Citation Nr: 1006468 Decision Date: 02/22/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 09-06 194 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Columbia, South Carolina THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea. 2. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen service connection for a right hip disorder, including secondary to service-connected lumbosacral strain and/or degenerative changes of the left hip. 3. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 4. Entitlement to compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for a heart disability and hypertension. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Jason A. Lyons, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1978 to October 1990. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2007 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Columbia, South Carolina, denying an original claim for service connection for sleep apnea, and petition to reopen a claim for service connection for a right hip disorder. The December 2007 rating decision also reopened the claim for service connection for PTSD, and denied it again on the merits. Notwithstanding the RO's action taken on the PTSD claim, the Board must determine whether to reopen the claim in the first instance, because this affects the Board's legal jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying claim on a de novo basis. See Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The issue of compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for a heart disability and hypertension arises out of the Veteran's February 2009 statement accepted as a timely Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the RO's rating decision denying entitlement to that benefit. Under these circumstances remand is required for issuance of a Statement of the Case (SOC). See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238, 240-41 (1999). In November 2009, the Veteran testified during a personal hearing before the undersigned Acting Veterans Law Judge at the Board's Central Office in Washington, D.C. A transcript of that hearing is of record. In January 2009, the Veteran's representative provided additional evidence consisting of correspondence from a family member and a friend, along with a waiver of RO initial consideration. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.800, 20.1304(c) (2009). The Board is reopening the claim for service connection for PTSD, and denying the petition to reopen pertaining to a right hip disorder. The underlying claim for service connection for PTSD on its merits, and claims for service connection for sleep apnea and benefits under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (for heart disability and hypertension) are addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and are REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) in Washington, DC. As a further preliminary matter, the Veteran has provided a formal application for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability (TDIU) in December 2006, and again in February 2009. This additional claim, however, has not been developed and adjudicated by the RO. Accordingly, the matter is referred to the RO for appropriate development and consideration. Moreover, through a statement made upon a February 2009 VA Form 9 (Substantive Appeal to the Board) the Veteran raised informal claims for service connection for an upper back disability, and increased disability ratings for service- connected disabilities of lumbosacral strain, L5-S1 radiculopathy to the left leg, and degenerative changes of the left hip. These matters also have not been originally adjudicated by the RO, and must be referred back there for initial consideration. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a February 2006 rating decision, the RO denied service connection for a right hip condition, finding no nexus to service or service-connected lumbosacral strain and/or degenerative changes of the left hip, and denied service connection for PTSD, finding no verified in-service stressful event. 2. Since the February 2006 rating decision, no additional evidence has been received which relates to an unestablished fact of nexus to service or service-connected disability that is necessary to substantiate the Veteran's claim for service connection for a right hip disorder. 3. Some of the additional evidence received relates to an unestablished fact of in-service stressful event that is necessary to substantiate the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD, thus raising a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The February 2006 rating decision which denied service connection for a right hip disorder and PTSD became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.200, 20.202, 20.1103 (2009). 2. New and material evidence has not been received to reopen service connection for a right hip disorder. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2009). 3. New and material evidence has been received to reopen service connection for PTSD. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Duties to Notify and Assist the Claimant The Veterans' Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009), prescribes several requirements as to VA's duty to notify and assist a claimant with the evidentiary development of a pending claim for compensation or other benefits. Implementing regulations were created, codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326 (2009). VCAA notice consistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) must inform the claimant of any information and evidence (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (3) that VA will seek to provide on the claimant's behalf. A regulatory amendment effective for claims pending as of or filed after May 30, 2008 removed the requirement that VA specifically request the claimant to provide any evidence in his or her possession that pertains to the claim. 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353-56 (Apr. 30, 2008), codified later at 38 CFR 3.159(b)(1). In Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) established additional criteria as to the content of the notice to be provided in connection with a petition to reopen. Because the Board is granting reopening of service connection for PTSD, and remanding the underlying claim on the merits for additional development, a determination on whether the VCAA's duty to notify and assist provisions were satisfied is unnecessary at this point pending further development and the readjudication of the claim. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). Through VCAA notice correspondence dated in March 2007 and July 2007, the RO notified the Veteran as to each element of satisfactory notice set forth under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) on the petition to reopen service connection for a right hip disorder. The VCAA notice further indicated the joint obligation between VA and the Veteran to obtain pertinent evidence and information, stating that VA would undertake reasonable measures to assist in obtaining additional VA medical records, private treatment records and other Federal records. In addition, the July 2007 VCAA notice letter provided a claim-specific definition of "new and material" evidence as required under the Kent decision. In addition, the January 2009 Statement of the Case (SOC) explained the general criteria to establish claims for service connection, including the evidentiary criteria necessary to reopen a previously denied claim for that benefit. The RO has taken appropriate action to comply with the duty to assist the Veteran, through obtaining extensive VA outpatient treatment records. In support of his claim, the Veteran has provided various private treatment records, and several personal statements. He has testified during a Board Central Office hearing before the undersigned. The Veteran's representative has requested that the Veteran receive a VA medical examination in support of his claim pertaining to a right hip disorder. Pursuant to applicable law and regulations, VA is not required to provide a medical examination where the matter at hand is a petition to reopen a previously denied claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The duty to provide such an examination would only apply if the claim were reopened, and the medical evidence further warranted obtaining such an examination. Accordingly, the current record as it stands includes sufficient competent evidence to decide the claim. Under these circumstances, with regard to the issues addressed in this decision, the Board finds that VA's duties to notify and assist the Veteran have been fulfilled, and no further action is necessary to assist the Veteran. Reopening Service Connection for a Right Hip Disorder Service connection may be granted for any current disability that is the result of a disease contracted or an injury sustained while on active duty service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2009). Service connection may also be granted for a disease diagnosed after discharge, where all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). Service connection may also be granted for a disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a). In addition, a claimant is entitled to service connection on a secondary basis when it is shown that a service-connected disability has chronically aggravated a nonservice-connected disability. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). Under the current version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b), the regulation provides that any increase in severity of a nonservice-connected disease or injury proximately due to or the result of a service- connected disease or injury, and not due to the natural progress of the disease, will be service connected. In reaching this determination as to aggravation of a nonservice-connected disability, consideration is required as to the baseline level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury (prior to the onset of aggravation by service-connected condition), in comparison to the current level of severity of the nonservice-connected disease or injury. See Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,744-47 (Sept. 7, 2006), later codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(b). Through a February 2006 rating decision, the RO denied the Veteran's original claim for service connection for a right hip disorder, finding that the evidence did not establish that this disorder was related to service or to the service- connected disabilities of lumbosacral strain or degenerative changes of the left hip. The RO observed that there was VA outpatient treatment on file indicating complaints of right hip pain, and showing osteoarthritis on both hips; however, there was no competent evidence associating a right hip condition with service, or otherwise with a service-connected disability. Thus, the denial of benefits encompassed both direct and secondary theories of entitlement. The Veteran did not appeal from the RO's rating decision upon notification of it. Consequently, the February 2006 rating decision became final and binding on the merits. See U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.200, 20.202, 20.1103. When a claim to reopen is presented under section 5108, VA must first determine whether the evidence presented or secured since the last final disallowance of the claim is new and material. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a); Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For purposes of the present appeal, new evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. For the purpose of establishing whether new and material evidence has been submitted, the credibility of the evidence, although not its weight, is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). See also Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 283 (1996). The basis for the former denial of benefits is lack of positive evidence on the element of the etiology of a right hip condition, namely, that relating the claimed disorder to service, or a service-connected disability. To reopen the claim, favorable evidence addressing the essential question of etiology would have to be received. The evidence obtained since the February 2006 rating decision consists of VA outpatient treatment records, an electromyogram (EMG) study from a private facility, a January 2009 VA Compensation and Pension examination, several personal statements from the Veteran, and a transcript of the Veteran's November 2009 Board hearing testimony. Records of VA outpatient treatment dated from July 2004 to January 2009 include an October 2004 MRI of the lower extremities which showed in part a normal right hip. A May 2008 report of treatment by a nurse practitioner denotes a complaint of generalized back and hip pain. There are numerous entries in the records pertaining to diagnosed osteoarthritis of the left hip, and on this side only. The foregoing records do not conclusively establish a current right hip disorder, particularly the October 2004 MRI which demonstrated a normal right hip. Moreover, assuming the likelihood of a right hip disorder as claimed, there is no indication from the medical records that said disorder has an etiological connection to a service-connected disability. The report of an August 2008 EMG study is limited in scope to evaluation of radiculopathy of neck pain to the upper extremities, and does not discuss or consider the potential for disability involving the right hip region. The report of a January 2009 VA medical examination pertains entirely to evaluation of the feet, resulting in a diagnosis of bilateral pes planus, and does not provide reference to a right hip disorder. The remaining evidence on file is comprised of the Veteran's own statements and hearing testimony. The Veteran's assertions then presented are generally cumulative of the existing evidence of record. See e.g., Untalan v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 467 (2006) (the presentation of new arguments based on evidence already of record as of the previous decision does not constitute new evidence). The Veteran further states that a VA physician told him that his right hip disorder was associated with existing left hip degenerative arthritis; however, this secondhand account cannot provide competent evidence of the requisite medical relationship to service-connected disability. See Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77 (1995) (statement of physician on subject of etiology is necessary instead of layperson account, as a reliable indicator of physician's opinion and its underlying basis). In addition, the Court has held that a claimant's lay testimony does not comprise a basis to reopen a claim where the determinative issue is that involving medical causation. See Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211, 214 (1993). In summary, the newly received evidence does not assist in establishing that a claimed right hip disorder is due to an incident of service, or is associated with a service- connected disability. Hence, new and material evidence has not been received to reopen the claim for service connection for a right hip disorder. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. As the criteria for new and material evidence to reopen service connection for a right hip disorder have not been met, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply, and the petition to reopen must be denied. See Annoni v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 463, 367 (1993). Reopening Service Connection for PTSD The criteria for establishing service connection for PTSD are: (1) medical evidence diagnosing PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. A diagnosis of PTSD must be established in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), which provides that all psychiatric diagnoses must conform to the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service to support a diagnosis of PTSD will vary depending upon whether the veteran engaged in "combat with the enemy," as established by recognized military combat citations or other official records. See, e.g., Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). If VA determines the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and his alleged stressor is combat-related, then his lay testimony or statement is accepted as conclusive evidence of the stressor's occurrence and no further development or corroborative evidence is required provided that such testimony is found to be "satisfactory," i.e., credible, and "consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of service." See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 164 (1996); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). If, however, the veteran's stressor is unrelated to participation in combat, then his lay testimony, in and of itself, is insufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain credible supporting information from an independent source that corroborates his testimony or statements, such as service records. See Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 146-47. See also Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996). The available sources for corroboration of a claimed stressor are not necessarily limited to service records, but may also include other sources of evidence such as lay statements from third- party individuals. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). By a February 2006 rating decision, the RO denied service connection for PTSD due to the lack of a verified stressor of record. The incidents alleged did not involve participation in combat, and hence required objective verification. The RO observed that one reported incident, involving a tank accident in the mid-1980s, had not been confirmed by reference to service personnel records. Another incident involving having been accidentally shot by bullets in 1990 could not be confirmed. Other described incidents consisted of post-service automobile accidents, which could not provide the basis for a finding of an in-service stressor. It was also considered that besides the objective requirement of a verified stressor from service, VA medical records did not show a definitive diagnosis of PTSD at any point. As previously indicated, the Veteran did not appeal from the February 2006 rating decision, and it therefore became final on the merits. See U.S.C.A. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.200, 20.202, 20.1103. Applying the standard as to whether to reopen the above claim, the Board must review independently each item of evidence submitted since the February 2006 denial of benefits. The grounds for the prior denial was the absence of a verified stressor, so evidence to warrant reopening the claim would have to address this element. In particular, the Board finds that the Veteran's May 2008 response to a PTSD stressor questionnaire and hearing testimony elicit new incidents that qualify as claimed in- service stressors. The Veteran indicated there was an incident in which he was falsely accused of having perpetrated murders at the Fort Benning base and was harassed by local law enforcement and at one point was detained at gunpoint. He further indicated that on one occasion he was present when the body of an individual who had been hanged from a tree was discovered by the base entrance. He further described several incidents of physical confrontations and fights perpetrated by commanding officers or fellow serviceman some of which were racially motivated. The forgoing indicates that there are additional identified stressors in furtherance of the Veteran's claim. These newly addressed events, while not yet having been objectively verified, provide a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran's claim. Thus, the criteria for new and material evidence has been met. The claim for service connection for PTSD is therefore reopened, and adjudication of this claim is deferred pending completion of the development requested below. ORDER New and material evidence not having been received, the claim to reopen service connection for a right hip disorder, including secondary to service-connected lumbosacral strain and/or degenerative changes of the left hip, is denied. New and material evidence having been received, the claim to reopen service connection for PTSD is granted. REMAND The Board is remanding the underlying reopened claim for service connection for PTSD for RO adjudication in the first instance. There remains specific additional development warranted both on this claim, and on the issue of service connection for sleep apnea. As to the issue of service connection for PTSD, the Veteran has identified several new stressful circumstances from service in support of this claim. One such incident is that local law enforcement authorities falsely accused him of having perpetrated murders at the Fort Benning base and at one point detained him at gunpoint. Another incident is having witnessed the discovery of the body of an individual who had been hanged from a tree by the base entrance. Also described are several incidents of physical confrontations and fights perpetrated by commanding officers or other serviceman that were racially motivated. The Board points out that the Veteran has on other occasions described 1999 and 2002 post-service automobile accidents, and a domestic dispute with his ex-wife beginning during service as claimed stressors, and that in contrast to the aforementioned incidents, these events do not have any connection to his service, and would not necessitate further consideration as qualifying in-service stressors. Regarding those incidents with a clear association with the Veteran's service, however, further evidentiary development is required. The Veteran must first be prompted to give more specific information on each incident. If possible, he should provide dates (or approximate dates within a time period 60-days), locations, complete names of individuals involved, and his unit designation at the time. He should further be prompted to offer any supporting evidence to confirm the events described, including but not limited to official service records, and lay statements from individuals involved. Following this, the RO should undertake any necessary measures to independently corroborate the Veteran's alleged stressors, including if warranted a unit history information request to the U. S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) for this purpose. Provided that through the above requested development at least one claimed stressor is independently verified, then schedule the Veteran for a VA psychiatric examination. The designated examiner should indicate whether a medical diagnosis of PTSD is warranted and if this is established, he should then offer an opinion as to whether this condition is the result of a confirmed stressor from service. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4) (2009) (VA will provide a medical examination or obtain a medical opinion based upon a review of the evidence of record if VA determines it is necessary to decide the claim). Turning to the claim for service connection for sleep apnea, VA outpatient records dated from as early as January 2004 indicate the diagnosis of this condition. A sleep study the following month was positive for obstructive sleep apnea. Meanwhile, there is no reference to any form of sleep disorder in the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs). Notwithstanding this, the Veteran presents an explanation for why the claimed condition is service related, alluding to the fact that his occupational duty in service was as a cavalry scout and required frequently conducting operations at night and sleeping in the daytime for periods of up to 2 to 3 days in a row. He states that the resulting fatigue and strain on his biological sleeping patterns contributed to the development of sleep apnea. Under VA law, the Veteran's assertions of in-service injury or other circumstances precipitating disability are to be afforded due consideration, even where not confirmed by actual service records. See also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Personnel records confirm the Veteran was a cavalry scout for the majority of his active duty service. The Board finds on these facts that a VA medical examination is necessary to ascertain whether sleep apnea had any origin in the Veteran's occupational duties during his service. Finally, the Veteran has filed a timely Notice of Disagreement in February 2009 with a RO rating decision earlier that month which in pertinent part denied compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for a heart disability and hypertension. Therefore, a remand is required for issuance of a Statement of the Case as the next step in the appellate process. See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238, 240-41 (1999); Holland v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 433, 437 (1997). Accordingly, these claims are REMANDED for the following action: 1. The RO/AMC should request copies of all additional records pertaining to the Veteran's outpatient treatment at the Augusta, Georgia, VA Medical Center (VAMC) since January 2009, and associate all records obtained with the claims file. 2. The RO/AMC should provide the Veteran another opportunity to identify information that pertains to his alleged stressors from service. Request further information with respect to the stressors he has described, to include such details as specific locations, dates (preferably within no more than a 60-day timeframe), names of any other individuals involved, and his unit designation at the time of the event(s) claimed. Also inform him of the opportunity to submit any evidence helping to verify these events, including lay statements from other individuals involved. 3. Then undertake all appropriate action to assist in the independent corroboration of the Veteran's stressors. This should include a request for relevant unit history information from the JSRRC as necessary. 4. Provided that at least one claimed stressor has been independently verified, then schedule the Veteran for a VA PTSD examination. The designated examiner should provide an opinion indicating whether it is at least as likely as not (i.e., 50 percent or greater probability) the Veteran has PTSD due to a confirmed stressor from service. In making this determination, only a stressor that is related to participation in combat during service or that has been independently verified is to be considered. If PTSD is diagnosed, the examiner should indicate what specific stressor in service provided the basis for this diagnosis. If PTSD is not diagnosed, the examiner should explain why the Veteran does not meet the DSM-IV criteria for this diagnosis. 5. The RO/AMC should schedule the Veteran for a VA respiratory disorders examination to determine the likely etiology of his claimed sleep apnea. The claims folder must be provided to and reviewed by the examiner in conjunction with the examination. All indicated tests and studies should be performed, and all findings should be set forth in detail. It is requested that the VA examiner offer an opinion as to whether sleep apnea is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) due to an incident of the Veteran's military service, to include his occupational duties in the capacity of a cavalry scout. The examiner should include in the examination report the rationale for any opinion expressed; however, if the examiner cannot respond to the inquiry without resort to speculation, he or she should so state, and further explain why it is not feasible to provide a medical opinion. 6. Thereafter, the RO/AMC should readjudicate the claims for service connection for PTSD and service connection for sleep apnea based upon all additional evidence received. If any benefit sought on appeal is not granted, the Veteran and his representative should be furnished with a Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC), and should be afforded an opportunity to respond before the file is returned to the Board for further appellate consideration. 7. The RO/AMC shall issue a Statement of the Case addressing the issue of entitlement to compensation under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1151 for a heart disability and hypertension. If, and only if, the Veteran submits a timely Substantive Appeal addressing this issue should it be returned to the Board for appellate review. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). The Veteran is advised to appear and participate in any scheduled VA examination(s), as failure to do so may result in denial of the claim(s). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655 (2009). These claims must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ J. Parker Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2009). Department of Veterans Affairs