Citation Nr: 1006002 Decision Date: 02/18/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 08-28 888 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Nashville, Tennessee THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Tennessee Department of Veterans' Affairs ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Paul S. Rubin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active military service from August 1943 to November 1945. He died in March 1969. The appellant is his widow (surviving spouse). This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2008 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Nashville, Tennessee. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran died in March 1969. The death certificate lists the immediate cause of death as gunshot wound to the heart, with immediate onset. The manner of death was ruled a suicide. No contributory cause of death is listed. 2. At the time of his death, the Veteran did not have a single adjudicated service-connected disability. 3. The Veteran's suicide was not due to willful misconduct since he was mentally unsound at the time of his death. 4. There is no probative evidence of a lung or psychiatric disorder during the Veteran's military service or for many years thereafter, and there is no link between the Veteran's death by suicide and his military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The Veteran's death was not caused by, or substantially or materially contributed to by, an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service, to include on a presumptive basis. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 105, 1101, 1103, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1310, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(k), 3.1(n), 3.102, 3.159, 3.301, 3.302, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.312 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Review of the claims folder reveals compliance with the VCAA. The duty to notify was accomplished by way of VCAA letters from the RO to the appellant dated in October 2007 and January 2008. Those letters effectively satisfied the notification requirements of the VCAA consistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) by: (1) informing her about the information and evidence not of record that was necessary to substantiate her cause of death claim; (2) informing her about the information and evidence the VA would seek to provide; (3) informing her about the information and evidence she was expected to provide. See also Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). In addition, with regard to his Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) claims, the October 2007 VCAA notice letter is essentially compliant with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court's) decision in Hupp v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 342, 352-53 (2007). The RO did not, however, provide VCAA notice that an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if DIC benefits are awarded, as required by Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Regardless, since DIC benefits are being denied, no effective date will be assigned on this basis, so not providing additional notice concerning this downstream element of the claim is moot and, therefore, at most harmless error. See, too, Dunlap v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 112 (2007). As such, the Board concludes prejudicial error in the content of VCAA notice has not been demonstrated. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009) (reversing prior case law imposing a presumption of prejudice on any notice deficiency). As to the timing of VCAA notice, the Court and Federal Circuit Court have held that VCAA notice should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Mayfield II); Pelegrini II, 18 Vet. App. at 120. In the present case, the RO issued all required VCAA notice prior to the February 2008 rating decision on appeal. Thus, there is no timing error. With respect to the duty to assist, the RO has secured the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs). In addition, the appellant has also submitted several written personal statements, a death certificate, and a marriage certificate. In February 2008, the RO attempted to obtain the Veteran's private treatment records leading up to his death from the University of Tennessee Medical Center dated from 1960 to 1969. However, in a February 2008 response, this private facility remarked they do not have any medical records prior to 1985. It is common practice for hospitals and physicians to retain medical records for as long as required by law and then to destroy them. In addition, the appellant herself indicated in her September 2008 Substantive Appeal that the Veteran's private records were unavailable due to the time elapsed since his death, as well as the death of his physicians. In short, since the RO received a negative response, the Board is satisfied the RO has made reasonable efforts to obtain these private hospital records. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1). In addition, in the January 2008 VCAA letter, the appellant was advised that the RO needed a copy of the accident or police report from the Veteran's suicide or the name and address of the police department that investigated the matter. In this letter, the RO also asked for a copy of the autopsy report. The appellant was provided with a VA Form 21-4142 (Authorization and Consent to Release Information to the Department to Veterans Affairs). In this regard, VA is generally required to make reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining non-Federal records. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1). However, a claimant is required to cooperate fully with VA's efforts and, if necessary, authorize the release of existing records in an acceptable form. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1)(i), (ii). The duty to assist is not a one-way street; a claimant cannot remain passive when he or she has relevant information. See Wamhoff v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 517 (1996) (VA has duty to assist the claimant, not a duty to prove his or her claim while the claimant remains passive); accord Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). In this case, the appellant has not cooperated and provided the necessary information or authorization for VA to request a police report or autopsy report regarding the Veteran's suicide. In fact, the appellant stated in a February 2008 statement she was not aware of the existence of any police or autopsy reports. The Board is satisfied the RO has made reasonable efforts to obtain these non-Federal records, and no further effort is required. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). Finally, the Board finds that the evidence here does not require that a separate VA medical opinion be obtained with respect to appellant's cause of death claim for benefits. In this vein, the Board acknowledges the recent Federal Circuit cases of DeLaRosa v. Peake, 515 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and Wood v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008), which held that 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a) does not require the VA to assist a claimant in obtaining a medical opinion or examination in a DIC claim when no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. In the present case, the STRs are silent for any reference to the psychiatric or lung disorders which may have contributed to the Veteran's death. The death certificate is also negative for any mention of these disorders. There are also no post-service medical records documenting treatment for these disorders. Consequently, there is no reasonable possibility of substantiating this claim on any basis, and a medical opinion is not warranted. Overall, the Board is satisfied that the duty to assist has been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A. Governing Laws and Regulations - Cause of Death When it is determined that a Veteran's death is service connected, with service connection determined according to the standards applicable to disability compensation, his surviving spouse is generally entitled to DIC. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.5(a) (2009); see generally 38 U.S.C.A. Chapter 11. Generally, a Veteran's death is service connected if it resulted from a disability incurred or aggravated in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(k), 3.303. Direct service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110 (wartime service), 1131 (peacetime service); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Disorders diagnosed after discharge may still be service connected if all the evidence, including pertinent service records, establishes that the disorder was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In such case, the physician must relate the current condition to the period of service. Cosman v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 503, 505 (1992). Service connection may be demonstrated either by showing direct service incurrence or aggravation, as discussed above, or by use of applicable presumptions, if available. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994). As to presumptive service connection, some chronic diseases, such as psychoses, are presumed to have been incurred in service, although not otherwise established as such, if manifested to a degree of ten percent or more within one year of the date of separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(3), 1112(a)(1); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a). To establish service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death, the service-connected disability must be either the principal or a contributory cause of death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(a). A disability is the principal cause of death if it was the immediate or underlying cause of death, or was etiologically related to the death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(b). A disability is a contributory cause of death if it contributed substantially or materially to the cause of death, combined to cause death, aided or lent assistance to producing death - e.g., when a causal (not just a casual) connection is shown. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312(c). In short, the appellant is entitled to DIC benefits if the principal or contributory cause of the Veteran's death was (1) an already service-connected disability that caused or aggravated another disability, directly leading to the Veteran's death; or (2) a previously nonservice-connected disability that was in fact incurred or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), 3.310, 3.312. However, compensation shall not be paid if a disability is the result of the Veteran's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(n), 3.301(c). In fact, the Federal Circuit has held that a finding of willful misconduct precludes a finding of service connection for the purposes of DIC entitlement under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1310. See Myore v. Nicholson, 489 F.3d 1207, 1212 (2007). In order for a suicide to constitute willful misconduct, the act of self-destruction must be intentional. A person of unsound mind is incapable of forming an intent (mens rea, or guilty mind, which is an essential element of crime or willful misconduct). It is a constant requirement for a favorable action in a suicide case that the precipitating mental unsoundness be service connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(a) (2009). Whether a person, at the time of suicide, was so unsound mentally that he or she did not realize the consequences of such an act, or was unable to resist such impulse is a question to be determined in each individual case, based on all available lay and medical evidence pertaining to his or her mental condition at the time of suicide. The act of suicide or a bona fide attempt is considered to be evidence of mental unsoundness. Therefore, where no reasonable adequate motive for suicide is shown by the evidence, the act will be considered to have resulted from mental unsoundness. A reasonable adequate motive for suicide may be established by affirmative evidence showing circumstances which could lead a rational person to self-destruction. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(b) (2009). VA is to give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for death benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1154(a) (West 2002). With regard to lay evidence, the Federal Circuit Court recently held that lay evidence from the Veteran's spouse, when competent, can establish a nexus between the Veteran's death and an in- service disease or injury. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, a medical opinion is not always required to establish such a nexus. See id. As pertinent to this holding, the Federal Circuit has also previously rejected as "too broad" the proposition that competent medical evidence is always required when the determinative issue involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On this point, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (e.g., a broken leg), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377 (footnote omitted). In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the claimant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; and Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Analysis - Cause of Death In this case, the Veteran died on March [redacted], 1969. He was 50 years old. His death certificate lists the immediate cause of death as gunshot wound to the heart, with immediate onset. His death was ruled as a suicide. He died at home. No contributory causes of death are listed. According to the appellant, no autopsy was performed and no police records are available. See February 2008 appellant statement. At the time of his death, the Veteran did not have a single adjudicated service-connected disability. The appellant contends that the Veteran should be service- connected for a psychiatric disorder (described as a nervous condition with depression), that began during his military service in the 1940s during World War II. She believes that the Veteran committed suicide because he was mentally unsound at the time of his death due to symptoms of a service- connected psychiatric disorder. She maintains she witnessed the Veteran exhibiting psychiatric symptoms during the first year of their marriage in 1946, immediately after discharge from service in 1945. She also believes he suffered from lung problems due to asbestos exposure during his military service that further aggravated his psychiatric problems, leading to his death. See October 2007 appellant statement; September 2008 Substantive Appeal. The Board must first address the threshold question of whether the Veteran's suicide constitutes willful misconduct, thus barring payment of compensation. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 105, 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(n), 3.301(c). As noted above, in order for suicide to constitute willful misconduct, the act of self-destruction must be intentional. A person of unsound mind, however, is incapable of forming intent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(a). In the present case, there is no lay or medical evidence of any reasonable adequate motive for the Veteran's suicide by gunshot wound in March 1969. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(b)(3). In fact, the appellant has credibly asserted that the Veteran was suffering from nervous problems and depression at the time of his suicide. There is no other evidence suggesting the Veteran was of sound mind at the time of his death or that there were circumstances at the time of his death that could lead a rational person to commit suicide. Therefore, as set forth in the applicable regulation, the Veteran's act of suicide is considered to be evidence of mental unsoundness. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(b)(2). Accordingly, resolving reasonable doubt in the appellant's favor, the Board finds that the Veteran was mentally unsound at the time of his death, such that his act of suicide does not constitute willful misconduct as defined by the regulations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.302(c)(2). The remaining question for purposes of entitlement to DIC is whether symptoms of a service-connected psychiatric or lung disorder caused the Veteran to be mentally unsound at the time of his death. In fact, the Federal Circuit recently concluded that the distinction between mental unsoundness and willful misconduct makes little difference if the Veteran does not have a service-connected psychiatric disorder. See DeLaRosa, 515 F.3d at 1323. In other words, service connection for mental unsoundness presumed as a result of suicide, as addressed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.302, may be granted only where a service-connected disability is already established. Id. Without a prior finding of service connection, the provisions of § 3.302 are not applicable. Id. Unfortunately for the appellant, it is in this critical element that her cause of death claim fails. Specifically, there is no competent and credible evidence of a relationship between any psychiatric or lung disorder and the Veteran's period of military service from August 1943 to November 1945. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(k), 3.303; Boyer, 210 F.3d at 1353; Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Veteran's STRs are negative for any complaint, treatment, or diagnosis of a psychiatric or lung disorder. Notably, a November 1945 chest X-ray was negative for a respiratory disorder. The Veteran's November 1945 discharge examination is negative for a psychiatric or lung disorder. His service records do not demonstrate any evidence of combat, and there has been no specific description of combat from the appellant. There is also no specific evidence as to how he was exposed to asbestos during service. Post-service, since there is no objective indication of a psychosis within one year after service, the appellant is not entitled to application of the presumptive provisions either. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. In addition, the evidence as a whole does not show continuity of symptomatology of a psychiatric or lung disorder since service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494-97 (1997). In fact, there are no post-service medical records in the claims folder showing treatment for a psychiatric or respiratory disorder. The appellant has alleged the Veteran underwent private treatment for a lung disorder from 1960 until his death in 1969. See February 2006 VA Form 21-4142 (Authorization and Consent to Release Information to the Department to Veterans Affairs). Although the appellant is competent and credible to say the Veteran received treatment for a lung disorder, there is still no probative evidence that any a lung disorder was related to service or was even a contributory cause of death. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.312. The Board acknowledges the appellant is indeed competent to report her observations of psychiatric and lung problems from the time of the Veteran's military service. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). See also 38 C.F.R.§ 3.159(a)(2). But once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether the evidence also is credible. The former, the Court has held, is a legal concept, which is useful in determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while the latter is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997). See also Layno, supra. Here, although her lay assertions regarding the Veteran's observable symptoms are still credible, they are outweighed by the dearth of any in- service or post-service medical evidence revealing medical diagnoses for a psychiatric or lung disorder. In essence, the Board affords the appellant's lay statements less probative weight in light of the lack of corroborating medical evidence upon discharge from service and for so many years thereafter. Simply put, her lay contentions regarding his symptomatology are outweighed by the lack of any medical evidence. See generally Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 310 (2007). See also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (2006) (finding that the Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against the lay evidence in determining credibility, but the Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence.) Finally, with regard to lay evidence, as noted above, in certain instances lay evidence from the Veteran's spouse, when competent, can establish a nexus between the Veteran's death and an in-service disease or injury. Davidson, 581 F.3d at 1315-16. But in the present case, although the appellant is indeed competent to report her observations on the Veteran's medical symptoms and discomfort during his lifetime, she is not competent to render an etiological opinion as to the purported relationship between his cause of death by suicide due to mental unsoundness and his military service, absent evidence showing that she has medical training or expertise. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1), (2); Jandreau , 492 F.3d at 1377. She does not meet any of the three exceptions for competent lay evidence as listed under Jandreau. In short, although the Board acknowledges that symptoms from a psychiatric disorder appear to have contributed to the Veteran's death by suicide, there is insufficient evidence that such a psychiatric disorder was incurred during his military service decades earlier. Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death, so there is no reasonable doubt to resolve in the appellant's favor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. ORDER Service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is denied. ____________________________________________ A. BRYANT Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs