Citation Nr: 1002014 Decision Date: 01/12/10 Archive Date: 01/22/10 DOCKET NO. 08-06 338 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Waco, Texas THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Texas Veterans Commission WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Motrya Mac, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran, who is the appellant, served on active duty from August 1964 to August 1967. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision, dated in April 2007, of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas. In June 2008, the Veteran withdrew his request for a hearing before the Board. In June 2009, the Board remanded the claim for further development. As the requested development has been completed, no further action to ensure compliance with the remand directive is required. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). FINDING OF FACT Tinnitus was not affirmatively shown to have been present in service and current tinnitus, first documented after service, is unrelated to an injury or disease of service origin. CONCLUSION OF LAW Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The VCAA, codified in part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, and implemented in part at 38 C.F.R. § 3.159, amended VA's duties to notify and to assist a claimant in developing information and evidence necessary to substantiate a claim. Duty to Notify Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it will notify the claimant of (1) any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim, (2) what portion of the information and evidence VA will obtain, and (3) what portion of the information and evidence the claimant is to provide. The notification requirements are referred to as Type One, Type Two, and Type Three, respectively. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). Also, the VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. The five elements are: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The VCAA notice must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable adjudication by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The RO provided pre-adjudication VCAA notice by letter, dated in December 2006. The Veteran was notified of the evidence needed to substantiate the claim of service connection, namely, evidence of current disability; evidence of an injury or disease in service or an event in service, causing injury or disease; and evidence of a relationship between the current disability and the injury, disease, or event in service. The Veteran was notified that VA would obtain service records, VA records, and records of other Federal agencies and that he could submit other records not in the custody of a Federal agency, such as private medical records or with his authorization VA would obtain any non-Federal records on his behalf. The notice included the provisions for the effective date of a claim and for the degree of disability assignable for the claim. As for content and the timing of the VCAA notice, the document complied with the specificity requirements of Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002) (identifying evidence to substantiate a claim and the relative duties of VA and the claimant to obtain evidence); of Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002) (identifying the document that satisfies VCAA notice); of Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (pre-adjudication VCAA notice); and of Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (notice of the elements of the claim). And no further development is needed to ensure VCAA compliance. Duty to Assist Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A, VA must make reasonable efforts to assist the claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. The RO has obtained service treatment records, private medical records, and VA medical records. The Veteran was afforded VA examinations. As the Veteran has not identified any additional evidence pertinent to the claim and as there are no additional records to obtain, the Board concludes that no further assistance to the Veteran in developing the facts pertinent to the claim is required to comply with the duty to assist. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Principles of Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110. Service connection means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated by service. This may be accomplished by affirmatively showing inception or aggravation during service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." Continuity of symptomatology after discharge is required where the condition noted during service is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Evidentiary Standards VA must give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in a case where a veteran is seeking service connection. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). Competency is a legal concept in determining whether medical or lay evidence may be considered, in other words, whether the evidence is admissible as distinguished from weight and credibility, a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence, that is, does the evidence tend to prove a fact, once the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997). Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer a medical diagnosis, statement, or opinion. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The Board, as fact finder, must determine the probative value or weight of the admissible evidence. Washington v. Nichloson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 369 (2005) (citing Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2000) ("Fact-finding in veterans cases is to be done by the Board)). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative admissible evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the Veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Facts The DD-214 shows that the Veteran was a combat engineer during service, but he did not serve in Vietnam. The service treatment records contain no complaint, finding, history, or treatment of tinnitus. The audiograms on entrance examination in August 1964 and on separation examination in March 1967did not show a hearing loss disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 when converted from ASA units to ISO units (ISO units are the current method for measuring hearing loss and used by VA to determine hearing loss disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.385) (For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent.). An interim audiogram in January 1967 showed an upward shift in the thresholds for hearing, but the shift was not permanent as evidence by the audiogram on separation from service in three months later. After service on VA examination in February 2007, the examiner, an audiologist, noted that after service, the Veteran had noise exposure on the job, working as a helicopter fueler and on an assembly line at General Dynamic for five years. The Veteran complained of tinnitus, but he could not identify the onset of tinnitus. The examiner concluded that tinnitus was less likely than not the result of military noise exposure as the Veteran's hearing was within normal limits during separation and no significant threshold shifts in hearing were present during service. On VA examination in August 2009, the examiner, an audiologist, noted that audiometric thresholds were within normal limits on enlistment examination in 1964 and on separation examination in 1967 with no significant threshold shifts during service. The Veteran stated that during service he was exposed to weapons fire, tank noise, demolitions, and driving a truck. The Veteran estimated that tinnitus began 15 to 20 years earlier. The examiner concluded that it was less likely than not that tinnitus was related to service because the Veteran's hearing was normal during service with no significant threshold shifts during service and the Veteran indicated that tinnitus began about 20 years after the Veteran was separated from service. Analysis The Veteran contends that he has tinnitus due to demolition work in service. During service, tinnitus was not affirmatively shown to have been present and service connection under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) is not established. But tinnitus is a condition under case law where lay observation has been found to be competent to establish the presence of the disability. Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002) (On the question of whether the veteran has a chronic condition since service, the evidence must be medical unless it relates to a condition as to which, under case law, lay observation is competent). Although the Veteran is competent to declare that he has tinnitus, to the extent the Veteran's statements are offered as a lay opinion on causation, that is, an association between his tinnitus and noise exposure in service, a lay opinion is limited to inferences which are rationally based on the Veteran's perception and does not require specialized knowledge. See generally Fed.R.Evid. 701 (opinion testimony by a lay witness is limited to inferences which are rationally based on the Veteran's perception and does not require specialized knowledge). Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to veterans' jurisprudence, recourse to the Federal Rules of Evidence is appropriate, where the Rules assist in the articulation of the Board's reason. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 73 (1997) (Recourse to the Federal Rules of Evidence is appropriate where the Rules assist in articulation of the Board's reasons for finding a claim not well grounded.); Cf. Nieves-Rodriguez, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008) (Federal Rules of Evidence for evaluating expert medical opinion before U.S. district courts are important, guiding factors to be used by VA adjudicators in evaluating the probative value of a medical opinion.). As an opinion on causation in this case requires specialized knowledge, education, training, or experience, and as no factual foundation has been established to show that the Veteran is qualified through knowledge, education, training, or experience to offer such an opinion, his statements and testimony are not competent evidence on the question of causation and are excluded, that is, the statements and testimony are not to be consider as evidence in support of the claim. Where, as here, the determinative questions involve a nexus or causation, where a lay assertion on medical causation is not competent evidence, Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993), competent medical evidence is required to substantiate the claim. Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer a medical diagnosis or opinion. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. The evidence against the claim consists of the opinions of VA audiologists, who examined the Veteran. The VA audiologists are competent to offer an opinion by virtually of their education and training in the field of audiology. Each VA audiologists expressed the opinion with rationale that it was less likely than not that the Veteran's tinnitus was related to service, including noise exposure. This evidence opposes the claim. As for a private audiogram in January 2007 in which the Veteran gave a history of chronic tinnitus since service, a bare transcription of lay history, unenhanced by additional comment by the transcriber, is not competent medical evidence merely because the transcriber is a health care professional. LeShore v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 406, 409 (1995). For this reason, the Board rejects the history of tinnitus as recorded by a health-care professional as competent evidence establishing a causal connection between tinnitus and service. As the opinions of the VA audiologists are against the claim, which is the only competent evidence on the material issue of causation, and as the Board may consider only independent medical evidence to support its finding on the question of a medical nexus or medical causation, where a lay assertion on medical causation is not competent evidence, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection for tinnitus, and the benefit-of-the-doubt standard of proof does not apply. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). ORDER Service connection for tinnitus is denied. ____________________________________________ George E. Guido Jr. Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs