Citation Nr: 1000303 Decision Date: 01/04/10 Archive Date: 01/14/10 DOCKET NO. 06-14 207 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in North Little Rock, Arkansas THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder claimed as depression. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Chaplin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1998 to February 1999. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a November 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in No. Little Rock, Arkansas, that denied entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder claimed as depression. The Veteran presented testimony at a personal video conference hearing in March 2007 before the undersigned. A copy of the hearing transcript attached to the claims file reflects that the Veteran voluntarily decided not to have his representative present at the hearing. The claim was remanded in February 2009 for further development and has been returned to the Board for appellate review. FINDING OF FACT The competent and probative evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the Veteran's psychiatric disability diagnosed as depression due to drug and alcohol abuse; rule out adjustment disorder with depressed mood; rule out major depression, single episode, moderate, with psychotic features; rule out delusional disorder; rule out paranoid schizophrenia; and rule out malingering either had its onset in service or preexisted service and was aggravated by service; and manifestation of a psychosis to a compensable degree within one year after separation from service is not shown. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by military service, nor may it be presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Notice and Assistance Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits and prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by an agency of original jurisdiction, VA is required to notify the appellant of the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim. In the notice, VA will inform the claimant which information and evidence, if any, that the claimant is to provide to VA and which information and evidence, if any, that VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2008); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The notice should also address the rating criteria and effective date provisions that are pertinent to the appellant's claim. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The RO provided the appellant pre-adjudication notice by a letter dated in August 2005. Although the pre-adjudicatory notice provided did not address either the rating criteria or effective date provisions that are pertinent to the appellant's claim, such error was harmless given that service connection is being denied, and hence no rating or effective date will be assigned with respect to this claimed condition. Dingess, 19 Vet. App. at 473. Moreover, notice addressing the rating criteria and effective date provisions was sent by a letter dated in March 2006 and the claim was readjudicated in an October 2009 supplemental statement of the case. Mayfield, 444 F.3d at 1333. Regarding the duty to assist, VA has obtained service treatment records and assisted the appellant in obtaining evidence. As there is no evidence of a psychiatric disability in service and no probative evidence, including the Veteran's own statements, demonstrating continuity of symptomatology or relating the Veteran's claimed current psychiatric disability to his period of active service, the Board finds that a VA examination is not required in this case. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). All known and available records relevant to the issues on appeal have been obtained and associated with the appellant's claims file; and the appellant has not contended otherwise. VA has substantially complied with the notice and assistance requirements and the appellant is not prejudiced by a decision on the claim at this time. Acquired psychiatric disorder The Veteran seeks entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder claimed as depression. Service connection may be granted for disability arising from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). With chronic disease shown as such in service, or within a pertinent presumption period under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. Continuity of symptomatology after discharge is required only where the condition noted during service (or in the presumption period) is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Where a veteran served continuously for 90 days or more during a period of war or after December 31, 1946, and specified diseases to include a psychosis become manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may also be granted if the evidence shows that the condition was observed during service and continuity of symptomatology was demonstrated thereafter, and if the evidence includes competent evidence relating the current condition to that symptomatology. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In order to prevail on the issue of service connection, there must be competent evidence of a current disability; medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in- service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and competent evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). When a disability is not initially manifested during service or within an applicable presumption period, direct service connection may nevertheless be established by evidence demonstrating that the disability was in fact incurred or aggravated during the veteran's service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Moreover, service connection may be established on a secondary basis for a disability which is shown to be proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). In addition, service connection may be granted on a secondary basis where it is demonstrated that a service-connected disorder has aggravated a nonservice-connected disability. In such a case the veteran may be compensated only for the degree of additional disability over and above the degree of disability existing prior to the aggravation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Service treatment records are negative for any complaints, findings or diagnosis of an acquired psychiatric disorder. In a medical history accompanying the Veteran's entrance examination in November 1998, he denied having or having had any psychiatric symptoms. On examination, his psychiatric clinical evaluation was normal. The proceedings of an Entrance Physical Standards Board (EPSBD) in January 1999 recommended that the Veteran be separated from the military based on plantar fasciitis bilaterally secondary to pes planus. He had not completed basic training or 8 weeks one station unit training. Following discharge, the Veteran filed a claim of service connection for flat feet in February 1999. He did not claim depression at that time. VA outpatient treatment records show that in July 1999, the Veteran, without prior psychiatric contact, sought VA treatment for complaints of depression. He related that since he got out of the Army in January he had increasing anxiety, stress, and depression. He described his symptoms and clinical findings were recorded. The examiner noted that given the quantity and frequency of drug consumption, a definitive Axis I diagnosis could not be made. Consideration was given to adjustment disorder with disturbance of mood; major depression, single episode, moderate, with psychotic features (voices and delusional jealousy); delusional disorder; and paranoid schizophrenia. The examiner thought the Veteran would need to be drug free for 6 months to a year before residual effects of the drug could be excluded from his diagnosis. The diagnoses shown on Axis I were Depression due to drug and alcohol abuse; rule out adjustment disorder with depressed mood; rule out major depression, single episode, moderate, with psychotic features; rule out delusional disorder; rule out paranoid schizophrenia; and rule out malingering. In November 2005, the Veteran expressed that he was having sleepless nights. The Veteran testified at his March 2007 hearing that he became stressed from his VA treatment and was concerned about providing for himself and his child. He thought that his depression was secondary to the pain he felt from his other disorders. He described symptoms of depression as not being able to sleep at night because he was stressed out. He was angry, had no friends and had problems. The Veteran indicated that a private doctor had related the Veteran's depression to his pain symptoms. He related that he had sent an opinion from one or two doctors regarding the depression to the VA RO in Little Rock the previous month. The Veteran further testified that he had been unable to work because of his foot pain ever since he received a medical discharge from service which was approximately eight years earlier, and contended that his situation would cause to stress anyone. As instructed in a Board remand in February 2009, the RO contacted the Veteran by letter dated in March 2009 to identify any treatment records relating to his depression claim and provide authorization for VA to request the medical records. To date no reply has been received. Again, the service treatment records are negative for findings or diagnosis of a psychiatric disability. The psychiatric clinical evaluation was normal on examination at entrance. The Veteran was separated from military service based on a foot disability. The EPSBD proceedings regarding the Veteran's separation are negative for any findings or diagnosis of a psychiatric disability. Thus, the Board finds that a chronic acquired psychiatric disability is not shown in service. Further, there is no medical evidence of record showing that a psychosis manifested to a compensable degree within one year following separation from active service. Although at a July 1999 psychiatric evaluation, diagnoses under consideration included ruling out a psychosis, the examiner stated that a definitive Axis I diagnosis could not be made due to the quantity and frequency of the Veteran's drug consumption. Thus, that medical evidence is not sufficient to establish the diagnosis of a psychosis that manifested to a compensable degree within one year following separation from active service. Therefore, the Board finds that service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability is not warranted on a presumptive basis. Although the July 1999 VA psychiatric evaluation showed psychiatric complaints, a diagnosis of depression due to drug and alcohol abuse, and consideration of other psychiatric diagnoses, that evidence does not provide a link between any current psychiatric disability and service, nor is continuity since service shown. The Board further acknowledges the Veteran's statements of record. In this regard, lay statements are considered to be competent evidence when describing the features or symptoms of an injury or illness. Falzone v. Brown, Vet. App. 398 (1995). However, to the extent that continuous psychiatric symptoms since active service can be implied from the Veteran's statements, such statements are not found to be credible here. Indeed, he filed a claim for flat feet in February 1999. If he had been experiencing psychiatric problems at that time, it is reasonable to believe that he would have made such claim at that time. Thus, his failure to do so weighs against a finding of continuity here. Additionally, while the Veteran is competent to provide evidence as to his experiences and symptoms, he is not competent to state the etiology of a claimed psychiatric disorder. Where the determinative issue involves a question of medical diagnosis or causation, generally only individuals possessing specialized medical training and knowledge are competent to render such an opinion. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). The evidence does not reflect that the Veteran currently possesses a recognized degree of medical knowledge that would render his opinions on medical diagnoses or causation of a psychiatric disorder competent. Moreover, while in certain cases a lay person may be able to render a diagnosis or speak as to etiology, the present case involves complex medical issues beyond which he is competent to address. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Moreover, the Veteran is not contending that his depression is related to service but rather asserts that it is related to pain from his other disorders. However, the Veteran is not presently service-connected for any claimed disorders; thus, a claim for a psychiatric disorder as secondary to a service-connected disorder is not for consideration. As previously noted, the July 1999 VA examiner stated that a definitive diagnosis on Axis I could not be made until the Veteran was drug free for up to a year before residual effects of the drugs could be excluded from his diagnosis. However, a diagnosis entered on Axis I was depression due to drug and alcohol abuse. With respect to disabilities due to drug and alcohol abuse, VA regulations provide that an injury incurred during active military service shall not be deemed to have been incurred in line of duty if such injury or disease was a result of the abuse of alcohol or drugs by the person on whose service benefits are claimed. Alcohol abuse is the use of alcoholic beverages over time, or such excessive use at any one time, sufficient to cause disability to or death of the user. Drug abuse is the use of illegal drugs (including prescription drugs that are illegally or illicitly obtained), the intentional use of prescription or non-prescription drugs for a purpose other than the medically intended use, or the use of substances other than alcohol to enjoy their intoxicating effects. 38 C.F.R. § 3.301. Alcohol abuse and drug abuse, unless they are a secondary result of an organic disease or disability, are considered to be willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.301(c)(2), 3.301(c)(3). The isolated and infrequent use of drugs by itself will not be considered willful misconduct. However, the progressive and frequent use of drugs to the point of addiction will be considered willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. § 3.301(c)(3). With respect to claims filed after October 31, 1990, an injury or disease incurred during active service will not be deemed to have been incurred in line of duty if the injury or disease was a result of the person's own willful misconduct, including abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(m). A Veteran may be service connected for a disability resulting from drug abuse where that abuse is secondary to, or as a symptom of, a service-connected disability. Allen v. Principi, 237 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In this case, the Veteran does not contend nor does the evidence show that his drug abuse was secondary to, or as a symptom of, a service- connected disability. More importantly, as noted above, the Veteran is not service-connected for any disabilities. Thus, consideration of a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder resulting from drug abuse that is secondary to a service-connected disability is not warranted. In sum, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence is against entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Competent medical evidence of an acquired psychiatric disorder is not shown in service. Although acquired psychiatric disorders have been provisionally diagnosed, there is no probative, competent medical evidence of record linking an acquired psychiatric disorder to service or to any event in service. No probative, competent medical evidence exists of a relationship between any currently claimed acquired psychiatric disorder and any alleged continuity of symptomatology since separation from service. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997). To the extent that a diagnosis of depression due to drug and alcohol abuse was considered, VA regulations preclude the granting of benefits for a disability which results from the Veteran's abuse of alcohol and substance abuse. Where application of the law to the facts is dispositive, the appeal must be terminated because there is no entitlement under the law to the benefit sought. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). In reaching this decision, the Board has considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt; however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim, the doctrine is not for application. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Accordingly, the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder must be denied. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder claimed as depression is denied. ____________________________________________ ERIC S. LEBOFF Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs