Citation Nr: 1004239 Decision Date: 01/28/10 Archive Date: 02/16/10 DOCKET NO. 08-13 285 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral hearing loss disability. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a right hip disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The appellant and his spouse ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD O. Lee, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from April 1951 to August 1953. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2007 rating decision of the RO in Muskogee, Oklahoma, which denied service connection for hearing loss, tinnitus, skin conditions and a right hip condition. The Veteran testified at a December 2009 videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of that proceeding has been associated with the claims file. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2007). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that a bilateral hearing loss disability had its onset in service, manifested within one year of service separation, or is otherwise related to the Veteran's active military service. 2. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that tinnitus had its onset in service, or is otherwise related to the Veteran's active military service. 3. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that a skin disorder had its onset in service, or is otherwise related to the Veteran's active military service. 4. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that a right hip disability that had its onset in service, or is otherwise related to the Veteran's active military service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A bilateral hearing loss disability was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service, and nor may it be presumed to have been so incurred. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). 2. Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 3. A skin disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 4. A right hip disability was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the appellant's claims file, and has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting the decision. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claims. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the veteran). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the appellant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) With respect to the Veteran's claims, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009). Under the VCAA, when VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120- 21 (2004) (Pelegrini II), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) request that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim. The requirement of requesting that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim was eliminated by the Secretary during the course of this appeal. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23353 (final rule eliminating fourth element notice as required under Pelegrini II, effective May 30, 2008). Any error related to this element is harmless. Prior to the initial adjudication of the Veteran's claims, a letter dated in June 2007 fully satisfied the duty to notify provisions. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio, 16 Vet. App. at 187; Pelegrini II, 18 Vet. App. at 120-21. The letter advised the Veteran of the information necessary to substantiate the claims, and of his and VA's respective obligations for obtaining specified different types of evidence. The Veteran was informed of the specific types of evidence he could submit, which would be pertinent to his claims, and advised to send any medical reports that he had. He was also told that it was ultimately his responsibility to support the claims with appropriate evidence. In addition, the letter provided the Veteran with notice concerning the assignment of disability ratings and effective dates. See Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 490 (2006). As for the duty to assist, the result of RO development indicates that some of the Veteran's service records were likely destroyed, presumed to have been lost in a 1973 fire at the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) facility located in St. Louis, Missouri. Inasmuch as the Veteran was not at fault for the loss of the missing records, VA is under heightened obligation to assist the Veteran in the development of his claim. See, e.g., Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 369-70 (2005); O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365 (1991). This heightened obligation includes searching for alternative medical records. Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 401 (1991); see also Cromer v. Nicholson, 455 F.3d 1346 (2006). The Board concludes that the heightened duty to assist has been met in this case. The claims file contains all available evidence pertinent to the claim, including the Veteran's DD Form 214. A formal finding of unavailability of personnel records was made in September 2007, and the Veteran was notified accordingly in a September 2007 letter. Pursuant to the heightened duty to assist, the RO has undertaken the required procedures to locate and reconstruct the Veteran's records, but remains unsuccessful. The RO provided the Veteran with a copy of an NA Form 13055, Request for Information Needed to Reconstruct Medical Data, and requested that he complete and return the form. While the Veteran did return the form, the information provided was deemed insufficient for purposes of reconstructing the Veteran's medical records. Specifically, the form did not provide complete organization information, nor did it identify the name and location of any hospitals or medical facilities at which the Veteran had been treated. In addition, it is noted that the Veteran has not provided any information on current treatment for his claimed disabilities. Although VA has a statutory duty to assist the Veteran in developing evidence pertinent to a claim, the Veteran also has a duty to assist and cooperate with VA in developing evidence; the duty to assist is not a one-way street. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991). The Veteran has at no time referenced other outstanding records, with any specificity, not yet associated with the file that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to his claims. All relevant records that could be located have been associated with the file. The Board finds that the duty to assist is discharged. The duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law. The case of McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), held that an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in-service event, injury or disease," or a disease manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. The Board concludes an examination is not needed in this case because the only evidence indicating the Veteran "suffered an event, injury or disease in service" and that his claimed current disabilities are related to service is his own lay statements. Such evidence is insufficient to trigger VA's duty to provide an examination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has held, in circumstances similar to this, where the supporting evidence of record consists only of a lay statement, that VA is not obligated, pursuant to 5103A(d), to provide an appellant with a medical nexus opinion. See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 519 (2004) (finding no prejudicial error in Board's statement of reasons or bases regarding why a medical opinion was not warranted because there was no reasonable possibility that such an opinion could substantiate the veteran's claim because there was no evidence, other than his own lay assertion, that " 'reflect[ed] that he suffered an event, injury[,] or disease in service' that may be associated with [his] symptoms"). See also Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that 3.159(c)(4)(i) is not in conflict with § 5103A(d) and evidence of record "establishing that the veteran suffered an event, injury, or disease in service," is required to trigger VA's duties pursuant to § 5103A(d)); Wells v. Principi, 326 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the Secretary's obligations under § 5103A to provide a veteran with a medical examination or to obtain a medical opinion is triggered if the evidence of record demonstrates "some casual connection between his disability and his military service"). There is no reasonable possibility that a medical opinion would aid in substantiating the Veteran's claim since it could not provide evidence of a past event. Likewise, an examination is not warranted also because there is no competent evidence of record demonstrating some causal connection between the claimed current disabilities and service. See McLendon, supra. As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such failure is harmless. See Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). II. Service Connection The Veteran contends that he has hearing loss, tinnitus, a skin condition and a right hip condition as a result of active service. For the reasons that follow, the Board concludes that service connection is not warranted for any of these claimed disabilities. Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002). For the showing of chronic disease in service there must be a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). If chronicity in service is not established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. Id. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection may also be granted for a chronic disease, including arthritis or an organic disease of the nervous system such as sensorineural hearing loss, when it is manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). In order to establish service connection for the claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). Medical evidence is generally required to establish a medical diagnosis or to address questions of medical causation; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence for these purposes. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). However, lay assertions may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). Competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997). a. Hearing loss and tinnitus For VA purposes, impaired hearing is considered a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The Veteran asserts that he has a hearing loss disability and tinnitus as a result of inservice noise exposure. Specifically, he contends that he suffered acoustic trauma while stationed in Guam as a result of being exposed to hammers, saws and other construction noise. See videoconference hearing transcript, December 2009. As noted above, the Veteran's service treatment records and service personnel records are unavailable. The only service record available is his DD Form 214, which lists his military specialty number as 70250 and shows its related civilian occupation to be Chief Clerk. The Board observes that this military occupational specialty is not indicative of noise exposure. Likewise, given the unavailability of service treatment records, there is no evidence to otherwise show that the Veteran incurred a disease or injury, to include acoustic trauma, in service. In this regard, the Board finds the preponderance of the evidence to be against a finding of a disease, injury or noise exposure in service. See Hickson, supra. At the December 2009 videoconference hearing, the Veteran testified that the first time he had a comprehensive hearing test was about 14 or 15 years ago. He also indicated that it had been 12 to 15 years since his last hearing test, which had been shortly before his retirement from the State of Oklahoma. As to tinnitus, the Veteran testified that he probably noticed it within the last 20 to 25 years, but that it was not diagnosed until his hearing test 15 years ago. The Board notes that the Veteran has failed to provide any current medical evidence of treatment for hearing loss and tinnitus. Indeed, he acknowledges that he has not sought treatment for these conditions within the last 12 to 15 years. In addition, he indicates that his first comprehensive hearing test was over four decades after his service discharge. These periods without treatment are evidence that there has not been a continuity of symptomatology, and they weigh heavily against the claims on a direct basis. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Given that there is no evidence of noise exposure in service and no evidence of treatment for hearing problems for many decades following service separation, the Board concludes that service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus is not warranted. In determining whether service connection is warranted, VA must determine whether the preponderance of the evidence supports or is against the claim. In this case, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims of service connection for bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus, and the claims must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). b. Skin At the December 2009 videoconference hearing, the Veteran testified that, while stationed in Guam, he used to go to the beach and sit in the sun; however he did not notice any skin problems until a year or two following his return. Initially, he had something on the instep of his foot, then he started having problems with his face and skin in general. He sought treatment from Dr. Owens sometime in the 1950s. Dr. Owens indicated that the Veteran had a type of fungus and that it was something he might have picked up in Guam. The Veteran stated that, since his treatment with Dr. Owens, he has continued to have skin problems over the years. A review of the claims file reveals that there is no evidence of any skin problems in service. As previously discussed, the Veteran's service treatment records are not available. While the Veteran has testified that he sought treatment for his skin condition shortly after service and throughout the years since, he has failed to provide medical records of any such post-service treatment. There is no indication that the Veteran has a current diagnosis for his claimed skin condition, nor is there any evidence linking the claimed current condition to service. Indeed, the Veteran testified at the videoconference hearing that none of his doctors recently have indicated that his skin condition might be related to his service in Guam. The Board has considered the Veteran's self-reported continuity of symptomatology of skin problems dating back to the 1950s. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, he has failed to provide or identify evidence showing treatment or a diagnosis of skin problems at any time from service to the present. While his statements regarding symptomatology are within his competence to make, and are of some probative value, as a lay person, he has not been shown to be capable of making medical conclusions; thus, his statements regarding diagnosis and etiology are not competent. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). Considering the totality of the evidence, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran has a current skin disorder that is related an injury or disease incurred in service. In view of the foregoing, the Board concludes that service connection for a skin disorder is not warranted. Although the Veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt where the evidence is in approximate balance, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55. c. Right hip The Board has reviewed that the evidence of record and finds that it fails to demonstrate the existence of a current disability of the right hip. A service connection claim must be accompanied by evidence which establishes that the claimant currently has the claimed disability. See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 141, 144 (1992). The Veteran, however, has not submitted any evidence or identified any records showing that he currently has a right hip disability, despite having been afforded plenty of opportunity to do so. Significantly, there is no indication that the Veteran has sought any treatment for his right hip in recent years. The Board notes that the existence of a current disability is the cornerstone of a claim for VA disability compensation. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110; see Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (1997) (holding that Secretary's and Court's interpretation of sections 1110 and 1131 of the statute as requiring the existence of a present disability for VA compensation purposes cannot be considered arbitrary and therefore the decision based on that interpretation must be affirmed); see also Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); Rabideau v Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143 (1992). Without medical evidence of a current disability of the right hip, the Veteran's claim fails to meet the requirements of service connection, and the Board need not undertake an analysis as to whether there is evidence of an in-service injury or disease. The Board is mindful of the Veteran's statements regarding the etiology of his claimed right hip disability. The Veteran can attest to factual matters of which he has first- hand knowledge; for example, he is competent to report that his right hip condition causes him to walk with a limp from time to time. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005). However, the Veteran as a lay person has not been shown to be capable of making medical conclusions, thus, his statements regarding the current nature and etiology of his disability are not competent. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992). While the Veteran is competent to report what comes to him through his senses, he does not have medical expertise. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469- 470 (1994). Therefore, he cannot provide a competent opinion regarding diagnosis and causation. As such, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim of service connection for a right hip disability. Consequently, the benefit-of- the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 55. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a bilateral hearing loss disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus denied. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right hip disability is denied. ____________________________________________ K. PARAKKAL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs