Citation Nr: 1006497 Decision Date: 02/22/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 04-24 861 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability other than PTSD. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Judy J. Donegan, Attorney WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J.G. Reinhart, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from August 1966 to May 1970. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2004 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. In February 2008, the Veteran testified at a personal hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of that hearing is of record. In June 2008 the Board issued a decision in which it reopened a claim for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder and denied the appeal as to entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder and PTSD. The Veteran appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court). In August 2009, the Veterans Court granted a joint motion for partial remand filed by the Veteran and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Parties), vacated the Board decision as to the issues of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder and PTSD, and remanded the issues for compliance with the instructions in the joint motion. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD and depression, which had onset during service or is etiologically related to his service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD and depression, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Preliminary matters In December 2009, an attorney working with the Veteran's appointed representative submitted a statement signed by the Veteran, an e-mail from "W.S.", a December 2005 letter from an attorney "A.F.", a Social Security Administration (SSA) form signed by the Veteran and dated in 2005. Also submitted was a request to remand the case to the RO for review of the newly submitted evidence. Under 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(c), if the Board receives pertinent evidence which has not yet been considered by the RO and the Veteran does not waive RO consideration of that evidence in the first instance, the Board must remand the matter to the RO for consideration of the evidence in the first instance. Evidence is not pertinent if it does not relate to or have a bearing on the appellate issue or issues. Id. The information regarding SSA benefits does not have a bearing on either issue on appeal because already of record and considered by the RO are the Veteran's SSA disability claim records. The evidence submitted in December 2009 adds nothing to the evidence in those SSA disability claim records. As to the e-mail from W.S., this e-mail refers to a fire aboard the Mauna Kea. The Veteran has previously submitted evidence from other persons who state that they served aboard the Mauna Kea and remember the fire. The issue regarding whether there was, or was not, a fire on the Mauna Kea, is not in dispute, therefore, this evidence is not pertinent to this claim. Further, the reason that the Board denies the Veteran's claim, to the extent that the Veteran claims to have a psychiatric disorder as the result of experiencing this fire, is the Veteran's lack of credibility regarding his alleged reaction to that fire. W.S.'s e-mail does not address the Veteran's credibility in this matter and therefore has no bearing on an issue on appeal. As the documents submitted in December 2009 are not evidence pertinent to either issue on appeal, there is no basis for remanding the matter to the RO for consideration of the documents in the first instance. Service connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2009). "To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: "(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service"-the so-called "nexus" requirement." Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Establishing service connection for PTSD requires (1) a current medical diagnosis of PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The diagnosis of PTSD must comply with the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV). Id., see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (2009). Evidence of record does not show that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy. Therefore, his lay testimony cannot, by itself, establish the occurrence of an alleged stressor. See Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91, 98 (1993). Instead, the record must contain corroborative evidence that substantiates or verifies the Veteran's testimony or statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994). The requisite additional evidence may be obtained from sources other than the veteran's service medical records. See Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395 (1996). In reviewing evidence of record the Board has the "authority to discount the weight and probity of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence." Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As to the Board's determinations regarding credibility, the U.S.Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has stated "[t]his is not to say that the Board may not discount lay evidence when such discounting is appropriate. Rather, the Board, as fact finder, is obligated to, and fully justified in, determining whether lay evidence is credible in and of itself, i.e., because of possible bias, conflicting statements, etc." Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F3.d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Similarly, the Veterans Court has stated that "[t]he credibility of a witness can be impeached by a showing of interest, bias, inconsistent statements, or, to a certain extent, bad character." Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 511 (1995) As explained below, the Veteran's reported anxiety reaction during service was a physical rather than psychological disorder and, as shown by medical evidence and the Veteran's own statements, resolved decades prior to when he filed his current claim. Hence, service connection is not warranted based on his reported inservice symptoms of a nervous disorder manifested by his shaking hands. VA treatment records from December 2004 show that the Veteran has been diagnosed with depression and PTSD. The evidence is in conflict as to whether the diagnosis of PTSD complies with the criteria set for in the DSM IV. However, the Board need not and does not reach the issue of whether he PTSD has been diagnosed in accordance with the DSM-IV. Rather, the Board is denying the Veteran's appeal with regard to PTSD because his alleged stressors are, when taken as a whole, incredible, and, based on his demonstrated lack of credibility his reports of contemporaneous and present reactions to events during service, are not credible. Whether service connection is warranted for any psychiatric disorder from which the Veteran currently suffers hinges on the only remaining connection he has asserted between his psychiatric disorders and his service. This connection is the occurrence of a number of alleged events during service that resulted in an acquired psychiatric condition, aggravated an existing condition, or caused a psychiatric disability - whether diagnosed as depression or PTSD or another psychiatric illness. The preponderance of evidence shows that the Veteran's accounts are not credible, the vast majority of the events that the Veteran has reported as causing his psychiatric symptoms are not verifiable, and, to the extent that two of those events may possibly be subject to verification, his demonstrated lack of credibility renders his reported reactions to those events not credible. The Veteran has offered a growing number of events that he alleges to have experienced during service and resulted in a current psychiatric disability. The number of events alleged, the fact that he has added events since he first reported any stressful event, the lack of mention of the events in an earlier claim for service connection for a psychiatric disability, a finding that he had no psychiatric disability at the time of the earlier claim, and the long period of time between when the events to which he allegedly had such reaction occurred and his report of the events, convinces the Board that the Veteran has equated a successful grant of service connection with a search for an event that is either so shocking as to convince a practitioner that he has a psychiatric disability as the result of the event, or finding an event that is verifiable, and then asserting that he suffered an extreme reaction to the event which led to current psychiatric symptoms. In reality, on a factual basis, the Board finds that he has fabricated that reaction for the purpose of obtaining VA benefits. Service personnel records show that the Veteran reported to the U.S.S. Mauna Kea, a seagoing ammunition supply ship, in mid January 1968 and served at that command until mid May 1970. Prior to when the Board issued the now vacated June 2008 decision, the events alleged by the Veteran were as follows: (1) loss of a friend who was beaten to death and thrown overboard; (2) witnessing a different friend suffer severe injuries when returning from a mail run in a utility boat; (3) deaths of childhood friends in branches of the military in which the Veteran did not serve; (4) witnessing one marine fatally stab another marine; (5) witnessing a fellow serviceman shoot someone climbing onto the Mauna Kea; (6) witnessing a Republic of the Philippines citizen shoot another person in the head at close range; (7) a shipboard fire, (8) a typhoon, (9) almost being stabbed while in the Republic of the Philippines, (10) radioing orders for the Mauna Kea to ram Vietnamese civilians in small boats and witnessing their deaths. In a letter received in December 2009 the Veteran expanded and provided additional details to this list as follows: "I have recurring dreams of reaching out to my friend that went down when the overloaded lifeboat went into the ocean as I was talking to him" and "Two nights ago we had thunder and that put me back to Vietnam, maybe because I spent 22 months in the combat zone and in and out of Danang." As to most of these claimed stressors, only the Veteran's assertions provide any indication the Veteran experienced the reported events. Evidence from persons who report serving aboard the Mauna Kea submitted to corroborate the occurrence of these events either simply repeat accounts by the Veteran, do not mention the Veteran, do not involve any actual knowledge on the part of the person reporting the events, or are so unreliable as to be afforded little probative value. In a January 1966 pre-induction report of medical history, the Veteran indicated that he then had or had previously had nervous trouble. He stated that he had bad nerves and was unable to complete school work. He also reported consultation with physicians for excessive shaking, bad nerves, loss of sleep, and sick stomach. This form is signed by a physician and the physician summarized pertinent data as "Anxiety, headaches", "Nervousness", and indigestion nervousness". A report of medical examination of that same date indicates normal psychiatric and neurologic clinical evaluations. Service personnel records show that the Veteran's job specialty during service was a barber. He was a seaman apprentice from November 1966 to September 1967 when he was promoted to seaman. In January 1969 he was promoted to SHB third class, a ships serviceman barber, and was separated from service in May 1970 with that rate. Following recruit training, the Veteran was stationed in Adak, Alaska, during which time, in January 1967, he complained of being nervous. He was prescribed meprobamate, which had no effect. Later that month he was prescribed Thorazine. While serving aboard the Mauna Kea in February 1968 the Veteran reported that his nerves were bothering him. This treatment note includes that the Veteran had seen the medical officer at his last command and was placed on mepromate but reported no relief. Medical personnel recommended that he report to sick bay if he felt the need to talk to someone and that an appointment be arranged at the next port. A September 1968 consultation sheet shows that the Veteran had difficulty waking one morning and then appeared groggy, he was unable to hold a pen to write his name, and his appearance and actions suggested a person highly intoxicated on barbiturates. The Veteran reported that he had been drinking alcohol recently and slept little. Laboratory tests were negative for barbiturates. A Court memorandum shows that the Veteran received a nonjudicial punishment for being drunk aboard ship and while on duty in the laundry. In January 1970, the Veteran complained of chronic muscular nervousness, reported that he had been nervous since entering service, with a slight increase in symptoms during the past eight months. He denied feeling nervous or tense and denied mental problems and family problems. Medical personnel stated that the problem appeared to be muscular and possibly central nervous system overstimulation. Physical examination revealed slight shaking of his upper extremities when trying to remain immobile. An impression was rendered of chronic motor reflex autostimulation of unknown cause and his case was referred to a medical officer. That same date, the medical officer reported that the Veteran was suffering from mild anxiety that had increased due to his concern over returning to barbering duties He recommended that the Veteran continue his current duties and return for treatment on an as needed basis. The medical officer also stated that he did not feel medications or further consult was necessary. The Board finds that these records provide evidence against the Veteran's claims. First, the service medical records do not report depression or PTSD, the only psychiatric conditions from which the Veteran currently suffers at this time. The statement of the medical officer shows that the Veteran's nervous symptoms were of physical rather than a psychiatric nature. These records also show that the reported anxiety was not the result of a psychiatric disorder, but rather fear over returning to barbering duties with shaky hands. There is no evidence that the anxiety was chronic or a symptom of a psychiatric disorder. The evidence relied on by the Board in making the determination that the Veteran's reported symptoms were not of psychiatric origin is, in part, the evidence just described. These records include the finding by medical personnel during service that the problem appeared to be muscular and possibly of central nervous system overstimulation; the impression rendered was chronic motor reflex autostimulation. This is evidence of physical origin of his symptoms. If the medical personnel had referred the Veteran to a psychiatrist for these symptoms, or stated that they thought his problems originated in his mind or were of psychological origin, it follows that they would have said so instead of stating that he had chronic motor reflex autostimulation. This last term, "motor reflex autostimulation" refers to physical structures. While it is not excluded from the realm of possibility that he could have had motor reflex autostimulation, to find so would be to inject an unsubstantiated medical opinion because the medical personnel did not state that his motor reflex autostimulation was of psychological origin. Finally, the Board finds that complete absence of mention of any of the events now alleged by the Veteran to have given rise to psychiatric disability, in very detailed records from the service, tends to show that the Veteran did not have any reaction to the alleged events, if any of the alleged events occurred. The Veteran showed a willingness to report for medical treatment and to express his worry over returning to barbering duties with shaky hands. If his later assertions that he experienced extreme fear due to the numerous events that he has reported occurring during service were accurate, it is surprising that he did not report those events during service or for decades after separation from service. Had he experienced those events in any meaningful way, particularly the alleged fire and typhoon as those carry no negative legal implications for anyone, this Veteran would likely have mentioned the event during a visit to sick call or within 20 years following service. The detailed nature of the service records suggest that had these events occurred or if he had attached any meaning to the events, they would have been at least mentioned in the those records. That they are not is the first indication to the Board that the Veteran had no meaningful reaction to those events. In January 1974, three and one half years after service, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for a nervous condition and diabetes. In that application he indicated that he had been treated for diabetes and nervous symptoms in September 1966 while in boot camp, for nerves and possible diabetes in December 1966 and December 1967, and for diabetes symptoms in October 1969. Service medical records are absent for any mention of diabetes or symptoms of diabetes. There are no entries for treatment in 1966, November 1967 entries are for treatment of a boil, there are no entries for December 1967, the January 1968 entry for complaints of the Veteran's nerves bothering him, and in October 1969 he was treated for a venereal wart, not for diabetes. These records are more probative as to what the Veteran was treated for during service than his report of that history several years after service. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59 (1994) (contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the veteran). His 1974 mischaracterization of fact is evidence that the Veteran has a tendency to not be credible as to historical reports. This lack of credibility impacts negatively as to all of his statements as to what happened during service and his response to events during service. This is another indication that the Veteran is not to be believed. Of record is a "MEDICAL AFFIDAVIT" in which "C.D.", M.D. recounted the Veteran's report that he had mild shaking and stated that the Veteran had been given a glucose tolerance test. He included the results of that test. Under a heading for "Complete Diagnosis" Dr. C.D. provided a diagnosis of diabetes. He stated that the prognosis was good. Dr. C.D. indicated that he had examined the Veteran on "this date" but did not indicate the date of examination, however he listed dates of previous treatment as December 1973 and January 1974 and the affidavit is date stamped as received by VA on February 7, 1964. Thus, as of January or February 1974, the Veteran had been diagnosed with diabetes . During an April 1974 VA psychiatric evaluation, the Veteran indicated that he had "shook some" prior to service, but not enough to affect his chosen occupation as a barber. He reported post-service treatment for diabetes and that he now had only minimal residual tremulousness. Psychiatric examination was essentially normal. The Veteran was oriented as to time, place, and person; thinking was logical, relevant and coherent; there was no evidence of intellectual impairment or psychotic thinking; affective response appeared even with no evidence of overt anxiety or depression; insight, judgment, and motivation were satisfactory. A very fine tremor of outstretched hands was noted. The examiner deferred final diagnosis pending physical evaluation and laboratory test results. This examination report includes that the Veteran served as a barber for most of his service career, was referred to a base hospital in California in the winter of 1969 where he underwent medical and psychiatric evaluation and change of occupational status was recommended. This is more evidence that any current psychiatric disorder is unrelated to the Veteran's service because he had no psychiatric disorder three and one half years after separation from service and no report of a psychiatric disorder between separation from service and the June 1974 rating decision. This report is also curious for the complete absence of any mention that the Veteran had served as a radio operator during service or the extremely stressful events the Veteran will cite below. This report gives the impression that prior to the January 1970 treatment, most of the Veteran's career in the U.S. Navy was as a barber. This is consistent with his service treatment records, but inconsistent with the Veteran's reported stressor that he radioed orders to ram small Vietnamese ships during service. In an October 1974 statement, the Veteran reported that "C.D.", M.D. had prescribed insulin for treatment of diabetes. He stated that since starting insulin treatment he was no longer nervous and his shaking had ceased. He also reported that Dr. C.D. had told him that his anxiety reaction was due to diabetes which had not been properly diagnosed during service. Accompanying this letter was a handwritten statement on the letterhead of Dr. C.D. stating "[s]ince being under our treatment for diabetes all of his symptoms of [illegible] and shaking have disappeared the diagnosis was suggested by his symptoms [and] glucose tolerance proved it." The Board has relied on this medical opinion from Dr. C.D. and the Veteran's own report of then current symptoms, in conjunction with the service treatment records already discussed, in arriving at a finding that the Veteran's tremulousness during service was not the result of result of any psychiatric illness, but rather reflected illness of physical origin. Taken together, the service and post service medical and lay evidence through October 1974 shows that the Veteran had no "psychiatric" disability due to his service. A nervous condition, as initially claimed by the Veteran, was not a psychiatric condition and his symptoms that gave rise to a finding of anxiety (shaky upper extremities) did not post-date his service for any appreciable time period. This evidence also tends to show that no preexisting condition did not increase in severity during service, no psychiatric disorder had onset during the Veteran's service, and no symptoms occurring during service that could be even be possibly associated with a psychiatric disorder continued to the date that the Veteran filed his current claim. As he has not had any disorder manifested by shaky upper extremities at any time near to the time that he filed his current claim, service connection cannot be granted based on an aggravation or onset of this disorder during service. See Gilpin v. West, 155 F. 3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992). The only question remains is whether the evidence links PTSD or any other psychiatric disorder to some event during service. The Board will address each of the Veteran's reported stressful events so that the Veteran understands why the Board has denied his appeal. In so doing, the Board refers to several sources of information that the Veteran has provided or are otherwise of record. These include VA treatment notes; a January 2004 letter from the Veteran, testimony from the February 2008 hearing, and unsigned letters or e-mails, all received by VA in February 2008, purportedly from persons who served with the Veteran, including "B.M.", "J.M.", "D.S.", "W.S.", "M.H.", and "R.L." Statements offered by the Veteran and letters submitted from persons who state that they served with the Veteran are quoted without correction of grammar and spelling mistakes. Treatment records associated with the Veteran's claim for SSA disability benefits from Dr. "G." document that the Veteran was treated with Vicodin, Xanax, Paxil, testosterone, and Viagra in 2002 and 2003. There are reports of erectile dysfunction and chronic low back pain and that the Veteran needed pain medication to sleep. He reported some anxiety but no depression. These records end in May 2003. Importantly, although the records mention the Veteran's military service with regard to his back pain there is no mention of any traumatic event during service giving rise to any psychiatric symptoms. June 2003 marks the next interaction between the Veteran and VA with regard to medical matters. An interdisciplinary clinic note indicates that the Veteran had low back pain and answered "yes" to questions of whether he had been "super alert" or on guard in the past month, had experienced a traumatic experience, and had ever been bothered by repeated disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of the traumatic events. Of note is that prior to being asked these questions, the Veteran had never reported any traumatic event or any reaction to a traumatic event. This is the earliest report in the record that the Veteran had symptoms related to any traumatic event. Thus, the Veteran had been treated with such drugs as Xanax and Paxil for months prior to June 2003 but his first report of traumatic events was in response to a question about such events. Taken by itself this fact is not important. Taken with the rest of the evidence of record this fact fits into a factual picture of the Veteran as not having any actual reaction to traumatic events at any time. August 2003 VA treatment notes recorded the Veteran's report that he had been treated for depression and anxiety by a community doctor a year earlier and continued to take Paxil and Xanax. The August 2003 VA consult and screening note contains the treatment team's conclusion that the Veteran did not meet the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. VA clinicians encouraged him to contact the mental health clinic for follow up for his psychiatric medications and to contact the Vet Center. These notes from August 2003 contain the Veteran's report that he served as a barber, radioman and supplier of ammunition while stationed aboard the Mauna Kea. The clinician's recording of the Veteran's reports of service include as follows: He states that his traumatic memories are related to the witnessing of many deaths and actual threats to his life. He also relates that several friends from his home town have died in Viet Nam, including his best friend. One of his recurrent memories is when the No. Viet Nam civilians brought their boats near the side of the ship trying to keep them from transporting the ammunition to another ship. As a radio man on the ship, his commander gave him orders to direct the ship to crash into the small boats. He didn't want to do this, but these were orders and when their ship ran into these boats, he saw the people "get chewed up and spit out". Once the ship almost sank and another rime the ship was on fire. They were unloading at a dock when they noticed the fire on-board; and the commander ordered them to travel away from the dock to prevent a massive explosion. So they went out into the water with a burning ship carrying explosives. Eventually they were able to extinguish the fire but the memory of the eminent (sic) fear of all of them dying continues to haunt him. He has a consistent dream that involves seeing himself back on the ship and it is sinking. He also reports "nagging" survivors guilt since a lot of his friends died and he's still alive. He said he told his friends to go into the Navy, but because they wanted to "get out sooner" that they chose other branches of the service and died. In January 2004 the Veteran filed his claim for VA benefits for disability due to PTSD. The August 2003 treatment notes mark the start of the Veteran's list of events that he has presented as giving rise to psychiatric disability. There are serious factual problems regarding the Veteran's many alleged events that the Board will attempt to address completely. The Board addresses the alleged inservice stressful events under the subheadings that follow: Shootings, stabbings, threats of stabbings, and deaths of home town friends In his January 2004 letter, the Veteran alleged the following stressors: Next, we at all times required to have armed men with shotguns patrol the ship. One night a Philipino, I believe tried to climb up the side and on the fantail. Our guy killed him and I had the duty of seeing what a shotgun loaded with four large pellets does to a man. Also I was privilege to a Philipino shooting another man in the head about 10 ft from me, I was almost stabbed more than once in Subic Bay, Philippines 68 and 68,I could go on with more and if it calls for it I will but I think this is sufficient. I have cruse books with pictures and dates. Also I will attach a copy of a newspaper clipping listing all the friends that I enlisted with and that were killed in Vietnam. This means a lot to me and I think it should to you to. With this letter, the Veteran included a photocopy of a newspaper clipping, apparently from his home town, describing the death of several men from that town. There is no mention of the Veteran. In this regard, the Board does not doubt that persons from the Veteran's home town died during service in Vietnam, or for that matter that he may have known some of the deceased. However, the Board finds that reading a newspaper or hearing about someone's death is not within the meaning of a "stressor" for the purposes of establishing service connection for PTSD. As to the Veteran's accounts of the shooting of a person climbing aboard ship, the fatal stabbing, a Philippine National citizen shooting someone at close range, and the near stabbings of the Veteran, he has not provided any corroboration of these events or provided sufficient identifying information to verify the events. Furthermore, on a factually basis, based on a review of the record, the Board finds it totally unbelievable that this Veteran experienced so many violent deaths during such a short time span, further development is not indicated. Cf. Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470 (1992) (VA is not required to conduct a "fishing expedition" for government records). The Board finds no evidence verifying the occurrence of these alleged events and can think of no basis upon which these events could be verified. The pattern is clear: The Veteran is creating stressors in order to be found to have PTSD. For example, in June 2004 VA clinic notes document the Veteran's account of even more deaths than those he had reported during treatment in August 2003 and in his January 2004 letter. These notes document the Veteran's report that he was the first one to arrive at the scene of an automobile accident some six months after his service and find his best friend's body (apparently not the same "best friend" who died in Vietnam). He also reported that, during service, a marine fatally stabbed another marine during an argument. This practitioner diagnosed the Veteran with depression and PTSD This is an incredible number of unusual events that the Veteran reports witnessing or being involved in over such a short time span, and the events constantly change over time. This alone draws into question his credibility. Also important is that the Veteran adds to his list of events as time goes on. This indicates to the Board that the reported events, if they occurred, did not have any effect upon the Veteran but that he is merely manufacturing events and manufacturing his reaction to events (including reports of current symptoms) in an effort to obtain disability benefits. Furthermore, if he was present during these alleged events, or had a reaction to the alleged events, it is unbelievable that he would not have reported such either in 1974 when he was examined by a mental health professional or when he was interviewed for psychiatric symptoms in August 2003. On a factual basis, the Board finds that this provides evidence against all claims, undermining his credibility to both the Board and to VA examiners who find he has PTSD or some other problems associated with service. This is true particularly in light of the service record, which is detailed, and provides no reference to any of these events. Steaming over Vietnamese civilians In his January 2004 letter, the Veteran reported his account of steaming over Vietnamese civilians as follows: it was late 68 or early 68, I was the Captains radioman. I relayed every order he gave when we were on the flying bridge. I doubt this is logged in but there we a bunch of Vietnamese, what we called gondola boats that would purposely get in our way to slow up our operations of passing ammo. Unfortunately for these people they were wearing American uniforms. The Capt [W.S] gave me a direct order of turn the ship 15 degrees to port. I questioned the order, as I knew what might happen. I was told he was the Capt. we ran over many boats and people and I had the clear view of them being chopped up eaten by the prop. I have almost nightly nightmares of this. I doubt this is logged in but I also doubt if Mai Lai with Lt Cally was either. This account has indices of total unreliability. First, the account is overly dramatic. Secondly, while the Veteran provides a time frame, he also builds into his account a reason why there will be no official record of the event stating that he doubted that the alleged event was recorded and comparing the alleged event to Mai Lai; thus seeking to simultaneously add authenticity to his story and explaining why there is no official account of the alleged event. At the time of that explanation, VA had not indicated that there was no record of the reported event. Hence, the Veteran's premature explanation for the lack of an official record of the event is evidence to the Board that the Veteran has fabricated this event. Offered to support his claim is the February 2008 e-mail from W.S., identified by the Veteran as the Captain of the Mauna Kea. W.S. states that he remembered the Veteran from the barber shop and as his phone talker on the bridge. This statement by W.S. is not evidence verifying the alleged killing of Vietnamese civilians at sea, a war crime. W.S. makes no mention of such an occurrence. Hence, the Board finds that this alleged stressor has not been verified and cannot support a grant of service connection for PTSD. Also important is W.S.'s assertion that he remembers the Veteran as his phone talker. This is inconsistent with the Veteran's service personnel records which show him as working as a barber and in the laundry. As both the laundry and the barbershop are components of ships services it makes sense that if the Veteran was not working as a barber he may be assigned to the laundry. The report of the Veteran working as a radioman, or phone talker, is also inconsistent with a February 2008 statement from B.M. submitted by the Veteran. In that statement B.M. reports that he knew the Veteran prior to June 1969 and states that the Veteran's barber shop was next to the post office where B.M. worked aboard the Mauna Kea. Assuming that the Veteran intended to state late 1968 - early 1969 in his letter (as opposed to late 1968 or early 1968) B.M.'s reference to the Veteran only as a barber raises questions as to the Veteran's report and W.S.'s memory. Other evidence that tends to show that the Veteran did not work as a radioman, as he has claimed, is the 1974 psychiatric evaluation report that states that the Veteran served most of his military career as a barber. Furthermore, it is illogical and highly unlikely that the ship's barber would be placed in the position of a radioman to relay orders from the ship's captain kill civilians. More likely is that a radioman with proper training would undertake these important duties. What is likely is that W.S. does not, some 40 years after the fact, remember this Veteran as his phone talker. Also likely is that this "memory" came about only after recent contact with the Veteran. In other words, the Veteran convinced W.S. of what W.S. now "remembers". Taking all of this evidence together, the impression is that the Veteran is fabricating an account of his service. R.R.'s murder Turning to his next reported stressor, in his January 2004 letter the Veteran stated that in October 1968, while in port in California: [t]hree of us friends were together and then there were two. I was later told "R.R." was killed by being beaten and thrown over board. It was written in the paper as a longshorman was found a few days later floating and bloated. I flipped a coin as to had to go identify him. The men who did this told me this. My division officer, R.L. was told this at reunions we have every two years by and also by another sailor name C.M. I was threatened with death if I mentioned any of this at that time. My ex division officers name is R.L., work phone [omitted], home phone [omitted] I have talked to him on a regular basis and he said feel free to contact him any time. During the Board hearing, the Veteran enhanced his story, stating that a fellow sailor, who was African American, confessed to him that he participated in the murder of R.R. Telling is the following testimony: There was a lot of strife between black and white at that time. And I was cutting. I can't say for sure, I'm pretty sure I know who told me, but I can't, I wouldn't try to blame it on him because I'm not 100 percent sure, but I think I know who it was. But not 100 percent. But he said that they thought he was a thief. Well. He actually - I was cutting his hair and he just started talking about it. He said, you know the guy that died there, your friend. We were all restricted to ship because we had been drinking overseas, so all three of us were together that night. He went over the side-I didn't see him go over or anything, but the guy said there was six of them. They beat him and threw him over. They said it was because they though he was either a thief or a homosexual. And they said something to the effect that there's another cruise, there's a lot of black water out there, so if you say anything you know what'll happen. I said, yeah, I'm not gonna -you know. And if I had gone to my division officer and told him there wouldn't have been time to even look into it before I was over the side. Hearing transcript at 15. Another report of this alleged stressor comes in a February 2008 letter from "J.M." who asserts that he served aboard the Mauna Kea during the same period of the Veteran's service aboard that ship. J.M. refers to the death of R.R. as follows: was found floating with crabs all over him along side the dock where we had tied up when the ship returned to the United States. The Mauna Kea had to change berthing to another location, as the ship moved away from the dock a body came floating out from under the pier. It was R. he was wearing a pea coat at the time his body was found. R. had been on restriction prior to entering port pending Captan's Mass? He had in his possession stolen wallets. Some say he was trying to climb down the tie up ropes and some others have a different story. J.M.'s statement is not competent evidence of a stressor experienced by the Veteran. Rather it is merely J.M. repeating a rumor. J.M. stated that he came back to the ship after 3 weeks leave and found out about R.R.'s death. Therefore, he did not observe any event involving R.R. and his statement is not competent evidence. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994) (holding that lay evidence is competent if it is limited to matters that the witness actually observed and is within the realm of the witness's personal knowledge). In his letter, J.M. reported several events as historical fact. He also stated I can't give accurate dates to these events, but there are many shipmates that I am still in touch with that share the same memories. We discuss them every reunion. I had went to the Naval Archives in Washington in 2004 or 2005 to review the ship logs and the day to day entries were not present. The supervisor of the archives told me that another set of logs were kept and that at the end of the day the Quartermaster on board the ship would rewrite the entries leaving just what was approved by the command. This is strong evidence that the letters offered to support the Veteran's claims are of little probative value. Rather than report historical fact, the letters are more in the nature of reports of rumors. Given the genesis of these reports, the reports are so tainted by time and retelling as to not be reliable evidence, whether as to the occurrence of the events, the timing of the events, or the Veteran's presence during any of the events. As J.M. stated these "events" are discussed at every reunion. Such discussion has the tendency to add to the facts and provide a ready opportunity for those present, including the Veteran, to "remember" events whether or not the actually was present at the event, or if present, whether the event had any significance at the time or since. The Board finds that these statements, as a whole, on a factual basis, provide evidence against all claims, clearly indicating highly inconsistent stories regarding what occurred to the Veteran during his military service. In the letter received in February 2008, R.L. states that, in October 1968, R.R., who had been restricted to the ship for disciplinary reasons, was absent without leave. His body was later found in water. Investigation revealed that R.R. was intoxicated at the time of his death and his death was determined to be accidental. R.L. states that at a reunion of ship's personnel, the Veteran told R.L. that the Veteran had been told that R.R. had been murdered. R.L. states that this story was repeated to R.L. from another shipmate two years later. Assuming, without deciding, that a crew member of the Mauna Kea with the initials R.R. was found dead in 1968, this is not a stressor to support service connection for PTSD. As a criterion for PTSD, the DSM-IV states "[t]he person has been exposed to a traumatic event." See QUICK REFERENCE TO THE DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FROM DSM-IV, 209 (1994). The Veteran does not claim to have been present at the death of R.R. Rather, the stressful event that the Veteran reports is a conversation in a barber shop. Even if the alleged death threats during that conversation could constitute a stressor for PTSD, the Veteran has not provided verification regarding the barbershop conversation. The letters from R.L. and J.M. are no more than evidence of rumors regarding the death of R.R. Given that the Veteran claims to have been the person to whom the alleged murderer of R.R. confessed, the rumor originated with the Veteran. Of particular interest is that the rumor originated with the Veteran many years after the event and in conjunction with his claim for PTSD. Moreover, as with the Veteran's reports of shooting, he made no mention of this prior to this letter, including in his report for psychiatric evaluation in 1974 and the August 2003 treatment notes. Taken as a whole the evidence just described tends to show that the Veteran has fabricated the event, manipulated his fellow veterans, and misrepresented the facts, providing evidence against his own case. The alleged murder of R.R. is not a "stressor" because the Veteran did not experience the event. To the extent that he was threatened during a barbershop conversation and such threat could constitute a "stressor", that conversation has not been verified. Indeed, absent the alleged murderer coming forward, these many years later, that conversation is not verifiable. Nor does the Board believe the Veteran's account of events or the reports offered in the letters submitted to support his claim. B.M.'s injury In his January 2004 letter, the Veteran reported that he was standing on the ship on June 13, 1969, when a mail clerk "B.M." returned in a small boat from a mail run. He reported that the gangplank was pulled up quickly resulting in an accident in which B.M.'s back and leg were broken. He reports that for thirty years he assumed B.M. had died following the accident. In the letter received in February 2008, B.M. identified himself as the mail clerk injured during return to the ship from a mail run. B.M. states that he remembers seeing the Veteran standing on the ship. He also points out that he knew the Veteran because the mailroom was adjacent to the barbershop. B.M. reports that his leg was broken in the accident and he was subsequently medically discharged from the service. He also reported that he had not heard from the Veteran until 35 years later when he saw the Veteran at a reunion. The Veteran states that B.M. was a good friend, yet the Veteran would have the Board believe that he spent many years mistakenly believing that B.M. had been killed. Once again, a completely inconceivable factual error from the Veteran emerges as his story evolves over time. It simply makes no sense that a Veteran would assume for the next 30 years that a good friend had died in an accident (resulting in only a broken leg) rather than inquire as to the condition of the friend after the event. The Board does not believe that B.M. remembers seeing the Veteran on the deck of the ship when B.M. suffered his broken leg. What is more likely is that the Veteran heard about the injury to B.M., either during service or at a reunion, and the event simply held little significance for the Veteran. Given the lack of credibility of the Veteran and his propensity for manipulating the facts, B.M.'s memory of the Veteran standing on the deck is likely a "memory" derived from recent contact rather than an accurate report of the day B.M. broke his leg. J.M., in his letter, also recounts the injury to the mail clerk. He does not state that he witnessed the event. Rather, his account is an explanation of the procedure for hoisting the utility boat carrying persons on board ship from mail runs to land. He states: Well, the hoisting ring disintegrated on one side of the utility boat after being raised about 20 feet in the air. I know that the our Postal Petty Officer was in the boat when the failure occurred and he fell hitting his leg within the boat and broke it. He was immediately rushed to the base hospital in Subic Bay and was not seen or heard from again until 2005. He came to a reunion. Again, this is not an account by J.M of observing an event. As such, J.M.'s account of his event is not competent evidence. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994). Nor does the account mention the Veteran. Finally, the wording of the account is more in the nature of a story that has either been repeated over time or essentially dictated, rather overtly or through manipulation, to J.M. by the Veteran. Hence, J.M.'s letter is not probative at to the presence of the Veteran during an injury to B.M. The Board finds that the Veteran's presence when B.M. broke his leg is not verified and the accounts of his presence during the event are not credible. Again, if the Veteran had such a reaction to the injury of B.M. it does not make sense that he would not have reported it during psychiatric interviews in 1974 and August 2003. Typhoon and fire The Board has grouped these two alleged events together because these are the events that could possibly be verified through official records. In this case however, verification of the occurrence of these events would not substantiate the Veteran's claim because the Veteran has demonstrated that he is so lacking in credibility that his reports of contemporaneous reactions to a storm or fire, and his reports of current symptoms associated with a storm or fire, or any other stressor in service (such as nightmares or other symptoms), are not afforded any probative value. VA treatment notes from August 2003 contain the Veteran's report that a fire broke out aboard the Mauna Kea while the ship was unloading at a dock. According to this account, the ship's commander ordered the ship to travel away from the dock to prevent a "massive explosion" and the fire was eventually extinguished. The Veteran indicated that the fear that he could have died continues to haunt him and he dreams of seeing himself back on the ship with the ship sinking. In his January 2004 letter the Veteran enhanced the story of the shipboard fire, stating: I believe it was on the 68 tour, that we were in Subic Bay in the Philippines Islands. We were at the ammo pier and against orders one of our officers shut down ships power, which is against the regs. We were welding I imagine but in any even we caught on fire. One man was so scared he ran into the jungle. They finally brought him back in a straight jacket and I never saw him again. Since we could not get water to the fire we were hooked on by tugboats and being pulled out to sea to blow away from all the ammo at the pier. All this can be verified by [provides a first and last name, "M.H.", and a social security number]. We were never allowed to tie up at piers overseas other than the ammo one I am talking about and that is out in the middle of the jungle. I have recurring nightmares of this; you would have to have been there to probably understand the full impact of this. We were finally able to put the fires out in time with fire extinguishers. From this account it appears that the Veteran was well acquainted with the operation of the ship at the time of this fire which he has reported, stating that the ship was never allowed to tie up at piers overseas because it carried ammunition. Also of record are copies of e-mails sent to the Veteran in February 2008 from D.S. and M.H. D.S. states that he remembered from the Mauna Kea days "[t]he fire when we were inport at the NAVMAG, Subic Bay." In the e-mail, M.H. places the occurrence of a fire in 1969, stating as follows: In 1969 the USS Mauna Kea was in the Phillipines for reaming tied to a ammunition pier. The ship was trying to run diesel generator to start our boilers. A fire broke out and being late at night And no power I had to wake up the crew members that were aboard> (sic) I ran thru compartments getting crew up to fight the fire. One fellow ran off the ship into the jungle had to be brought back in a straight jacket.we had to be moved away from the pier.[the Veteran] was a crew member also at that time. During the February 2008 Board hearing the Veteran made several references to the fire he alleges has resulted in psychiatric symptoms. He first testified that shortly after assignment to the Mauna Kea he reported to sick call for complaints about his nerves. Board Hearing transcript at 10. This is consistent with the service treatment record entry, but the service treatment record entry makes no mention of a fire, instead that entry refers to his report of the same symptoms at his previous command and is more in the nature of a continuing complaint on the part of the Veteran rather than a response to any particular event. This, however, is not how the Veteran presented the sick call visit during his testimony, as shown by the following exchange: Representative: Do you recall what prompted you to go to sick bay at that point? Veteran: Just the anxiety, being around - I mean, we carried 17000, tons of ammunition and we caught fire out in the middle of the Pacific and jumping over, and things like that. Representative:. This happened within a month or so of your being aboard the ship. Veteran. Yeah. We left directly when I got on the ship. They were on a shakedown cruise actually when I reported forward. Undersigned: Do you remember when the fire was? Veteran: Well, let's see. Whenever we left. It takes 18 days to get over there. It's between Hawaii and Subic Bay. So, does it say what day I reported onboard ship? Representative: Yeah. You reported onboard the ship January '68. Veteran: The ship was actually on a shakedown cruise when I went, so I had to spend two weeks at a naval weapons station and wait for the ship to get back in. And then we took off. So, it took us 18 days and we stopped in Hawaii for two days. And then, between Hawaii and Vietnam. We were full loaded. Representative: OK. I'm gonna cover that in a little while. Board Hearing transcript at 10-11. The Veteran's representative returned to this line of testimony further along in the hearing during which time the Veteran testified as to the details of a fire occurring with the Mauna Kea in port in Subic Bay, the Naval base in the Republic of the Phillipines. Board Hearing transcript at 21- 23. As shown by the hearing transcript, when specifically asked when the fire occurred, the Veteran indicated that it occurred shortly after he was assigned to the Mauna Kea in January 1968 and coincident with his February 1968 report at sick call that he had nervous symptoms. This is inconsistent with the account in M.H.'s letter which places the fire in 1969 and inconsistent with the Veteran's earlier letter in which he presented himself as knowing the routine of the ship, something which he would not know if he just arrived onboard. These inconsistencies tend to show that the Veteran has no recollection of the fire, that the fire, if it occurred, had no significance to him at the time, and that he has fabricated a reaction to the fire at the time and current symptoms, such as nightmares, in an effort to obtain VA benefits. More importantly it is clear from this testimony that the Veteran sought to link his reported reaction to the fire to his report to sick call for nervous symptoms. Since this makes no sense in view of all of the evidence, this testimony is evidence of a disingenuous juxtapositioning of evidence (the report to sick call and the letters from others attesting to the fire) on the part of the Veteran to support his claim. This tends to show that the Veteran is fabricating his account of service and any statements made by the Veteran are made in pursuit of those benefits are unreliable. Beyond the above, and perhaps most importantly, the undersigned has had the opportunity to review the Veteran's statements with him in person, at hearing. Based on this hearing, the Board finds that the Veteran can not be believed. His testimony was vague, inconsistent, with a tendency to directly contract prior statements and/or other evidence of record. Even if there is documentation somewhere that shows that a fire occurred aboard the Mauna Kea in Subic Bay, based on what the Board has just explained, the occurrence of the event would not substantiate the Veteran's claim because the Veteran's demonstrated lack of credibility dictates that no probative weight should be assigned to his statements - either as to what occurred in service or his reactions to events in service, both then and now. For example, when the Veteran states that he has nightmares to health care providers associated with the fire, the Board finds, on a factual basis, that the Veteran is not telling the truth (in light of the joint motion of August 2009, the Board finds no other basis it can state this finding with less definitiveness as the basis of this decision must be made clear) . Turning to the Veteran's report of reactions to a storm at sea, the Board notes that the Veteran has submitted a newspaper article from March 1970 which reports that the Mauna Kea played a Samaritan role in a 1969 storm. This article reports that in November 1969, the Mauna Kea answered a distress call from a ship that was in trouble in the 100 knot winds and 50 to 60 foot waves of Typhoon June. The article states that the Mauna Kea was in port as of March 1970 for scheduled overhaul and that the battering the ship took in the heavy seas resulted in more work than originally planned. This article thus provides evidence that the Mauna Kea encountered heavy seas in November 1969. In his January 2004 letter the Veteran first reported his reaction to and symptoms deriving from the storm, as follows: Also I believe in 69 we were on our way home and got orders to turn around and help a ship, I believe it was a Philippine ship that was sinking. We got our directions I believe from Guam. They put us through the eye of a typhoon. The Commander of the ship told me. M.E. who unfortunately died this Christmas Day that we probably had a 50% chance of not flipping over and going down. We made it through but had to pull into Guam for extensive repairs. Maybe it is becoming apparent why I have nightmares. J.M. provided the following account in his February 2008 letter: There was a ship in distress just west of the Philippines and we were the closest ship to her rescue. We had to travel through a typhoon to get to her and had to be the most frightening experience of my life. It was very precarious if we would make it through the estimated 75 foot waves. Winds were well in excess of 100 mph and we had to navigate to the other side of the typhoon to make rescue. We made it and our ship received a lot of damages. J.M.'s account attests to his own reaction to the storm, not the Veteran's. The Veteran's reported reactions to the storm are too tainted by the other evidence of record to be reliable. Again, he did not report any reaction to the storm during service or during the 1974 psychiatric examination. His first report of a reaction to the storm comes decades after the storm. More importantly, he reports not just a reaction to this storm but reactions to many other stressors, most of which are incredible, if not on their face, when taken together. The timing of the Veteran's reports, together with his demonstrated lack of credibility make him unbelievable as to his reported reaction to the storm, including current symptoms such as his reported nightmares concerning the storm. For this reason it makes no difference whether the occurrence of the storm is verified by official records. Verification of the occurrence of the storm at the time the Mauna Kea steamed to provide humanitarian aid would not verify the Veteran's reactions to the storm or that he has nightmare associated with the storm. Conclusion In the writing received from the Veteran in December 2009 he continued his practice of either adding events or enhancing previously reported events in explaining his service, undermining his credibility with the Board. In that writing the Veteran stated "I have recurring dreams of reaching out to my friend that went down when the overloaded lifeboat went into the ocean as I was talking to him at the time." He also reported that "[t]wo nights ago we had thunder and that put me back to the Vietnam, maybe because I spent 22 months in the combat zone and in and out of Danang." In this statement regarding serving 22 months in a 'combat zone' the Veteran appears to be adding to and dramatizing his account of service in an effort to obtain VA disability benefits by implying that he is a combat Veteran. All evidence of record shows that the Veteran's is not a combat veteran. During his honorable service the Veteran served as a barber and worked in the laundry upon a seagoing vessel. This statement by the Veteran that he has nightmares about reaching out to his friend that went down when the overloaded lifeboat went into the ocean "as I was talking to him at the time" is either the assertion of a new stressor or an account inconsistent with the earlier account that the Veteran offered in support of his claim with regard to the postal clerk who was in a utility boat when a cable snapped. In the February 2008 letter, that postal clerk, B.M., stated that he approached the Mauna Kea in a utility boat and saw the Veteran standing on the ship waving as the utility boat approached, was injured when a cable snapped and was taken to shore by a utility boat for treatment. This is decidedly different than the December 2009 account by the Veteran that he was talking to this friend at the time of the alleged incident. Thus, if the Veteran was referring to the postal clerk, the letter provides more evidence against his claim due to the inconsistencies and further demonstrates a lack of credibility. If the Veteran seeks to introduce yet another stressful event from service this late assertion also tends to show that the Veteran is not credible for the reasons already stated. Put simply, the Board finds that the Veteran's self reported reactions to a fire and a storm, and the other dramatic events that he alleges occurred during service, causing nightmare and other symptoms, are not credible whether those reports were made to the RO, the Board, or to clinicians. Thus, any diagnosis of a psychiatric disability, whether as the result of PTSD or an acquired psychiatric illness, is based on a foundation of no value - the Veteran's reports of his contemporaneous reactions to events, whether the events were real or manufactured, and his present symptoms. This is not an arbitrary factual finding but rather is based on the evidence of record. Once again, in the context of this unusual case, the timing of the reports of the events tends to show lack of credibility. Particularly given that the Veteran did not mention the events during the course of his claim for psychiatric disability in 1974. The shear number of events that the Veteran has reported as occurring during his service alone (which continues to expand) renders the Veteran unbelievable as to any of his statements. For example, according to the Veteran, in a period of two and one half years, the Veteran - whom the most probative evidence of record shows served as a barber and in the laundry aboard a seagoing vessel - witnessed violent deaths in four incidents (stabbing of a marine, shooting of someone climbing aboard ship, one Philippine National shoot another, and the death of Vietnamese Nationals in small boats at sea); lost a friend to a beating with a confession to the Veteran by a conspirator to the murder; and saw another friend seriously injured while returning from a mail run. These factors, as well as others, tend to show that the Veteran is not credible in any of his accounts, including his report of reactions to any of the alleged events including a fire and a storm. The Board is fully aware of the prohibition against inserting its own unsubstantiated medical opinion in deciding a case. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991). The Board's finding that the Veteran is not credible is not a medical or psychiatric opinion; it is a finding of fact within the purview of the Board. Whether or not the Veteran has honestly reported his reaction to a fire aboard the Mauna Kea is not a medical or psychiatric determination. Physician's and psychologists are experts with regard to medical and psychiatric disease. The Board's determination that the Veteran is not to be believed as to his reported reaction to a fire, or any other event, is not a Colvin violation because the Board is not relying on its medical or psychiatric opinion in making such a determination. This is a factual determination: The Veteran is not telling the truth to either the Board or his doctors regarding events in service or his reaction to events in service. The preponderance of the evidence is thus against finding that the Veteran suffers from a current disability as the result of any event occurring during his active service. Additionally, the nervous condition (shaking hands) reported during the Veteran's service was not aggravated or caused by his service. By his own account, and consistent with all evidence of record, that condition has not been present for many years, there is no evidence that the Veteran currently suffers from that condition, and there is evidence that the condition was not aggravated by service (the post-service medical records immediately following service). Depression is the only psychiatric disorder other than PTSD of which the Veteran currently suffers. Service medical records are absent for any mention of depression. The record shows that this depression did not have its onset until more than thirty years after separation from service. This is evidence that the depression did not have its onset during the Veteran's service. For these reasons the Veteran's claims must be denied. The evidence in this case is not so evenly balanced so as to allow application of the benefit-of- the-doubt rule. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). Duties to notify and assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). In Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), the Veterans Court held that, upon receipt of an application for a service-connection claim, 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) require VA to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating, or is necessary to substantiate, each of the five elements of the claim, including notice of what is required to establish service connection and that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Other than notice as to assignment of disability ratings and effective dates, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by way of a letter sent to the Veteran in March 2004, prior to the initial adjudication by the RO. That letter informed the Veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim for service connection for PTSD and of the Veteran's and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. In January 2004, the RO received a claim from the Veteran requesting service connection for PTSD. He did not request service connection for any other disorder. The March 2004 letter was properly tailored to the claim received by VA from which this Board decision ultimately derives. As it is the initial receipt of a claim that triggers VCAA notice, this notice sufficiently addressed the claim received. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a). Since receipt of the January 2004 claim, VA has characterized the claim to include one for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Given the Veteran's assertions, both claims involve the same evidence and differ, from a laypersons perspective, only in the diagnosed condition. In short, the Veteran seeks compensation for psychiatric symptoms that he contends are the result of his service, whatever diagnoses those symptoms fall under. As the evidence in this case is common to both claimed disorders and establishing service connection for PTSD arguably includes more stringent elements than establishing service connection for other psychiatric disorders, the Board finds that the March 2004 letter sufficiently informed the Veteran as to the VCAA elements, other than disability ratings and effective dates, applicable to a claim for service connection for PTSD to include an acquired psychiatric disorder. By a June 2007 letter, the RO provided the Veteran with VCAA notice as to assignment of disability ratings and effective dates. Although the notice letter was not sent before the initial RO decision in this matter, the Board finds that this error was not prejudicial to the Veteran because the actions taken by VA after providing the notice have essentially cured the error in the timing of notice. Not only has the Veteran been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim and given ample time to respond, but the RO also readjudicated the case by way of a supplemental statement of the case issued in October 2007, after the notice was provided. See also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (the issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by readjudication of the claim, such as a statement of the case or supplemental statement of the case, is sufficient to cure a timing defect). VA has a duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting the Veteran in the procurement of service medical records and pertinent treatment records and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. In determining whether the duty to assist requires that a VA medical examination be provided or medical opinion obtained with respect to a veteran's claim for benefits, there are four factors for consideration. These four factors are: (1) whether there is competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability; (2) whether there is evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, or evidence establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumption period; (3) whether there is an indication that the disability or symptoms may be associated with the Veteran's service or with another service-connected disability; and (4) whether there otherwise is sufficient competent medical evidence of record to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). With respect to the third factor above, the Court has stated that this element establishes a low threshold and requires only that the evidence "indicates" that there "may" be a nexus between the current disability or symptoms and the veteran's service. The types of evidence that "indicate" that a current disability "may be associated" with military service include, but are not limited to, medical evidence that suggests a nexus but is too equivocal or lacking in specificity to support a decision on the merits, or credible evidence of continuity of symptomatology such as pain or other symptoms capable of lay observation. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The RO has obtained VA outpatient treatment records, service medical records, service personnel records, and Social Security Administration disability records. The Veteran submitted letters from persons who state they served with the Veteran. A VA medical examination was not afforded the Veteran and an opinion from a mental health professional was not obtained. Here, the evidence does not establish that a relevant event, injury, or disease occurred in service, for reasons noted above. In this regard, it is important to note that credibility determinations are made by the Board, not a VA doctor. Thus, VA has no duty to afford the Veteran a VA examination or obtain an opinion. Further, the Board finds that there otherwise is sufficient competent medical evidence of record to make a decision on the case. The Board finds that the record provides so much evidence against these claims that further examinations, or efforts to confirm the Veteran's stressors, will not provide a basis to grant these claims. The Veteran's lack of credibility militates against VA conducting any further development in this case. Verification of the occurrence of a fire aboard the Mauna Kea or that the Mauna Kea went through a storm would not change the outcome of this case because it would not cure the problem with the Veteran's credibility which includes his reports of his contemporaneous reactions to those alleged events and his reports of current symptoms, such as nightmares, involving those alleged events. VA is not required to provide assistance to a claimant where there is no reasonable possibility that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2). With regard to the issue of the "relative severity", of the fire or typhoon, it is important to note that in this case the "relative severity" of either stressor is irrelevant. For the limited purposes of this decision, the Board will concede that the fire and/or typhoon both occurred and were "extremely severe", therefore, there is no basis to remand this case to the RO to corroborate the stressor event through the request of "service department records, such as ship logs, etc." (which, based on the Veteran's history and the facts of this case, will most likely reveal nothing). As the Board concedes that the stressor event occurred and that it was "extremely severe" (even in the extreme), there is no basis to remand the case. Even if detailed records regarding both events were found, the Board has also found that the Veteran's statements to examiners as to how these events impacted him can not be believed (for reasons noted above). The Veteran's statements, as a whole, provides highly probative evidence against his case, indicating his willingness to tell examiners what is needed to prevail in this claim, even if that information is false, providing highly probative evidence that he has any disability related to his service. The Board has not overlooked the joint motion, it is simply conceding this point regarding the fire and typhoon to avoid a needless remand. It appears that the basis of the joint motion was to obtain evidence regarding the "relative severity" of the stressor, which is rendered moot by this concession. Therefore, no records regarding either event would provide a basis to grant this case. As a result, there is no basis to remand this case for stressor verification. The Board will not attain a VA examination regarding these stressors and whether or not these stressors caused PTSD (or some other problem) because the Veteran's prior statements to examiners and the Board make clear it clear that his statements to the examiners can not be trusted and, in fact, indicate the unfortunate extent to which he will go to obtain VA benefits. Regarding the second point of the joint motion (that the Board's decision had "unclear" reasons and bases), the Board has attempted to cure this issue with the detailed discussion above. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Based on the above, no further notice or assistance to the Veteran is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist the appellant in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). ORDER The appeal is denied. ____________________________________________ JOHN J. CROWLEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs