Citation Nr: 1000128 Decision Date: 01/04/10 Archive Date: 01/14/10 DOCKET NO. 07-26 294 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Detroit, Michigan THE ISSUES 1. Whether a January 15, 2002 rating decision was clearly and unmistakably erroneous for failing to assign an effective date prior to December 4, 2001 for the grant of service connection for tinnitus and the assignment of a 10 percent evaluation, for accrued benefits purposes. 2. Whether a May 13, 1981 rating decision was clearly and unmistakably erroneous in failing to assign a compensable evaluation for a fragment wound of the right thigh, for accrued benefits purposes. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. L. Mollan, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from May 1967 to October 1973. The appellant or the moving party is his surviving spouse. These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2006 RO decision, which denied entitlement to accrued benefits. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a January 2002 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for tinnitus and assigned a 10 percent evaluation, effective December 4, 2001. 2. For the purposes of accrued benefits, the moving party has not alleged any errors of fact or law in the January 2002 rating decision that compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the results would have been manifestly different but for the errors. 3. In a May 1981 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for a fragment wound of the right thigh and assigned a noncompensable evaluation, effective February 18, 1981. 4. For the purposes of accrued benefits, the moving party has not alleged any errors of fact or law in the May 1981 rating decision that compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the results would have been manifestly different but for the errors. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The January 2002 rating decision, which granted service connection for tinnitus and assigned a 10 percent rating, effective December 4, 2001, was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous, for the purposes of accrued benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5109A, 5121 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a), 3.1000 (2009). 2. The May 1981 rating decision, which granted service connection and assigned a 0 percent rating for a fragment wound of the right thigh, was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous, for the purposes of accrued benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5109A, 5121 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a), 3.1000 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) As provided for by the VCAA, VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). However, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that the VCAA does not apply to claims of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) in prior final decisions. Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165, 179 (2001) (en banc). Nevertheless, with respect to the claims for CUE, the Board notes in passing that the moving party and her accredited representative have been accorded ample opportunity to present her contentions, and there is no indication that either the appellant or her representative have further argument to present. II. Analysis The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claims or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, in which case, the claims are denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). The law applicable to accrued benefits provides that certain individuals, including the Veteran's surviving spouse, may be paid periodic monetary benefits (due and unpaid for a period not to exceed two years) to which the Veteran was entitled at the time of his death under existing ratings or based on evidence in the file or constructively of record at the time of his death. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000 (2009). A claim for such benefits must be filed within one year of the Veteran's death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a), (c) (2009). In Jones v. West, 136 F.3d 1296, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) concluded that, for a surviving spouse to be entitled to accrued benefits, "the Veteran must have had a claim pending at the time of his death for such benefits or else be entitled to them under an existing rating or decision." See also Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236 (Fed Cir. 1996) (a consequence of the derivative nature of the surviving spouse's entitlement to a Veteran's accrued benefits claim is that, without the Veteran having a claim pending at time of death, the surviving spouse has no claim upon which to derive his or her own application). The term "pending claim" means an application, formal or informal, which has not been finally adjudicated. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2009). The term "finally adjudicated claim" means an application, formal or informal, which has been allowed or disallowed by the agency of original jurisdiction, the action having become final by the expiration of one year after the date of notice of an award or disallowance, or by denial on appellate review, whichever is earlier. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(d) (2009); see also 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1103, 20.1104 (2009). Prior to his death, the Veteran was assigned a 10 percent disability rating for tinnitus, effective December 4, 2001, and a noncompensable rating for a fragment wound of the right thigh, effective February 18, 1981. In a claim dated December 20, 2005, the Veteran indicated that there was CUE in a May 13, 1981 rating decision, which assigned a noncompensable evaluation for a fragment wound of the right thigh, and a January 15, 2002 rating decision, which granted service connection for tinnitus and assigned a 10 percent rating, effective December 4, 2001. These claims were denied in a May 2006 rating decision. The Veteran died in June 2006. Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121(c), a claim for accrued benefits requires that the application be filed within one year after the date of death. As discussed, normally, there is no basis for an accrued benefits claim unless the individual from whom the accrued benefits claim derives had a claim for VA benefits pending at the time of death. See Jones v. West, 136 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Taylor v. Nicholson, 12 Vet. App. 126 (2007), however, the Court clarified that an appellant seeking accrued benefits may file a notice of disagreement (NOD) within the one-year period following entry of a rating decision, the result being that a claim remained pending at the time of death. As noted above, in a rating decision dated in May 2006, the Veteran's claims for an increased rating for a fragment wound of the right thigh on the basis of CUE and an earlier effective date for the grant of service connection for tinnitus and the assignment of a 10 percent evaluation on the basis of CUE were denied. Accordingly, the Veteran or the appellant had until May 2007 to file a NOD with respect to the May 2006 denial of these claims. The appellant filed a NOD with regard to the denial of these claims for CUE in October 2006. Therefore, in light of the holding in Taylor v. Nicholson, it must be found that the claims for an increased rating for a fragment wound of the right thigh on the basis of CUE and an earlier effective date for the grant of service connection for tinnitus and the assignment of a 10 percent evaluation on the basis of CUE were pending at the time of the Veteran's death. Additionally, the record reflects that the appellant filed for accrued benefits in August 2006, within one year of the Veteran's death. As such, the Board will consider the merits of the aforementioned claims based on the evidence of record at the time of the Veteran's death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000 (2009). Additionally, it is noted that, where the Board addresses a question that has not been addressed by the agency of original jurisdiction, the Board must consider whether the claimant has been prejudiced thereby. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). In this case, despite the fact that the RO determined that there was no pending claim at the time of the Veteran's death, the RO also went on to determine that there was no CUE in any earlier decision. As such, there is no prejudice in adjudicating the claims. 1. Whether a January 15, 2002 rating decision was clearly and unmistakably erroneous for failing to assign an effective date prior to December 4, 2001 for the grant of service connection for tinnitus and the assignment of a 10 percent evaluation, for accrued benefits purposes. The Board notes that, on January 25, 2001, the Veteran filed a claim for re-evaluation of his service-connected hearing loss condition. On December 4, 2001, he underwent a VA audiological examination. On January 15, 2002, the Veteran was granted service connection for tinnitus and assigned an evaluation of 10 percent, effective December 4, 2001. The appellant essentially contends that the RO committed CUE in the January 15, 2002 rating decision that granted service connection for tinnitus and assigned a 10 percent evaluation, effective December 4, 2001. Specifically, it has been argued that the evidence of record reflects that the Veteran had tinnitus since his military service and, as such, an earlier effective date should be assigned. See Statement of Accredited Representative in Appealed Case, January 2008. The Court has consistently stressed the rigorous nature of the concept of CUE. "Clear and unmistakable error is an administrative failure to apply the correct statutory and regulatory provisions to the correct and relevant facts. It is not mere misinterpretation of facts." Oppenheimer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 370, 372 (1991). "Clear and unmistakable error' requires that error, otherwise prejudicial,...must appear undebatably." Akins v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 228, 231 (1991). Clear and unmistakable errors "are errors that are undebatable, so that it can be said that reasonable minds could only conclude that the original decision was fatally flawed at the time it was made." Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-4. "It must always be remembered that CUE is a very specific and rare kind of 'error'." Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993). The Court has propounded the following three-pronged test for determining when there was CUE present in a prior decision: (1) Either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied; (2) the error must be undebatable and of the sort which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made; and (3) a determination that there was CUE must be based on the record and law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in question. Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313-14. CUE that requires revision of a prior final rating action exists only where it appears "undebatably" that "[e]ither the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied." Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313. In Fugo, 6 Vet. App. at 40, the Court refined and elaborated on the test set forth in Russell. The Court stated that CUE was a very specific and rare kind of "error." It was the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compelled a conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Upon review of the claims file, the Board finds that there is no evidence that an error occurred at the time of the January 2002 rating decision that was undebatable and of the sort which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made. It appears that the RO reviewed the relevant service and post-service treatment records at the time of the January 2002 rating decision. Moreover, it was specifically noted that the Veteran was previously denied service connection for tinnitus by the May 13, 1981 rating decision, as tinnitus was not shown by the evidence of record at that time. This rating decision further indicated that an effective date of December 4, 2001 was being assigned, as this was the date of the VA examination which the RO determined to be the first evidence of tinnitus. In assigning this effective date, the RO cited to 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(q)(ii) and specifically noted that, if the evidence is received after a final disallowance of the benefit in question, and the benefit is now being granted, the effective date will be the date of receipt of the new claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. The Board notes that there is no indication that, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. With regard to the argument that the effective date assigned at the January 2002 rating decision was in error, as the Veteran had tinnitus since his military service, the Board notes that, under VA laws and regulations, a specific claim in the form prescribed by VA must be filed in order for benefits to be paid or furnished to any individual under laws administered by the VA. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a). In general, the effective date of an award based on an original claim or a claim reopened after final adjudication of compensation shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of the receipt of the application. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. Generally, the effective date of an award of disability compensation based on an original claim shall be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. However, the effective date of an award of disability compensation based on a claim to reopen after a final disallowance shall be the date of receipt of the new claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(q)(ii), (r). As the January 2002 rating decision assigned an effective date of December 4, 2001, the date of the VA examination, the RO assigned the effective date of the award of disability based on the date that it determined entitlement arose. To the extent that the appellant argues that entitlement arose earlier, the Board notes that this assertion amounts to nothing more than an argument that the facts were not weighed or evaluated correctly. Although the appellant may disagree with the RO's findings in the January 2002 rating decision, the Court has determined that an assertion that the RO improperly weighed or evaluated evidence can never raise to the level of CUE. Fugo, 6 Vet. App. at 43. Thus, as there is no indication that the RO's January 2002 grant of service connection for tinnitus and assignment of a 10 percent evaluation, effective December 4, 2001, was "undebatably incorrect", a finding of CUE not is warranted. See Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313. Therefore, the Board concludes that, the record does not establish that, but for an error in the January 2002 rating decision, an earlier effective date would have been assigned for the grant of service connection and assignment of a 10 percent evaluation for tinnitus. Therefore, the criteria for a finding of CUE in the January 2002 rating decision has not been met. As such, the appellant's claim for accrued benefits must be denied. 2. Whether a May 13, 1981 rating decision was clearly and unmistakably erroneous in failing to assign a compensable evaluation for a fragment wound of the right thigh, for accrued benefits purposes. The Board notes that, on February 18, 1981, the Veteran filed a formal claim of entitlement to service connection for a gunshot wound to the right leg. On May 13, 1981, the Veteran was granted service connection for a fragment wound to the right thigh and assigned an evaluation of 0 percent, effective February 18, 1981. At no time has an increased evaluation for this service-connected disability been assigned. . The appellant essentially contends that the RO committed CUE in the May 13, 1981 rating decision by assigning a noncompensable evaluation for the Veteran's fragment wound of the right thigh. Specifically, it has been asserted that service treatment records reflect that the wound was "Clean, Debrided, Dress"; a separate service treatment record referred to debridement; and an April 17, 1981 VA examination report revealed retained foreign bodies at the site of the wound. See Statement of Accredited Representative in Appealed Case, January 2008. As such, the May 13, 1981 rating decision was in error for not assigning the moderately severe evaluation to muscle group IVX, under 38 C.F.R. § 4.56, based on the finding of debridement and prolong infection. Upon review of the claims file, the Board finds that there is no evidence that an error occurred at the time of the May 1981 rating decision that was undebatable and of the sort which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made. It appears that the RO reviewed the relevant service treatment records at the time of the May 1981 rating decision. Moreover, it was specifically noted that the Veteran had recently been examined on April 17, 1981. There is no indication that, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. With regard to the argument that the May 1981 rating decision was in error for not assigning a moderately severe evaluation to muscle group IVX based on the findings of debridement and prolong infection and the evidence in the April 1981 VA examination that the Veteran had retained foreign bodies at the site of the wound, the Board notes that this assertion amounts to nothing more than an argument that the facts were not weighed or evaluated correctly. In this regard, it must be noted that the version of the regulation in effect in 1981 has been found by the Court to employ a "totality-of-the- circumstances-test." See, e.g., Tropf v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 317 (2006). In Tropf, the Court explained that, notwithstanding language in certain provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.56 that would appear mandatory on its face, the regulations setting forth classification of muscle injuries as slight, moderate, moderately severe, or severe employ essentially a totality-of the-circumstances test, so that no single factor is per se controlling in determining the rating for a muscle injury. Although the Tropf case itself was not decided until years following the 1981 decision, and was thus not binding case law in effect at that time, the case does serve to demonstrate that how to balance the extent of an initial muscle injury with the extent of current muscle disability under the regulations pertaining to rating muscle injuries is a matter upon which reasonable minds can disagree. In other words, the representative's argument is a debatable one, and therefore not the type of "error" that can constitute CUE. Thus, there is no indication that the RO's May 1981 assignment of a noncompensable evaluation for a fragment wound of the right thigh was "undebatably incorrect" so as to warrant a finding of CUE. See Russell, 3 Vet. App. at 313. Although the Veteran may disagree with the RO's findings in the May 1981 rating decision, the Court has determined that an assertion that the RO improperly weighed or evaluated evidence can never raise to the level of CUE. Fugo, 6 Vet. App. at 43. Therefore, the Board concludes that, the record does not establish that, but for an error in the May 1981 rating decision, a compensable evaluation would have been awarded for the Veteran's fragment wound of the right thigh. Therefore, the criteria for a finding of CUE in the May 1981 rating decision has not been met. As such, the appellant's claim for accrued benefits must be denied. ORDER The January 15, 2002 rating decision was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous for failing to assign an effective date prior to December 4, 2001 for the grant of service connection for tinnitus and the assignment of a 10 percent evaluation, for accrued benefits purposes. The May 13, 1981 rating decision was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous in failing to assign a compensable evaluation for a fragment wound of the right thigh, for accrued benefits purposes. ____________________________________________ MICHAEL LANE Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs