Citation Nr: 0814757 Decision Date: 05/05/08 Archive Date: 05/12/08 DOCKET NO. 05-30 390 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Waco, Texas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a mental disorder. 2. Entitlement to a rating in excess of 10 percent for a right knee disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. C. Dale, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active duty service from August 1989 to July 1990. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2004 rating decision by a Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The veteran was afforded a February 2008 Travel Board hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the record. The Board has reviewed the veteran's claims file and observes that the claim of service connection for a mental disorder has been adjudicated in an August 2004 RO decision as whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim of service connection for headaches. Notably, the prior claim was denied in a May 1991 RO decision. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7014, 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Nevertheless, while the prior final denial concerned headaches, the current claim on appeal concerns a mental disorder. As indicated in 38 C.F.R. § 4.124a, Diagnostic Codes 8100 rates migraine headaches and 38 C.F.R. § 4.129, Diagnostic Code 9440 rates mental disorders, these two disabilities are listed separately and are different for purposes of VA adjudication. In Boggs v. Peake, No. 2007-7137 (Fed. Cir. March 26, 2008), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that a claim for one diagnosed disease or injury cannot be prejudiced by a prior claim for a different diagnosed disease or injury. Rather, the two claims must be considered independently. See Ephraim v. Brown, 82 F.3d 399 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In view of Boggs, the claim of service connection for a mental disorder was not previously adjudicated in a prior final denial, as that denial addressed a different disability, and should be addressed on a de novo basis. The claim will thus be adjudicated on its merits, rather than as an application to reopen. Such action does not inure to the prejudice of the veteran, as in treating the claim as one involving an original application for service connection, the veteran is relieved of his predicate obligation to provide new and material evidence to overcome the finality of the prior decision. Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 393-94 (1993) (Holding that when the Board addresses in its decision a question that has not been addressed by the RO, it must consider whether the appellant has been given adequate notice to respond and, if not, whether he has been prejudiced thereby.). The issue of an increased rating for a right knee disability is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. VA will notify the appellant if further action is required. FINDING OF FACT The veteran's current mental disorder is not etiologically related to active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for the establishment of service connection for a mental disorder are not met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Duty to Notify and Assist Before addressing the merits of the claim, the Board is required to address the duty to notify and duty to assist imposed by 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103(A) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. VA has a duty to notify a claimant and his representative, if any, of the information and evidence needed to substantiate a claim. This notification obligation was accomplished by way of letters from the RO to the veteran dated in May 2004 and July 2006. These letters effectively satisfied the notification requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) by: (1) informing the veteran about the information and evidence not of record that was necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) informing the veteran about the information and evidence VA would seek to provide; (3) informing the veteran about the information and evidence he was expected to provide; and (4) requesting the veteran provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to his claim. The veteran did not receive notice of how VA assigns disability ratings and effective dates and complies with the holding of Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). However, the denial of the claim in the instant decision makes the timing error non-prejudicial. Second, VA has a duty to assist a veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a claim. The service medical records are associated with the claims files. Additionally, the veteran was afforded VA examinations. Through July 2006 correspondence, the veteran requested a new VA examination with a different doctor. However, the current VA examination reports reflect thorough mental status and knee examinations. Nothing in the record indicates that the examinations are inadequate for rating purposes. The Board finds that no prejudice inures to the veteran by not affording him an additional VA examination. Lastly, VA treatment records from the Monroe Clinic are unavailable. The record reflects multiple searches for these records, which culminated in an August 2007 formal finding that the records were unavailable. As such, the Board concludes that the RO did everything possible to locate the Monroe Clinic records, and the claims will have to be considered without these records. The veteran and his representative have not made the RO or the Board aware of any outstanding evidence that needs to be obtained in order to fairly decide his claims. As such, all relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the veteran's appeal has been obtained, and the case is ready for appellate review. Analysis The veteran seeks service connection for a mental disorder. Although the veteran was treated for mental illness during service, there is no evidence etiologically linking his current mental condition to any incident during active service. Because there is no competent medical evidence linking the veteran's current mental disorders to his active service, the claim will be denied. Applicable law provides that service connection will be granted if it is shown that the veteran suffers from disability resulting from an injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. That an injury occurred in service alone is not enough; there must be chronic disability resulting from that injury. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Mercado-Martinez v. West, 11 Vet. App. 415, 419 (1998) (citing Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992)). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). The veteran will be considered to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable (obvious or manifest) evidence demonstrates that an injury or disease existed prior thereto and was not aggravated by such service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). A preexisting injury or disease will be considered to have been aggravated by active military service, where there is an increase in disability during such service, unless there is a specific finding that the increase in disability is due to the natural progress of the disease. 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a). Alternatively, the nexus between service and the current disability can be satisfied by medical or lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology and medical evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the symptomatology. See Voerth v. West, 13 Vet. App. 117 (1999); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495 (1997). The veteran's service medical records reflect that the veteran was treated for an adjustment disorders in June 1990. The adjustment disorder was characterized as including mixed emotional features and an unspecified personality disorder. Congenital or developmental defects are not diseases or injuries for the purposes of service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c), 4.9. Private medical records from December 1995 reflect that the veteran sought emergency treatment for an intentional substance overdose. These records do not include a diagnosis of the veteran's mental condition. Later, private medical records, from February 2003, indicate that the veteran has been diagnosed with depression. These private medical records indicate that the depression resulted from a work injury that caused the veteran to experience chronic pain in his right rib cage and right backside. The veteran was afforded a February 2005 VA mental examination. After a thorough examination, the examiner diagnosed the veteran with major depressive disorder and a personality disorder. In a note, dated July 2005, the examiner reviewed her February 2005 examination report and the veteran's claims file. After her review, she concluded that there is no evidence that the veteran's military service caused or contributed to the personality disorder that pre- existed the veteran's enlistment. She explained that she believed the adjustment disorder diagnosed during active service should have immediately resolved since the veteran's active service was the underlying cause of this mental condition. However, regarding the diagnosis of a personality disorder, the examiner reported that the cause is likely due to the veteran's extremely chaotic early life as opposed to any incident during active service. She concluded that the affective or anxiety disorders currently experienced by the veteran are secondary to his pre-existing personality disorder. Although the veteran asserts that he has a mental disorder caused by military service, his theory regarding this linkage is not competent evidence. It is well-established that laypersons, such as the appellant, are not qualified to render medical opinions regarding the etiology of disorders and disabilities, and his opinion is entitled to no weight. Cromley v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 376, 379 (1995); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). The preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and the appeal is denied. ORDER Service connection for a mental disorder is denied. REMAND The Board finds that the record needs to be further developed as to determine the physical basis for the veteran's complaints of pain and buckling in his right knee. Thus, another VA opinion is necessary before it may adjudicate the issue of an increased rating for a right knee disability. Numerous medical records indicate that there is a loose piece of patella within the veteran's right knee. On several occasions, the veteran has been recommended for surgery to remove it, but he has never had the surgery. At the February 2008 Travel Board hearing, the veteran reported that his right knee buckled once or twice a day and that he could only walk for about five minutes before his knee pain prevented him from walking further. This account is corroborated by the February 2005 VA examination report, noting that the veteran's knee locked up on him once or twice a day due to the loose patella. However, in the August 2006 VA examination report, the examiner did not find that the veteran had varus or valgus instability. The Board finds that additional development is necessary to determine whether the loose piece of patella within the right knee would be related to the veteran's complaints of daily buckling of his right knee. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The RO/AMC should contact the examiner conducting the August 2006 VA examination and inquire as to whether the loose patella found upon X-ray may be consistent with the veteran's complaints of instability. The claims folder and a copy of this remand must be made available to the examiner, who must acknowledge such report and review in any report generate. The examiner should review complaints made by the veteran about his knee during the February 2008 Travel Board hearing. If the VA examiner conducting the August 2006 examination is not available, the RO/AMC should direct a further VA medical examination to determine if the veteran experiences knee instability due to the patella fragment - in either event, the examiner should opine as to whether there is any physical basis for the veteran's complaints that his knee buckles once or twice a day. 2. After completion of the above, and any additional development of the evidence, the RO should review the record, to include all additional evidence, and readjudicate the claim. If any benefits sought remain denied, the veteran and his representative should be issued an appropriate supplemental statement of the case, and afforded the opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board for further appellate review, if otherwise in order. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2007). _________________________________________________ VITO A. CLEMENTI Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2006). Department of Veterans Affairs