Citation Nr: 0813253 Decision Date: 04/22/08 Archive Date: 05/01/08 DOCKET NO. 03-35 526 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the veteran's death, claimed as due to herbicide exposure. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Non Commissioned Officers Association WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Christine C. Kung, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from June 1962 to March 1974, including service in Vietnam. He died in May 2002. The appellant is the veteran's surviving spouse. This matter comes on appeal before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a February 2003 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky (RO) which denied service connection for the cause of the veteran's death. The Board remanded the case in November 2007 for a Travel Board hearing. The appellant testified at a January 2008 Travel Board hearing; the hearing transcript has been associated with the claims file. The case is once again before the Board for review. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran died in May 2002. The certificate of death lists the immediate cause of death as asystole, cardiac arrest, due to metastatic disease, due to renal cell carcinoma. 2. The medical evidence of record demonstrates that asystole, cardiac arrest due to renal cell carcinoma with metastatic disease resulted in the veteran's death; the veteran's cause of death is not shown to be etiologically related to active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for the cause of the veteran's death have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1310, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.310, 3.312 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION A. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The Board finds that VA has met all statutory and regulatory VCAA notice and duty to assist requirements. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2007); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). January 2003 and June 2007 letters informed the appellant of the evidence necessary to substantiate her claim, evidence VA would reasonably seek to obtain, and information and evidence for which the appellant was responsible. VA also asked the appellant to provide any evidence that pertains to her claim. The VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim, including the degree of disability and the effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). In the present appeal, VA did not provide the appellant with VCAA notice of the type of specific evidence necessary to establish a disability rating or effective date prior to the initial rating decision. The Board notes in that regard, that disability ratings are not applicable to cause of death claims and no effective date is to be assigned in light of the Board's decision this date. Thus, the Board finds that any notice failure is harmless error. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, No. 05-7157 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2006). The veteran's service medical records, certificate of death, VA treatment records, VA, a Board hearing transcript, and various statements in support of the appellant's claim have been associated with the claims file. VA has provided the appellant with every opportunity to submit evidence and arguments in support of her claim, and to respond to VA notices. The Board notes that during a January 2008 Board hearing, the appellant's representative requested a medical opinion to determine if the veteran's cause of death was due to diabetes mellitus. In determining whether the duty to assist requires that a VA medical examination be provided or medical opinion obtained with respect to a veteran's claim for benefits, there are four factors for consideration. These four factors are: (1) whether there is competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability; (2) whether there is evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, or evidence establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumption period; (3) whether there is an indication that the disability or symptoms may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability; and (4) whether there otherwise is sufficient competent medical evidence of record to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). As the Board will discuss below, the veteran was not shown by medical evidence to have diabetes mellitus, nor was diabetes mellitus elevated glucose levels indicated as a cause of death. The appellant and her representative have not made the Board aware of any additional evidence that needs to be obtained prior to appellate review. The record is complete and the case is ready for review. B. Law and Analysis Determinations as to whether service connection may be granted for a disability that caused or contributed to a veteran's death are based on the same statutory and regulatory provisions that generally govern determinations of service connection. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2007). Service connection may be granted for disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131(West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2007). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2007). In addition, certain chronic diseases, such as diabetes mellitus or malignant tumors, may be presumed to have been incurred or aggravated during service if such diseases become disabling to a compensable degree within one year of separation from active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2007). The death of a veteran will be considered to have been due to a service-connected disability where the evidence establishes that a disability was either the principal or the contributory cause of death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(a) (2007). A principal cause of death is one which, singly or jointly with some other condition, was the immediate or underlying cause of death or was etiologically related thereto. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(b) (2007). A contributory cause of death is one which contributed substantially or materially to cause death, or aided or lent assistance to the production of death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c) (2007). There are primary causes of death which by their very nature are so overwhelming that eventual death can be anticipated irrespective of coexisting conditions, but, even in such cases, there is for consideration whether there may be a reasonable basis for holding that a service-connected condition was of such severity as to have a material influence in accelerating death. In this situation, however, it would not generally be reasonable to hold that a service- connected condition accelerated death unless such condition affected a vital organ and was itself of a progressive or debilitating nature. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c)(4) (2007). The appellant claims that the veteran's cause of death is related to Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam. A veteran, who had active service in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962 and ending on May 7, 1975, will be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent during such service unless there is affirmative evidence to establish that the veteran was not exposed to any such agent during that service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(f) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2007). VA regulations provide that the following diseases shall be service connected if the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active service, even though there is no record of such disease during service, and provided further that the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d) are satisfied: chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, type II diabetes mellitus, Hodgkin's disease, chronic lymphocytic leukemia, multiple myeloma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy, porphyria cutanea tarda, prostate cancer, certain respiratory cancers, and soft tissue sarcoma. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (2007). Claims based on Agent Orange exposure are unique in that entitlement is based on an analysis of scientific evidence, ordered by statute. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(b). The Agent Orange Act of 1991 (in part) directed the Secretary of Veteran Affairs to enter into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review and summarize the scientific evidence concerning the association between exposure to herbicides used in support of military operations in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam Era and each disease suspected to be associated with such exposure. Whenever the Secretary determines that a positive association exists between exposure of humans to an herbicide agent and a disease, the Secretary will publish regulations establishing presumptive service connection for that disease. If the Secretary determines that a presumption of service connection is not warranted, he must publish a notice of that determination, including an explanation of the scientific basis for that determination. The Secretary's determination must be based on consideration of NAS reports and all other sound medical and scientific information and analysis available to the Secretary. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(b)-(c). In response to five NAS reports (and a special interim report), the Secretary published notices of these determinations in January 1994, August 1996, November 1999, January 2001, June 2002, and May 2003. In March 2005, NAS published its sixth full report, entitled "Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2004" (Update 2004). Consistent with prior reports of NAS, Update 2004 again found that there was "sufficient evidence of an association" between herbicide exposure and five categories of diseases in veterans and "limited/suggestive evidence'' of an association between herbicide exposure and six other categories of diseases in veterans. Update 2004 also categorized certain health outcomes as having "inadequate/insufficient" evidence to determine whether they may be associated with herbicide exposure. The health outcomes in this category include: hepatobiliary (liver) cancers; bone and joint cancer; skin cancers; urinary bladder cancer; renal cancer; respiratory disorders; gastrointestinal, metabolic, and digestive disorders (changes in liver enzymes, lipid abnormalities, ulcers). Update 2004 also concluded that two health outcomes fell into the "limited or suggestive evidence of no association" category: gastrointestinal tumors (esophagus, stomach, pancreas, colon, and rectum) and brain tumors. In June 2007, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs published determinations regarding these diseases, based on all available evidence in Update 2004 and prior NAS reports. The Secretary determined that a positive association between exposure to herbicides and enumerated health outcomes, to include renal cancer, did not exist. The Secretary also reiterated that there is no positive association between exposure to herbicides and any other condition for which he has not specifically determined that a presumption of service connection is warranted. See 72 Fed. Reg. 32,395 (June 12, 2007). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that an appellant is not precluded from establishing service connection with proof of actual direct causation. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The facts of this case show that the veteran died in May 2002. The veteran's certificate of death lists the immediate cause of death as asystole, cardiac arrest due to metastatic disease, due to renal cell carcinoma. No other significant conditions were listed as contributing to death. At the time of the veteran's death, service connection was established for right ear hearing loss with a 0 percent (non- compensable) evaluation. The veteran's Form DD 214 shows that he served in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam Era, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Thus, he is presumed to have been exposed during such service to Agent Orange. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2007). However, as the veteran's cause of death is not included in the above-indicated diseases associated with exposure to an herbicide agent, presumptive service connection is not warranted. The appellant contends that the veteran had diabetes mellitus, related to Agent Orange exposure in service, and she contends that diabetes mellitus contributed to the veteran's cause of death. The medical evidence of record does not show that the veteran had a diagnosis of diabetes mellitus. VA medical records show that the veteran was taking insulin in April 2002 and May 2002 due to elevated glucose levels in the blood. The veteran was not taking insulin prior to April 2002 and the medical evidence of record does not reflect a diagnosis diabetes mellitus rendered at any time. Further, elevated glucose levels are not shown by the medical evidence of record to be related to the veteran's cause of death. The medical evidence shows that renal cell carcinoma with metastatic disease caused the veteran's asystole, cardiac arrest. Even though presumptive service connection is not warranted, the appellant is not precluded from establishing service connection for the veteran's cause of death with proof of direct causation. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The veteran's cause of death is not shown to have been incurred or aggravated in service. Service medical records do not reflect any complaints, diagnoses, or treatment that can be related to renal cell carcinoma or metastatic disease. (See Clinical Treatment Reports and Routine Medical Examinations completed in December 1961, December 1968, December 1970, March 1974, and October 1973.) The earliest indication of metastatic disease or renal cell carcinoma shown by VA treatment records was in November 2001. At that time, the veteran was assessed with a 10 centimeter mass with probable central necrosis in the right kidney lower pole. The physician stated that renal cell carcinoma was the most likely diagnosis. In February 2002, the veteran was shown to have metastatic disease to the spine, liver, and brain. VA treatment reports leading up to the veteran's time of death reflect treatment for renal cell carcinoma with metastasis to the spine and brain. The veteran was hospitalized at VA at the time of his death. May 2002 terminal hospital records show that the veteran's death was caused by asystole, cardiac arrest due to or as a consequence of metastatic disease, due to or a consequence of renal cell cancer. Other significant conditions contributing to death were noted to include renal cell cancer with metastasis to various sites including spinal cord compression due to bone metastasis and brain metastasis. It was noted that after chemotherapy was discontinued the prior month, the veteran was re-admitted almost immediately with worsening hypoxemia, dyspnea, electrolyte abnormalities, and progressive weakness. Evaluation revealed worsening bilateral infiltrates in the lung. Treatment records note that the veteran's next of kin had denied permission to perform an autopsy due to the veteran's pre-determined diagnosis of renal cell cancer with metastasis. The medical evidence of record clearly shows that the cause of the veteran's death was cardiac arrest due to metastatic disease, due to renal cell cancer. The cause of the veteran's death is not shown to have been incurred in service, and is not shown to be related to Agent Orange exposure in service. The veteran did not have a diagnosis of diabetes mellitus at the time of his death and there is no competent evidence of record relating such a diagnosis to the cause of the veteran's death. The Board has considered the appellant's statements in support of her claim. The Board acknowledges the appellant's belief that the veteran's cause of death was related to service; however, where the determinative issue is one of medical causation or diagnosis, as in this case, only those with specialized medical knowledge, training, or experience are competent to provide evidence on the issue. See Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1991). See also Heuer v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 379, 384 (1995) (citing Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993)). The cause of the veteran's death is not shown by competent medical evidence to be related to service. The most probative evidence of record does not relate the veteran's cause of death to service, or to Agent Orange exposure in service. Thus, the Board finds that the cause of the veteran's death was not incurred or aggravated in service. C. Conclusion The cause of the veteran's death is not shown by competent medical evidence to be related to service or to in-service exposure to Agent Orange. Thus, the Board finds that service connection for the cause of the veteran's death is not warranted. The appeal is accordingly denied. In making this determination, the Board has considered the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) regarding benefit of the doubt, but there is not such a state of equipoise of positive and negative evidence to otherwise grant the appellant's claim. ORDER Service connection for the cause of the veteran's death is denied. ____________________________________________ S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs