Citation Nr: 0810252 Decision Date: 03/28/08 Archive Date: 04/09/08 DOCKET NO. 04-15 189 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for peripheral neuropathy of the extremities. 3. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for sinusitis/upper respiratory distress, to include bronchitis, asthma, and allergies. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD T. Adams, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from June 1970 to January 1972. This case is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2003 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri, which denied the benefits sought on appeal. The issues of whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen claims for service connection for peripheral neuropathy of the extremities and sinusitis/upper respiratory distress to include bronchitis, asthma, and allergies are remanded to the RO via the Appeals Management Center in Washington, D.C. FINDING OF FACT The medical evidence shows that the veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD which is medically attributed to a verified stressor he experienced during his service in Vietnam. CONCLUSION OF LAW PTSD was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West Supp. 2007), 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 4.125 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION VA has a duty to notify the veteran of any information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103 (West Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2007). VA also has a duty to assist the veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103A (West Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (2007). As discussed in detail below, sufficient evidence is of record to grant the benefit sought on appeal. Therefore, no further notice or development is needed. A claimant with active service may be granted service connection for a disease or disability either incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Mercado-Martinez v. West, 11 Vet. App. 415, 419 (1998); citing Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542 (1992). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible. Lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., under the criteria of DSM-IV), a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor, and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (2007). VA considers diagnoses of mental disorders in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (1994) (DSM-IV). The DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD include: A) exposure to a traumatic event; B) the traumatic event is persistently experienced in one or more ways; C) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness is indicated by at least three of seven symptoms; D) persistent symptoms of increased arousal are reflected by at least two of five symptoms; E) the duration of the disturbance must be more than one month; and F) the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. DSM-IV, Diagnostic Code 309.81. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2007). When the evidence does not establish that a veteran is a combat veteran, his assertions of service stressors are not sufficient to establish the occurrence of such events. Rather, his alleged service stressors must be established by official service record or other credible supporting evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002); Fossie v. West, 12 Vet. App. 1 (1998); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994). It is the Board's principal responsibility to assess the credibility, and therefore the probative value of proffered evidence of record in its whole. Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429 (1995); Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Guimond v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 69 (1993); Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). In determining whether documents submitted by a veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board is not required to accept an appellant's uncorroborated account of his active service experiences. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991). The record before the Board contains service medical records and post-service medical records, which will be addressed as pertinent. Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001) (a discussion of all evidence by the Board is not required when the Board has supported its decision with thorough reasons and bases regarding the relevant evidence). The veteran claims that while serving in Vietnam from June 1971 to January 1972, he was exposed to stressors that support a PTSD diagnosis. Specifically, he claims that during his first night in Da Nang in August 1971, his camp was attacked by mortar shells The veteran's service personnel records show that he served in the Army with a military occupational specialty of communications and electrical staff officer. From June 1971 to October 1971, he served as an electronics maintenance officer in Da Nang, Vietnam and his duties included preparing operations and maintenance procedures for military technicians. He received the National Defense Service Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, Vietnam Campaign Medal, and Bronze Star; awards that do not necessarily denote service in combat. The veteran's service medical records are void of findings, complaints, symptoms, or diagnoses of any psychiatric disorder or PTSD. The veteran underwent a VA PTSD initial examination in February 2003. He stated that he arrived at Cam Ranh Bay in June 1971 and was an electronics officer in charge of communications lines and calibrating radar. He was initially assigned to Da Nang and on his first night there, he was alone in his tent when the camp was bombarded by mortar shells. He indicated that he felt very alone, was unfamiliar with combat, and was not sure what to do. He sat on the floor in front of his cot and waited for the bombing to stop. For each successive raid thereafter, he found himself sitting on the floor by his cot reliving the incident. While he was not wounded, he claimed that he saw a number of other military men that were wounded and mutilated. He also claimed that he had to ride in helicopters to the front lines to fix communications and vividly remembered being shot at in the helicopter. He cited the first mortar attack as the most traumatic event and was afraid that he might die. The examiner reviewed a letter from the veteran dated in October 2002 in which he reported feelings of victimization that occurred when he felt angry, stressed, or detached from people around him. This resulted in problems sleeping including nightmares and night sweats. His appetite was not good and he described his mood as okay. He had no suicidal or homicidal ideation, or any premeditated plan to hurt anyone. On examination, he rarely smiled and showed intense eye contact. Rapport and cooperation were adequate. Speech was within normal limits for rate, flow, and volume. There was some circumstantiality and at times he was difficult to follow. There was a mild paranoid quality to his thinking. Overall, the ability to relate was intact for examination purposes, but in general the veteran was quite reserved and appeared very suspicious at times. From his own description, he was sometimes questioning to a point of being confrontational. His mood was okay and his affect was narrow and restricted. There was no overt evidence of anxiety during the examination. However, he did report anxiety symptoms associated with PTSD. There were no psychotic symptoms of hallucinations or delusions. Memory, mental control, attention, and concentration were intact. Thinking was abstract. Insight, judgment, and impulse control were fair. The examiner indicated that he met the DSM-IV criteria for PSTD based upon his exposure to traumatic life events in Vietnam during active service, recurrent and intrusive recall of those events, recurrent dreams, and anxious reactions to some triggers. He felt detached, distant, and suspicious of others, including his wife, and exhibited a very restricted range of affect. He persistently showed problems sleeping, irritability, and hypervigilance. The veteran also underwent a VA PTSD examination in April 2006. He complained of repeated and distressing memories of the war. He had flashbacks and dreams about violence, but not specifically about Vietnam. He reported some amnesia concerning Vietnam, and suffered from emotional numbness. He tried to avoid thoughts, feelings, and conversations, and activities that reminded him of Vietnam. He had a fear of being hurt because of loss and reported that he had a social life, but no close friends. He had problems sleeping and was easily started by loud noises. He reported that he was overly alert and easily angered. He again recounted the mortar attack of August 1971 and being shot at in the helicopter. On examination, impulse control was appropriate and speech was of normal volume, rate, and rhythm. He was alert and oriented to person, place, and time. His mood was within normal limits as long as he was not thinking about Vietnam which made him depressed. He became angry at times and reported that his mood was somewhat labile and that he could easily became depressed. He denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation. Affect was appropriate to content. No perceptual distortions were noted. Thought content was rational and logical and his thought process was sequential and goal-directed. He stated that his memory was within normal limits. The examiner opined that he met the criteria for a DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD. In a May 2006 addendum to the April 2006 VA examination, the examiner further opined that the veteran's PTSD was directly related to the August 1971 rocket attack in Da Nang. Having determined that the veteran has a valid PTSD diagnosis, the remaining question before the Board is whether the veteran's PTSD diagnosis is based upon a verified stressor. VA was able to identify the most serious stressor which was the August 1971 mortar attack at Da Nang. In March 2006, results of a DPRIS search revealed that the Da Nang Airfield received a rocket attack in August 1971. Accordingly, while the veteran's cited stressors of attacks by fire while riding in the helicopter have not been corroborated, the Board finds that the veteran's stressor of an incoming mortar attacks in August 1971 has been corroborated. Because the veteran's PTSD diagnosis was based, at least in part, on a corroborated stressor, the Board finds that service connection for PTSD is warranted. The Board has resolved all reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran in making this determination. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER Service connection for PTSD is granted. REMAND Additional development is needed prior to further disposition of the remaining claims. The veteran's claims for service connection for peripheral neuropathy of the extremities; and sinusitis/upper respiratory distress to include bronchitis, asthma, and allergies, were previously denied in a July 1998 rating decision. In a January 2003 rating decision, the RO declined to reopen the claims. While the RO decided that new and material evidence sufficient to reopen the claims had not been submitted, the Board must consider the question of whether new and material evidence has been received because it goes to the Board's jurisdiction to reach the underlying claims and adjudicate the claims de novo. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Kent v. Nicholson requires that the Secretary look at the bases for the prior denial and notify the veteran as to what evidence is necessary to substantiate the element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient at the time of the previous denial. The question of what constitutes material evidence to reopen a claim for service connection depends on the basis upon which the prior claim was denied. Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). In this case, the veteran has not yet been notified as to the specific evidence necessary to reopen his claims for service connection. On remand, the veteran should be so notified. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Send the veteran a corrective notice under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) that (1) notifies the veteran of the evidence and information necessary to reopen the claims for service connection for peripheral neuropathy of the extremities; and sinusitis/upper respiratory distress to include bronchitis, asthma, and allergies, (i.e., describes what new and material evidence is under the current standard); and (2) notifies the veteran of what specific evidence would be required to substantiate the element or elements needed for service connection that were found insufficient in the prior denial on the merits (i.e., an opinion relating his current peripheral neuropathy and sinusitis/respiratory disability to his period of active service, to an event or injury in service, or to a service- connected disability). 2. Then review the issues on appeal. If the decision remains adverse to the veteran, issue a supplemental statement of the case and allow the applicable period of time for response. Then, return the case to the Board The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). These claims must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that claims remanded by the Board or the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2007). ______________________________________________ Harvey P. Roberts Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs