Citation Nr: 1004182 Decision Date: 01/28/10 Archive Date: 02/16/10 DOCKET NO. 07-01 483 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Detroit, Michigan THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. L. Mollan, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1948 to June 1952. These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2006 RO decision, which denied a claim for service connection for hearing loss, and an April 2007 RO decision, which denied a claim for service connection for tinnitus. This appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the competent and credible evidence is against finding that bilateral hearing loss was present in-service, sensorineural hearing loss manifested to a compensable degree in the first post-service year, or that bilateral hearing loss is related to service. 2. The preponderance of the competent and credible evidence is against finding that tinnitus was present in-service or that tinnitus is related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bilateral hearing loss was not incurred in or aggravated by active service, nor may bilateral sensorineural hearing loss be presumed to have been incurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2009). 2. Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) With respect to the Veteran's claims, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) request that the claimant provide any evidence in his or her possession that pertains to the claim. The requirement of requesting that the claimant provide any evidence in his or her possession that pertains to the claim was eliminated by the Secretary during the course of this appeal. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23353 (final rule eliminating fourth element notice as required under Pelegrini II, effective May 30, 2009). Thus, any error related to this element is harmless. VCAA letters dated in December 2005, March 2006, and February 2007 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions prior to the adjudication of the claims by the RO. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2009); Quartuccio, at 187. The Veteran was aware that it was ultimately his responsibility to give VA any evidence pertaining to the claims. These letters informed him that additional information or evidence was needed to support his claims, and asked him to send the information or evidence to VA. See Pelegrini II, at 120-121. Additionally, the March 2006 and February 2007 letters described how appropriate disability ratings and effective dates were assigned. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Moreover, the Board finds that even if the above letter failed to provide the Veteran with adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice, that this notice problem does not constitute prejudicial error in this case because the record reflects that a reasonable person could be expected to understand what was needed to substantiate the claims after reading the above letters as well as the May 2006 and April 2007 rating decisions, August 2006 and January 2008 statements of the case, and the December 2006 and January 2008 supplemental statements of the case. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009). Furthermore, the Board finds that there can be no prejudice to the Veteran due to a lack of adequate 338 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice where, as here, none has been specifically alleged. Id. With regard to the duty to assist, the result of the RO's development indicates that the Veteran's service treatment records were likely lost in a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) facility located in St. Louis, Missouri. Where, as here, "service medical records are presumed destroyed, . . . the Board's obligation to explain its findings and conclusions and to consider carefully the benefit-of-the-doubt is heightened." O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). The cases, however, do not establish a heightened "benefit of the doubt," but rather only a heightened duty of the Board to consider the applicability of the benefit of the doubt, to assist the claimant in developing the claim, and to explain its decision when the veteran's medical records have been destroyed. The case law does not lower the legal standard for proving a claim for service connection but rather increases the Board's obligation to evaluate and discuss in its decision all of the evidence that may be favorable to the appellant. Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46 (1996). In this regard, not only was the Veteran previously notified in June 1984 of the unavailability of his service treatment records but in October 1985 the RO obtained and associate with the record alternative service medical records. Moreover, it is clear from the April 2007 VA Form 646, Statement of Accredited Representation in Appealed Case, and the November 2009 Appellate Brief Presentation that the Veteran was aware of the unavailability of his service treatment records. Therefore, adjudication of his claim may go forward without these records. See Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992) (the "'duty to assist' is not a license for a 'fishing expedition' to determine if there might be some unspecified information which could possibly support a claim . . . [and] this duty is limited to specifically identified documents that by their description would be facially relevant and material to the claim"). VA has also secured all available pertinent evidence and conducted all appropriate development. Specifically, the record shows that the RO has obtained and associated with the claims file all identified and available post-service medical records. The Veteran was also afforded a VA examination in November 2006 which is adequate to adjudicate his claims because the examiner provided a medical opinion as to the origins of the Veteran's disabilities as well as a rational for the opinion after a review of the record on appeal and an examination of the claimant. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet App 303 (2007). Accordingly, the Board finds that there is no identified, available, and pertinent evidence which is not currently part of the claims file. Hence, VA has fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in the prosecution of his claims and adjudication of this appeal may go forward. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001). II. Analysis Service connection is warranted where the evidence of record establishes that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated thereby. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required for service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). In addition, service connection may also be granted on the basis of a post-service initial diagnosis of a disease, where the physician relates the current condition to the period of service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). Sensorineural hearing loss, if manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year after separation from active duty, may be presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: "(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service"-the so-called "nexus" requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). With respect to hearing loss, VA has specifically defined what is meant by a "disability" for the purposes of service connection. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 (2009). "[I]mpaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent." The Board notes that the Court has held that the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 decibels, and that higher threshold levels indicate some degree of hearing loss. See Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 157 (1993). In evaluating the evidence in any given appeal, it is the responsibility of the Board to weigh the evidence and decide where to give credit and where to withhold the same and, in so doing, accept certain medical opinions over others. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310-11 (1999). In this regard, the Board has been charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002); Klekar v. West, 12 Vet. App. 503, 507 (1999); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Indeed, the Court has declared that in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to do so. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). In doing so, the Board is free to favor one medical opinion over another, provided it offers an adequate basis for doing so. Evans v. West, 12 Vet. App. 22, 30 (1998); Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995). The Veteran essentially contends that he currently experiences hearing loss and tinnitus as a result of his active duty service. Specifically, the Veteran asserted in his December 2005 claim and January 2007 VA Form 9 Appeal that he served in the armor unit as a tank driver and gunner, during which time he was exposed to acoustic and concussive trauma while firing weapons. He indicated that, on one particular occasion, he had his head out of the hatch when a round was fired, and he suffered bleeding from his ears. The Veteran further stated that he was in the field at the time of this injury and no medical care was available. He contends that he has suffered hearing problems since that time. As noted above, the Veteran's service treatment records are regrettably not available for review and while the alternative records VA was able to obtain document the claimant going on sick call in October 1950 and November 1950 as well as being hospitalized in October 1950, they are negative for complaints, diagnoses, or treatment related to hearing loss or tinnitus. However, the Veteran's DD 214 documents that he served with a tank battalion. Moreover, the Board finds that Veteran is both competent and credible to report on the fact that, while on active, he was exposed to tank fire. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002). Therefore, the Board will concede that he had acoustic trauma while on active duty. With regard to a current disability, VA and private treatment records dated from January 2006 to August 2007 document his complaints and treatment for bilateral hearing loss with the VA treatment records starting in January 2006 noting a 15 year history of using hearing aids. In this regard, a January 10, 2006, VA treatment record noted the Veteran's claim that he first began to lose his hearing during service. Specifically, he reported experiencing a severe concussion ringing in his ears and bleeding from his left ear after a gunman continued to fire after he raised his head out of a tank. Thereafter, in a January 25, 2006, VA treatment record, the Veteran was noted as not having tinnitus. Additionally, the Veteran was noted as having civilian occupational noise exposure as a General Motors hi/lo driver and crane operator with no hearing protection devices provided. The Veteran underwent a VA audiological examination in November 2006. The examiner indicated that she reviewed the claims file. The examiner noted that the Veteran reported a sudden and temporary hearing change for hours during a tank mission as a tank commander while serving in the military from 1948 to 1952. She noted that the Veteran served as a tank driver and reported ordering a gunner to stop firing. However, when the Veteran raised himself out of the tank, the gunman fired the cannon. The Veteran's left ear then began to bleed. Post service, the Veteran was employed at General Motors from 1952 to 1958 in the upholstering department. From 1988 to 2005, the Veteran worked at Simons Inc. industrial plant, where a hearing conservation program was in place with the use of hearing protectors. Recreationally, the Veteran reported using lawn care equipment as needed and limited home power tools for household tasks, with no hearing protection worn. The Veteran reported an onset of constant, bilateral tinnitus that was caused in 1951 when the 90 millimeter blast caused his ears to bleed. Upon examination, the Veteran's speech recognition was recorded as 62 percent for the right ear and 56 percent for left ear. As such, the criteria for hearing loss according to 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 have been met bilaterally. Upon examination of the Veteran and review of the claims file, the examiner determined that bilateral hearing loss is not at least as likely as not caused by military service and tinnitus was not caused by military service. In rendering this opinion, the examiner noted that the Veteran submitted a claim for service connection for a left thumb injury in 1983. This statement request was void of any complaint of other health-related problems, including hearing loss or tinnitus. A medical examination for disability was performed in July 1984 and negative reports of ear problems were noted. In 1995, the Veteran filed a claim for an increased rating for his service-connected thumb condition without any complaint of hearing loss or tinnitus. A medical evaluation was conducted in February 1996 without any complaint of hearing loss or tinnitus. The examiner noted that the Veteran's DD 214 Form showed that his related civilian occupation was as a tractor operator and an automobile mechanic helper prior to military. Post service, the Veteran worked as a hi-lo crane operator for General Motors automobile plant. The examiner noted that this history was substantiated through a March 2006 audiological evaluation, in which the Veteran reported civilian noise exposure as a hi-lo driver and crane operator without hearing protection. This March 2006 evaluation also indicated a self report of negative tinnitus. The examiner noted that the Veteran reported that he did not work with machinery during his time in the upholstery department at General Motors. The examiner also noted that otoscopic examination of the Veteran showed no evidence of a healed perforation or scar tissue for either ear. Furthermore, immittance tests showed normal middle ear function, including normal compliance for both ears, without monomeric findings. A perforated ear drum routinely results in otoscopic appearance of healed perforation and a hypercompliant middle ear system. Neither of these findings was noted for the left or the right ear, suggesting intact and non-injured ear drums. The examiner concluded by stating that all of the evidence reviewed suggests that the Veteran's present hearing loss was not at least as likely as not due to the military service. The Veteran filed a claim for hearing loss 52 years after military service and never reported any complaints of hearing loss or tinnitus in any of the statement claim requests or medical examinations for compensation. There is no chronicity or continuity of care to establish a nexus between the hearing loss and the military service. Further, the Veteran obtained hearing aids over 15 years ago with General Motor health insurance, suggesting a later onset for hearing loss than during the military service. In addition, the Veteran's self-reported historical information at the time of the rating examination regarding vocational noise and tinnitus is contradictory to other reports reviewed. The Veteran reported no significant vocational noise to this examiner and bilateral tinnitus but a report of 6 months prior showed a self report of vocational noise for over 30 years operating machinery and negative tinnitus. The examiner opined that the Veteran's bilateral tinnitus was not caused by his military service but was due to the continuous vocational noise for over 30 years. In an August 2007 letter from a private audiologist at Advanced Audiology Hearing Services, Inc., the audiologist stated that he had assisted the Veteran with hearing aid amplification over the last 11 years. The Veteran's hearing decreased severely while he was stationed in Germany in 1951. At that time, he stood up above a tank turret and was immediately hit with the concussion from a 90 millimeter blast from his tank's main gun. He was left with a sudden decrease in hearing and bleeding from the ears. The audiologist stated that the Veteran described to him that a medic cleaned the blood from around his ears. He went on to state that he does not have the knowledge base to know the loudness and blast that a large projective fired from a tank would be. However, based on casual observation and speculation, he would think this incident may have caused or made the Veteran's hearing poorer than it would have been without blast trauma. As to service incurrence under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), despite the Veteran's verified service around tanks and his competent and credible statements regarding acoustic trauma while on active duty, even if the Board accepts the Veteran's claims of having worn hearings adds since 1991 as the year in which he was first diagnosed with bilateral hearing loss as defined by VA as well as with tinnitus, the record still contains an almost 40 year gap between his 1952 separation from military service and the first post-service problems with the claimed disorders. Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus based on in-service incurrence must be denied despite the fact that the Veteran was exposed to acoustic trauma while on active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). As to service connection for bilateral hearing loss based on the presumptions found at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309, the Board finds that they do not help the Veteran is establishing his claim because the record is negative for a diagnosis of sensor neural hearing loss in the first post service year. As to post-service continuity of symptomatology under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), the Board finds that the length of time between his separation from active duty in 1952 and first evidence of the disabilities in 1991 to be compelling evidence against finding continuity. Put another way, the almost four decade gap between the Veteran's discharge from active duty and the first evidence of either disability weighs heavily against his claims. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453 (1999), aff'd., 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (service incurrence may be rebutted by the absence of medical treatment for the claimed condition for many years after service); Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact); Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (holding that VA did not err in denying service connection when the Veteran failed to provide evidence which demonstrated continuity of symptomatology, and failed to account for the lengthy time period for which there is no clinical documentation of his low back condition); Shaw v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 365 (1992) (a Veteran's delay in asserting a claim can constitute negative evidence that weighs against the claim). In this regard, the Board acknowledges as it did above that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about what he sees and feels; for example, the claimant is competent to report that he had problems with ringing in his ears and hearing people talk since service. See Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra; Charles, supra. However, upon review of the claims folder, the Board finds that the Veteran's assertions that he has had these problems since service are not credible. In this regard, the Veteran and his representative's claims are contrary to what is found in the post-service medical record. The Board also finds it significant that the Veteran did not refer to either problem when he submitted his previous claims to VA in 1983 and 1995. If he did have problems with bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus since active duty, it would appear only logical that he would claim such disabilities at those times. See Shaw v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 365 (1992) (a Veteran's delay in asserting a claim can constitute negative evidence that weighs against the claim). Moreover, the medical records found in the claims files at the time of these earlier claims, including the VA examination reports, are negative for complaints of bilateral hearing loss or tinnitus. In these circumstances, the Board gives more credence to the independent medical evidence of record, which is negative for complaints, diagnoses, or treatment for either of the claimed disorders for almost four decades following his separation from active duty, than the Veteran's and his representative's claims. Therefore, entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing and tinnitus based on post-service continuity of symptomatology must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). As for service connection based on the initial documentation of the disabilities after service under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d), the Board notes that the August 2007 letter from the private audiologist at Advanced Audiology Hearing Services, Inc., indicated that the Veteran's problems were caused by his military service. However, the November 2006 VA examination specifically indicated that, based on a review of the claims file, the current audiological results, and the history reported by the Veteran, that his bilateral hearing loss is not at least as likely as not caused by military service and his tinnitus was not caused by military service. In this regard, the Board notes that finds that VA examiner's opinion was based on a review of the claims file, an examination of the Veteran, considered the claimant's assertions, and the examiner offered an extremely detailed rationale for her opinion. See Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999) (holding that the probative value of a physician's statement is dependent, in part, upon the extent to which it reflects "clinical data or other rationale to support his opinion."); Black v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 297, 284 (1997) (in evaluating the probative value of medical statements, the Board looks at factors such as the individual knowledge and skill in analyzing the medical data). On the other hand, the Board finds the private opinion, which stated "based on casual observation and speculation, [he] would think this incident may have caused or made [the Veteran's] hearing poorer than it would have been, without blast trauma," to speculative to be credible. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d. 1477 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holing that the Board is entitled to discount the credibility of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence); Molloy v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 513 (1996); Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518 (1996); Lathan v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 359 (1995); Dixon v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 261 (1992) (physicians' statements that claimed disability "may be," "could be," or is "possibly" related to service or a service-connected disability sufficient to make claim for service connection well-grounded). Therefore, the Board places greater probative value on the VA examiner's opinions that the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss is unrelated to service as this opinion is based on a review of the claims file, objective clinical evaluation, and are consistent with the evidence of record. Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the competent and credible evidence of record shows that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus were not caused by his exposure to tank fire while on active duty. See Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995) (holding that VA may favor the opinion of one competent medical expert over that of another when decision makers give an adequate statement of reasons and bases); Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467, 473 (1993) ("the probative value of medical opinion evidence is based on the medical expert's personal examination of the patient, the physician's knowledge and skill in analyzing the data, and the medical conclusion the physician reaches.... As is true with any piece of evidence, the credibility and weight to be attached to these opinions [are] within the province of the [Board as] adjudicators. . ."); Wray v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 488, 493 (1995) (holding that the adoption of an expert medical opinion may satisfy the Board's statutory requirement of an adequate statement of reasons and bases if the expert fairly considered the material evidence seemingly supporting the Veteran's position). As to the Veteran's and his representative's claims that the appellant's tinnitus was caused by his military service including his in-service noise exposure, when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. The Board finds that tinnitus is such a condition. Charles, supra. In such cases however, the Board is within its province to weigh the lay statements and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence is sufficient to establish service connection due to service incurrence, a superimposed disease or injury creating additional disability, continuity of symptomatology, and/or a nexus. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra. As noted above, the Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about what he sees and feels; for example, the claimant is competent to report that he had problems with ringing in his ears since service. See Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra; Charles, supra. However, as noted above, the Board finds that the Veteran's assertion's of having tinnitus since service lacks credibility. Moreover, the Board places greater probative value on the November 2006 VA medical opinion cited above which found that tinnitus was not caused by military service after an examination of the claimant and a review of the record on appeal than the Veteran's and his representative's claims. In reaching the above conclusion, the Board has not overlooked the fact that the Veteran asserted in his January 2007 VA Form 9 appeal that he was provided hearing protection during his post-service work in a manufacturing environment. Furthermore, the Veteran asserted at the August 2007 local hearing that the manufacturing plant he worked at after service was a cut-and-sew plant, which dealt with soft materials as opposed to loud metals, and he worked away from the machinery on the rail docks. As such, this was not a noisy environment and, therefore, the November 2006 VA opinion was based on a faulty occupational history. However, the examiner at the November 2006 VA examination specifically noted that the Veteran reported that he did not work with machinery during his time in the upholstery department at General Motors. The examiner further noted that the Veteran reported to her no significant vocational noise. Moreover, the examiner also noted that the Veteran's self-reported historical information at the time of the rating examination regarding vocational noise and tinnitus was contradictory to other reports reviewed. Specifically, the Veteran reported no significant vocational noise at the November 2006 VA examination and bilateral tinnitus but a report of 10 months prior in January 2006 showed a self report of vocational noise for over 30 years operating machinery and negative tinnitus. Therefore, it is clear that the examiner took into account the Veteran's contentions at the VA examination regarding his occupational noise exposure. However, a negative nexus opinion was offered based on a review of the medical evidence in its entirety. As to the Veteran's and his representative's claims that the claimant's bilateral hearing loss was caused by his military service, including his in-service noise exposure, the Board finds that this condition may not be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features because special equipment and testing is required to diagnose hearing loss as defined by 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 and therefore the presence of the disorder is a determination "medical in nature" and not capable of lay observation. Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra; Charles, supra. Therefore, since laypersons are not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge, the Board finds that their opinions that bilateral hearing loss being caused by service not credible. Routen, supra; see also Bostain, supra. Moreover, the Board also places greater probative value on the November 2006 VA examiner's opinion which found that this disability was not caused by his military service after an examination of the claimant and a review of the record on appeal than the Veteran's and his representative's claims. Based on the discussion above, the Board also finds that service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus is not warranted based on the initial documentation of the disabilities after service because the weight of the competent and credible evidence is against finding a causal association or link between the post-service disorders and an established injury, disease, or event of service origin. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Rabideau, supra. Accordingly, the Board must conclude that the weight of the evidence is against the claims of service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In reaching the above conclusions, the Board also considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the doctrine is not for application. See also, e.g., Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER Service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied. Service connection for tinnitus is denied. ____________________________________________ NEIL T. WERNER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs