Citation Nr: 1003595 Decision Date: 01/25/10 Archive Date: 02/01/10 DOCKET NO. 07-19 294 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral sensorineural hearing loss disability. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 3. Whether the severance of a separate 10 percent rating for left ankle arthritis was proper. 4. Entitlement to an increased rating greater than 20 percent for residuals of a left ankle fracture. 5. Entitlement to an increased rating greater than 10 percent for the post-operative residuals of a right knee medial meniscus tear. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant and Friend ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. M. Marcus, Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant is a veteran who served on active duty from March 1971 to March 1973. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from July 2005 and June 2008 rating decisions of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Louisville, Kentucky. The Veteran had a hearing before the Board in October 2009 and the transcript is of record. The case was brought before the Board in September 2009, at which time the claims were remanded to allow the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) to afford the Veteran a hearing before the Board. The requested development having been completed, the case is once again before the Board for appellate consideration of the issues on appeal. Evidence on file includes allegations that are sufficient to raise a claim of entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities (TDIU). Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[o]nce a Veteran submits evidence of a medical disability and makes a claim for the highest rating possible, and additionally submits evidence of unemployability, . . . VA must consider TDIU."). The RO did not consider such a claim. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447, 453 (2009) (noting that a claim to TDIU benefits is not a free-standing claim that must be pled with specificity; it is implicitly raised whenever a pro se Veteran, who presents cogent evidence of unemployability, seeks to obtain a higher disability rating). It appears that the Veteran may be claiming TDIU, therefore this issue is referred to the RO for appropriate action. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's bilateral sensorineural hearing loss is not related to a disease or injury in service; it was not manifest to a compensable level within one year of service separation. 2. The Veteran's tinnitus is not related to a disease or injury in service. 3. The grant of a separate 10 percent rating for left ankle arthritis was undebatably erroneous because, at that time, the Veteran was already in receipt of compensation for residuals of a left ankle fracture and both ratings are predicated on loss of motion, thus constituting unlawful pyramiding of benefits. 4. The Veteran's left ankle is manifested by a well-healed scar, pain and limited motion. 5. The Veteran's right knee is manifested by a well-healed scar from a past partial medial meniscectomy, pain and limited motion. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Veteran's bilateral sensorineural hearing loss disability was not incurred in or aggravated by military service, nor may hearing loss be presumed to be of service onset. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 and 5107 (West 2002 and Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2009). 2. The Veteran's tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, and 5107 (West 2002 and Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). 3. The grant of a separate 10 percent rating for left ankle arthritis was clearly and unmistakably erroneous and severance thereof was proper. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.105(d), 3.159, 3.303 (2009). 4. The criteria for a disability rating greater than 20 percent for residuals of a left ankle fracture have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.321, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.40, 4.45, 4.69, 4.71a, DC 5271 (2009). 5. The criteria for a disability rating greater than 10 percent for post-operative residuals of a right knee medial meniscus tear have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.321, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.40, 4.45, 4.69, 4.71a, DC 5259 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The Veteran must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the veteran). The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The VCAA describes VA's duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a). Inasmuch, however, as the propriety of the severance of the separate 10 percent rating for left ankle arthritis involves a determination as to clear and unmistakable error (CUE), the VCAA is not for application. See Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165 (2001); see also Parker v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 407 (2002). It is additionally noted that when severance is warranted, a rating proposing severance will be prepared setting forth all material facts and reasons. The claimant will be notified at his or her latest address of record of the contemplated action and furnished detailed reasons therefore and will be given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that service connection should be maintained. 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). As shown in detail below, the Veteran was provided the appropriate due process by a July 2005 notification letter of the rating decision that proposed to sever the Veteran's separate 10 percent award for left ankle arthritis, and the July 2005 rating decision provided a clear explanation concerning the reasons for proposed severance. Also, the RO issued an April 2005 letter that provided the standards of establishing an increased rating for his left ankle. Thus, the Veteran was aware of what was necessary to substantiate his claim, and was provided appropriate due process with regard to the need to submit evidence showing the severance should not take place. As such, no prejudice exists in adjudicating the appeal. Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993). With regard to the other claims, the notice requirements were met in this case by a letter sent to the Veteran in April 2005. That letter advised the Veteran of the information necessary to substantiate his claim, and of his and VA's respective obligations for obtaining specified different types of evidence. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Since the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims for service connection for hearing loss and tinnitus, any questions as to the appropriate disability rating or effective date to be assigned are rendered moot, and no further notice is needed. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Similarly, since the RO assigned the 20 percent and 10 percent disability ratings at issue here for the Veteran's service-connected left ankle and right knee disabilities respectively, and the Board has concluded that the preponderance of the evidence is against assigning a higher rating, there is no question as to an effective date to be assigned, and no further notice is needed. Id. In the recent decision in Vazquez-Flores v. Peak, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC or "the Court") held that, with respect to increased rating claims, section 5103(a) notice requires, at a minimum, that the Secretary notify the Veteran that, to substantiate a claim, the Veteran must provide, or ask the Secretary to obtain, medical or lay evidence demonstrating a worsening or increase in the severity of the disability and the effect the worsening has on the Veteran's employment and daily life. Notice may also need to include the specific Diagnostic Code under which the Veteran is rated if entitlement to a higher disability rating would not be satisfied by the Veteran demonstrating a noticeable worsening or increase in severity of the disability. This decision was recently vacated by the Federal Circuit in Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, Nos. 2008-7150 & 2008-7115, slip op. at 19 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 4, 2009), vacating Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008), where the Federal Circuit held that notice need not be veteran specific, provide alternative diagnostic codes or ask the Veteran to submit evidence indicative of daily life impairment. In any case, the Veteran was informed of the specific diagnostic codes of his various disabilities in a June 2007 Statement of the Case (SOC), was provided an opportunity to explain how his disabilities affect his daily and occupational life in VA examinations dated 2005 and 2008 as well as before the Board in October 2009, and the claims were then readjudicated in a Supplemental SOC (SSOC) in June 2008. The Veteran has not alleged that VA failed to comply with the notice requirements of the VCAA, and he was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claims, and has in fact provided additional arguments at every stage. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005). The notice required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005). That was done in this case. The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The Veteran's service treatment records and VA medical records are in the file. The Veteran testified he has never received private treatment for any of the claims on appeal. Indeed, the Veteran has at no time referenced outstanding records that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to the claims. The duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law. With regard to service connection claims, the Court held in the case of McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), that an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in- service event, injury or disease," or a disease manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. The Veteran was afforded medical examination to obtain an opinion as to whether his hearing loss and tinnitus can be directly attributed to service. Cf. Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 517 (2004). Further examination or opinion is not needed because, at a minimum, there is no persuasive and competent evidence that the claimed conditions may be associated with the Veteran's military service. This is discussed in more detail below. The duty to assist includes, when appropriate, the duty to conduct a thorough and contemporaneous examination of the Veteran. Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121 (1991). In addition, where the evidence of record does not reflect the current state of the Veteran's disability, a VA examination must be conducted. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a). The RO provided the Veteran an appropriate VA examination in 2005 and 2008. There is no objective evidence indicating that there has been a material change in the severity of the Veteran's disabilities since he was last examined. The Veteran has not reported receiving any recent treatment specifically for this condition, and indeed testified during his October 2009 hearing before the Board he has not received treatment for his left ankle or knee since the March 2008 VA examination. There are no records suggesting an increase in either disability has occurred as compared to the prior VA examination findings. The duty to assist does not require that a claim be remanded solely because of the passage of time since an otherwise adequate VA examination was conducted. VAOPGCPREC 11-95. The 2005 and 2008 VA examination reports are thorough and supported by VA outpatient treatment records. There is no rule as to how current an examination must be, and the Board concludes the examinations in this case are adequate upon which to base a decision. Thus, the Board finds that VA has satisfied the duty to assist the Veteran. In the circumstances of this case, additional efforts to assist or notify him in accordance with the VCAA would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the Veteran at every stage of this case. Therefore, the Board may proceed to consider the merits of the claims. Service Connection (Hearing Loss and Tinnitus) The Veteran alleges that his current hearing loss and tinnitus are a result of exposure to heavy artillery fire while in the military serving as a light weapons infantry crewman in Panama. Service connection means that the facts establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). This may be shown by affirmative evidence showing inception or aggravation during service or through statutory presumptions. Id. When a disease is first diagnosed after service, service connection can still be granted for that condition if the evidence shows it was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection may be established for a current disability on the basis of a presumption under the law that certain chronic diseases manifesting themselves to a certain degree within a certain time after service must have had their onset in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1113 and 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.307 and 3.309(a). Service connection for hearing loss may be established based on a legal "presumption" by showing that either manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). Here, no legal presumption is applicable here because the earliest evidence of the Veteran's hearing loss is decades after his military service. In the absence of a presumption, in order to prevail on the issue of service connection there must be medical evidence of a current disability; medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); see also Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999). For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The Veteran is alleging that his current hearing loss and tinnitus is due to exposure to loud noise in the military. His DD-214 indicates the Veteran served as a light weapons infantry crewman, to include foreign service in Panama. His DD-214 further indicates the Veteran was awarded, among other things, a sharpshooter badge. Accordingly, the Board concedes the Veteran was exposed to in-service noise trauma. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about what he experienced; for example, he is competent to discuss his current difficulties hearing and other experienced symptoms. See, e.g., Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). He is not, however, competent to diagnose any medical disorder or render an opinion as to the cause or etiology of any current disorder because he does not have the requisite medical knowledge or training. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997) (stating that competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence). Here, the Veteran's service treatment records are silent as to any treatment, diagnoses or complaints of hearing loss or tinnitus. His entrance and separation audiological examinations were within normal limits. The Board finds noteworthy, the separation audiological examination reflects slightly-improved results compared to the Veteran's entrance audiological examination. The records are silent as to any specific complaints, treatments or diagnoses of hearing loss or tinnitus. The Board notes, however, that the Veteran self-reported a history of ear drainage problems on his November 1970 entrance examination. No actual diagnosis was rendered at that time. In short, the records are devoid of any findings consistent with in-service incurrence of chronic hearing loss or tinnitus. Even if a chronic condition was not shown during service, service connection may be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) by evidence of continuity of symptomatology or under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) if the evidence shows a disease first diagnosed after service was incurred in service. The pertinent inquiry here, then, is whether the Veteran's current hearing loss and tinnitus has been medically related to any incident of his military service. The Board concludes it has not. After service, the first evidence of hearing loss and tinnitus is not until decades after service when filing this claim in 2005. The Veteran was afforded a VA audiological examination in April 2005 where the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with bilateral sensorineural hearing loss and tinnitus. In regard to etiology, the examiner noted the Veteran's self-reported ear drainage problems on his 1970 induction examination, but also noted the specific audiological findings on entrance and separation from the military were within normal limits. The examiner further indicated the Veteran's in-service noise exposure to artillery fire, but also found significant the Veteran's 10- year post-service occupation as a factory worker where the Veteran conceded he did not always where the required ear plugs. Also compelling, the examiner noted the Veteran's recreational hunting and wood-working with heavy machinery. In light of all these elements, the examiner opined as follows: With the documentation of normal hearing sensitivity upon discharge from the military, it is believed less than likely that the hazardous military noise exposure could contribute to the current mixed nature of the hearing loss or the current complaint of tinnitus. The examiner, in rendering his conclusion, further noted the Veteran's tinnitus only reportedly initiated years ago where the Veteran contends he suspected its onset was after some loud noise such as a hunting rifle. With regard to hearing loss, the examiner found the type of hearing loss found in the Veteran is "primarily conductive involvement, most likely related to his history of ear drainage during childhood." Overall, the examiner's conclusions were based on physical examination and diagnostic tests as well as a complete review of the C-file. The rationale is thoroughly explained as indicated above. For all these reasons, the Board finds the examiner's opinion persuasive. The Board has considered the Veteran's statements that he suffered with hearing problems while in the military and thereafter. In accordance with the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Buchanan v. Nicholson, No. 05-7174 (Fed. Cir. June 14, 2006), the Board concludes that the lay evidence presented by the Veteran concerning his continuity of symptoms after service is credible and ultimately competent, regardless of the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. It is for this reason the Board accepts the Veteran's recollection of in-service noise exposure. However, the Veteran's claims fail based upon the lack of medical nexus associating his in-service noise exposure to a current disability. The provisions concerning continuity of symptomatology do not relieve the requirement that there be some evidence of a nexus to service. For service connection to be established by continuity of symptomatology there must be medical evidence that relates a current condition to that symptomatology. See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-98 (1997). In other words, even accepting the Veteran's allegations, no medical professional has ever linked his current bilateral hearing loss or tinnitus to any remote incident of service. Indeed, the only medical evidence of record is a VA examination provided to the Veteran in assistance with substantiating his claim and VA outpatient treatment records merely indicating a diagnosis of hearing loss, with no opinion rendered regarding etiology. He has denied any private or recent VA treatment for his hearing loss and tinnitus, and the first evidence of the disabilities is not until decades after his military service. The Board concludes service connection must be denied. As reflected by the discussion above, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims. As such, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claims for service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Severance (Left Ankle Arthritis) Service connection will be severed only where evidence establishes that a previous grant of service connection was clearly and unmistakably erroneous (the burden of proof being upon the Government). When severance of service connection is considered warranted, a rating proposing severance will be prepared setting forth all material facts and reasons. The claimant will be notified at his or her latest address of record of the contemplated action and furnished detailed reasons therefore and will be given 60 days for the presentation of additional evidence to show that service connection should be maintained. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d). In this case, all of the proper administrative actions were undertaken by the RO as described above. An unappealed decision of the RO or the Board becomes final and binding and is not subject to revision on the same factual basis in the absence of CUE. Previous determinations which are final and binding will be accepted as correct in the absence of CUE. Where evidence establishes such error, the prior decision will be reversed or amended. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109A, 7111; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.105, 20.1400. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the Court) has defined CUE as "an administrative failure to apply the correct statutory and regulatory provisions to the correct and relevant facts. It is not mere misinterpretation of facts." Oppenheimer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 370, 372 (1991). Clear and unmistakable errors "are errors that are undebatable, so that it can be said that reasonable minds could only conclude that the original decision was fatally flawed at the time it was made." Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992). "To prove the existence of clear and unmistakable error as set forth in § 3.105(a), the claimant must show that an outcome-determinative error occurred, that is, an error that would manifestly change the outcome of a prior decision." Yates v. West, 213 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999). There is a three-part test to determine whether a prior decision is the product of CUE: (1) "[e]ither the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the adjudicator (i.e., more than a simple disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated) or the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied," (2) the error must be "undebatable" and of the sort "which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome at the time it was made," and (3) a determination that there was CUE must be based on the record and law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication in question. Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994) (quoting Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992) (en banc)); Wilson v. West, 11 Vet. App. 383, 386 (1998). The Court has clarified that although the same standards applied in a determination of CUE in a final decision are applied to a determination whether a decision granting service connection was the product of CUE for the purpose of severing service connection, § 3.105(d) does not limit the reviewable evidence to that which was before the RO in making its initial service connection award. In fact, § 3.105(d) specifically states that "[a] change in diagnosis may be accepted as a basis for severance," clearly contemplating the consideration of evidence acquired after the original granting of service connection. Daniels v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 474, 480 (1998). In this case, this claim stems from a rating decision evaluating the severity of an already service-connected disability, namely the Veteran's left ankle. In a July 2001 rating decision, in evaluating the current rating for the disability, the RO awarded the Veteran service-connection for a separate rating of 10 percent for left ankle arthritis under Diagnostic Code (DC) 5010. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5010. At that time, the Veteran was also in receipt of a 20 percent rating under DC 5271, for residuals of a left ankle fracture, manifested by marked limitation of motion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5271. Regrettably, awarding a separate rating for arthritis was clearly and unmistakably erroneous because both diagnostic codes are predicated on loss of motion. Compare 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5010, with 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5271. In other words, as will be explained below, the Veteran was essentially awarded a separate disability rating for the same disability, which is impermissible under the applicable law. See Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259, 262 (1994). That is, separate disability ratings may be assigned for distinct disabilities resulting from the same injury so long as the symptomatology for one condition was not "duplicative of or overlapping with the symptomatology" of the other condition. See Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259, 262 (1994). For example, the VA Office of General Counsel stated that compensating a claimant for separate functional impairment under Diagnostic Code 5257 (for knee instability) and 5003 (for knee arthritis) does not constitute pyramiding. See VAOPGCPREC 23-97 (July 1, 1997). In this opinion, the VA General Counsel held that a veteran who has arthritis and instability of the knee may be rated separately under Diagnostic Codes 5003 and 5257, provided that a separate rating must be based upon additional disability. Additionally, in VAOPGCPREC 9-98, the VA General Counsel held that if a veteran has a disability rating under Diagnostic Code 5257 for instability of the knee, and there is also x- ray evidence of arthritis, a separate rating for arthritis could also be based on painful motion under 38 C.F.R. § 4.59. In contrast, however, the Veteran is currently service connected for residuals of a left ankle fracture, primarily manifested by painful motion. At the time the separate rating for arthritis was awarded, the Veteran was already in receipt of a 20 percent disability rating under DC 5257, for "marked" limitation of motion. DC 5010 is rated analogous to degenerative arthritis under Diagnostic Code 5003. Degenerative arthritis, when established by x-ray findings, is also rated on the basis of limitation of motion under the appropriate diagnostic codes for the specific joint or joints involved. It is only when the limitation of motion of the specific joint or joints involved is noncompensable under the appropriate diagnostic codes that a rating of 10 percent is for application for each such major joint or group of minor joints affected by limitation of motion to be combined, not added under Diagnostic Code 5003. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5003. In this case, the Veteran's left ankle range of motion was clearly limited to a compensable degree as evidenced by his 20 percent rating under DC 5257. Accordingly, DC 5010 should never have been applied. For these reasons, assignment of a separate 10 percent rating under DC 5010 constitutes unlawful pyramiding in this case. See Esteban, 6 Vet. App. at 262. Severance, therefore, was proper. The Board has considered and sympathizes with the Veteran's statements and the potential financial hardship severance of service connection would cause. Regrettably, a favorable decision here is simply barred as a matter of law. Increased Rating (Left Ankle and Right Knee) Disability evaluations are determined by the application of a schedule of ratings that is based on average impairment of earning capacity. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155. Percentage evaluations are determined by comparing the manifestations of a particular disorder with the requirements contained in the VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), 38 C.F.R. Part 4. The percentage ratings contained in the Rating Schedule represent, as far as can practically be determined, the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from such disease or injury and their residual conditions in civilian occupations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. In evaluating the severity of a particular disability, it is essential to consider its history. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1; Peyton v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 282 (1991). For a claim for an increased rating, such as the disabilities in this case, the primary concern is the current level of disability. See Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994). The Court recently held that "staged" ratings are also appropriate for an increased rating claim when the factual findings show distinct time periods where the service-connected disability exhibits symptoms that would warrant different ratings. Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007). Where there is a question as to which of two evaluations shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. In general, evaluation of a service-connected disability involving a joint rated on limitation of motion requires adequate consideration of functional loss due to pain under 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 and functional loss due to weakness, fatigability, incoordination or pain on movement of a joint under 38 C.F.R. § 4.45. See DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995). The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 state that disability of the musculoskeletal system is primarily the inability, due to damage or inflammation in parts of the system, to perform normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination and endurance. Functional loss may be due to the absence of part, or all, of the necessary bones, joints and muscles, or associated structures. It may also be due to pain supported by adequate pathology and evidenced by visible behavior of the claimant undertaking the motion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.40. The factors of disability affecting joints are reduction of normal excursion of movements in different planes, weakened movement, excess fatigability, swelling and pain on movement. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.45. Left Ankle The Veteran's residuals of a left ankle fracture are currently rated as 20 percent disabling under DC 5271, for limitation of motion. Normal range of motion of the ankle includes 0 to 45 degrees plantar flexion and 0 to 20 degrees dorsiflexion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Plate II. Under DC 5271, a 10 percent rating disability is assigned for "moderate" limitation of ankle motion whereas a 20 percent disability rating is assigned for "marked" limitation of ankle motion. 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5271. The Board observes that the words "slight," "moderate" and "severe" as used in the various diagnostic codes are not defined in the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities. Rather than applying a mechanical formula, the Board must evaluate all of the evidence, to the end that its decisions are "equitable and just." 38 C.F.R. § 4.6. VA outpatient treatment records from 2005 to 2008 indicate sporadic complaints of left ankle pain and medication prescribed for pain. Indeed, the Veteran testified during his October 2009 hearing before the Board that he does not receive any regular treatment or physical therapy for his left ankle, but rather manages his pain with medication. The Board notes, however, that x-ray findings throughout time have been inconsistent in whether the Veteran has arthritis of the left ankle. Specifically, x-rays taken from 1998 and 1999 in the outpatient treatment records note degenerative joint disease of the left ankle. More recent x-rays, to include those done in conjunction with the April 2005 and March 2008 VA examinations, do not indicate findings consistent with arthritis. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in April 2005 and again in March 2008. The April 2005 examiner diagnosed the Veteran with anterior joint effusion of the left ankle with previous internal fixation of the medial malleolus, as confirmed by x-ray. The Veteran's left ankle dorsiflexion was limited to 0 degrees and plantar flexion was limited to 10 degrees. The Veteran complained of pain on plantar flexion only, but the examiner did not observe any additional limitations or functional loss on repetitive range of motion. The examiner did not observe any edema, instability or abnormal movement or guarding. The examiner did note mild weakness of the left ankle compared to the right and a well- healed "c" shaped scar. Most recently, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination in March 2008 where the Veteran was diagnosed with post- operative left ankle sprain. At that time, the Veteran's x- ray did not reveal any joint effusion and range of motion was considerably better. Specifically, dorsiflexion was limited to 5 degrees and plantar flexion was limited to 45 degrees. The examiner did not observe any additional loss of function or motion on repetition. The examiner also did not observe any edema, effusion, instability or ankylosis. The examiner did, however, note some tenderness, weakness and an abnormal antalgic gait. The Board notes DC 5271 does not provide for a rating greater than 20 percent. Indeed, the only diagnostic code for the ankle that provides for a rating greater than 20 percent is DC 5270 for "ankylosis" of the ankle. Ankylosis is "immobility and consolidation of a joint due to disease, injury, surgical procedure." Lewis v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 259 (1992) (citing Saunders Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, and Allied Health at 68 (4th ed. 1987)). As will be discussed below, the Veteran is able to move his left ankle, albeit with limitation, so his ankle is clearly not ankylosed. Indeed, both the 2005 and 2008 examiners specifically indicated no ankylosis of the left ankle. There is no other diagnostic code applicable to the ankle joint that provides for a rating greater than 20 percent. Functional loss was considered as required under 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45 and DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202 (1995). In this case, complaints of painful motion are consistent throughout the appellate time frame. The Veteran also was noted to walk with a cane and testified to using an ankle brace for extra stability. The Veteran further indicated he could no longer work as a painter because he was unable to stand, climb a ladder, stoop, kneel or walk for prolonged periods. Both VA examiners noted some left ankle weakness, and the 2005 examiner further noted joint effusion, although the 2008 examiner specifically found no evidence of joint effusion on x-ray. Both examiners also found no evidence of instability or edema. In short, the Veteran's restricted activities are mainly due to painful and limited motion, which is already part of the consideration of his current 20 percent rating. The Veteran's functional loss does not warrant a greater rating then already awarded. The Veteran has limitation of motion, but this is compensated by the current ratings. As indicated above, separate disability ratings may be assigned for distinct disabilities resulting from the same injury so long as the symptomatology for one condition was not "duplicative of or overlapping with the symptomatology" of the other condition. See Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259, 262 (1994). The Veteran takes issue here with the fact that his left ankle has been inconsistently diagnosed with arthritis throughout time. As indicated above, x-rays in the past, to include February 1998 and December 1999 note degenerative joint disease of the left ankle. More recent x- rays, to include those done in conjunction with the April 2005 and March 2008 VA examinations, do not indicate findings consistent with arthritis. Whether the Veteran has arthritis, however, would not warrant an increased rating or separate rating here. As explained in more detail above with respect to the Veteran's severed separate 10 percent rating, arthritis is rated and primarily predicated on some evidence of limitation of motion. The Veteran's current rating, however, is entirely predicated on limitation of motion. Accordingly, assigning an additional 10 percent rating due to some evidence of arthritis of the left ankle would constitute impermissible pyramiding. Id. The diagnostic codes related to arthritis, moreover, do not provide for a rating greater than 20 percent and, thus applying the alternative diagnostic code would serve no useful purpose here. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5003. In short, there simply is no diagnostic code that could be applied that would provide for a rating greater than 20 percent for the Veteran's left ankle. Right Knee The Veteran's post-operative tear of the medial meniscus of the right knee is rated under Diagnostic Code 5259 for symptomatic removal of the semilunar cartilage. Under DC 5259, the a 10 percent rating is assigned where there is evidence of removal of the semilunar cartilage, which is symptomatic. DC 5259 does not provide for a rating greater than 10 percent, but under DC 5258, a 20 percent rating is warranted where dislocated semilunar cartilage results in frequent episodes of "locking," pain, and effusion into the joint. Knee disabilities may also be rated based on limitation of motion. The general rating schedules for limitation of motion of the knee are 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Codes 5260 and 5261. Normal range of motion of the knee is to 0 degrees extension and to 140 degrees flexion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, Plate II. Under Diagnostic Code 5260, a 10 percent disability rating is warranted for flexion limited to 45 degrees. A 20 percent disability rating is assigned for flexion limited to 30 degrees; and a 30 percent disability rating is assigned for flexion limited to 15 degrees. Under Diagnostic Code 5261, a 10 percent disability rating is warranted for extension limited to 10 degrees. A 20 percent disability rating is assigned for extension limited to 15 degrees. A 30 percent disability rating is assigned for extension limited to 20 degrees. A 40 percent disability rating is assigned for extension limited to 30 degrees; and a 50 percent disability rating is assigned for extension limited to 45 degrees. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a. The Veteran's VA outpatient treatment records indicate sporadic complaints of pain during the appellate time frame. The Veteran testified that he merely seeks pain medication for his right knee and does not receive any other regular treatment or physical therapy. Past VA outpatient treatment records reveal the Veteran had diagnostic arthroscopy of the right knee and a partial medial meniscectomy of the right knee in June 2000. Since the filing of his claim, the Veteran was afforded VA examinations in April 2005 and, more recently, in March 2008. In April 2005, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with degenerative joint disease (DJD) of the right knee, confirmed by x-ray. The examiner also noted the x-ray indicated a questionable small suprapatellar joint effusion. On physical examination, in contrast, the examiner noted only mild "puffiness" of the medial malleolus. The examiner found no edema, no signs of instability, no guarded movement, and no weakness. The Veteran also had a barely visible well-healed scar from the 2000 surgical procedure. The examiner noted the Veteran walked with a limp gait with a cane. Range of motion testing indicated extension to 5 degrees and flexion to 110 degrees. No additional limitations were noted on repetition. In March 2008, the Veteran was again afforded a VA examination. X-rays at that time did not reveal any joint effusion, dislocation, fracture or arthritis. Rather the examiner diagnosed the Veteran with right knee post-operative meniscus repair. On physical examination, the examiner found no edema, no effusion, no instability and no ankylosis. The examiner noted the Veteran walked with an abnormal antalgic gait. Range of motion testing revealed the right knee motion from 0 degrees extension to 125 degrees flexion with some tenderness on the medial knee. Ligaments were normal. No additional functional loss was found on repetition. In short, the Veteran's right knee disability is mainly manifested by a post-operative partial medial meniscectomy with complaints of pain and some limited motion. The Veteran's limited motion, however, does not reach a compensable level under DC 5260 or DC 5261. Although the April 2005 examiner found a questionable small suprapatellar joint effusion, the 2008 examiner found no evidence of joint effusion. Accordingly, the Board does not find a higher rating under DC 5258 warranted. Rather, the Veteran's right knee disability is manifested by symptomatic post-operative residuals of a partial medial meniscectomy, to include some limitation of motion, painful motion, tenderness and altered gait. 10 percent is the highest rating available under DC 5259. The Board notes that the Veteran's functional loss was considered. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45; see also DeLuca, 8 Vet. App. 202. The Veteran's 10 percent rating is primarily based on symptoms of pain, limited motion and functional loss due to the Veteran's post-operative partial medial meniscectomy. Both the 2005 and 2008 VA examiners indicate the Veteran uses a cane and walks with an altered gait due to both the Veteran's left ankle and right knee. Both joints also cause functional limitations, such as limited ability to walk, stand, stoop, climb or kneel. Although the 2005 examiner notes some evidence of joint effusion, the most recent x-rays do not confirm even the minimal joint effusion noted in 2005. The "puffiness" of the right knee noted on the 2005 VA examination report, moreover, is not confirmed by the 2008 VA examiner. Both examiners found no additional limitations or functional loss on repetition of motion of the knee. The Veteran's right knee disability is mainly manifested by residual pain and limited motion from the Veteran's June 2000 surgery, which is already compensated under the current rating assigned. Thus, no increased rating due to functional loss is warranted for the right knee. As indicated above, there was some x-ray evidence of degenerative joint disease in April 2005. This diagnosis was not confirmed in March 2008. In any case, DC 5003, for degenerative arthritis, does not provide for a rating greater than 10 percent for arthritis found in one major joint. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a, DC 5003. A separate disability rating for arthritis, moreover, is also not warranted. Again, separate disability ratings may be assigned for distinct disabilities resulting from the same injury so long as the symptomatology for one condition was not "duplicative of or overlapping with the symptomatology" of the other condition. See Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259, 262 (1994). In this case, however, the 10 percent rating assigned under DC 5259 is for "symptomatic" removal of semilunar cartilage. The Veteran's right knee is "symptomatic" because of his limited motion and pain. Accordingly, a separate rating for arthritis, which is predicated on painful motion, would constitute unlawful pyramiding. Id. The Board notes that there are other Diagnostic Codes relating to knee disorders, such as 5256 (ankylosis of the knee), 5257 (instability of the knee), 5262 (impairment of the tibia and fibula) and 5263 (for genu recurvatum). The Veteran further complains of locking and instability of the knee, but the objective evidence consistently indicates the Veteran's knee ligaments are within normal limits. No examiner has observed instability, locking or grinding of the right knee. The medical evidence consistently indicates no objective evidence of ankylosis, instability, impairment of the tibia and fibula or genu recurvatum. These diagnostic codes, therefore, are inapplicable here. In short, the Board finds no provision in which the Veteran may be entitled to a higher or separate rating for his right knee disability. Extra-Schedular Considerations In denying the claim for a higher rating, the Board also has considered whether the Veteran is entitled to a greater level of compensation on an extra-schedular basis. Ordinarily, the VA Schedule will apply unless there are exceptional or unusual factors which would render application of the schedule impractical. See Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993). According to the regulation, an extraschedular disability rating is warranted based upon a finding that the case presents such an exceptional or unusual disability picture with such related factors as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization that would render impractical the application of the regular schedular standards. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1). An exceptional case is said to include such factors as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization as to render impracticable the application of the regular schedular standards. See Fanning v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 225, 229 (1993). Under Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet App 111 (2008), there is a three- step inquiry for determining whether a veteran is entitled to an extraschedular rating. First, the Board must first determine whether the evidence presents such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluations for that service-connected disability are inadequate. Second, if the schedular evaluation does not contemplate the claimant's level of disability and symptomatology and is found inadequate, the Board must determine whether the claimant's disability picture exhibits other related factors such as those provided by the regulation as "governing norms." Third, if the rating schedule is inadequate to evaluate a veteran's disability picture and that picture has attendant thereto related factors such as marked interference with employment or frequent periods of hospitalization, then the case must be referred to the Under Secretary for Benefits or the Director of the Compensation and Pension Service to determine whether, to accord justice, the Veteran's disability picture requires the assignment of an extraschedular rating. With respect to the first prong of Thun, the evidence in this case does not show such an exceptional disability picture that the available schedular evaluation for the service- connected right knee and left ankle disability is inadequate. A comparison between the level of severity and symptomatology of the Veteran's right knee and left ankle with the established criteria found in the rating schedule shows that the rating criteria reasonably describes the Veteran's disabilities' level and symptomatology. The Board further observes that, even if the available schedular evaluation for the disabilities are inadequate (which it manifestly is not), the Veteran does not exhibit other related factors such as those provided by the regulation as "governing norms." The Veteran has undergone surgery for both his left ankle and right knee and contends he can no longer work as a painter because he is unable to stand, climb a ladder, walk, stoop, or kneel. The VA 2005 and 2008 examiners further note the Veteran walks with a cane. The Veteran testified during his hearing before the Board that he also wears a brace on his ankle and knee during flare-ups. The Veteran's current ratings are primarily based on his limited motion, pain and other functional loss. The Board finds the described amount of functional limitation, as explained above, is already contemplated in the ratings currently assigned. There is no evidence in the medical records of an exceptional or unusual clinical picture. In short, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Veteran's disabilities cause impairment over and above that which is contemplated in the assigned schedular rating. See Van Hoose v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 361, 363 (1993) [noting that the disability rating itself is recognition that industrial capabilities are impaired]. The Board therefore has determined that referral of this case for extra-schedular consideration pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 3.321(b)(1) is not warranted. As shown above, and as required by Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 594 (1991), the Board has considered all potentially applicable provisions of 38 C.F.R. Parts 3 and 4, whether or not they have been raised by the Veteran. In this case, the Board finds no provision upon which to assign ratings greater than those already assigned for the Veteran's left ankle and right knee. ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral sensorineural hearing loss disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is denied. Severance of a separate 10 percent rating for left ankle arthritis was proper. Entitlement to an increased rating greater than 20 percent for residuals of a left ankle fracture is denied. Entitlement to an increased rating greater than 10 percent for the post-operative residuals of a right knee medial meniscus tear is denied. ____________________________________________ K. PARAKKAL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs