Citation Nr: 0820963 Decision Date: 06/26/08 Archive Date: 06/30/08 DOCKET NO. 05-37 995 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Montgomery, Alabama THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for asbestosis. 2. Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Alabama Department of Veterans Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Douglas E. Massey, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from December 1968 to July 1970, with additional service in the U.S. Army Reserves. This case comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a May 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Montgomery, Alabama. The veteran has submitted additional evidence since the statement of the case (SOC) was issued in November 2005, and the RO has not addressed this additional evidence in a supplemental SOC (SSOC). See 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.31, 19.37 (2007). However, he waived his right to have the RO initially consider this additional evidence, so the Board may in the first instance. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.800, 20.1304(c). The Board recently, in May 2008, advanced this case on the docket because of the veteran's financial hardship. See 38 U.S.C. § 7107 and 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c). Regrettably, the Board must remand the claim for service connection for PTSD to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC, for further development. But the Board is going ahead and deciding the claim for asbestosis. FINDING OF FACT The veteran's asbestosis was first diagnosed many years after service and has not been linked by competent medical evidence to exposure to asbestos during service, as opposed to since his discharge from the military. CONCLUSION OF LAW The veteran's asbestosis was not incurred in or aggravated by his military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West Supp. 2005); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2007). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION In the interest of clarity, the Board will initially discuss whether the claim for service connection for asbestosis has been properly developed for appellate review. The Board will then address the claim on its merits, providing relevant VA laws and regulations, the relevant factual background, and an analysis of its decision. I. The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2007). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will obtain and assist the claimant in obtaining; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must ask the claimant to provide any evidence in his or her possession that pertains to the claim in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). To the extent possible, VCAA notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II). If, however, for whatever reason it was not, or the notice provided was inadequate, this timing error can be effectively "cured" by providing any necessary VCAA notice and then going back and readjudicating the claim - such as in a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental SOC (SSOC), such that the intended purpose of the notice is not frustrated and the veteran is given an opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). In addition, the VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Further, this notice must include information that a downstream disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted. Id. at 486. VCAA notice errors, concerning any element of a claim, are presumed prejudicial unless VA rebuts this presumption by showing the error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. To overcome the burden of prejudicial error, VA must show (1) that any defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant; (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed; or (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Also, obviously, if the Board is granting the requested benefit, this, too, would render any notice error nonprejudicial. In this case, a letter satisfying the notice requirements under 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) was sent to the veteran in August 2004, prior to the initial adjudication of his claim in May 2005. This letter informed him of the evidence required to substantiate his claim for service connection for asbestosis, and of his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining supporting evidence. He was also asked to submit relevant evidence and/or information in his personal possession to the RO. As for the Dingess requirements, since the Board is denying this claim, the downstream disability rating and effective date elements of this claim are ultimately moot. So not providing notice concerning these downstream elements of the claim is nonprejudicial, i.e., harmless error. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). See also 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102. VA also fulfilled its duty to assist the veteran by obtaining all relevant evidence in support of his claim for service connection for asbestosis. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. VA has obtained all relevant medical and other records he and his representative identified as pertinent to the claim. In addition, a VA examination and medical nexus opinion are not needed to decide the claim because the standards of the Court's decision in McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), have not been met. Under McLendon, VA must provide a medical examination in a service- connection claim when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for VA to make a decision on the claim. Id., at 81. See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Here, though, as will be discussed below, the medical evidence already on file shows the veteran's asbestosis was first diagnosed many years after his military service ended and has been medically attributed to post-service asbestos exposure (not to any asbestos exposure during his military service). So absent the required proof concerning the second and third prongs of McLendon, VA has no duty to obtain a medical opinion to determine whether his asbestosis is related to his military service. Instead, there are only his unsubstantiated lay allegations in support of his claim. But his lay allegations, alone, are insufficient to trigger VA's duty to assist by providing an examination for a medical nexus opinion. See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 519 (2004). Accordingly, the Board finds that no further action is necessary to meet the requirements of the VCAA or Court. II. Merits of the Claim The veteran may be awarded service connection by showing that he currently has a disability resulting from a disease or an injury incurred in or aggravated by his military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Stated somewhat differently, service connection requires: (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). There is no statute specifically dealing with service connection for asbestos-related diseases, nor has the Secretary promulgated any specific regulations. In 1988, however, VA issued a circular on asbestos-related diseases that provided guidelines for considering asbestos compensation claims. See Department of Veterans Benefits, Veterans Administration, DVB Circular 21-88-8, Asbestos- Related Diseases (May 11, 1988). The information and instructions contained in the DVB Circular have since been included in VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, part VI, para. 7.21 (January 31, 1997) (hereinafter "M21-1"). Also, an opinion by VA's Office of General Counsel discussed the development of asbestos claims. VAOPGCPREC 4-2000 (April 13, 2000). VA must analyze the veteran's claim for service connection for asbestos-related disease under these administrative protocols using the following criteria. Ennis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 523, 527 (1993); McGinty v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 428, 432 (1993). The latency period for asbestos-related diseases varies from 10 to 45 or more years between first exposure and development of disease. M21-1, Part VI, 7.21(b)(2), p. 7-IV- 3 (January 31, 1997). An asbestos-related disease can develop from brief exposure to asbestos. Id. With asbestos-related claims, the Board must also determine whether the claim development procedures applicable to such claims have been followed. Ashford v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 120, 124-125 (1997) (while holding that the veteran's claim had been properly developed and adjudicated, the Court indicated that the Board should have specifically referenced the DVB Circular and discussed the RO's compliance with the Circular's claim-development procedures). The RO must determine whether military records demonstrate evidence of asbestos exposure during service, develop whether there was pre-service and/or post- service occupational or other asbestos exposure, and determine whether there is a relationship between asbestos exposure and the claimed disease, keeping in mind the latency and exposure information discussed above. M21-1, Part VI, 7.21(d)(1), p. 7-IV-3 and 7-IV-4 (January 31, 1997). In this case, the record shows the RO complied with these procedures. The RO sent the veteran a letter in August 2004 requesting these details, including the nature of the disability he claims is related to asbestos exposure, the history of his exposure in service, and his history of employment after service. Therefore, VA has satisfied its duty to assist the veteran in developing this claim. The most common disease resulting from exposure to asbestos is interstitial pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis). Asbestos fibers may also produce pleural effusions and fibrosis, pleural plaques, mesotheliomas of pleura and peritoneum, lung cancer, and cancers of the gastrointestinal tract. Cancers of the larynx and pharynx as well as the urogenital system (except the prostate) are also associated with asbestos exposure. See M21-1, Part VI, 7.21(a)(1). Persons with asbestos exposure have an increased incidence of bronchial, lung, pharyngolaryngeal, gastrointestinal and urogenital cancer. See M21-1, Part VI, 7.21(a)(3). Occupations involving asbestos exposure include mining and milling, shipyard and insulation work, demolition of old buildings, construction, manufacture and servicing of friction products such as clutch facings and brake linings, manufacture and installation of roofing and flooring materials, asbestos cement sheet and pipe products, etc. High exposure to asbestos and a high prevalence of disease have been noted in insulation and shipyard workers. See M21- 1, Part VI, 7.21. The veteran has been diagnosed with asbestosis, so there is no disputing he has this alleged condition. Thus, the determinative issue is whether this condition is attributable to his military service - and, in particular, to exposure to asbestos while in service, as opposed to, for example, during the many years since his discharge. See Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Concerning this, the veteran's service personnel records show his military occupational specialty (MOS) was Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman. He had no complaints of pulmonary problems while in the military, including when examined in June 1970 for separation when he specifically denied experiencing asthma, shortness of breath, a chronic cough, and pain and pressure in his chest. His lungs and chest were also normal on objective clinical evaluation. These records, therefore, provide evidence against the claim - although, as mentioned, the inherent nature of asbestos-related disease is such that the residual disability may not actually manifest until many years after the fact because of the accepted latency. See Struck v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 145 (1996). Nevertheless, two physicians that have commented on the likely cause of the veteran's asbestosis have both indicated it is the result of asbestos exposure after service, not during. These reports therefore provide compelling evidence against the veteran's claim. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."); see also Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (ruling that a prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability). In a June 1994 report, L.M., M.D., noted the veteran's complaints of dyspnea over the past few years. Following a physical examination, including chest X-rays and pulmonary function testing, Dr. L.M. diagnosed the veteran with pulmonary asbestosis. Dr. L.M. explained that the diagnosis of pulmonary asbestosis means that the veteran is suffering from an abnormality of the parenchymal lung tissue consistent with interstitial fibrosis as a result of asbestos products. However, Dr. L.M. made no reference to the veteran's military service as a possible source of his asbestos exposure. Instead, Dr. L.M. reported the veteran's 23-year history of having worked for U.S. Steel, where he had occasion to be intermittently exposed to asbestos materials. In a more recent November 2006 letter, E.M., M.D., also noted the veteran's history of having worked in mines since 1984, and that he now has problems with asbestosis. Like Dr. L.M., Dr. E.M. made no reference to in-service asbestos exposure as a contributing factor in the veteran's asbestosis. Thus, not only does the record lack a medical nexus opinion relating the veteran's asbestosis to his military service, but to the contrary, these two medical opinions - particularly Dr. L.M.'s opinion - specifically indicate the veteran's asbestosis is attributable, instead, to his 23-year history of post-service asbestos exposure while working as a civilian in mines. Indeed, VA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21- 1, Part IV, 7.21, specifically lists mining as an occupation involving asbestos exposure. These two medical opinions therefore provide highly probative evidence against the veteran's claim. See Wray v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 488, 493 (1995) (holding that the adoption of an expert medical opinion may satisfy the Board's statutory requirement of an adequate statement of reasons and bases if the expert fairly considered the material evidence seemingly supporting the veteran's position). In addition to the medical evidence, the Board has also considered the veteran's lay statements in support of his claim. While he may well believe that his asbestosis is related to his military service, as a layman without medical expertise, he is not qualified to render a medical opinion concerning the etiology of a pulmonary disorder such as asbestosis See Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 494-95 (1991) (laypersons are not competent to render medical opinions). He is only competent to comment on symptoms (e.g., pain in his chest, coughing and difficultly breathing) he may have personally experienced during and since service, not the cause of them, and in particular whether they are attributable to in-service asbestos exposure. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2) and Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994) (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). For these reasons and bases, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for asbestosis. And as the preponderance of the evidence is against his claim, the doctrine of reasonable doubt is not for application. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). Accordingly, the appeal of this claim is denied. ORDER The claim for service connection for asbestosis is denied. REMAND The veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD based on an alleged personal assault in service. In a January 2008 VA outpatient treatment record, the veteran reported that he was attacked, robbed, and sexually assaulted by four men while leaving a night club in Korea. Based on his report, as well as PTSD screening, the VA clinician diagnosed the veteran with PTSD. Unfortunately, the Board finds that additional development is needed before it can adjudicate the veteran's claim. Service connection for PTSD requires: [1] a current medical diagnosis of the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., DSM-IV, presumed to include the adequacy of the PTSD symptomatology and the sufficiency of a claimed in- service stressor), [2] credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor(s) actually occurred, and [3] medical evidence of a causal relationship between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor(s). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2007). If, as here, the claim for PTSD is based on an alleged personal assault, then evidence from sources other than the veteran's records may corroborate his account of the stressor incident. Examples of such evidence include, but are not limited to: records from law enforcement authorities, mental health counseling centers, hospitals or physicians; and statements from family members, roommates, fellow service members, or clergy. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). Evidence of behavior changes following the claimed assault is one type of relevant evidence that may be found in the mentioned sources. Examples of behavior changes that may constitute credible evidence of the stressor include, but are not limited to: a request for a transfer to another military duty assignment; deterioration in work performance; substance abuse; episodes of depression, panic attacks, or anxiety without an identifiable cause; or unexplained economic or social behavior changes. VA may submit any evidence that it received to an appropriate mental health professional for an opinion as to whether it indicates that a personal assault occurred. Id. In Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272, 277 (1999), the Court pointed out that VA has established special procedures for evidentiary development of claims for PTSD based on personal assault. The Court advised that the portions of the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1, Part III, paragraph 5.14c, provided "guidance on the types of evidence that may serve as 'credible supporting evidence' for establishing service connection of PTSD which allegedly was precipitated by a personal assault during military service." Manual M21-1 lists evidence that might indicate such a stressor such as lay statements describing episodes of depression; panic attacks or anxiety but no identifiable reasons for the episodes; visits to medical clinics without a specific ailment; evidence of substance abuse; and increased disregard for military or civilian authority. The Manual also lists behaviors such as requests for change of military occupational specialty (MOS) or duty assignment, increased use or abuse of leave, changes in performance and performance evaluations, increased use of over-the-counter medications, unexplained economic or social behavior changes, and breakup of a primary relationship as possibly indicative of a personal assault, provided that such changes occurred at the time of the incident. The Court has also held that the provisions in M21-1, Part III, 5.14(c), which address PTSD claims based on personal assault are substantive rules that are the equivalent of VA regulations, and are binding on VA. YR v. West, 11 Vet. App. 393, 398-99 (1998); Patton, 12 Vet. App. at 272. VA will not deny a PTSD claim that is based on an in-service personal assault without first advising the claimant that evidence from sources other than the veteran's service records or evidence of behavioral changes may constitute credible supporting evidence of the stressor in allowing him the opportunity to furnish this type of evidence or advise VA of potential sources of such evidence. In this case, however, the veteran has not received this required notice. Therefore, he must be provided a proper notice letter explaining the evidence necessary to corroborate a stressor during service to support his claim for service connection for PTSD based on a personal assault, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). This requirement is consistent with the VCAA's duty to inform him of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). In addition, a VA examination is needed to assist in determining whether the veteran has PTSD from a personal (sexual) assault during his military service. Although the Board must make the ultimate finding of fact concerning whether an alleged stressor occurred, VA regulation provides that VA may submit any evidence it receives to an appropriate medical or mental health professional for an opinion as to whether it indicates that a personal assault occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). In Patton, the Court held that, unlike its holding in Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 396 (1996), credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an in-service stressor (to the extent it is based on personal/sexual assault) can consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. So based on the unique facts of this case, the Board believes that an opinion by a VA mental health professional would be helpful in resolving the issue of the whether a sexual assault actually occurred in service. If the mental health professional believes that a sexual assault occurred in service, a medical opinion is then required to determine whether the veteran has PTSD based solely on the in-service sexual assault as opposed any other stressor the veteran may have experienced either before or after service. See McLendon, 20 Vet. App. at 81-82, citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Accordingly, the PTSD claim is remanded for the following development and consideration: 1. Send the veteran an appropriate PTSD stressor development letter. He must be notified that an alleged personal (sexual) assault in service may be corroborated by evidence from sources other than his service records, as defined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). All specific examples of alternative sources of evidence listed in this regulation must be included in the notification letter. 2. Schedule the veteran for a VA psychiatric examination to determine whether he has PTSD as a result of a personal assault in service. The claims file and a copy of this remand should be provided to the examiner for his or her review of the pertinent medical and other history. Following a review of the veteran's claims file, completion of the examination, and receipt of all test results, the examiner should render an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that the veteran was sexually assaulted in service and has PTSD as a consequence. In making these important determinations, the examiner should utilize the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) in arriving at diagnoses and identify all existing psychiatric diagnoses. If PTSD is diagnosed, the examiner must explain whether and how each of the diagnostic criteria is or is not satisfied, and identify the stressor(s) supporting the diagnosis. 3. Then readjudicate the claim in light of the additional evidence. If the claim is not granted to the veteran's satisfaction, send him and his representative a supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) and give them an opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further consideration of the claim. The veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument concerning the claim the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2007). ______________________________________________ Keith W. Allen Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs