Citation Nr: 1003577 Decision Date: 01/25/10 Archive Date: 02/01/10 DOCKET NO. 94-14 944 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder other than posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to a total disability rating for compensation based on individual unemployability (TDIU). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. Smith, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1991 to June 1991. He also had periods of active duty for training and inactive duty for training in the Puerto Rico Army National Guard from 1982 to 1992, and he was discharged from the Army Reserve in 1997. The Veteran's claim comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from July 1992 and December 1998 rating decisions of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Regional Office (RO) in San Juan, Puerto Rico. In February 1997, June 2003, and April 2006, the Board remanded the matter for additional development. That development having been completed, the claim has been returned to the Board and is now ready for appellate disposition. The Board notes that the psychiatric claim on appeal had previously been developed to include both a general psychiatric disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, a final decision was issued by the Board in April 2006 on the PTSD claim. As such, the only claim remaining is that for service connection for any other psychiatric disorder. This is in accord with the recent holding of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009) (holding that the scope of a mental health disability claim includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by the claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and the other information of record.) FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's depressive disorder and cognitive impairment were not manifested during service and are not shown to be causally or etiologically related to active service or to any service-connected disability. 2. The Veteran's service-connected disability of the lumbar spine is rated as 60 percent disabling, and resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the competent evidence shows he is precluded from substantially gainful employment as a result of this service-connected disability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder other than PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1154, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2009). 2. The criteria for entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities (TDIU) have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.340, 3.341, 4.15, 4.16, 4.18, 4.19 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Psychiatric Disorder The Veteran seeks service connection for a psychiatric disorder. As noted above, in April 2006 the Board issued a final decision on the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. As such, the issue left to be adjudicated is entitlement to service connection for any other psychiatric disorder. The Veteran has alleged that this condition is both related to service, and is secondary to his service-connected lumbar spine disability. The Veteran has also alleged a continuity of symptomatology since his discharge from active duty. To establish direct service connection, the record must contain (1) medical evidence of a current disability, (2) medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay testimony, of in-service incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease, and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. In other words, entitlement to service connection for a particular disability requires evidence of the existence of a current disability and evidence that the disability resulted from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated during service. In order to prevail on the issue of entitlement to secondary service connection, there must be (1) evidence of a current disability; (2) evidence of a service-connected disability; and (3) medical nexus evidence establishing a connection between the service-connected disability and the current disability. See Wallin v. West, 11 Vet. App. 509, 512 (1998). In addition, the regulations provide that service connection is warranted for a disability which is aggravated by, proximately due to, or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2009). Any additional impairment of earning capacity resulting from an already service-connected condition, regardless of whether or not the additional impairment is itself a separate disease or injury caused by the service-connected condition, should also be compensated. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). The Board notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 was amended effective October 10, 2006. Under the revised § 3.310(b) (the existing provision at 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b) was moved to sub-section (c)), any increase in severity of a nonservice-connected disease or injury proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury, and not due to the natural progress of the disease, will be service-connected. In reaching this determination as to aggravation of a nonservice-connected disability, consideration is required as to what the competent evidence establishes as the baseline level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury (prior to the onset of aggravation by service- connected condition), in comparison to the medical evidence establishing the current level of severity of the nonservice- connected disease or injury. These findings as to baseline and current levels of severity are to be based upon application of the corresponding criteria under the Schedule for Rating Disabilities (38 C.F.R. part 4) for evaluating that particular nonservice- connected disorder. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52,744-47 (Sept. 7, 2006). It appears as though the new regulatory amendment poses a new restriction on claimants. Nonetheless, because the Veteran's claim was pending before the regulatory change was made, the Board will consider the version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 in effect before the revision, as this version is more favorable to the Veteran. See generally VAOGCPREC 7-03 and VAOPGCPREC 3-00. Here, in a November 2006 VA psychiatric examination, the Veteran was diagnosed with depressive disorder not otherwise specified, as well as a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified. However, there is no evidence to support the in- service incurrence of this disability, and no nexus to service has been established. The Veteran's service treatment records are silent in this regard. No psychiatric abnormalities were noted on either his entrance or separation examination, and the treatment records contain no complaints or diagnoses of psychiatric symptoms. In addition, the claims file is completely devoid of a nexus opinion linking this disability to service. At most, an October 1992 VA examination report lists the Veteran's Gulf War exposure as an Axis IV factor to his diagnosis, however this is unsupported by the Veteran's service treatment records and by the large volume of medical evidence rendered subsequent to that report. For this reason, and because an actual nexus opinion was not provided, the Board finds the October 1992 finding of no significant probative value. Moreover, VA treatment notes, including that of May 2002, have indicated that the Veteran's depression is caused by his narcotics use and pain. There is no opinion of record providing a direct link between the Veteran's current diagnoses and service. As such, service connection cannot be found on a direct basis. to address the Veteran's contention regarding a continuity of symptomatology, the Board notes that service connection may be awarded for a "chronic" condition when (1) a chronic disease manifests itself and is identified as such in service (or within the presumption period under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307, and the Veteran presently has the same condition); or (2) a disease manifests itself during service (or during the presumptive period) but is not identified until later, there is a showing of continuity of symptomatology after discharge, and medical evidence relates the symptomatology to the Veteran's present condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; see Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-98 (1997). Here, as noted above, there is no indication of any psychiatric disorder from the Veteran's periods of active duty. Further, a review of the claims file does not reveal continuous treatment for any psychiatric problem from this time. Indeed, as noted by the November 2006 examiner, while the Veteran received some psychiatric treatment in 1992 and 1993, subsequent to this there was "no further evidence of treatment." As such, no further discussion of this theory of service connection is required. Turning to the issue of secondary service connection, it is undisputed that the Veteran holds a current diagnosis of both a depressive disorder and a cognitive disorder, and that he is service-connected for a lumbar spine disability. However, the only definitive nexus opinion of record on the issue of secondary service connection is negative. In November 2006, a VA examination was conducted, and the examiner concluded, "[t]he currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder is less likely as not (less than 50/50 probability) caused by or a result of service connected back condition." The only evidence that could be construed to the contrary includes VA treatment notes of May 1992 and December 1994. In May 1992 the Veteran was diagnosed with chronic pain syndrome with secondary depressive disorder not otherwise specified, and a rule out of adjustment reaction with depressed mood. In December 1994 it was noted that the Veteran had a history of depression and insomnia associated with back pain. Also, the previously discussed VA treatment note of May 2002 indicated that the Veteran's depression is caused by his narcotics use and pain. None of the treatment notes, however, explicitly link the Veteran's depression to his service-connected bulging disc of L4-L5 with L5-S1 radiculopathy and degenerative joint disease. On the contrary, the May 2002 record suggests that the pain causing psychiatric symptoms was due to a 1999 motorcycle accident. Moreover, as the November 2006 examiner's opinion was founded upon a review of the entire medical record, the Board finds this opinion more probative. As such, service connection on a secondary basis is also not warranted. For all of the above reasons, the Veteran's appeal must be denied. In reaching this decision the Board considered the Veteran's arguments in support of his assertion that his depressive and cognitive disorders are related to service. However, the Veteran, as a lay person untrained in the field of medicine, is not competent to offer an opinion in this regard. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). These arguments do not provide a factual predicate upon which compensation may be granted. For all of the above reasons, service connection is not warranted. TDIU Applicable law provides that a total disability rating for compensation may be assigned where the schedular rating is less than total when the disabled person is, in the judgment of the rating agency, unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as the result of service- connected disabilities provided that, if there is one such disability, this disability shall be rated at 60 percent or more, and if there are two or more disabilities, there shall be at least one disability ratable at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). To meet the requirement of "one 60 percent disability" or "one 40 percent disability," the following will be considered as one disability: (1) disability of one or both lower extremities, including the bilateral factor, if applicable; (2) disabilities resulting from one common etiology; (3) disabilities affecting a single body system; (4) multiple injuries incurred in action; and (5) multiple disabilities incurred as a prisoner of war. Id. In addition to the foregoing, there must be evidence that the disabled person is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation. Id. Marginal employment is not considered substantially gainful employment. Id. A total disability rating may also be assigned pursuant to the procedures set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b) for Veterans who are unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation by reason of service-connected disabilities, but who fail to meet the percentage standards set forth in section 4.16(a). Here, the Veteran meets the percentage requirements for consideration of a total evaluation under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). The Veteran is rated 60 percent disabled for his bulging disc of L4-L5 with L5-S1 radiculopathy and degenerative joint disease. The Board must now consider whether the competent evidence otherwise demonstrates that the Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation due to his service connected disability. Resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Board finds that his lumbar spine disability renders him unable to obtain or maintain substantially gainful employment. Several opinions have been rendered in this regard. Taking the negative evidence first, on psychiatric examination in November 2006, the examiner found that the Veteran has a total occupational impairment as a result of a motorcycle accident he sustained in which he received multiple body traumas. Similarly, in a July 2008 addendum opinion, a VA examiner stated that the Veteran's lumbar spine disability does not render him unable to perform the job duties he performed prior to his 1998 motorcycle accident. As for the positive evidence, on VA examination in November 2006 and in a March 2007 addendum opinion, the same examiner who rendered the negative opinion in July 2008 provided positive opinions. In November 2006 the examiner found that the Veteran's service-connected lumbar spine disability renders him "unable to perform substantially gainful employment" due to the "easy exacerbation of pain upon minimal effort in his thoracolumbar spine." In March 2007 the examiner again found that the Veteran's service-connected lumbar spine disability "preclude[s] him from employability." The examiner explained that the motorcycle accident aggravated his existing back disability, causing the Veteran to "develop poor ambulation and standing tolerance as well as easy exacerbation of pain even at sitting position," but clearly found that the service-connected disability is responsible for the Veteran's unemployability. It is unclear why the RO sought a second addendum opinion in July 2008 in light of the evidence of record at the time which was largely in the Veteran's favor, or why on the third request for an opinion the examiner changed his conclusion. However, the Board finds that the evidence on this issue is, at minimum, in equipoise. Moreover, the November 2006 and March 2007 examination reports contain a rationale for the finding that the Veteran is unable to perform substantially gainful employment, while the negative evidence contains only bare conclusions. For these reasons, the Board finds that a total evaluation based on individual unemployability due to the Veteran's service connected lumbar spine disability is warranted. The Veteran's claim is granted. Notice and Assistance Under applicable law, VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must ask the claimant to provide any evidence in her or his possession that pertains to the claim in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The Board finds that the content requirements of a duty to assist notice have been fully satisfied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Letters from the RO dated in June 2002, August 2003, and May 2006 provided the Veteran with an explanation of the type of evidence necessary to substantiate his claims, as well as an explanation of what evidence was to be provided by him and what evidence the VA would attempt to obtain on his behalf. In addition, the letter of May 2006 provided the appellant with information concerning the evaluation and effective date that could be assigned should his claims be granted, pursuant to Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). VA has no outstanding duty to inform the Veteran that any additional information or evidence is needed. Not all of the Veteran's duty-to-assist letters were provided before the adjudication of his claims. However, after he was provided the letters he was given a full opportunity to submit evidence, and his claims were subsequently readjudicated. He has not claimed any prejudice as a result of the timing of the letters, and the Board finds no basis to conclude that any prejudice occurred. Any notice defect in this case was harmless error. The content of the aggregated notices, including the notice letters subsequently issued, fully complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). After VA provided this notice, the Veteran communicated on multiple occasions with VA, without informing it of pertinent evidence. The Veteran has been provided with every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claims, and to respond to VA notices. For all of these reasons, the Board concludes that the appeal may be adjudicated without a remand for further notification. VA also has a duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting the Veteran in the procurement of service treatment records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. Here, the Board finds that all relevant facts have been properly developed, and that all evidence necessary for equitable resolution of the issue has been obtained. His service treatment records and post service treatment records have been obtained. He has been afforded the opportunity for a personal hearing. He has been afforded multiple VA examinations. The Board does not have notice of any additional relevant evidence which is available but has not been obtained. Additionally, the Board notes that the Veteran's Social Security records have been obtained but a copy of the decision itself is not of record, however, this decision is not relevant to the adjudication above. The file shows the Veteran receives Social Security disability benefits for a brachial plexus injury and not for any mental health disability. Recently, the Federal Circuit held that Congress does not require VA to obtain SSA records in every case and neither do VA regulations. The Federal Circuit declared that the duty to assist "was not boundless in scope" and that it related only to obtaining relevant records, i.e., records relating to the injury for which the claimant is seeking benefits and that have a reasonable possibility of helping to substantiate the Veteran's claim. Golz v. Shinseki, No. 2009-7039 (Fed. Cir. January 4, 2010). As the Social Security decision in this case is not pertinent to the Veteran's psychiatric claim, and as his TDIU claim is granted, the decision needs not be obtained. For the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that all reasonable efforts were made by the VA to obtain evidence necessary to substantiate the Veteran's claims. Therefore, no further assistance to the Veteran with the development of evidence is required. ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder other than PTSD is denied. Entitlement to TDIU is granted. ____________________________________________ MICHAEL MARTIN Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs