Citation Nr: 1000144 Decision Date: 01/04/10 Archive Date: 01/14/10 DOCKET NO. 07-20 766A ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Sioux Falls, South Dakota THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a major depressive disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. J. Wells-Green, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from February 1976 to July 1977. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a January 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Fargo, North Dakota. Thereafter, the Veteran's claims files were transferred to the RO in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) recently found that a claim for benefits for one psychiatric disability also encompassed benefits based on other psychiatric diagnoses and should be considered by the Board to be within the scope of the filed claim. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). The Board notes that the Veteran has also raised a claim for service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that was denied in a January 2008 rating decision. However, despite being notified of that decision and his appellate rights, the Veteran has not appealed the January 2008 rating decision. Therefore, the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is not encompassed in the current issue and is not for appellate consideration. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the appellant's appeal has been obtained. 2. Any currently diagnosed depressive disorder did not have its onset in service or within one year thereafter and has not been etiologically linked to the Veteran's service or any incident therein. CONCLUSION OF LAW A depressive disorder was neither incurred in nor aggravated by active military service; and cannot be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION VA's Duties To Notify And Assist When VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2007); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Specifically, VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide that pertains to the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159, as amended, 73 Fed. Reg. 23353-56 (Apr. 30, 2008); see Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini II, 18 Vet. App. at 119. Further, upon receipt of an application for a service- connection claim, VA is required to review the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the Veteran with notice of what evidence not previously provided will help substantiate his/her claim. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Specifically, VA must notify the Veteran of what is required to establish service connection and that a disability rating and effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. In cases where service connection has been granted and an initial disability rating and effective date have been assigned, the claim for service connection has been substantiated, and any defect in the notice regarding that claim was therefore not prejudicial to the claim. See Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 491. In reviewing the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for a depressive disorder, the Board observes that the RO issued VCAA notices to the Veteran in November 2005, March 2006, May 2006 and March 2008 letters which informed him of the evidence generally needed to support claims of entitlement to service connection; what actions he needed to undertake; and how the VA would assist him in developing his claim. The March 2006, May 2006 and March 2008 letters informed him of the evidence needed for the assignment of evaluations and effective dates for initial awards of service connection. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The November 2005 VCAA notice was issued prior to the January 2006 rating decision from which the instant appeal arises. Thus, the Board concludes that the RO provided appropriate notice of the information or evidence needed in order to substantiate the claim prior to the initial decision. In view of this, the Board finds that VA's duty to notify has been fully satisfied with respect to this claim. VA has secured or attempted to secure all relevant documentation to the extent possible. Service treatment records and VA medical treatment records and evaluation are of record, as well as private treatment records and evaluations, a copy of a submitted news article regarding mental problems for soldiers after war service and the Veteran's written contentions regarding the circumstances of his depressive disorder, and these records were reviewed by both the RO and the Board in connection with the Veteran's claim. With respect to the VA psychiatric examination provided the Veteran in February 2008, with subsequent clarification, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). In this case, the Board finds that the February 2008 VA psychiatric examination report is adequate, as it provides an opinion regarding whether the Veteran's current depressive disorder was incurred in service or etiologically related to an inservice incident. That opinion was based on a review of the Veteran's claims files, which included his private treatment records, VA treatment records and complete service treatment records. The examiner outlined the Veteran's history and gave an opinion based on the pertinent evidence of record. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the issue on appeal has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). There remains no issue as to the substantial completeness of the Veteran's claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Any duty imposed on VA, including the duty to assist and to provide notification, has been met. Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d (Fed. Cir. 2007). Analysis Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131. That an injury or disease occurred in service is not enough; there must be chronic disability resulting from that injury or disease. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any injury or disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease or injury was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Some chronic diseases are presumed to have been incurred in service, although not otherwise established as such, if manifested to a degree of ten percent or more within one year of the date of separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(3); see 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101(3) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (listing applicable chronic diseases, including psychosis). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the benefit of the doubt shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). When a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, such doubt will be resolved in the favor of the claimant. Reasonable doubt is doubt which exists because of an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. The question is whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the claimant prevailing in either event, or whether a fair preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which event the claim must be denied. See Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. Although the Veteran contends that his current depressive disorder had its onset in service, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against his claim. Initially, the Board observes that the available service treatment records do show that the Veteran was hospitalized overnight in May 1977 after ingesting multiple drugs. Clinical records indicate that he was depressed about the Army and his family situation at the time. The discharge diagnosis was depression. There is no evidence of subsequent complaints, findings, treatment or diagnoses during the remainder of his service. The Veteran's report of medical history, completed 2 days before his hospitalization, shows that he had affirmed that he had trouble sleeping and experienced depression or excessive worry. It was noted that he had financial worries and the accompanying separation examination shows that a clinical psychiatric evaluation was normal. In July 1977, the Veteran signed a statement of medical condition indicating that there had been no change in his medical condition since his separation medical examination. Despite the Veteran's assertions that he experienced chronic symptoms of depression since his service, the earliest competent medical evidence of a diagnosed depressive disorder is an April 1990 private admission note indicating diagnoses of adjustment disorder with depressed mood, rule out major depression, and alcohol dependence, 13 years after his discharge from service. Although the April 1990 treatment record and subsequent treatment records note the Veteran's medical history of multiple treatments for chemical dependency and detoxification programs, as early as 1978, there is no indication that he was diagnosed with depression prior to April 1990. Because the earliest competent medical evidence of a diagnosed depressive disorder is the April 1990 private treatment record, 13 years after his discharge, the Board finds this gap in time significant, and it weighs against the existence of a link between the Veteran's disability and his time in service. Cf. Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding, in an aggravation context, that the Board may consider a prolonged period without medical complaint when deciding a claim). With regard to the Veteran's symptomatology and diagnosis of depression in service, such symptomatology and diagnosis appear, based on other medical evidence, to have been acute and transitory and to have resolved prior to his separation. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991) (holding that Board must rely on independent medical evidence to support its findings and must not refute medical evidence in the record with its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions), overruled on other grounds by Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). With regard to this other medical evidence, the Board notes, for example, that the February 2008 VA psychiatric examiner, after reviewing the Veteran's claims files and interviewing him, opined that the April 1990 diagnosis of adjustment disorder with a depressed mood was not linked to the Veteran's service, but rather to then current stressors and his alcohol issues. Moreover, the examiner stated that the overdose in service appeared to be an acute and short-lived event and that his major depression and alcohol dependence were not caused by or the result of his military service. In a subsequent February 2008 VA report of contact, the VA psychiatric examiner stated that the 1-day hospitalization in 1977 was for an acute stress reaction and was not the first signs or manifestations of the current mental health disability. He further noted that there was a clear demarcation between the episode in service and the Veteran's diagnosed disability over 12 years later and that there was no correlation between the 2 timeframes. He opined that the incident in 1977 was related to alcohol use and not a separate mental health disability. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran's current depressive disorder did not manifest during service or for many years thereafter. Assuming, without deciding, that a mental disorder in this case can be classified as a psychosis, the Board notes that because a mental disorder did not manifest for many years after service, presumptive service connection for a depressive disorder is not warranted. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, 3.309(a). In addition to the lack of objective medical evidence showing that the Veteran's current depressive disorder was first manifested during service or within close proximity thereto, the medical evidence of record does not etiologically link his current depressive disorder to his service or any incident therein. In fact, as noted above, the February 2008 VA examiner finds the Veteran's currently diagnosed depressive disorder to be unrelated to his service or the May 1977 episode in service when he was diagnosed with depression. These records merely show treatment for alcohol abuse and chemical dependence with associated suicide attempts as early as 1988. There is no other medical opinion of record regarding the etiology of the Veteran's current depressive disorder. To the extent that the Veteran is contending that he has experienced chronic or continuous depressive disorder symptomatology since service, the Board notes that the medical evidence of record weighs against his own lay statements contending that the symptoms he has experienced have been symptoms of a chronic condition or continuous symptoms of the same disorder. For example, the February 2008 VA examination report is against the Veteran's claim, finding that his depressive episode in service was acute and transitory and that there was no correlation between it and his current depressive disorder. Moreover, the contemporaneous VA and private treatment records do not support his history provided many years after his discharge. The Board finds that the contemporaneous records are entitled more probative weight than the Veteran's recent recollections of what happened in service and the continuity of his symptoms since many decades ago. See Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991); see also Savage, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). Likewise, the Veteran, as lay a person, not trained or educated in medicine, is not competent to offer medical nexus opinions as to whether he currently has a depressive disorder as a result of his service or any incident therein and such statements are of little probative value. See Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). With regard to the submitted news article regarding mental health problems of soldiers after war service, the Court has held that a medical article or treatise "can provide important support when combined with an opinion of a medical professional" if the medical article or treatise evidence discussed generic relationships with a degree of certainty such that, under the facts of a specific case, there is at least "plausible causality" based upon objective facts rather than on an unsubstantiated lay medical opinion. Sack v. West, 11 Vet. App. 314 (1998); see also Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509 (1998) (medical treatise evidence discussed generic relationships with a degree of certainty to establish a plausible causality of nexus), and Mattern v. West, 12 Vet. App. 222, 228 (1999). However, the Board finds that the article has no bearing in the Veteran's case, as he did not serve during a period of war and he did not serve outside the United States. Moreover, the Court has held that a medical article or treatise can provide support for a claim, but must be combined with an opinion of a medical professional and be reflective of the specific facts of a case as opposed to a discussion of generic relationships. Sack, supra. The Veteran has not provided any medical opinion of a medical professional supporting his claim. For this reason, the Board must find that the medical text evidence submitted by the Veteran does not contain the necessary specificity to constitute competent evidence of the claimed medical nexus. See Sacks, 11 Vet. App. at 317 (citing Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996)); see Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996). Finally, the Board notes that the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence of record indicates that the Veteran has received ongoing outpatient and inpatient treatment for chemical dependency and alcohol abuse as early as 1978, just 1 year after the Veteran's discharge from service. Moreover, the February 2008 VA psychiatric examiner has related the Veteran's 1977 depressive episode to his alcohol use in service. The Board notes that with respect to claims filed after October 31, 1990, service connection may not be granted for substance abuse on the basis of service incurrence or aggravation. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(a); VAOPGCPREC 2-98. The law does not preclude a veteran from receiving compensation for an alcohol or drug abuse disability acquired as secondary to, or as a symptom of, a veteran's service-connected disability. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Compensation is precluded only for (a) primary alcohol abuse disabilities (an alcohol abuse disability arising during service from voluntary and willful drinking to excess), and (b) secondary disabilities (such as cirrhosis of the liver) that result from primary alcohol abuse. Id. Therefore, assuming, without conceding, that the Veteran's current depressive disorder has been continuously present since service, service connection cannot be established for such as the competent evidence of record, the February 2008 VA examiner's report, links it to his alcohol use in service. Accordingly, for the reasons noted above, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim in this case, and service connection for a depressive disorder must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). ORDER Service connection for a depressive disorder is denied. ____________________________________________ KATHLEEN K. GALLAGHER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs