Citation Nr: 1004497 Decision Date: 01/29/10 Archive Date: 02/16/10 DOCKET NO. 08-17 476 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, to include as due to an undiagnosed illness. 2. Entitlement to service connection for bronchial asthma, to include as due to an undiagnosed illness. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Tiffany Sykes, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active military duty from October 1963 to September 1965, January 1991 to June 1991, September 1994 to December 1994, and January 2002 to October 2002. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision issued in July 2007 by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had active service in the Southwest Asia Theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War. 2. Sleep apnea is a known clinical diagnosis and is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident of service. 3. Bronchial asthma is a known clinical diagnosis and is not shown to be causally or etiologically related to any disease, injury, or incident of service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for sleep apnea have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1117, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.317 (2009). 2. The criteria for service connection for bronchial asthma have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1117, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.317 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. VA's Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations impose obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). In Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a service connection claim. Those five elements include: 1) Veteran status; 2) existence of a disability; 3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; 4) degree of disability; and 5) effective date of the disability. In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004), the Court held that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on the claim for VA benefits. The Board finds that VA has satisfied its duty to notify under the VCAA. In this regard, an October 2006 letter, sent prior to the initial unfavorable AOJ decision issued in July 2007, advised the Veteran of the evidence and information necessary to substantiate his service connection claims as well as his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining such evidence and information. Such letter also informed him of the evidence and information necessary to establish a disability rating and an effective date in accordance with Dingess/Hartman, supra. VA also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran by obtaining all relevant evidence in support of his claim that is obtainable, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudicing him. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159; see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The AOJ obtained his service treatment records (STRs) from October 1986 to October 2003, VA treatment records, and private medical records. The Veteran has not identified any additional, outstanding records necessary to decide his pending appeal. In this regard, the Board notes that the Veteran had a period of active duty from October 1963 to September 1965; however, STRs from such period are not contained in the claims file. In January 2000, the RO requested such records from the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC); however, NPRC indicated that the Veteran's records had not yet been retired to such location. As such, in February 2000, the RO requested the records from the Records Management Center (RMC); however, later that month, RMC indicated that such records were not found. Thereafter, in December 2006, the RO again requested all STRs from NPRC and all such records were mailed. However, as indicated previously, only those dated from October 1986 to October 2003 were obtained. While the Veteran was not specifically advised of VA's inability to obtain his STRs from his first period of active duty, the Board finds no prejudice to the Veteran in proceeding with a decision in this matter. In this regard, the Board observes that the Veteran has never alleged that he incurred sleep apnea or bronchial asthma during his first period of active duty. Rather, he claims that such disorders are related to his service in Southwest Asia, where he served from February 1991 to May 1991. Moreover, as will be discussed further, records dated prior to 2004 fail to reveal complaints of the Veteran's claimed disorders and the first diagnoses not rendered until October 2005. Therefore, while VA has not been able to obtain the Veteran's STRs from his first period of active duty, the Board finds no prejudice to him in proceeding with his appeal as such records have no bearing on the issues at hand. However, in cases such as these, VA has a heightened duty to explain its findings and conclusions and to consider carefully the benefit of the doubt rule. O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). As will be discussed below, the Board's analysis of the Veteran's claims has been undertaken with this duty in mind. The Board notes that the Veteran has not been provided with a VA examination in order to determine whether his claimed sleep apnea and bronchial asthma are related to his military service. However, as will be discussed below, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of either disorder and such were not diagnosed until after the Veteran's service discharge. Moreover, the Board finds that the Veteran's lay statements regarding the in-service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology relevant to each claimed disorder are outweighed by the remainder of the evidence of record. As such, the Board finds that there is no indication that sleep apnea or bronchial asthma, or persistent or recurrent symptoms of either disorder, may be associated with the Veteran's military service. Thus, a remand for examination and/or opinion is not necessary to decide the claims. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c)(4); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006) (discussing circumstances when a VA examination is required). Thus, the Board finds that VA has fully satisfied the duty to assist. In the circumstances of this case, additional efforts to assist or notify the Veteran in accordance with the VCAA would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements of the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the Veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the Veteran are to be avoided). VA has satisfied its duty to inform and assist the Veteran at every stage in this case, at least insofar as any errors committed were not harmful to the essential fairness of the proceeding. Therefore, the Veteran will not be prejudiced as a result of the Board proceeding to the merits of his claims. II. Analysis Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Direct service connection may not be granted without medical evidence of a current disability; medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. See also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995) aff'd, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) [(table)]. Alternatively, service connection may be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) by (a) evidence of (i) the existence of a chronic disease in service or during an applicable presumption period under 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 and (ii) present manifestations of the same chronic disease, or (b) when a chronic disease is not present during service, evidence of continuity of symptomatology. Because the Veteran served in the Southwest Asia Theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, service connection may also be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317. In this regard, the Board notes that the Veteran's service personnel records reflect service in Southwest Asia from February 1991 to May 1991. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, service connection may be warranted for a Persian Gulf Veteran who exhibits objective indications of a qualifying chronic disability that became manifest during active military, naval or air service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, or to a degree of 10 percent or more not later than not later than December 31, 2011. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(1). For purposes of 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, there are three types of qualifying chronic disabilities: (1) an undiagnosed illness; (2) a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness; and (3) a diagnosed illness that the Secretary determines in regulations prescribed under 38 U.S.C. 1117(d) warrants a presumption of service-connection. The definition of an undiagnosed illness is a condition that by history, physical examination and laboratory tests cannot be attributed to a known clinical diagnosis. In the case of claims based on undiagnosed illness under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1117; 38 C.F.R. § 3.117, unlike those for "direct service connection," there is no requirement that there be competent evidence of a nexus between the claimed illness and service. Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. at 8-9. Further, lay persons are competent to report objective signs of illness. Id. A medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illnesses is one defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms, and specifically includes chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome, as well as any other illness that the Secretary determines meets the criteria in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section for a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness. There are currently no diagnosed illnesses that have been determined by the Secretary to warrant a presumption of service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(C). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). As indicated previously, the Veteran's STRs from his first period of active duty from October 1963 to September 1965 are unavailable. As such, the Board is required to provide a heightened explanation of its findings and a careful consideration of the benefit of the doubt rule. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). However, there is no presumption, either in favor of the claimant or against VA, arising from missing records. See Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215, 217-18 (2005) (the Court declined to apply an "adverse presumption" where records have been lost or destroyed while in Government control which would have required VA to disprove a claimant's allegation of injury or disease in service in these particular cases). Moreover, the case law does not lower the legal standard for proving a claim for service connection but rather increases the Board's obligation to evaluate and discuss in its decision all the evidence that may be favorable to the Veteran. Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46 (1996). The Veteran contends he has sleep apnea and bronchial asthma as a result of his active service in the Persian Gulf War, to include as a result of an undiagnosed illness. He also claims that he developed sleep apnea as a result of receiving the Anthrax vaccination. Therefore, the Veteran claims that service connection for such disorders is warranted. With respect to the Veteran's contention that he is entitled to service connection for sleep apnea and bronchial asthma due to an undiagnosed illness, the Board finds that both disorders are known clinical diagnoses. In this regard, the Board notes that the record reflects that the Veteran was diagnosed with sleep apnea and bronchial asthma in October 2005. Because the medical evidence shows that the Veteran claimed disorders have been diagnosed as sleep apnea and bronchial asthma, he is not entitled to service connection based on an undiagnosed illness. Further, these disorders are not an illness which the Secretary has determined warrants presumptive service connection. Therefore, service connection under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1117 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.317 is not warranted. As such, the Board must consider whether service connection for either claim may be granted on a direct basis. Here, there is no disputing the Veteran meets the first requirement for any service-connection claim, which is proof of the existence of current diagnoses of sleep apnea and bronchial asthma. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As previously mentioned, the Veteran was diagnosed with sleep apnea and bronchial asthma in October 2005. Consequently, the determinative issue is whether the sleep apnea and bronchial asthma are attributable to his military service. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See also Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Veteran's STRs are completely silent regarding complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of sleep apnea or bronchial asthma during service. Moreover, such records are negative for any complaints regarding sleeping or breathing difficulty. In fact, on Report of Medical History forms dated in October 1982, October 1986, April 1991, February 1994, May 1996, November 1999, and October 2001, the Veteran specifically indicates that he did not previously or currently have asthma, shortness of breath, or frequent trouble sleeping. Moreover, a June 2005 VA treatment record shows that the Veteran denied having any problems while on active duty. Post-service records reflect that, in September 2004, the Veteran indicated that he had a history of bronchial asthma and currently experienced sleep disturbance. Following additional examination, to include a sleep study and pulmonary function testing, bronchial asthma and sleep apnea were diagnosed in October 2005. Based on the preceding evidence, the Board finds that the Veteran has current diagnoses of sleep apnea and bronchial asthma. However, the competent and probative evidence of record fails to show that such disorders are related to any disease, injury, or incident of the Veteran's military service, to include an Anthrax vaccination. In this regard, while he is competent to testify as to his difficulty breathing and sleeping during and after his military service, the Board finds that such statements are outweighed by the remainder of the evidence of record. Specifically, the Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints, treatment, or diagnoses relevant to sleep apnea or bronchial asthma. Moreover, he expressly denied asthma, shortness of breath, or frequent trouble sleeping throughout his military career. The Board finds such evidence, made contemporaneous to service, to be more probative than his statements made a number of years after his service discharge. Moreover, the Board observes that the first medical evidence demonstrating a diagnosis of either disorder is dated in October 2005. The Board notes that the lack of contemporaneous medical records may be a fact that the Board can consider and weigh against a Veteran's lay evidence, the lack of such records does not, in and of itself, render lay evidence not credible. The Board, however, finds that the fact that the Veteran's post-service treatment records are negative for any complaints referable to his claimed disorders for approximately two years after his service discharge to be persuasive evidence against his claims. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1336-37 (2006). Furthermore, the Veteran was not diagnosed with either disorder until October 2005, approximately three years after his service discharge. In this regard, the Board notes that in Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) stated that lay evidence is competent and sufficient in certain instances related to medical matters. Specifically, the Federal Circuit determined that a layperson may establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Id. Similarly, the Court has held that when a condition may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). Thus, while the Veteran is competent to report experiencing symptoms such as difficulty breathing or sleeping, he is not competent to diagnose sleep apnea or bronchial asthma, which are complex disorders requiring testing to definitely diagnose (i.e., a sleep study or pulmonary function testing, respectively). Moreover, to the extent that the Veteran is competent to report a contemporaneous medical diagnosis of bronchial asthma, as he indicated in September 2004, such diagnosis is still approximately two years following his service discharge. Additionally, the Veteran is not competent to provide an etiological nexus between any current sleep apnea and/or bronchial asthma and service as such assessments are not simple in nature. See Jandreau; see also Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007) (although the Veteran is competent in certain situations to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg or varicose veins, the Veteran is not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions). In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that, while the Veteran is competent to report experiencing sleeping or breathing difficulty during his military service, such statements are outweighed by the remainder of the evidence of record. Moreover, to the extent that he has contended a continuity of symptomatology of sleeping and breathing difficulty since service, the Board finds that the probative value of such allegation is outweighed by the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. See Buchanan, supra. Furthermore, there is no competent and probative evidence that the Veteran's sleep apnea and bronchial asthma are related to his military service, to include an Anthrax vaccination. In this regard, no medical professional has related such disorders to his service. Therefore, as there is no competent and probative evidence linking the Veteran's sleep apnea and/or bronchial asthma to any disease, injury, or incident of service, service connection for such disorders is not warranted. In reaching the foregoing conclusions, the Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea and bronchial asthma. As such, that doctrine is not applicable in the instant appeal, and his claims must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107. (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Service connection for sleep apnea, to include as due to an undiagnosed illness, is denied. Service connection for bronchial asthma, to include as due to an undiagnosed illness, is denied. ____________________________________________ A. JAEGER Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs