Citation Nr: 1000511 Decision Date: 01/05/10 Archive Date: 01/15/10 DOCKET NO. 08-06 899 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office Center in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Missouri Veterans Commission WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant and J. L. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. M. Powell, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from December 1990 to June 1991, February 2002 to March 2002, and September 2003 to November 2004. He also had periods of active and inactive duty for training between August 1969 and February 2007. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2007 rating decision of the St. Louis, Missouri Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). FINDING OF FACT Tinnitus was initially demonstrated years after service and has not been shown by competent evidence to be causally related to the Veteran's active duty service, active duty for training or inactive duty training. CONCLUSION OF LAW Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by active duty service, active duty for training or inactive duty training and may not be presumed (as an organic disease of the nervous system) to have been so incurred or aggravated on active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ §§ 101(24), 106, 1110, 1131, 1154, 5107(West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.6, 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION VCAA The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). VCAA notice should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). On March 3, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) issued its decision in the consolidated appeal of Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Court in Dingess/Hartman holds that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a "service connection" claim. As previously defined by the courts, those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Upon receipt of an application for "service connection," therefore, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is required to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application. This includes notice that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned in the event award of the benefit sought. In the present case, VA satisfied its duty to notify prior to the initial adjudication of the claim by means of a March 2007 letter from the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) to the appellant that informed him of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence and provided him with notice of the type of evidence necessary to establish a disability rating or effective date for the disability on appeal in the event of award of the benefit sought. With regard to the duty to assist, the claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment and personnel records and a VA examination report. Additionally, the claims file contains the Veteran's statements in support of his claim. The Board has carefully reviewed such statements and concludes that he has not identified further evidence not already of record. The Board has also perused the medical records for references to additional treatment reports not of record, but has found nothing to suggest that there is any outstanding evidence with respect to the Veteran's claim. Additionally, the claims file contains the Veteran's statements in support of his claim. The record reflects that the Veteran was afforded a VA examination and opinion in July 2007. To that end, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). The Board finds that the VA examination and opinion obtained in this case is more than adequate for the issue decided on the merits herein, as it was based on a review of the Veteran's claims file and a physical examination. A reasoned rationale for the opinion provided was set forth. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the issue on appeal decided on the merits herein has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4); Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet App 295 (2008). Thus, based on the foregoing, the Board finds that all relevant facts have been properly and sufficiently developed in this appeal and no further development is required to comply with the duty to assist the Veteran in developing the facts pertinent to his claim. Essentially, all available evidence that could substantiate the claim has been obtained. Legal Criteria The Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence of record. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence where appropriate, and the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the claim. The term "active military, naval, or air service" includes active duty, and "any period of active duty for training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty, and any period of inactive duty training during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in line of duty." 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(24) (West Supp 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) (2009); Biggins v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 474, 477-478 (1991). Active duty for training is defined, in part, as full-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by Reserves for training purposes or full-time duty performed by members of the National Guard of any State. 38 U.S.C.A. § 101(22) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(c) (2009). Inactive duty training includes duty, other than full-time duty, performed by a member of the National Guard of any State. 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(d) (2009). Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), service connection for a combat-related injury may be based on lay statements, alone, but do not absolve a claimant from the requirement of demonstrating current disability and a nexus to service, as to both of which competent medical evidence is generally required. Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 464 (1996). The provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) do not allow a combat veteran to establish service connection with lay testimony alone. Rather, the statute relaxes the evidentiary requirements for determining what happened during service and is used only to provide a factual basis for a determination that a particular disease or injury was incurred or aggravated in service, not to link the service problem etiologically to a current disability. Gregory v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 563, 567 (1996). Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). Where a veteran served continuously for 90 days or more during a period of war, or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946 and tinnitus, as an organic disease of the nervous system, becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in, or aggravated by, such service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). Present disability resulting from disease or injury in service is required to establish entitlement to service connection. Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To establish service connection for a disability, there must be competent evidence of a current disability (medical diagnosis), of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service (lay or medical evidence), and of a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability (medical evidence). Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 507 (1995). Regulations also provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). Legal Analysis The Veteran asserts that service connection is warranted for tinnitus. With respect to a current disability, a July 2007 VA audiology examination report shows that the Veteran was diagnosed with periodic bilateral tinnitus. The Veteran asserts that such tinnitus is due to noise that he was exposed to in service while working as a jet mechanic, recap engine mechanic, crew chief, and turbo prop engine mechanic. See March 2007 VA Form 21-526 (Veteran's Application for Compensation and/or Pension). The Veteran's DD Form 214s reflect that his military occupational specialties while serving in the Air Force and Air Force National Guard included that of a jet engine mechanic, an aircraft maintenance technician, and aerospace propulsion superintendent. Such records also show that he received the small arms expert marksmanship ribbon and participated in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. Therefore, based on this evidence, the Board finds that it would have been consistent with the Veteran's service for him to have been exposed to noise while in service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). As such, the Board concedes that the Veteran was exposed to acoustic trauma in service. However, the Veteran's service treatment records are silent for complaints of, or treatment for, tinnitus. Nevertheless, the Board observes that on his August 2007 Notice of Disagreement, the Veteran stated that "at the time I completed the medical forms at the end of my deployments I did have ringing in my ears. I checked that I didn't have tinnitus because it wasn't explained to us what tinnitus was and I didn't know it meant ringing in my ears." However, in reviewing the available service treatment records, the Board observes that the numerous hearing conservation examination reports, hearing conservation data forms, occupational health physical examinations, pre-deployment health assessments, and post-deployment reassessments dated between 1983 to 2006 show that "tinnitus" was described as "ringing of the ears," "constant ringing," and/or "ringing in ears." Further, on each of these occasions, the Veteran specifically indicated that he did not have or had not experienced such symptomatology. Therefore, the Board finds that any assertions made by the Veteran regarding his not knowing what tinnitus meant to be less than credible. In order to establish service connection on a presumptive basis, the Veteran's tinnitus must have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of termination of his service. In this case, the first clinical documentation of tinnitus was in 2007, which was years after the Veteran's 2004 discharge from service. As such, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against a grant of service connection on a presumptive direct- incurrence basis. Further, it is significant to point out that there is no competent medical opinion of record that etiologically relates the Veteran's current tinnitus to his in-service exposure to noise. In this regard, the Board notes that the examiner from the Veteran's July 2007 VA examination opined that the Veteran's periodic bilateral tinnitus was not caused by or a result of the Veteran's military service. In reaching this determination, the examiner, who indicated that she had reviewed the Veteran's claims file, noted that the Veteran also had occupational noise exposure and that he had worked the same job as a civil servant as he did for the National Guard. She also noted that the Veteran denied experiencing tinnitus in 1995 as well as after returning from Operation Enduring Freedom in 2004. Thus, in the absence of demonstration of continuity of symptomatology, or a clinical opinion that relates current tinnitus to service, the initial demonstration of tinnitus decades after service is too remote from service to be reasonably related to service. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In adjudicating a claim, including as to continuity of symptomatology, the Board must assess the competence and credibility of the veteran. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368-69 (2005). The Board also has a duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001). Although the Veteran asserts that his current tinnitus is related to service, he is not competent to provide an opinion requiring medical knowledge, such as a question of medical causation. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). He is competent to give evidence about what he experienced; for example, he is competent to report that he has experienced tinnitus since service. See, e.g., Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). Competency, however, must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); see also Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify"). The Board acknowledges that it cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006). However, such lack of contemporaneous evidence is for consideration in determining credibility. In this regard, the Board again notes that the record is not only devoid of objective evidence of tinnitus until 2007, but that no ringing in the ears was specifically noted on numerous clinical examinations between 1983 and 2006. As such, the Board finds that any assertions by the Veteran as to continuity of symptomatology of tinnitus since service to be less than credible. Therefore, in the absence of any documented competent medical evidence that demonstrates that the Veteran's tinnitus is related to noise exposure in service, or demonstration of continuity of symptomatology of his tinnitus since service, the Board finds that the negative evidence of record, including the July 2007 VA opinion, is of greater probative value than the Veteran's statements in support of his claim. Although the Board concludes that the evidence of record is sufficient to establish that the Veteran sustained acoustic trauma in service, the competent evidence of record fails to establish that his current tinnitus is related to such incident of service. The Board has considered the doctrine of giving the benefit of the doubt to the Veteran, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002), and 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009), but does not find that the evidence is of such approximate balance as to warrant its application. Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for tinnitus and the claim must be denied. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is denied. ____________________________________________ U. R. POWELL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs