Citation Nr: 0812799 Decision Date: 04/17/08 Archive Date: 05/01/08 DOCKET NO. 97-20 673 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Columbia, South Carolina THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for benefits under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Virginia A. Girard-Brady, Attorney at Law WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD R. Giannecchini, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active military service from June 4, 1968 to August 3, 1971. These matters come to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) following rating decisions of November 1996 and March 2004 of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office in Columbia, South Carolina. By way of history, the veteran's original appeal was from the RO's November 1996 denial of a claim for service connection for PTSD as not well grounded under the law. In connection with that appeal, the veteran testified at a Travel Board hearing held before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge at the Columbia VARO in April 1999. In November 1999, the Board held that the claim was in fact well grounded and remanded the merits of the matter to the RO for further evidentiary development and adjudication. The RO subsequently continued its prior denial of the claim for service connection for PTSD. In June 2002, while the case was in remand status at the RO, the veteran filed claims for service connection for a rash of the hands and for a compensable rating for residuals of an excision of a growth from the right lower abdomen. The RO denied both claims in November 2002. By a June 2003 decision, the Board denied service connection for a rash on the hands and remanded to the RO the veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD and his claim for a compensable rating for residuals of excision of a growth on the abdomen. The RO subsequently continued its prior denials of service connection for PTSD and for a compensable rating for residuals of excision of a skin growth on the abdomen. In July 2003 the veteran filed a petition to reopen his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. The RO denied that claim in March 2004 and the veteran perfected an appeal of that issue. In addition, the veteran's July 2003 petition to reopen his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 contained a request that a VA "decision letter" dated October 22, 1998, in which the veteran's original claim for compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 had been denied, be reviewed for clear and unmistakable error (CUE). In May 2005, the Board denied the veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD and also his claim for a compensable rating for residuals of excision of a growth from the right lower abdomen. It remanded the veteran's petition to reopen the claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. The veteran appealed the Board's decision as to his denied claims to the United States Court of Appeals for Veteran's Claims (Court). In an August 2007 memorandum decision, the Court vacated and remanded the Board's decision in relation to the veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD, and affirmed the Board's denial of the claim for a compensable rating for residuals of excision of a growth from the right lower abdomen. The veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD on appeal was remanded for readjudication pursuant to the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252(a) (West 2002). In December 2007, the Board contacted the veteran by letter and notified him of the right to submit additional argument and/or evidence within 90 days concerning the remanded issue on appeal for service connection for PTSD. (As noted above, the Court affirmed the Board's denial of the claim for a compensable rating for residuals of excision of a growth from the right lower abdomen. As such, that issue is no longer in appellate status.) In March 2008, the veteran's attorney submitted to the Board a Letter Response Form, signed by the veteran and dated in January 2008, in which the veteran notified the Board that he had no further information or evidence to submit. Otherwise, the Board notes that the veteran had been initially represented in his appeal by The American Legion. In January 2008, a VA Form 21-22a (Appointment of Individual as Claimant's Representative) was received by the Board in which the veteran granted a power-of-attorney with ABS Legal Services, in particular, V. A. G-B. The Board is aware that Ms. G-B's fee agreement with the veteran, dated and signed in November 2007, notes only representation with regard to his claim for service connection for PTSD. However, in light of the subsequently filed VA Form 21-22a and the noted conditions of appointment (to prosecute the veteran's claim(s) for any and all benefits from VA), the Board finds that Ms. G-B's representation encompasses both issues currently before it on appeal. The Board also notes that a copy of a June 2007 supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) is noted to have been sent to The American Legion and not necessarily to Ms. G-B. However, as Ms. G-B has submitted a written response to the June 2007 SSOC, the Board finds her to have demonstrated constructive notice of the document. Thus, further action to send Ms. G-B a copy of the June 2007 SSOC is not warranted. Finally, in May 2005 the Board remanded the issue of whether new and material evidence had been submitted to reopen a claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury, inter alia, because the issue was inextricably intertwined with the veteran's claim of CUE in the RO's October 22, 1998 decision (decision letter). The veteran was notified by the Board that in the event of an adverse decision by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) on his claim of CUE, he was required to perfect a separate appeal with regard to that issue. In a June 2007 rating decision, the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, D.C. denied the veteran's claim of CUE in the October 22, 1998 decision. Thereafter, as noted above, the AMC issued the veteran a June 2007 SSOC. In that SSOC, the AMC informed the veteran that his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury had been denied. The AMC also notified the veteran that his claim of CUE in the RO's October 22, 1998 decision had been denied. In an August 2007 statement, the veteran's attorney addressed the June 2007 SSOC noting that the veteran believed his case had been stated completely and that he respectfully requested that his appeal be expedited without waiting 60 days. (The decision below addresses the veteran's petition to reopen his claim for benefits under §38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. The remaining issue on appeal will be discussed in the remand that follows this decision.) FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In an October 1998 decision letter, the RO denied the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. The decision letter also notified the veteran of his procedural rights; however the veteran did not appeal the RO's decision. 2. Additional evidence associated with the claims file since the RO's October 1998 decision does not relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. An October 1998 RO decision that denied the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103 (2007). 2. Since the October 1998 RO decision, new and material evidence has not been received; hence, the requirements to reopen the claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2007). (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist At the outset, the Board notes the enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), in November 2000. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, and 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007). To implement the provisions of the law, VA promulgated regulations codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2007). The VCAA and its implementing regulations include, upon the submission of a substantially complete application for benefits, an enhanced duty on the part of VA to notify a claimant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate a claim, as well as the duty to notify the claimant of what evidence will be obtained by whom. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In addition, they define the obligation of VA with respect to its duty to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The Board points out that the VCAA expressly provides that nothing in the Act "shall be construed to require [VA] to reopen a claim that has been disallowed except when new and material evidence is presented or secured, as described in section 5108 of this title." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(f). In any event, the Board finds that all notification and development action needed to render a decision on the veteran's petition to reopen his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury has been accomplished. In this respect, through August 2003 and August 2006 notice letters, the veteran received notice of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim. Thereafter, the veteran was afforded the opportunity to respond. Hence, the Board finds that the veteran has been afforded ample opportunity to submit information and/or evidence needed to substantiate his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. The Board also finds that the August 2003 and August 2006 notice letters satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirement that VA notify a claimant what evidence, if any, will be obtained by the claimant and which evidence, if any, will be retrieved by VA. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002) (addressing the duties imposed by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)). In those letters, the AOJ notified the veteran that VA was required to make reasonable efforts to obtain medical records, employment records, or records from other Federal agencies. It also requested that the veteran identify any medical providers from whom he wanted the AOJ to obtain and consider evidence. Additionally, the veteran was requested to submit relevant evidence in his possession in support of his claim. Furthermore, the veteran was informed of the provisions regarding the assignment of effective dates and disability rating elements. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd, Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Also as regards to VA's notice requirements, the Board notes that, in the decision of Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that proper VCAA notice should notify the veteran of: (1) the evidence that is needed to substantiate the claim, (2) the evidence, if any, to be obtained by VA, and (3) the evidence, if any, to be provided by the claimant; and (4) VA must make a request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim. As indicated above, the four content-of-notice requirements have been met in this case. The Board notes that while the complete notice required by the VCAA was not necessarily provided prior to the RO's initial adjudication of the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury, "the appellant [was] provided the content- complying notice to which he [was] entitled." Pelegrini, 18 Vet. App. at 122. Nothing about the evidence or any response to the AOJ's notification suggests that the case must be re-adjudicated ab initio to satisfy the requirements of the VCAA. Furthermore, following the issuance of the August 2006 notice letter, the veteran's claim was re- adjudicated in June 2007. Additionally, in Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the Court specifically addressed VCAA notice requirements in the context of a veteran's request to reopen a previously and finally denied claim. The Court found that VA must notify a claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to reopen the claim, and must provide notice that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate the element or elements required to establish service connection (or, in the case at hand, benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151) that were not found in the previous denial. After having carefully reviewed the record, the Board has concluded that the notice requirements of the VCAA, per the holding in Kent, have been satisfied. In this regard, assuming any error in the August 2003 notice letter, the subsequent letter to the veteran in August 2006 notified him of the denial of his claim in October 1998 for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury, the reasons for the denial, as well as the evidence and information necessary to reopen his claim. Thus, in light of the August 2006 notice letter, the Board finds that the veteran is on notice of what he needs to reopen his claim and the evidence necessary to substantiate his claim. Nothing about the evidence or any response to the AOJ's notification suggests that the essential fairness of the adjudication of the veteran's claim has been affected. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board also points out that there is no indication whatsoever that any additional action is needed to comply with the duty to assist in connection with the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury decided herein. The AOJ has obtained relevant records from the VA Medical Center (VAMC) in Columbia, South Carolina and the veteran has been medically examined for VA purposes and the necessary medical opinion obtained. Otherwise, neither the veteran nor his attorney has identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, existing records pertinent to the claim that need to be obtained. In this regard, the record appears to indicate that the veteran is receiving disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (SSA). As will be discussed further below, medical records associated with any denial or grant of SSA disability benefits do not have a bearing on the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. Therefore, the Board finds that VA has complied with all duties to notify and assist required under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. II. Analysis As indicated above, the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury was previously considered and denied by the RO in October 1998. The veteran was notified of the decision and his procedural rights but did not appeal. Thus, the October 1998 decision is final based on the evidence of record. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103. In July 2003, the veteran sought to reopen his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury. Under pertinent legal authority, VA may reopen and review a claim, which has been previously denied if new and material evidence is submitted by or on behalf of the veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a); see also Hodge v. West, 155 F.3rd 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Regarding petitions to reopen filed on or after August 29, 2001, Title 38 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 3.156(a) defines "new" evidence as evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers and "material" evidence as evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). (During the pendency of the veteran's appeal VA revised 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52,455-52,457 (Sept. 6, 2006) (as codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2007). The amended regulation became effective October 6, 2006. The Board notes that none of the revisions to the regulation, which relate to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) and the receipt of additional service department records, affects the veteran's pending claim.) In determining whether new and material evidence has been received, VA must initially decide whether evidence associated with the claims file since the prior final denial is, in fact, new. This analysis is undertaken by comparing newly received evidence with the evidence previously of record. After evidence is determined to be new, the next question is whether it is material. The provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 require a review of all evidence submitted by or on behalf of a claimant since the last final denial on any basis to determine whether a claim must be reopened. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 282-3 (1996). Here, as indicated above, the final denial pertinent to the claim was the October 1998 RO decision. Furthermore, for purposes of the "new and material" analysis, the credibility of the evidence is presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 512-513 (1992). In October 1998, the RO denied the veteran's claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury on the basis that any injury the veteran reported as having occurred as a result of a fall associated with a collapsed chair was not shown to be the result of VA medical or surgical treatment, examination or hospitalization. The evidence available for review at the time of the RO's decision in October 1998 did not include any medical treatment records or reports of examination associated with the veteran's injury or treatment at the Columbia VAMC. Relevant evidence received since the final October 1998 decision consists of Columbia VAMC treatment records and a report of January 2004 VA examination. The treatment records document that in March 1998 the veteran reported for a physical therapy appointment at the Columbia VAMC. Upon arrival the veteran sat in a chair outside the physical therapy office. The chair collapsed and the veteran fell onto the floor. Treatment records note the veteran's associated complaints of left arm pain following his fall. An X-ray of the veteran's left shoulder at that time was negative. Treatment records also document prior injuries to the veteran's left upper extremity associated with a fall from a bicycle in April 1995 causing injury to his left shoulder, and that he had fallen on his left shoulder in October 1997 when his left leg had given out. Furthermore, the veteran reportedly suffered a mild cerebral vascular accident sometime in the early 1990s causing residual weakness of the left upper and lower extremities. Otherwise, records document the veteran as having undergone surgical repair of his left shoulder in February 1999 and his receiving physical therapy following the surgery. The report of January 2004 VA examination notes the examiner's opinion that the veteran likely had impingement syndrome and a possible rotator cuff tear prior to his fall in March 1998, and that the fall from the chair was felt by the examiner to be inconsequential. Furthermore, the examiner noted that even without the fall associated with the chair collapse, the veteran's left shoulder pain would have continued and he would have had to have had surgery. In this case, notwithstanding the veteran's contentions, where, as here, resolution of the issue on appeal turns on a medical matter, unsupported lay statements, even if new, cannot serve as a predicate to reopen a previously disallowed claim. See Voracek v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (New and material evidence is required to be something other than the veteran's own statement); see also Hickson v. West, 11 Vet. App. 374 (1998); Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211, 214 (1993). Otherwise, the Board finds that the relevant evidence received since the final October 1998 RO decision is new in the sense that it was not previously before agency decision makers. However, none of the evidence is material for purposes of reopening the claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury, as it does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the veteran's claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). The Board notes that 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 was amended in September 1996. See Pub. L. 104-204, title IV, § 422(a) (Sept. 26, 1996). Prior to the amendment, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 required that a claimant should have ". . . suffered an injury, or an aggravation of an injury, as the result of hospitalization . . ." The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the phrase "as the result of hospitalization" does not require that any claimed injury have been caused by actions of the VA, but only that such injury encompass events that occur during a stay at a hospital. See Jackson v. Nicholson, 433 F.3d 822 (Fed. Circ. 2005). As amended and effective October 1, 1997, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 required that a ". . . disability or death was caused by hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished the veteran under any law administered by the Secretary, either by a Department employee or in a Department facility as defined in [38 U.S.C.A. § 1701(3)(A)] of this title." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (West 2002). The Federal Circuit in Jackson interpreted "hospital care" as implying the provision of care by the hospital specifically, as opposed to the broader, more general experience of a patient during the course of hospitalization. Jackson, 433 F.3d at 825-26. The Board notes that the veteran filed his claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 in May 1998. Thus, the amended version of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 in effect October 1, 1997 is for application. With this in mind, the Board finds no evidence to suggest that the collapse of the veteran's chair while he was sitting and waiting for his physical therapy appointment is in any way directly associated with hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished the veteran at the Columbia VAMC. The veteran has not pointed to any evidence that suggests otherwise. Thus, it cannot be said that VA hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished the veteran had a remote contributory cause to any claimed left shoulder injury resulting from the veteran's fall following the collapse of his chair in March 1998. The veteran's claim in this instance lies beyond the ambit of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151. See Loving v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 96, 100 (2005), citing Sweitzer v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 503 (1993). Therefore, under these circumstances, with consideration of the applicable statute in conjunction with the facts in this case, the Board must conclude that new and material evidence has not been received; hence, the requirements to reopen the claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury has not been met, and the appeal of this issue must be denied. Here, as new and material evidence to reopen the finally disallowed claim has not been received, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable. See Annoni v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 463, 467 (1993). ORDER As new and material evidence has not been received, the application to reopen a claim for benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for residual disability due to left shoulder injury, is denied. REMAND As noted above, in a September 2007 memorandum decision, the Court vacated and remanded the Board's May 2005 decision relating to the veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD. In doing so, the Court found that VA failed to inform the veteran that he could submit buddy statements to corroborate his claimed in-service PTSD stressors. Thus, the veteran was not adequately advised of the types of information that might verify his claimed in-service stressors. See e.g., Garlejo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 619, 620-21 (1992) (concluding that VA breached its duty to assist the appellant by neglecting to inform him that he could ask fellow soldiers to write letters in support of his claim); Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264, 270 (2004) (finding that VA fails to discharge duty to inform veteran claiming service connection for PTSD when it does not "advise the appellant that he could submit corroboration in the form of buddy statements as to some of the occurrences that he alleged were in-service stressors). The service-related stressor events cited by the veteran as the cause of his current claimed PTSD consist primarily of involvement in a car accident in Germany and participation in TDY from Germany to Vietnam for the purpose of bringing back American war dead. Other claimed stressors include witnessing an automobile accident in which children were killed, being cut while on KP duty, the smashing of his thumb by an antenna pole, attending CBR school in icy cold weather, and witnessing a grenade accident. The Board notes that the veteran's service medical records document that he was in a car accident in Germany. As such, that stressor incident has been verified. In a report of April 2001 VA psychiatric examination, the examiner was unable to render a diagnosis of PTSD based on the information available regarding the veteran's car accident in Germany. Otherwise, a review of the claims file does not reflect that the veteran has been informed that he could submit buddy statements to support his other claimed in-service stressors. Thus, the veteran should be invited to supplement the record with buddy statements from persons having first hand knowledge or who may be able to provide direct corroborative evidence of those claimed in-service stressors not already verified by the record. The Board also notes, as previously identified, that the record reflects that the veteran apparently is in receipt of SSA disability benefits. In particular, in a September 1999 VA treatment record, it was noted that the veteran was "disabled by Social Security, and police retirement." The record on which the veteran's disability claim with SSA was decided may contain additional relevant evidence with respect to his claim for service connection for PTSD. Once VA is put on notice that a claimant was denied or is in receipt of disability benefits from SSA, VA has a duty to obtain the records associated with that decision. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); Murincsak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 363 (1992). Thus, the records associated with the veteran's claim for disability benefits from SSA should be obtained and associated with the claims file. All procedures set forth pertaining to requests for records from Federal facilities must be followed. Furthermore, following a request by the veteran in July 2003, attempts were made by the RO to obtain any available records from Moncrief Army Hospital at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and from Dwight David Eisenhower Medical Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Subsequent notice from both medical facilities indicated no records were available. In an August 2004 SSOC, the RO notified the veteran of the unavailability of records from either medical facility. The Board notes that VA has a duty to make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining identified private and federal records. This duty includes notifying the claimant of the inability to obtain any specific authorized records as per the notice requirements enumerated at 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(e)(1) (2007). A review of the record does not reflect proper notice of missing records in accordance with the law and regulations. As such, and in light of this remand for the development above, the AOJ should notified the veteran of its inability to obtain identified records from Moncrief Army Hospital at Fort Jackson, South Carolina and/or from Dwight David Eisenhower Medical Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Such notice should be in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(e)(1). In light of the foregoing, this matter is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The AOJ should send to the veteran and his attorney a letter requesting that the veteran provide sufficient information, and if necessary, authorization to enable it to obtain any additional pertinent evidence not currently of record. Additionally, the letter should invite the veteran to provide verifying statements from persons that may have first-hand knowledge or who may be able to provide direct corroborative evidence of his claimed in-service stressors. (As noted above, the veteran's claimed in-service stressor associated with his involvement in a car accident in Germany has been verified.) The letter should also notify the veteran that records relating to reported treatment at Moncrief Army Hospital at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and at Dwight David Eisenhower Medical Center at Fort Gordon, Georgia are unavailable for review. Such notice should be in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(e)(1) regarding the unavailability of Federal records. 2. The AOJ should obtain from SSA any medical records relied upon in granting, or otherwise denying, any claim filed by the veteran for disability benefits. The AOJ must follow the procedures set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (2007) as regards requesting records from Federal facilities. All records and/or responses received should be associated with the claims file. 3. If, and only if, any evidence corroborating the occurrence of a claimed in-service stressful experience(s) is received, the AOJ should arrange for the veteran to undergo a psychiatric examination at an appropriate VA medical facility. In such instance, the entire claims file, to include a complete copy of this REMAND, must be made available to the physician designated to examine the veteran, and the report of the examination should include discussion of the veteran's documented medical history and assertions. The AOJ must provide the examiner with a summary of any verified stressor(s) and the examiner must be instructed that only these verified events may be considered for the purpose of determining whether exposure to an in-service stressor has resulted in PTSD. The examiner should specifically diagnose or rule out a diagnosis of PTSD. If the veteran is found to have PTSD, the examiner should specify how the diagnostic criteria are met, to include identification of the specific stressor(s) underlying the diagnosis, as well as all symptoms and other factors that support the diagnosis. The examination findings and complete rationale for each opinion expressed and conclusion reached should be set forth. 4. After completing the requested actions, and any additional notification and/or development deemed warranted, the AOJ should adjudicate the claim for service connection for PTSD on appeal in light of all pertinent evidence and legal authority. If the benefit sought on appeal remains denied, the AOJ must furnish to the veteran and his attorney an appropriate SSOC and afford them the appropriate time period for response before the claims file is returned to the Board. Thereafter, the case should be returned to the Board for further appellate review, if in order. By this remand, the Board intimates no opinion as to any final outcome warranted. No action is required of the veteran until he is notified by the AOJ. The veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded to the RO. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This case must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2007). ______________________________________________ STEVEN L. COHN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs