Citation Nr: 0811534 Decision Date: 04/08/08 Archive Date: 04/23/08 DOCKET NO. 05-32 323 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in No. Little Rock, Arkansas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for peripheral vascular disease of the left lower extremity (claimed as a left foot disorder). 2. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the appellant's claim for entitlement to service connection for a right foot and ankle disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. C. Graham, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from October 1950 to May 1952. The instant appeal arose from a January 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO), in North Little Rock, Arkansas, which denied a claim for service connection for peripheral vascular disease of the left lower extremity and denied a claim to reopen a claim for service connection for residuals of a fracture of the right foot and ankle. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A chronic left lower extremity disorder, including peripheral vascular disease, was not manifested in service or for many years following service discharge, and has not been related by competent medical evidence to any disease or injury sustained during the veteran's period of service. 2. In May 2002, the RO denied a claim to reopen a claim for service connection for residuals of a chip fracture of the right foot. 3. Evidence submitted subsequent to the May 2002 decision, although new, is not material because it does not include competent evidence that relates to the unestablished fact of an injury to the right foot in service or an aggravation of a pre-existing injury. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A left lower extremity disorder, including peripheral vascular disease, was not incurred in or aggravated by the veteran's active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303 (2007). 2. A May 2002 RO rating decision that denied service connection for residuals of a chip fracture of the right foot is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103 (2007). 3. The evidence received since the RO's May 2002 decision is not new and material; the veteran's claim for service connection for a right foot and ankle disorder is not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5108 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156 , 3.159 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Service connection for a left lower extremity disorder The veteran contends that service connection is warranted for a left lower extremity disorder. He is currently diagnosed with iliac and popliteal artery disease and mild pedal arch disease of the left lower extremity. See July 21, 2003, VA treatment record. He attributes his current diagnosis to treatment and injuries in service. Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). Service connection for a left lower extremity disorder is not warranted on a direct or secondary basis because the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the veteran's current left lower extremity disorder is related to service or a service- connected disability. The service medical records reveal no complaint, treatment, or diagnosis referable to the left lower extremity. The first post-service medical record which refers to a left lower extremity disorder is a 1995 VA examination report which opined that the veteran "probably has some arteriolar deficiency to the . . . left lower extremity." Evidence of such a prolonged period without apparent medical complaint weighs against the claim. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition, while the veteran is competent to report what he experiences, like pain in the leg, in view of the absence of any evidence of complaints referable to the left lower extremity for over 40 years, the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) accords his current assertions little probative weight. The claim is denied because the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no nexus between any current left lower extremity diagnosis and service or a service-connected disability. While the veteran has stated that his current left lower extremity problems are related to service, as a lay person, he has no competence to give a medical opinion on the etiology of a condition. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). While the veteran is competent to relate his observable symptoms, like left leg pain, his statements in support of the claim are outweighed by the medical evidence. While the Board has sympathetically considered the arguments advanced by the veteran, it concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim on appeal. When the preponderance of evidence is against a claim, it must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107. VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2007). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must ask the claimant to provide any evidence in her or his possession that pertains to the claim in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims held that, upon receipt of an application for a service-connection claim, 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) require VA to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating, or is necessary to substantiate, each of the five elements of the claim, including notice of what is required to establish service connection and that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. In this case, although the notice provided did not address either the rating criteria or effective date provisions that are pertinent to the appellant's claim, such error was harmless given that service connection is being denied, and hence no rating or effective date will be assigned with respect to this claimed condition. Here, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by way of a letter sent to the veteran in August 2004 that fully addressed all four notice elements and was sent prior to the initial AOJ decision in this matter. The letter informed the veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate the service connection claim and of the veteran's and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The veteran was also asked to submit evidence and/or information in her or his possession to the AOJ. VA has a duty to assist the veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting the veteran in the procurement of service medical records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. In determining whether the duty to assist requires that a VA medical examination be provided or medical opinion obtained with respect to a veteran's claim for benefits, there are four factors for consideration. These four factors are: (1) whether there is competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability; (2) whether there is evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, or evidence establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumption period; (3) whether there is an indication that the disability or symptoms may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability; and (4) whether there otherwise is sufficient competent medical evidence of record to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). With respect to the third factor above, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has stated that this element establishes a low threshold and requires only that the evidence "indicates" that there "may" be a nexus between the current disability or symptoms and the veteran's service. The types of evidence that "indicate" that a current disability "may be associated" with military service include, but are not limited to, medical evidence that suggests a nexus but is too equivocal or lacking in specificity to support a decision on the merits, or credible evidence of continuity of symptomatology such as pain or other symptoms capable of lay observation. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). In this case, the duty to assist does not require that a VA medical examination be provided because there is no evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease with respect to the left lower extremity occurred in service. As noted above, there are no complaints, treatment, or diagnosis with respect to the left leg in the service medical records. Further, the low threshold with regard to the third element has not been met in this case. There is no medical evidence that suggests a nexus between the veteran's current diagnosis and service. In addition, there is no credible evidence of continuity of symptomatology. The veteran has only recently reported left leg complaints, and his statements with regard to nexus are vague. He attributes his vascular problems, diagnosed many years after service, to nonspecific "treatment and injuries" in service. Accordingly, a VA examination is not warranted. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the appellant. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The RO has obtained VA outpatient treatment records. Significantly, neither the veteran nor his or her representative has identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. The veteran informed VA of several medical providers who had treated his foot, although it is unclear as to whether any of these medical providers treated the left foot. He was unable to provide complete addresses for these providers, and he indicated that several of the medical providers could be retired or deceased. VA searches of the American Medical Association listings, the internet, and the phone book were unsuccessful. In addition, one medical facility responded to VA's development request by stating that they had no record for the veteran. Accordingly, the Board finds that further efforts to obtain this evidence would be futile. For that reason, no further notice or assistance to the veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the veteran in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Reopening service connection for a right foot and ankle disorder The veteran contends that he has a right foot and ankle disorder that began in service. He reported that these problems continued after service and have worsened in recent years. The Board has a legal duty to address the "new and material evidence" requirement regardless of the actions of the RO. If the Board finds that no new and material evidence has been submitted, it is bound by a statutory mandate not to consider the merits of the case. Barnett v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 1, 4 (1995), aff'd 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239, 244 (1993). The law provides that a claimant may reopen a previously final adjudicated claim by submitting new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). In Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that new evidence could be sufficient to reopen a claim if it could contribute to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a veteran's injury or disability, even where it would not be enough to convince the Board to grant the claim. In determining whether evidence is new and material, the "credibility of the evidence is to be presumed." Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). If new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim that has been disallowed, the VA Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108. In this case, a May 2002 RO rating decision declined to reopen the claim for service connection for residuals of a chip fracture of the right foot. That rating decision noted that the claim was originally denied in 1953 because there was no injury to the right foot or ankle in service or an aggravation of a pre-existing injury. Claims to reopen were denied in 1962, 1979, and 1992. In 1996, the Board granted a claim to reopen based on a 1992 private treating physician's statement which indicated that the veteran's current right foot complaints might be due to an inservice injury to the right foot. However, the claim for service connection for a right foot disorder was denied, based on the fact that the veteran sustained a chip fracture of the foot prior to service and there was no increase in severity of the pre- service foot disorder during service. Another claim to reopen was denied in 2000. The evidence of record at the time of the January 2002 rating decision included service medical records; private medical records; private medical opinions, lay statements from the veteran, his friends, and his family; VA treatment records; and VA examination reports. The service medical records included an induction examination that noted a history of a fractured metatarsal of the right foot in 1947. The remainder of the service medical records were negative for persistent foot or ankle problems, although a 1951 X-ray report revealed an old chip fracture of the right foot. Medical records after service, in 1952 and 1953, did not reveal complaints or treatment with respect to a right foot or ankle disorder. The next medical treatment records for the right foot were dated in 1962. The veteran complained of pain and swelling. These complaints remained fairly consistent for the next 40 years. Minimal degenerative changes in the right foot were noted in 1986. A 1995 VA examiner opined that the veteran's arthritis of the right foot was consistent with his age. VA treatment records dated from 2000 to 2002 did not show treatment for fracture of the right foot. Notice of the May 2002 rating decision was issued on May 7, 2002. The veteran did not appeal the decision, so the May 2002 rating decision became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103. In July 2004, the veteran filed a claim to reopen. The additional evidence received since the May 2002 final rating decision includes VA treatment records dated in 2003 and 2004 that show that the veteran reported calf pain and was assessed with femoral artery disease and that the veteran underwent diabetic foot care assessment. Complaints, treatment, or diagnosis with regard to the right foot or ankle were not otherwise noted. After a review of all the evidence of record, lay and medical, whether or not specifically mentioned in this decision, the Board finds that the evidence associated with the claims file subsequent to the May 2002 decision that was not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers, when considered with previous evidence of record, does not relate to the unestablished facts of in-service injury or disease of the right foot and ankle or relationship of current findings to service, including aggravation of a pre-existing right foot disorder, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. Because this new evidence does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim, the evidence associated with the claims file subsequent to the May 2002 rating decision is not new and material, and a previously denied claim for service connection for a right foot and ankle disorder is not reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2007). The duty to notify provisions of the statute and implementing regulations apply to claims to reopen based on new and material evidence. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Specific to requests to reopen, the claimant must be notified of both the reopening criteria and the criteria for establishing the underlying claim for service connection. See Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006). To satisfy this requirement, the Secretary is required to look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to provide the claimant with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate those elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. In this case, the notice letter provided to the veteran in August 2004 included the criteria for reopening a previously denied claim and the criteria for establishing service connection. That letter also informed the veteran that his claim had previously been denied because there was no evidence showing that a right foot disorder was incurred in or caused by military service. Consequently, the Board finds that adequate notice has been provided. In the present appeal, because the claim to reopen service connection is being denied, and no effective date or rating percentage will be assigned regarding that issue, the Board finds that there can be no possibility of any prejudice to the veteran under the holding in Dingess, supra. The veteran and his representative have not alleged any prejudice with respect to the timing of the notification, nor has any been shown. The veteran has been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of the claim, including by submission of statements and evidence. For these reasons, it is not prejudicial to the veteran for the Board to proceed to finally decide the appeal. See Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 186-87 (2002); Sutton v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 553 (1996); Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). + ORDER Service connection for a left lower leg disorder is denied. New and material evidence has not been received, and the claim for service connection for a right foot and ankle disorder is not reopened. ____________________________________________ MARJORIE A. AUER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs