Citation Nr: 1005883 Decision Date: 02/18/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 06-17 818 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Nashville, Tennessee THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to an initial rating higher than 10 percent for residuals of a shrapnel wound of the left knee. 2. Entitlement to an initial compensable rating for bilateral hearing loss from December 9, 2003 to June 17, 2008; and a rating higher than 20 percent since June 18, 2008. 3. Entitlement to service connection for shrapnel wound residuals of both legs. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Military Order of the Purple Heart of the U.S.A. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Biswajit Chatterjee, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty in the military from October 1959 to August 1989. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from a November 2004 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. That decision granted the Veteran's claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss and assigned an initial 0 percent (i.e., noncompensable) rating, retroactively effective from December 9, 2003, the date of receipt of his claim. That decision also granted his claim for service connection for shrapnel wound residuals of the left knee and initially rated them as 0-percent disabling, as well, also retroactively effective December 9, 2003, the date of receipt of his claim. He appealed for higher initial ratings. See Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 125-26 (1999) (when a Veteran appeals his initial rating following the grant of service connection, VA must consider his claim in this context - which includes determining whether he is entitled to a "staged" rating to compensate him for times since the effective date of his award when his disability may have been more severe than at others). He also appealed the RO's denial of his claim for service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to his legs (left and right lower extremities). In a decision since issued in October 2009 by the RO in Nashville, Tennessee, which has assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, the rating for the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss was increased from 0 to 20 percent, but only retroactively effective from June 18, 2008, the date of a VA compensation examination. That decision also increased the rating for his left knee disorder from 0 to 10 percent - maintaining the retroactive effective date of December 9, 2003, the date of receipt of his claim. He has since continued to appeal, requesting even higher ratings. See AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 39 (1993) (a Veteran is presumed to be seeking the highest possible rating, unless he expressly indicates otherwise). The Board is remanding the claim for higher ratings for the bilateral hearing loss to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC, for further development and consideration. Whereas the Board is going ahead and deciding the claims for service connection for residuals of shrapnel wounds to the legs and for a higher rating for the left knee disorder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran was wounded in combat in Vietnam and received several medals and commendations in recognition of that and his very meritorious service, including, among others, the Purple Heart Medal (with 2 stars), Bronze Star (with "V" device for valor), Combat Action Ribbon, and Presidential Unit Citation. 2. Service connection since has been granted for several disabilities resulting from those injuries he sustained in combat in Vietnam, including for lumbar degenerative changes (rated as 40-percent disabling), bilateral hearing loss (initially rated as 0-percent disabling but, as of June 18, 2008, as 20-percent disabling), residuals of a shrapnel wound to his left knee (10percent), residuals of a shrapnel wound to his right hand (10 percent), tinnitus (10 percent), Dupetryn's, i.e., flexion contracture of the little finger on the left hand (0 percent), and scars on the posterior scalp, center of the forehead, middle of the forehead, and left side of the chin (0 percent), for a combined 70 percent rating as of June 18, 2008. 3. The Veteran does not, however, have any current residuals or diagnosed disability from shrapnel wounds involving either leg, aside from that already service connected for the injury to his left knee. 4. At most, the flexion in the Veteran's left knee is limited to 90 degrees, with pain on movement. He also has degenerative joint disease, i.e., arthritis, in this knee. 5. There is no limitation of extension in the left knee, so normal or full extension, and no pain on movement in that direction. 6. There also is no objective evidence of subluxation or lateral instability in the left knee. 7. The Veteran's left knee scar from his shrapnel wound is superficial, stable, and measures less than 39 square centimeters. There is no objective evidence this scar is painful or tender on examination. It also does not cause any associated limitation of motion or function. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Veteran does not have current disability due to shrapnel wounds to his legs. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 2. The criteria are not met for a rating higher than 10 percent for the left knee disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.7, 4.10, 4.40, 4.45, 4.59, 4.71a, Diagnostic Codes (DCs) 5003, 5257-5263 (2009); 4.118, DCs 7801, 7802, 7803, 7804, 7805 (2008); 4.118, DCs 7801, 7802, 7804, 7805 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS In the interest of clarity, the Board will initially discuss whether the claims have been properly developed for appellate review. The Board will then address the claims on their merits, providing relevant VA laws and regulations, the relevant factual background, and an analysis of its decision. I. The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will obtain and assist the claimant in obtaining; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 373- 74 (2002). These VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service-connection claim: (1) Veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Further, this notice must include information that a downstream disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is granted. Id., at 486. Ideally, VCAA notice should be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II). If, however, for whatever reason it was not, or the notice provided was inadequate, this timing error can be effectively "cured" by providing any necessary VCAA notice and then going back and readjudicating the claim - such as in a statement of the case (SOC) or supplemental SOC (SSOC), such that the intended purpose of the notice is not frustrated and the Veteran is given an opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). In Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009), the United States Supreme Court made clear that a reviewing court, in considering the rule of prejudicial error, is precluded from applying a mandatory presumption of prejudice rather than assessing whether, based on the facts of each case, the error was outcome determinative. In Sanders, the Supreme Court rejected the lower Federal Circuit's framework (see Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F. 3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) that all VA notice errors are presumptively prejudicial, in part, because it was "complex, rigid, and mandatory." Id., at 1704. The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's analysis because it imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden on VA to rebut the presumption and because it required VA to demonstrate why the error was harmless, rather than requiring the appellant - as the pleading party, to show the error was harmful. Id., at 1705-06. The Supreme Court stated that it had "warned against courts' determining whether an error is harmless through the use of mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record." Id., at 1704-05. Thus, it is clear from the Supreme Court's analysis that, while the Veterans Court may conclude generally that a specific type of error is more likely to prejudice an appellant, the error must nonetheless be examined in the context of the facts of the particular case. Id. The Veterans Court initially held in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37, 48 (2008), that prejudicial deficiencies in the timing or content of a VCAA notice can be cured by showing the essential fairness of the adjudication will not be affected because: (1) the defect was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant ("Actual knowledge is established by statements or actions by the claimant or the claimant's representative that demonstrates an awareness of what was necessary to substantiate his or her claim.") (citing Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 30-31 (2007)); (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice what was needed; or (3) that a benefit could not have been awarded as a matter of law. Sanders, 487 F. 3d at 889. Additionally, consideration also should be given to "whether the post-adjudicatory notice and opportunity to develop the case that is provided during the extensive administrative appellate proceedings leading to the final Board decision and final Agency adjudication of the claim ... served to render any pre-adjudicatory section 5103(a) notice error non-prejudicial." Vazquez-Flores, 22 Vet. App. at 46. See also Overton v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 427, 435 (2006) (finding the Board had erred by relying on various post-decisional documents for concluding adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice had been provided to the appellant, the Veterans Court nonetheless determined the evidence established the Veteran was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of his claims, and therefore found the error harmless). The Veterans Court further held in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake that, for an increased-compensation claim, 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) requires, at a minimum, that VA notify the claimant that, to substantiate the claim, the medical or lay evidence must show a worsening or increase in severity of the disability and the effect that such worsening or increase has on the claimant's employment and daily life. On appeal, however, in Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 2009 WL 2835434 (Fed.Cir.), the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded important aspects of the Veterans Court's holding in Vazquez- Flores, as well as a related case, Schultz v. Peake, No. 03- 1235, 2008 WL 2129773, at 5 (Vet. App. Mar. 7, 2008). Significantly, the Federal Circuit concluded that "the notice described in 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) need not be Veteran specific." Similarly, "while a Veteran's 'daily life' evidence might in some cases lead to evidence of impairment in earning capacity, the statutory scheme does not require such evidence for proper claim adjudication." Thus, the Federal Circuit held, "insofar as the notice described by the Veterans Court in Vazquez-Flores requires the VA to notify a Veteran of alternative diagnostic codes or potential "daily life" evidence, we vacate the judgments." Vazquez, 2009 WL 2835434, at 10. The Veterans Court's other holdings in Vazquez-Flores appear to be intact, that is, regarding the above discussion of prejudicial deficiencies in timing or content. In this case, letters satisfying the notice requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) were sent to the Veteran in January 2004 and February 2008. These letters informed him of the evidence required to substantiate his claims and of his and VA's respective responsibilities in obtaining supporting evidence. Keep in mind the initial letter, in January 2004, was sent when the Veteran was trying to establish his underlying entitlement to service connection for all of the conditions he had filed claims concerning. And in the November 2004 decision at issue in this appeal, some of those conditions were service connected - including, notably, the residuals of the shrapnel wound to his left knee. In cases, as here, where a claim arose in another context, namely, the Veteran trying to establish his underlying entitlement to service connection, and this claim since has been granted and he has appealed a downstream issue such as the initial disability rating assigned, the underlying claim has been more than substantiated - it has been proven, thereby rendering § 5103(a) notice no longer required because the intended purpose of the notice has been fulfilled. See Goodwin v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 128 (2008). Thereafter, once a notice of disagreement (NOD) has been filed, for example contesting a downstream issue such as the initial disability rating assigned, the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. §§ 5104 and 7105, regarding a rating decision and statement of the case (SOC), control as to the further communications with the Appellant, including as to what evidence is necessary to establish a more favorable decision with respect to downstream elements of the claim. And, here, after the Veteran appealed the initial rating assigned for his left knee disability, the RO sent him this required SOC in May 2006 discussing the applicable statutes and regulations governing this claim and the reasons and bases for not assigning a higher initial rating (although, as mentioned, the rating for this disability since has been increased from 0 to 10 percent in a more recent October 2009 RO decision). In any event, letters issued in May 2006 and February 2008 in the interim complied with Dingess by discussing the downstream disability rating and effective date elements of the claims. And of equal or even greater significance, after providing that additional Dingess notice, the RO went back and readjudicated the claims in the October 2009 SSOC - including considering the additional evidence received in response to that additional notice. See again Mayfield IV and Prickett, supra. It further deserves mentioning that when, as here, service treatment records (STRs) are lost or missing, through no fault of the Veteran, VA has a heightened obligation to consider the applicability of the benefit of the doubt rule, to assist him in developing his claims, and to explain the reasons and bases for the decision concerning his claims. Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215, 217-18 (2005) citing Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46, 51 (1996). See also Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 542, 548 (1992); O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991). No presumption, however, either in favor of the claimant or against VA, arises when there are lost or missing service records. See Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215, 217-18 (2005) (Court declined to apply "adverse presumption" against VA where records had been lost or destroyed while in Government control because bad faith or negligent destruction of the documents had not been shown). Moreover, the mere fact that these records are unavailable for consideration, while indeed unfortunate, does not obviate the need for the Veteran to still have medical nexus evidence supporting his claim for service connection by suggesting a correlation between his currently claimed condition and his military service. Milostan v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 250, 252 (1993) (citing Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 401, 406 (1991) and O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365, 367 (1991)). In other words, missing records concerning his service, either STRs or service personnel records (SPRs), do not lower the threshold for an allowance of his claim. The legal standard for proving a claim is not lowered; rather, the Board's obligation to discuss and evaluate evidence is heightened. See Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 46 (1996). Cf. Collette v. Brown, 82 F.3d 389, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Arms v. West, 12 Vet. App. 188, 194-95 (1999). And, unfortunately, the record does not contain the required supporting medical nexus evidence in this particular instance concerning the claim for service connection for left and right leg shrapnel wound residuals. Further in this regard, the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC), which is a military records repository, provided a negative response to VA's request for the Veteran's service records file. It was noted that the Dept. of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps headquarters, had searched in July 1994 for the missing health and dental service records, but they were not located. So all procedures to obtain the Veteran's missing STRs were correctly followed. Notably, he was provided notices in April and July 2004 regarding the fact that his records were missing and, as a means of compensating for this, requesting that he assist by submitting any alternative records in his personal possession. In response, he was able to ultimately submit several missing SPRs, including DD Form 214s and a copy of another SPR showing combat wounds from shrapnel and resultant awards. Since all efforts have been exhausted, further attempts would be futile, so there is no basis for any further pursuit of his STRs. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(2) and (3). VA also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran by obtaining all relevant evidence in support of his claims that is obtainable, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudicing him. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159; see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The RO arranged for VA compensation examinations in October 2004, June 2008, and August 2009. And he personally submitted private treatment records, as well as personal statements and, as mentioned, copies of missing SPRs. There is no basis for a VA compensation examination for a medical nexus opinion concerning the nature and cause of his shrapnel wound residuals of his left and right legs. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). Even acknowledging his missing STRs, there is simply no competent evidence confirming any current residuals or currently diagnosed disability from shrapnel wounds to his left and right lower extremities (that is, aside from his already service connected shrapnel wound residuals involving his left knee, specifically). VA is not obligated to provide an examination in this circumstance when there is no competent and credible evidence suggesting the Veteran has the currently claimed disability because absent this required proof of current disability, there necessarily cannot be any relationship with or correlation to his military service, including to the type of injuries he sustained in combat in Vietnam. See Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 519 (2004). And as for the claim for a higher rating for his left knee disability, which, as mentioned, was service connected as a residual of a shrapnel wound sustained in combat in Vietnam, the record is inadequate and the need for a more contemporaneous examination occurs only when the evidence indicates the current rating may be incorrect. 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a) (2009). Here, the last VA compensation examination of the Veteran's left knee was in June 2008, so relatively recently. Consequently, another examination to evaluate the severity of the disability affecting this knee is not warranted because there is sufficient evidence, already on file, to fairly decide this claim insofar as assessing the severity of this condition. See Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377 (1994); Olsen v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 480, 482 (1992); Proscelle v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 629, 632 (1992); and Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 526 (1995). Therefore, the Board finds that VA has complied with the duty-to-assist requirements. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A. II. Analysis-Entitlement to Service Connection for Shrapnel Wound Residuals of the Left and Right Legs (Lower Extremities) The Veteran contends that, in addition to the shrapnel wounds and resulting residuals that already have been service connected, he received shrapnel wounds to his legs during his combat tour in Vietnam. In granting service connection for his other disabilities, VA already has conceded that he sustained a shrapnel wound to his left knee, and he is separately receiving compensation for that resultant disability. So the question at issue is whether he has additional disability from shrapnel wounds in that combat so as to also involve his lower extremities (left and right legs, aside from his left knee). Service connection is granted if it is shown the Veteran has disability resulting from an injury sustained or a disease contracted in the line of duty, or for aggravation during service of a pre-existing condition beyond its natural progression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306 (2009). To establish entitlement to service connection, there must be: (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain cases, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus, i.e., etiological link between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 252 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Contrary to his assertions, aside from his left knee, there is simply no evidence of record suggesting the Veteran has current disability involving his left and right legs as a result of the shrapnel wounds he sustained in combat in Vietnam. Proof of current disability is perhaps the most fundamental requirement for establishing entitlement to service connection. See Degmetich v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 208 (1995); 104 F.3d 1328, 1332 (1997) (holding that VA compensation only may be awarded to an applicant who has disability on the date of application, not for past disability). See, too, Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) (indicating that, in the absence of proof of current disability, there can be no valid claim since service connection presupposes a current diagnosis of the condition claimed). See also McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007) (further clarifying that the requirement of current disability is satisfied when the claimant has disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or during the pendency of that claim and that he may be granted service connection even though the disability resolves prior to VA's adjudication of the claim). Here, though, there is simply no such evidence or indication. Concerning this, the Veteran's post-service private medical records are completely unremarkable for any documented complaint, treatment, or diagnosis of a shrapnel wound disorder or residuals involving either leg, again, aside from that documented concerning his left knee specifically. Rather, the competent evidence of record specifically discounts the notion of other existing residuals or disorder in his legs. Indeed, the report of his October 2004 VA examination states that, "at the time of this examination, it appears that the [Veteran's] shrapnel wounds consist of both hands and his left knee and are superficial in nature." Importantly, then, that October 2004 VA examination report's findings were unremarkable regarding any other shrapnel wound residuals so as to also involve his legs. X-rays of his right knee, for example, were entirely negative. Also, the report of a more recent June 2008 VA examination notes that, aside from the injury to the Veteran's left knee, "all of the other shrapnel wounds were superficial," "there was no injury to any muscle, and no muscle has been affected by the residuals of the shrapnel." And an even more recent August 2009 VA examiner only found scarring on the left knee, nowhere else on the Veteran's left or right legs. So there are no objective clinical findings supporting the notion of any current left or right leg residuals from shrapnel wounds, except for as they relate to his left knee (which, as explained, are already service connected). The Veteran complained of occasional pain in his right knee from extended walking or running. But mere pain, alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition, is not generally considered a disability and cannot substantiate a claim for service connection. See Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999), appeal dismissed in part, and vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 239 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Veteran is certainly competent, even as a layman, to comment on any symptoms within his five senses, especially that involving pain in his legs. On the other hand, he is not competent to provide a probative opinion concerning the appropriate diagnosis of the underlying conditions causing his pain. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2) and Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994) (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). In fact, since service, no doctor or other qualified medical health care professional has ever provided a clinical diagnosis suggesting the Veteran has disability involving his legs (aside from his left knee), and especially not as residuals of shrapnel wounds. So obviously there is no possible means of attributing what amounts to a non-existent condition to his military service. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See, too, Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Simply stated, the medical record outweighs the Veteran's personal belief that he has left and right leg shrapnel wound residuals due to his military service from his combat wounds in Vietnam, aside from his left knee. Thus, absent the required proof of current disability, service connection cannot be granted. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) (indicating service connection presupposes a current diagnosis of the condition claimed). Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for shrapnel wound residuals of the left and right legs (aside from the already service-connected left knee shrapnel wound residuals). So there is no reasonable doubt to resolve in the Veteran's favor, and this claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). III. Analysis-Entitlement to an Initial Rating Higher than 10 Percent for the Residuals of the Shrapnel Wound to the Left Knee The Veteran contends that his service connected shrapnel wound residuals of his left knee deserve a higher rating. He currently has a 10 percent rating for his left knee due to arthritis with associated painful limitation of motion, on flexion, under DC 5260. This rating, up from the initial 0 percent, has been in effect since December 9, 2003, the date he filed his claim. Disability ratings are determined by the application of VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), 38 C.F.R. Part 4. The percentage ratings in the Rating Schedule represent, as far as can be practicably determined, the average impairment in earning capacity resulting from diseases and injuries incurred or aggravated during military service and their residual conditions in civil occupations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. When a question arises as to which of two ratings apply under a particular diagnostic code, the higher evaluation is assigned if the disability more nearly approximates the criteria for the higher rating; otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. When reasonable doubt arises as to the degree of disability, this doubt will be resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. The Board has considered the potential application of various other provisions of the regulations governing VA benefits, irrespective of whether they were expressly raised, as well as the entire history of the Veteran's disability in reaching its decision. See 38 C.F.R. 4.1; Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 592 (1995). Since the Veteran's claim arises from his disagreement with the initial rating assigned following the grant of service connection, the Board finds that some discussion of the Fenderson case is warranted. Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 125-126 (1999). In this case, the Court noted the distinction between a new claim for an increased evaluation of a service-connected disability and a case, as here, in which the Veteran expresses dissatisfaction with the assignment of an initial disability evaluation where the disability in question has just been service connected. In the former situation, the Court held in Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994), that the current level of disability is of primary importance. In the Fenderson scenario, however, where, as here, the Veteran has expressed dissatisfaction with the assignment of an initial rating, VA must assess the level of disability from the date of initial application for service connection and determine whether the level of disability warrants the assignment of different disability ratings at different times over the life of the claim-a practice known as "staged rating." Fenderson, 12 Vet. App. 125-126. Turning back now to the applicable statutes and regulations, degenerative arthritis (hypertrophic or osteoarthritis), when substantiated by X-ray findings, is rated on the basis of limitation of motion under the appropriate diagnostic codes for the specific joint or joints involved - which, here, are DC 5260 for limitation of flexion and DC 5261 for limitation of extension. When the limitation of motion of the specific joint or joints involved is noncompensable (i.e., 0 percent) under the appropriate diagnostic codes, a rating of 10 percent is for application for each such major joint or group of minor joints affected by limitation of motion to be combined, not added under Diagnostic Code 5003. Limitation of motion must be objectively confirmed by findings such as swelling, muscle spasm or satisfactory evidence of painful motion. Moreover, under Diagnostic Code 5003, in the absence of limitation of motion, a 10 percent rating is warranted where there is X-ray evidence of involvement of 2 or more major joints or 2 or more minor joint groups. A higher 20 percent rating requires X-ray evidence of involvement of 2 or more major joints or 2 or more minor joint groups, with occasional incapacitating exacerbations. For purposes of rating disability from arthritis, the knee is considered a major joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.45(f). DC 5260 provides that flexion limited to 15 degrees warrants a 30 percent rating; flexion limited to 30 degrees warrants a 20 percent rating; flexion limited to 45 degrees warrants a 10 percent rating; and flexion limited to 60 degrees warrants a 0 percent (noncompensable) rating. DC 5261 provides that extension limited to 45 degrees warrants a 50 percent rating; extension limited to 30 degrees warrants a 40 percent rating; extension limited to 20 degrees warrants a 30 percent rating; extension limited to 15 degrees warrants a 20 percent rating; extension limited to 10 degrees warrants a 10 percent rating; extension limited to 5 degrees warrants a 0 percent (noncompensable) rating. Normal range of motion of the knee is from 0 degrees of extension to 140 degrees of flexion. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71, Plate II. Under DC 5257, "other" knee impairment - including recurrent subluxation or lateral instability, warrants a 10 percent rating if resulting in slight disability, a 20 percent rating for moderate disability, and a 30 percent rating if it is severe. The provisions of 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40, 4.45, and 4.59 (2009) must be considered in assigning an evaluation for degenerative or traumatic arthritis under DC 5003 or 5010. Rating personnel must consider functional loss and clearly explain the impact of pain on the disability. When an evaluation of a disability is based on limitation of motion, the Board must also consider, in conjunction with the otherwise applicable diagnostic code, any additional functional loss the Veteran may have by virtue of other factors as described in 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.40 and 4.45. DeLuca v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 202, 206 (1995). These factors include more or less movement than normal, weakened movement, premature or excess fatigability, incoordination, pain on movement, swelling, and deformity or atrophy of disuse. The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 state that disability of the musculoskeletal system is primarily the inability, due to damage or inflammation in parts of the system, to perform normal working movements of the body with normal excursion, strength, speed, coordination and endurance. A finding of functional loss due to pain must be supported by adequate pathology and evidenced by the visible behavior of the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40; Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 80, 85 (1997). VA's General Counsel has held that a claimant who has arthritis and instability of the knee may be rated separately under Diagnostic Codes 5003 and 5257, respectively. VAOPGCPREC 23-97; 62 Fed. Reg. 63,604 (July 1, 1997; revised July 24, 1997). The General Counsel subsequently clarified in VAOPGCPREC 9-98 (August 14, 1998) that, for a knee disability rated under DC 5257 to warrant a separate rating for arthritis based on X-ray findings and limitation of motion, limitation of motion under DC 5260 or DC 5261 need not be compensable but must at least meet the criteria for a zero-percent rating. VA's General Counsel further explained that, if a Veteran has a disability rating under DC 5257 for instability of the knee, a separate rating for arthritis could also be based on X-ray findings and painful motion under 38 C.F.R. § 4.59. Read together, DC 5003 and 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 provide that painful motion due to degenerative arthritis, which is established by X-ray, is deemed to be limitation of motion and warrants the minimum rating for a joint, even if there is no actual limitation of motion. Lichtenfels v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 484, 488 (1991). Also, VA's General Counsel additionally held that separate ratings may be assigned, as well, for limitation of knee extension and flexion. Specifically, where a Veteran has both a compensable level of limitation of flexion and a compensable level of limitation of extension of the same knee, the limitations must be rated separately to adequately compensate him for functional loss associated with injury to his leg and knee. VAOPGCPREC 9-04 (Sept. 17, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 59,990 (2005). With any form of arthritis, painful motion is an important factor of disability. The intent of the schedule is to recognize painful motion with joint or particular pathology as productive of disability. Joints that are actually painful, unstable, or malaligned, due to healed injury, should be entitled to at least the minimum compensable rating for the joint. Special note should be taken of objective indications of pain on pressure or manipulation, muscle spasm, crepitation, and active and passive range of motion of both the damaged joint and the opposite undamaged joint. 38 C.F.R. § 4.59. In considering the applicability of other diagnostic codes, the Board finds that 5256 (ankylosis of the knee), 5258 (dislocation of semilunar cartilage), 5262 (impairment of the tibia and fibula) and 5263 (genu recurvatum) are not applicable in this case, as the medical evidence does not show the Veteran has any of these other conditions. See Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 532 (1993) (choice of diagnostic code should be upheld if it is supported by explanation and evidence). For example, the mere fact that he continues to have range of motion in his knee, albeit not normal range of motion (especially, as will be explained, on flexion), in turn means that, by definition, his knee is not ankylosed. Ankylosis is the complete immobility and consolidation of a joint due to disease, injury or surgical procedure. See Dinsay v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 79, 81 (1996) and Lewis v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 259 (1992) [citing Saunders Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, and Allied Health at 68 (4th ed. 1987)]. Upon review of the probative and competent medical evidence of record, the Board finds that an initial rating higher than 10 percent for the Veteran's service-connected left knee disability is not warranted. The most important competent evidence during the period of the appeal comes in the way of the October 2004 and the June 2008 VA examination reports. The October 2004 VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran with status-post superficial shrapnel wound, left knee, with retained shrapnel. Range of motion findings showed minimal limitation. He had full extension to 0 degrees. And his flexion was only relatively slightly limited, to 130 degrees (just 10 degrees shy of the normal 140 degrees), although the examiner did not indicate whether there was pain on motion that might or could further restrict the motion in this direction. The June 2008 VA examiner has clarified, after X-rays, that the Veteran has post-traumatic degenerative joint disease (DJD), i.e., arthritis of the left patella. But even so, range-of-motion testing by the June 2008 VA examiner revealed full extension in the left knee, so to 0 degrees, without any pain on motion - including as a result of the arthritis. And flexion again was only slightly to moderately limited - to 120 degrees, with pain not occurring until after 90 degrees. The Veteran reported experiencing mild flare-ups of his arthritis, lasting 1 to 2 days, occurring every 2 to 3 weeks, with just mild effects on limitation of motion or other functional impairment. So even considering the extent of the pain associated with his arthritis, the Veteran has not had any resultant limitation of extension in his left knee during the entire period at issue, i.e., since filing his December 2003 claim, so as to warrant a compensable rating under DC 5261. He always has had full extension, so to 0 degrees. And, notably, for even the minimum compensable rating of 10 percent under this code, extension must be restricted to at least 10 degrees, and it clearly is not according to the VA compensation examiners. Indeed, since the Veteran had completely full (i.e., entirely normal) extension to 0 degrees, again, even considering his pain, it is not sufficiently limited to warrant even the most minimum 0 percent rating under this code, requiring extension limited to 5 degrees. And there is no pain on extension, precluding a minimum compensable rating of 10 percent on the basis of painful extension motion due to the degenerative arthritis. Concerning flexion, a higher 20 percent rating under DC 5260 requires flexion limited to 30 degrees, and there simply is no objective clinical evidence to document such limitation of flexion in the left knee, even again considering the extent of the Veteran's pain associated with his arthritis. Significantly, the RO already appears to have considered his painful flexion in assigning a 10 percent rating for his left knee flexion. As already explained, read together, DC 5003 and 38 C.F.R. § 4.59 provide that painful motion due to degenerative arthritis, which is established by X-ray, is deemed to be limitation of motion and warrants the minimum rating for a joint, even if there is no actual limitation of motion. Lichtenfels v. Derwinski; 1 Vet. App. 484, 488 (1991). However, there is no basis for increasing the rating beyond the minimal compensable level of 10 percent when, as here, the pain associated with the arthritis formed the basis of this minimum compensable rating because, without this consideration, the Veteran does not have the required limitation of motion to otherwise warrant this rating. With regard to establishing loss of function due to pain, it is necessary that complaints be supported by adequate pathology and be evidenced by the visible behavior of the claimant. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40. The Board finds that the effects of pain, and DeLuca factors of functional loss, reasonably shown to be due to the Veteran's arthritis of the left knee are adequately contemplated in the currently assigned 10 percent rating. There is no indication that his associated pain causes functional loss greater than that contemplated by the 10 percent evaluation now assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40, 4.45, 4.59; DeLuca v. Brown. At most, even considering his pain, the flexion in his left knee is limited to 90 degrees, which far exceeds the 30-degrees' limitation required for a higher 20 percent rating under DC 5260. In addition, although he has arthritis under DC 5003 with resulting limitation of flexion under DC 5260, the Veteran is not entitled to a separate rating under DC 5257 for recurrent subluxation or lateral instability. Concerning instability, all findings by the October 2004 VA examiner were negative. In this regard, the cruciate and collateral ligaments were intact, and the Veteran had a negative Lachman's test, negative anterior drawer test, negative McMurray's examination, and negative effusion. X-rays confirmed the presence of retained foreign metallic material in this knee, consistent with shrapnel, just as the Veteran has reported. But during the June 2008 VA examination, there was no symptomatology of the left knee suggesting it gives way or is unstable. There also was no weakness, subluxation, locking, or effusion. So there is no objective clinical evidence of instability or subluxation to afford the Veteran the possibility of a separate compensable (10 percent) rating under DC 5257. The Board also considers the possibility the Veteran may be entitled to a separate compensable rating for his left knee scar. Concerning this, the October 2004 VA examination found the Veteran had a 3 cm medial joint line scar, which was well-healed, nonadherent to the underlying structures or tissue (i.e., superficial), with no evidence of ulcerative breakdown (stable), keloid formation, or gross pain to palpation. And the June 2008 VA examiner similarly found that the Veteran has a 0.1cm. by 5.0cm. scar (less than 39 sq. cm.) on the medial aspect of his left knee irregular elliptical hypopigmented scar, with etiology to shrapnel fragmentation wound. The examiner also noted there was no skin breakdown (stable) and that the Veteran reports no pain from the scar. The applicable schedular criteria for skin disorders are set out in 38 C.F.R. § 4.118, DCs 7801-7805. The schedular criteria by which skin disorders are rated were recently revised, effective October 23, 2008, so that it more clearly reflects VA policies concerning the evaluation of scars. But, they are inapplicable to the Veteran's skin disorder, save the removal of DC 7803 governing unstable scars, which the Veteran does not have. 73 Fed. Reg. 54,708-54,712 (September 23, 2008). Under the former regulations, a compensable disability rating is warranted for a scar that is deep or that causes limited motion in an area or areas exceeding 6 square inches (39 square centimeters) (DC 7801); for a superficial scar that does not cause limited motion but which covers an area of 144 square inches (929 sq. cm.) or greater (DC 7802); for an unstable, superficial scar (DC 7803); for a superficial scar that is painful on examination (DC 7804). 38 C.F.R. § 4.118 (2008). But, here, the objective medical evidence shows the Veteran's left knee scar is less than 39 square cm., superficial, stable, with no indication of pain on examination or that the scar causes limitation of motion or function. Therefore, the medical evidence does not warrant a compensable rating for this scar, under either the former or recent versions of the rating criteria. The Veteran is competent, as a layman, to report on that as to which he has personal knowledge. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994). But without the appropriate medical training and expertise, he is not competent to provide a probative (persuasive) opinion on a medical matter, especially the severity of his service-connected left knee DJD or left knee scar, given the findings of the VA compensation examiners. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) Since the Veteran's left knee disability has never been more than 10-percent disabling at any time since the effective date of service connection, the Board cannot "stage" this rating. Fenderson, 12 Vet. App at 125-26. The preponderance of the evidence is against his claim, for the reasons and bases discussed, therefore the "benefit-of-the-doubt" rule is inapplicable, and his claim must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1991). Extra-Schedular Consideration There is no evidence of exceptional or unusual circumstances to warrant referring this case for extra-schedular consideration. 38 C.F.R. § 3.321(b)(1) (2009). See also Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111 (2008). The Board finds no evidence that the Veteran's left knee disability has markedly interfered with his ability to work, meaning above and beyond that contemplated by his 10 percent schedular initial rating for his left knee disability. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.1, indicating that, generally, the degrees of disability specified in the Rating Schedule are considered adequate to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or illnesses proportionate to the severity of the several grades of disability. See, too, Van Hoose v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 361, 363 (1993) (reiterating that the disability rating, itself, is recognition that industrial capabilities are impaired). Furthermore, there is no evidence of any other exceptional or unusual circumstances, such as frequent hospitalizations, suggesting the Veteran is not adequately compensated for this disability by the regular rating schedule. His evaluation and treatment has been primarily-if not exclusively, on an outpatient basis, not as an inpatient. See Bagwell v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 237, 238-9 (1996); Floyd v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 88, 96 (1996); Shipwash v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 218, 227 (1995); and VAOPGCPREC 6-96 (August 16, 1996). ORDER The claim for service connection for shrapnel wound residuals of the legs is denied. The claim for an initial rating higher than 10 percent for the left knee disability also is denied. REMAND The Veteran asserts that his bilateral hearing loss impairs his ability to adequately function at his job, which involves extensive communication by telephone. He had VA audiological examinations in October 2004 and more recently in June 2008. At the more recent examination, he was diagnosed as having normal to profound bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. Word recognition scores were fair in both ears. He reported to the examiner that he cannot understand people and interact with them successfully because of his hearing loss. He added that loud noises cause him physical pain. Following extensive active duty service ending in 1989, he worked as security at a nuclear power plant until retiring in 2004. He apparently retired by age or his long duration of work history. It is unclear whether his hearing loss caused him any occupational impairment and whether this in turn played a role in his retirement or lack of employment since. Unfortunately, the October 2004 and June 2008 VA audiological examination reports both failed to address the impact of the Veteran's hearing loss on his ability to obtain or maintain substantially gainful employment. Significantly, C&P hearing examination worksheets were revised during the pendency of this appeal to include the effect of the Veteran's hearing loss disability on his occupational functioning and daily activities. See Revised Disability Examination Worksheets, Fast Letter 07-10 (Dep't of Veterans Affairs Veterans Apr. 24, 2007); see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.10 (2009); Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 455-56 (2007). Because the June 2008 examiner did not comment on the specific functional effects of the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss disability, the Board finds that an additional examination and opinion addressing the impact of the Veteran's hearing loss on his daily functioning is needed to fairly decide this claim. Martinak, 21 Vet. App. at 455- 56. Accordingly, this remaining claim is REMANDED for the following additional development and consideration: 1. Schedule the Veteran for another VA examination to determine the current severity and effect of his hearing loss on his occupational functioning and daily activities. All indicated testing and evaluation should be conducted. The claims file, including a complete copy of this remand, must be made available and reviewed by the examiner. In addition to objective test results, the examiner should fully describe the functional effects caused by the hearing disability in his or her final report and the impact of such on the Veteran's potential employability. In addressing the functional effects of the Veteran's hearing loss on his occupational functioning, generally, the examiner should consider his employment history, educational background, and day-to-day functioning in relation to his bilateral sensorineural hearing loss. In forming the opinion, the examiner should disregard both the age and any nonservice-connected disabilities the Veteran has. All opinions must be supported by a clear rationale, with citation to relevant medical findings. 2. Then readjudicate the claim for higher ratings for the bilateral hearing loss in light of any additional evidence. If the claim is not granted to the Veteran's satisfaction, send him another SSOC and give him an opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of this remaining claim. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument concerning the claim the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs