Citation Nr: 0947992 Decision Date: 12/18/09 Archive Date: 12/31/09 DOCKET NO. 09-36 447 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of stroke, to include paralysis of the left shoulder, arm and hand. 2. Entitlement to a disability rating in excess of 40 percent for a left shoulder disability, to include a frozen (minor) shoulder, with chronic dislocations, post-operative. 3. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) due to service-connected disabilities. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD A. Lindio, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from July 1945 to September 1946 with the Navy and from March 1951 to January 1952 with the Air Force. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) on appeal from an August 2008 rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2006). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). The issues of entitlement to a disability rating in excess of 40 percent for the left shoulder and TDIU are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDING OF FACT The evidence of record does not show that the Veteran's residuals of paralysis are related to his active military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for the establishment of service connection for residuals of a stroke have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.310 (2009). [Continued on the next page] REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Duty to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide, in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim, including: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Further, this notice must include information that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. at 486. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit previously held that any errors in notice required under the VCAA should be presumed to be prejudicial to the claimant unless VA shows that the error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. See Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Under Sanders, VA bore the burden of proving that such an error did not cause harm. Id. However, in the recent case Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit's blanket presumption of prejudicial error in all cases imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon VA. Rather, in Shinseki v. Sanders, the Supreme Court suggested that determinations concerning prejudicial error and harmless error should be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. As such, in conformance with the precedents set forth above, on appellate review the Board must consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether any potential VCAA notice errors are prejudicial to the claimant. Here, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by way of a letter sent to the Veteran in March 2008 that fully addressed all of the notice elements and was sent prior to the initial RO decision in this matter. The letter informed him of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The letter informed him that his service connection claim must be supported by evidence indicating a current disability, evidence that the injury or disease was incurred or aggravated during service, and medical evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the in-service injury or disease. He was also informed that VA would seek to provide federal records. Finally, he was informed that it was his responsibility to support his claim with appropriate evidence, though VA would help him obtain records from any non-federal sources. With respect to the Dingess requirements, the March 2005 letter from the RO also provided the Veteran with notice of what type of information and evidence was needed to establish a disability rating, as well as notice of the type of evidence necessary to establish an effective date. With that letter, the RO effectively satisfied the remaining notice requirements with respect to the issue on appeal. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that the notification requirements of the VCAA have been satisfied as to both timing and content. Therefore, adequate notice was provided to the Veteran prior to the transfer and certification of his case to the Board and complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Next, VA has a duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting him in the procurement of service medical records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The RO has obtained Social Security Administration (SSA) records. The Veteran submitted statements. There is no duty on the part of VA to provide a medical examination, because as in Wells v. Principi, 326 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Veteran has been advised of the need to submit competent medical evidence indicating that he has the disorders in question, and further substantiating evidence suggestive of a linkage between his active service and the current disorder, if shown. The Veteran has not done so, and no evidence thus supportive has otherwise been obtained. Here, as in Wells, the record in its whole, after due notification, advisement, and assistance to the Veteran under the VCAA, does not contain competent medical evidence to suggest that the disorder is related to service. Indeed, the Board notes that obtaining a VA examination is unnecessary as there is otherwise sufficient medical evidence of record to make a decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (d). Significantly, neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). Hence, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd, 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Applicable Law Under applicable law, service connection is granted if the evidence establishes that coincident with his service, the veteran incurred a disease or injury, or had a preexisting injury aggravated, in the line of duty of his active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may also be granted for certain chronic diseases, when such disease is manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. That an injury or event occurred in service alone is not enough. There must be chronic disability resulting from that injury or event. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection can also be found for any disease diagnosed after discharge, if all the evidence establishes it was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection requires that the evidence establish: (1) medical evidence of a current disability, (2) medical evidence, or lay testimony in some cases, that the injury or disease was incurred or aggravated during service, and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the in-service injury or disease. Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). Merits of the Claim As indicated in his August 2009 VA Form 9, the Veteran essentially argues that his stroke was caused by his service, specifically, exposure to either lead paint or asbestos while serving with the Navy. There is no specific statutory or regulatory guidance with regard to claims for service connection for asbestosis or other asbestos-related diseases. However, in 1988, VA issued a circular on asbestos-related diseases which provided guidelines for considering asbestos compensation claims. See Department of Veterans Benefits, Veterans' Administration, DVB Circular 21-88-8, Asbestos-Related Diseases (May 11, 1988). The information and instructions contained in the DVB Circular have since been included in VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, part VI, para. 7.21 (October 3, 1997) (hereinafter "M21-1"). Also, an opinion by VA's Office of General Counsel discussed the development of asbestos claims. VAOPGCPREC 4-00 (April 13, 2000). The applicable section of Manual M21-1 also notes that some of the major occupations involving exposure to asbestos include mining, milling, work in shipyards, carpentry and construction, manufacture and servicing of friction products such as clutch facings and brake linings, manufacture and installation of roofing and flooring materials, asbestos cement and pipe products, military equipment, etc. High exposure to respirable asbestos and a high prevalence of disease have been noted in insulation and shipyard workers, and this is significant considering that, during World War II, U.S. Navy veterans were exposed to chrysotile, amosite, and crocidolite that were used extensively in military ship construction. Furthermore, it was revealed that many of these shipyard workers had only recently come to medical attention because the latent period for asbestos-related diseases varies from 10 to 45 or more years between first exposure and development of disease. Also of significance is that the exposure to asbestos may be brief (as little as a month or two) or indirect (bystander disease). See Department of Veterans Affairs, Veteran's Benefits Administration, Manual M21-1, Part 6, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, § 7.21 b. The Board notes that the aforementioned provisions of M21-1 have been rescinded and reissued as amended in a manual rewrite (MR) in 2005. See M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 1, Sec. H, Para. 29, entitled "Developing Claims for Service Connection for Asbestos-Related Diseases," and Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 2, Sec. C, Para. 9, entitled "Service Connection for Disabilities Resulting from Exposure to Asbestos." VA must analyze the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for an asbestos related disorder under these administrative protocols using the following criteria. Ennis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 523, 527 (1993); McGinty v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 428, 432 (1993). The latency period for asbestos- related diseases varies from 10 to 45 or more years between first exposure and development of disease. The exposure may have been direct or indirect, and the extent or duration of exposure is not a factor. M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 1, Sec. H, Para. 29a. The manual provisions acknowledge that inhalation of asbestos fibers and/or particles can result in fibrosis and tumors, and produce pleural effusions and fibrosis, pleural plaques, mesotheliomas of the pleura and peritoneum, and cancer of the lung, gastrointestinal tract, larynx, pharynx and urogenital system (except the prostate), with the most common resulting disease being interstitial pulmonary fibrosis (asbestosis). Also noted is the increased risk of bronchial cancer in individuals who smoke cigarettes and have had prior asbestos exposure. As to occupational exposure, exposure to asbestos has been shown in insulation and shipyard workers, and others. The clinical diagnosis of asbestosis requires a history of exposure and radiographic evidence of parenchymal lung disease. M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 2, Sec. C, Para. 9a-f. In Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 145 (1999), the Court found that provisions in former paragraph 7.68 (predecessor to paragraph 7.21) of VBA Manual M21-1, Part VI, did not create a presumption of exposure to asbestos. Medical nexus evidence is required in claims for asbestos related disease related to alleged asbestos exposure in service. VA O.G.C. Prec. Op. No. 04-00. The manual further provides that VA must determine whether military records demonstrate evidence of asbestos exposure in service; whether there is pre-service and/or post service evidence of occupational or other asbestos exposure; and then make a determination as to the relationship between asbestos exposure and the claimed diseases, keeping in mind the latency and exposure information pertinent to the veteran. M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 2, Sec. C, Para. 9h. The Board notes that the Veteran did serve in the Navy for approximately one year, during World War II. However, he served as a seaman and the evidence does not show that he engaged in any of the occupations with a high risk of asbestos exposure. He also has not demonstrated how he was exposed to asbestos during service, other than indicating that he served on a ship. Asbestos exposure is not conceded. Additionally, the Veteran's claimed residuals of stroke are not listed as one of the previously discussed disorders acknowledged by VA to be due to the inhalation of asbestos fibers and/or particles. These disorders generally include respiratory disorders, such as asbestosis, and certain cancers. M21-1MR, Part IV, Subpart ii, Chap. 2, Sec. C, Para. 9a-f. Furthermore, no medical evidence of record indicates that any medical professional has found the Veteran to have an asbestos-related disorder; no medical professional has found the Veteran's stroke to be related to asbestos- related. The record thus does not indicate that the Veteran's claimed stroke residuals are related to his claimed in-service asbestos exposure. The record similarly does not support the Veteran's contention that he developed his stroke residuals due to any other part of his service. VA medical records generally indicate that the Veteran suffered two strokes, over 50 years following his discharge from his second period of service, as reported in his July 2008 VA examination. Although VA medical records generally indicate that the Veteran was treated for a cerebral vascular accident (CVA) or stroke, starting in 2002, no medical opinions are of record as to the etiology of the CVA. Private medical records, including the Veteran's SSA records, are also of record. However, they also do not provide any medical opinions as to the etiology of his stroke. No medical opinions link his stroke to service, including to his claimed lead paint exposure. The only evidence of record supporting the Veteran's claim that he developed his CVA due to service is his own statements. Although he can provide testimony as to his own experiences and observations, the factual question of if his disorder can be attributed to his in-service experiences and injuries is a medical question, requiring a medical expert. The Veteran is not competent to render such an opinion. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). He does not have the requisite special medical knowledge necessary for such opinion evidence. "Competent medical evidence" is evidence that is provided by a person qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a). No medical opinions are of record addressing the question of the etiology of the Veteran's CVA. As noted above, the Veteran was advised of the need to submit medical evidence demonstrating both a current disorder, as well as medical evidence demonstrating a nexus between the claimed current disorders and service by way of the VCAA letter provided to him, but failed to do so. A claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under laws administered by the VA, 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt rule does not apply. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 58 (1991). The Veteran's claim for service connection for residuals of a stroke, to include paralysis of the left shoulder, arm and hand, is denied. ORDER Service connection for residuals of stroke, to include paralysis of the left shoulder, arm and hand, is denied. REMAND The August 2008 rating decision included a denial of the Veteran's claim for a disability rating in excess of 40 percent for a left shoulder disability. The Veteran filed a Notice of Disagreement to all the decisions of the August 2008 rating decision in September 2008. To date, the Veteran has not been issued a Statement of the Case (SOC) for the issue of his increased rating claim, and under the circumstances the Board has no discretion and must remand this matter for issuance of an SOC. See Manlicon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999); Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 131-132 (1999). As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Proper VCAA notice was not provided to the Veteran in regards to his claim for an increased rating for his left shoulder claim. Notice compliant with VCAA standards must thus be provided. Additionally, the left shoulder disability rating bears a direct relationship on whether the Veteran is unemployable due to his service-connected disabilities, which implicates his TDIU claim. The appropriate remedy where a pending claim is inextricably intertwined with a claim currently on appeal is to remand the claim on appeal pending the adjudication of the inextricably intertwined claim. Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 180 (1991). Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following actions: (Please note, this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2006). Expedited handling is requested.) 1. A Statement of the Case should be issued to the Veteran concerning the claim of increased rating for a left shoulder disability. The Veteran should be advised of the necessity of filing a timely substantive appeal if he wants the Board to consider this issue. 2. When the development requested has been completed, the case should again be reviewed by the RO/AMC on the basis of the additional evidence. If the benefit sought is not granted, the Veteran should be furnished a Supplemental Statement of the Case, which would include consideration of the TDIU claim, and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond before the record is returned to the Board for further review. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ JONATHAN B. KRAMER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs