of a veteran's failure to attend scheduled medical examinations. That regulation at (a) provides that, when entitlement to a benefit cannot be established or confirmed without a current VA examination and a claimant, without "good cause," fails to report for such examination, action shall be taken. At (b) it is provided that when a claimant fails to report for an examination scheduled in conjunction with an original compensation claim, the claim shall be rated based on the evidence of record. However, when the examination is scheduled in conjunction with any other original claim, a reopened claim for a benefit which was previously disallowed, or a claim for increase, the claim shall be denied. For the reasons stated above, this case is REMANDED for the following: 1. The RO should obtain the names and addresses of all medical care providers who have treated the veteran for his tinnitus, blurred vision, and neck problems since July 2006. After securing any necessary release, the RO should obtain those records not on file. 2. After obtaining any additional records to the extent possible, the veteran should be afforded medical examinations to determine the current nature and etiology of his tinnitus, blurred vision, and neck disorder. The claims folder should be made available to the examiners for review of pertinent documents therein in connection with the examination; the examiners must state that the claims folder was reviewed. Following examination of the veteran, the examiners must express an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater likelihood) that the respective disability is causally related to the confirmed events of active service, as documented in the service medical records. If any of the examiners are unable to provide the requested opinion, it should be so stated. 3. Thereafter, the RO should review the claims folder to ensure that the foregoing requested development has been completed. In particular, the RO should review the examination reports to ensure that they are responsive to and in compliance with the directives of this remand and if not, the RO should implement corrective procedures. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). 4. After completing any additional development deemed necessary, the RO should readjudicate the issues on appeal in light of any additional evidence added to the records assembled for appellate review. If the benefits requested on appeal are not granted to the veteran's satisfaction, the veteran and his representative should be furnished a Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC), which addresses all of the evidence obtained after the issuance of the last SSOC in November 2006, and provided an opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board for further appellate consideration, if in order. By this remand, the Board intimates no opinion as to any final outcome warranted. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2007). ______________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Important Notice: Attached to this decision is a VA Form that provides information concerning your rights to appeal our decision. Due to recent changes in the law, some of the information contained in the attached notice of appellate rights form is no longer accurate concerning the ability to pay attorneys and agents to represent you. Some additional information follows that summarizes the current law. To the extent that the information contained in the attached VA Form conflicts with the summary below, please disregard the information on the VA Form and instead rely upon the following information: Do I have to pay an attorney or agent to represent me? An attorney or agent may charge a fee to represent you after a notice of disagreement has been filed with respect to your case, provided that the notice of disagreement was filed on or after June 20, 2007. See Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 3403 (2006). If the notice of disagreement was filed before June 20, 2007, an attorney or accredited agent may charge fees for services, but only after the Board first issues a final decision in the case, and only if the agent or attorney is hired within one year of the Board's decision. The notice of disagreement limitation does not apply to fees charged, allowed, or paid for services provided with respect to proceedings before a court. VA cannot pay the fees of your attorney or agent, with the exception of payment of fees out of past-due benefits awarded to you on the basis of your claim when provided for in a fee agreement. VA is in the process of amending its regulations governing representation of claimants for veterans' benefits in order to implement the provisions of the new law. More information concerning the regulation changes and related matters can be obtained at http://www1.va.gov/OGC (click on "Accreditation and Recognition of Service Organizations"). Fee for VA home and small business loan cases: An attorney or agent may charge you a reasonable fee for services involving a VA home loan or small business loan. For more information, read section 5904, title 38, United States Code. Filing of Fee Agreements: In all cases, a copy of any fee agreement between you and an attorney or accredited agent must be sent to the Secretary at the following address: Office of the Chief Counsel for Policy (01C3) Board of Veterans' Appeals 810 Vermont Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20420 Facsimile: (202) 565-5643 (When final regulations are published to implement the requirements of the new law, fee agreements must be filed with the VA Office of the General Counsel and not the Board.) Department of Veterans Affairs