Citation Nr: 1006745 Decision Date: 02/23/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 07-01 562 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen the claim of service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Missouri Veterans Commission ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD M. Scott Walker, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1965 to September 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri. The Board denied the Veteran's claims in September 2008. Following an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court), a September 2009 Joint Motion for Remand moved for the Court to vacate the September 2008 Board decision. Specifically, the Veteran alleged, through his representative, that proper notice under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) had not been provided with respect to these the issue of new and material evidence (bilateral hearing loss). Further, it was noted that the Veteran was competent to report the onset of tinnitus during his period of active service, and that the September 2008 Board decision failed to adequately address the Veteran's competency in this regard. See Joint Motion for Remand, November 10, 2009. In November 2009, the Court vacated these issues in accordance with the Joint Motion and remanded them to the Board for further development. See Order, November 30, 2009. The issue of whether new and material evidence has been received with regard to the Veteran's claim for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDING OF FACT Tinnitus had its onset during active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Tinnitus was incurred in active service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, all of the evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claims. The Veteran must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the Veteran). The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant. Equal weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in the record; every item of evidence does not have the same probative value. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) As a preliminary matter, the Board notes that regulations enacted under the VCAA require VA to notify claimants and their representatives of any information that is necessary to substantiate a claim for benefits. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103(a), 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159(b), 3.326(a). In the instant case, the appellant's claim for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is granted herein. As such, any deficiencies with regard to VCAA for this issue are harmless and non-prejudicial. II. Service Connection In September 2005, the Veteran submitted a claim for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. He noted that he experienced heavy noise exposure due to combat and artillery fire during his time in Vietnam while on active duty. Exposure to in-service acoustic trauma was conceded by the RO in February 2006. In order to establish service connection for a claimed disability, the facts must demonstrate that a disease or injury resulting in current disability was incurred in active military service or, if pre-existing active service, was aggravated therein. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). The Court held that, in order to prevail on the issue of service connection on the merits, there must be medical evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). It is also noted that the Board may not base a decision on its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions but, rather, may reach a medical conclusion only on the basis of independent medical evidence in the record. See Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). Neither the Board nor the Veteran is competent to supplement the record with unsubstantiated medical conclusions. See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991). Conversely, health professionals are experts and are presumed to know the requirements applicable to their practice and to have taken them into account in providing a diagnosis. At the outset, the Board notes that the Veteran has been diagnosed with tinnitus. See VA examination report, February 2006. Thus, element (1) of Hickson has been satisfied, in that the Veteran has demonstrated that he has a current diagnosis for his claimed disorder. The Veteran's service medical records are silent for complaints, treatment, or a diagnosis of tinnitus. During his enlistment examination in September 1965, the Veteran checked "No" to ear, nose, and throat trouble, and tinnitus was not noted by the examiner. On separation in September 1968, although bilateral hearing loss was observed, tinnitus was not reported. See Report of Medical Examination, September 22, 1968. Post-service, the Veteran was afforded a VA audiological examination in February 2006. At that time, he reported tinnitus which occurred once every three weeks. During those times, the Veteran reported hearing a mild buzz, bilaterally, lasting for approximately 10 seconds. The Veteran stated that tinnitus had its onset two years prior. It was also noted that the Veteran worked in a factory for 30 years, with 10 years of significant noise exposure, as well as the fact that the Veteran was a life-long hunter (later rebutted by the Veteran). The Veteran attributed his symptoms to noise exposure during active service. The examiner noted that the Veteran's service medical records were negative for a diagnosis of tinnitus. The examiner further stated that the Veteran's current symptoms were mild, infrequent, and of short duration. Finally, the examiner noted that the Veteran first noticed his symptoms approximately two years prior to the examination, and several years following his separation from service. Therefore, the examiner opined that it was not as likely as not that the Veteran's tinnitus was related to his military service. Although the Veteran reported a two-year tinnitus history at the time of the February 2006 VA examination, he submitted a statement in April 2006 in which he claimed that his ears had been ringing ever since separation from active service. See Statement, April 28, 2006. As to the Veteran's assertions that tinnitus began during his period of active service, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be considered, and competent lay evidence can be sufficient in and of itself. The Board, however, retains the discretion to make credibility determinations and otherwise weigh the evidence submitted, including lay evidence. See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This would include weighing the absence of contemporary medical evidence against lay statements. In Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), the Federal Circuit determined that lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition (noting that sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition where the condition is simple, for example difficulty hearing, and sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. The relevance of lay evidence is not limited to the third situation, but extends to the first two as well. Whether lay evidence is competent and sufficient in a particular case is a factual issue. Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1992) (distinguishing between competency, a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered, and credibility, factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted). See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). In Robinson v. Shinseki, the Court held that, in some cases, lay evidence will be competent and credible evidence of etiology. Whether lay evidence is competent in a particular case is a question of fact to be decided by the Board in the first instance. The Court set forth a two-step analysis to evaluate the competency of lay evidence. First, Board must first determine whether the disability is the type of injury for which lay evidence is competent evidence. If so, the Board must weigh that evidence against the other evidence of record. See Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Board notes that the Veteran can attest to factual matters of which he had first-hand knowledge. Therefore, the Veteran is competent to report that he had ringing in his ears during his period of active service. See Jandreau. Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted")). See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). Here, although the Veteran related to the February 2006 VA examiner that his tinnitus had bothered him for 2-3 years prior, he clarified that statement in April 2006. He noted that tinnitus had existed since separation from active service, and that it became worse over the prior 2-3 years. As the Board does not have cause to doubt the Veteran's credibility with regard to these statements, and taking into account that in-service acoustic trauma has been conceded, lay evidence submitted by the Veteran is sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a tinnitus during his period of active service. See Jandreau. In sum, the Veteran is competent to state that his currently- diagnosed tinnitus had its onset during his period of active service. Although the VA examiner was unable to provide an etiological connection between current tinnitus and service, the Board finds to evidence of record to be in relative equipoise, given the unique and subjective nature of the Veteran's claimed disorder. Accordingly, the Veteran's appeal is granted. ORDER Service connection for tinnitus is granted. REMAND In a August 1969 decision, the RO denied the Veteran's claim for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. The Veteran's claim was denied because the Veteran's hearing was shown to be defective prior to service with no indication that his hearing loss was aggravated beyond normal progress during service. A notice of disagreement was not received within the subsequent one-year period. Therefore, the RO's August 1969 rating decision is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105. In order to establish service connection for a claimed disability, the facts must demonstrate that a disease or injury resulting in current disability was incurred in active military service or, if pre-existing active service, was aggravated therein. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). Where a Veteran served 90 days or more during a period of war or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and sensorineural hearing loss became manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). The Court held that, in order to prevail on the issue of service connection on the merits, there must be medical evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). Hearing loss disability is defined by regulation. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The Board notes that prior unappealed decisions are final. However, a claim will be reopened and the former disposition reviewed if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to the claim which has been disallowed. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). The Court has held that, when "new and material evidence" is presented or secured with respect to a previously and finally disallowed claim, VA must reopen the claim. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 145 (1991). In Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) addressed directives consistent with the VCAA with regard to new and material evidence. The Court stated that in order to successfully reopen a previously and finally disallowed claim, the law requires the presentation of a special type of evidence-evidence that is both new and material. The terms "new" and "material" have specific, technical meanings that are not commonly known to VA claimants. Because these requirements define particular types of evidence, when providing the notice required by the VCAA it is necessary, in most cases, for VA to inform claimants seeking to reopen a previously and finally disallowed claim of the unique character of evidence that must be presented. This notice obligation does not modify the requirement that VA must provide a claimant notice of what is required to substantiate each element of a service connection claim. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). In other words, VA must notify a claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to reopen the claim and VA must notify the claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to establish his entitlement to the underlying claim for the benefit sought by the claimant. In addition, VA's obligation to provide a claimant with notice of what constitutes new and material evidence to reopen a service connection claim may be affected by the evidence that was of record at the time that the prior claim was finally denied. In order to satisfy the legislative intent underlying the VCAA notice requirement to provide claimants with a meaningful opportunity to participate in the adjudication of their claims, the VCAA requires, in the context of a claim to reopen, the Secretary to look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to respond with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate that element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. Therefore, the question of what constitutes material evidence to reopen a claim for service connection depends on the basis on which the prior claim was denied. Therefore, proper VCAA notification would provide that new and material evidence consists of evidence that shows that the Veteran's hearing loss was aggravated beyond its normal progression during his period of active service. According to the Court, the Veteran was not provided adequate, specific notice of what constitutes material evidence in the case at hand. In the October 2005 VCAA letter, the Veteran was not adequately advised as to why his claim for service connection was previously denied, as the notice did not state that defective hearing was found to have pre-existed service and was not aggravated beyond normal progression during service. See VCAA letter, October 2005. As such, the Veteran was provided inadequate VCAA notification. The failure to provide notice of what constitutes material evidence would generally be the type of error that has the natural effect of producing prejudice, because it would constitute a failure to provide a claimant notice of a key element of what it takes to substantiate a claim to reopen. Without such notice, a claimant effectively would be deprived of an opportunity to participate in the adjudication process because she or he would not know what evidence was needed to reopen her or his claim. Therefore, this issue must be remanded for the Veteran to be furnished specific notification of the reason for the prior final denial and of what constitutes material evidence specifically with respect to that prior decision. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The AMC should review the record and ensure compliance with all notice and assistance requirements set forth in the VCAA and subsequent interpretive authority. The VCAA notice should include specific notice of why the claim was previously denied and what constitutes material evidence for the purpose of reopening the claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss. The claim was denied in August 1969 on the basis that the medical evidence of record, to include service treatment reports, did not establish that a pre-existing hearing loss disorder was aggravated during the Veteran's period of active service. Material evidence, therefore, would be evidence showing that the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss was aggravated beyond its normal progression during his period of active service. The VCAA information provided to the Veteran should include reference to the version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) in effect for claims filed after August 2001. 2. After completing the above action and any other development as may be indicated by any response received as a consequence of the action taken in the paragraph above, the claim should be readjudicated. If the claim remains denied, a supplemental statement of the case should be provided to the appellant and his representative. After the appellant has had an adequate opportunity to respond, the appeal should be returned to the Board for appellate review. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ S. L. Kennedy Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs