Citation Nr: 1006798 Decision Date: 02/24/10 Archive Date: 03/02/10 DOCKET NO. 08-05 390 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim for service connection for major depressive disorder, and if so, whether the claim should be granted. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Joseph R. Moore, Esquire ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD A. Robben, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from July 1984 to August 1992 and from November 1996 to October 1998. This case comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2004 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Roanoke, Virginia, which, in pertinent part denied entitlement to service connection for PTSD and found that new and material evidence had not been received to reopen a claim for service connection for major depressive disorder. Jurisdiction of this case now rests with the Pittsburgh Regional Office. A July 2005 rating decision by the RO confirmed the denial of service connection for PTSD. Where the claim in question has been finally adjudicated at the RO level and not appealed, the statutes make clear that the Board has a jurisdictional responsibility to consider whether it was proper for a claim to be reopened, regardless of whether the previous action denying the claim was appealed to the Board. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, despite the various characterizations of the issue throughout the appeal, the Board must make an independent determination as to whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability. In a July 2007 statement the Veteran raised the issue of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) with the prior final decisions denying entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder and earlier effective dates for service- connected sleep apnea, cervical spine disability, and lumbar spine disability. See Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545, 557 (2008) (noting that "the Board itself commits error by failing to address issues reasonably raised by the record"); accord Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2004) (discussing VA's duty to "give a sympathetic reading to the veteran's filings to determine all claims for recovery supported by a liberal construction of those allegations"). As the issue of CUE has not yet been adjudicated, it is referred to the RO for appropriate action. The issue of entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran has current PTSD due to an in-service combat stressor that has been corroborated by credible evidence. 2. Entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder was initially denied in an unappealed March 2000 rating decision. 3. Evidence received since the March 2000 rating decision is not cumulative or redundant of the evidence previously of record and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. PTSD was incurred as a result of active duty. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (2009). 2. New and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim for service connection for major depressive disorder. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) redefined VA's duty to assist a Veteran in the development of a claim. VA regulations for the implementation of the VCAA were codified as amended at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2008). The VCAA is not applicable where further assistance would not aid the appellant in substantiating his claim. Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet App 362 (2001); see 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(a)(2) (Secretary not required to provide assistance "if no reasonable possibility exists that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim"); see also VAOPGCPREC 5-2004; 69 Fed. Reg. 59989 (2004) (holding that the notice and duty to assist provisions of the VCAA do not apply to claims that could not be substantiated through such notice and assistance). In view of the Board's favorable decision in this appeal, further assistance is unnecessary to aid the Veteran in substantiating his claim. Service Connection for PTSD Legal Criteria Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.Cir.1996) (table); see also Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza elements is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see Savage 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); see also Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 302 (1999). Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post- service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-96; see Hickson, 12 Vet. App. at 253 (lay evidence of in-service incurrence sufficient in some circumstances for purposes of establishing service connection); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Lay persons are not competent to opine as to medical etiology or render medical opinions. Barr v. Nicholson; see Grover v. West, 12 Vet. App. 109, 112 (1999); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). Lay testimony is competent, however, to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 405 (1995) (lay person competent to testify to pain and visible flatness of his feet); Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 494- 95 (lay person may provide eyewitness account of medical symptoms). "Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology." Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 496 (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted"). Service connection may also be granted for a disease first diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, for veteran's who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946, certain chronic disabilities, such as PTSD, are presumed to have been incurred in service if such manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a), 3.309(a). With chronic diseases shown as such in service, or within the presumptive period after service, so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestation of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). Analysis Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 32 (4th ed.)(1994)(DSM IV); credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor. If the evidence established that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. This rule was subsequently codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). A determination that a veteran engaged in combat with the enemy may be supported by any evidence which is probative of that fact, and there is no specific limitation of the type or form of evidence that may be used to support such a finding. VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (1999). Evidence submitted to support a claim that a veteran engaged in combat may include the veteran's own statements and an "almost unlimited" variety of other types of evidence. Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353, 359 (1998). The Court has held that receiving enemy fire can constitute participation in combat. Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264 (2004). The medical evidence clearly establishes the current diagnosis of PTSD. A November 2005 letter from a private physician stated that the Veteran had reported anxiety, panic, and nervousness connected to his active duty service in the Republic of Panama in the 1980s. Private hospital treatment notes in 2006 show continued treatment for major depression, PTSD, and alcoholism. During a February 2007 VA examination, the examiner stated that the Veteran had been hospitalized at that psychiatric facility three times since 2005, described the Veteran's treatment during that time, and diagnosed the Veteran with PTSD and with depressive disorder and anxiety disorder secondary to PTSD. The medical evidence also establishes a link between the diagnoses and in-service stressors, as the diagnoses were based upon the Veteran's descriptions of traumatic combat experiences during military service such as witnessing the deaths of other soldiers and civilians. After reviewing the Veteran's history and statements, the examiner concluded that PTSD was at least more likely as not the result of the Veteran's experience in Panama. Therefore, the issue in this case is whether the evidence supports a finding that the Veteran's claimed in-service stressors occurred. Service treatment records demonstrate that the Veteran was a special operations weapons sergeant and infantryman who participated in combat and was awarded a Combat Infantryman Badge, Special Forces Tab, Parachute Badge, and Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal. The Veteran has reported several stressors, including seeing twisted rubble and smelling burnt flesh where female cadet barracks had been bombed, finding a boot with an amputated human foot inside, and nearly shooting civilian children during a reconnaissance patrol. The Board, therefore, finds that the Veteran's consistent report of combat stressors together with the award of the Combat Infantryman Badge weighs the evidence in favor of a finding that he engaged in combat. As noted above, if the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009). Furthermore, a statement provided by the Veteran's colleague dated February 2005 described how the Veteran reported several stressing experiences that occurred while on active duty in Panama which included the experience of smelling burning flesh. The colleague described how intense and emotionally disturbing the recollection of those events was for the Veteran. The Board finds that the Veteran's statements and reported history are credible and are consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service. As there is no evidence to the contrary, the Board is satisfied that the Veteran's claimed in-service stressors related to combat occurred. In light of the foregoing, the Board concludes that the Veteran was subjected to combat stressors supporting the diagnoses of PTSD. Accordingly, service connection is warranted for PTSD. Claim to Reopen A claim which has been finally denied in an unappealed rating decision or Board decision may not thereafter be reopened and allowed. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 7104(b), 7105(c) (2009). An exception to this rule is 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108, which provides that if new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim which has been disallowed, the Secretary shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim. New evidence is defined as existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence means evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence previously of record, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). The Veteran was denied entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder in a March 2000 unappealed rating decision. The evidence of record at that time included the Veteran's service medical records, which showed complaints of and treatment for anxiety and depression, and a notice of failure to report for a VA psychiatric examination. There was no evidence of post-service psychiatric treatment. The RO determined that the evidence did not establish the existence of a chronic psychiatric disability in service or thereafter. The subsequently received evidence includes post-service private treatment records, which establish the diagnoses of recurrent, moderate major depressive disorder and relationship disorder and demonstrate continuing treatment for symptoms of depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and trouble sleeping, as well as a VA examination which diagnosed depressive disorder and anxiety disorder secondary to PTSD. This evidence pertains to the issue of chronicity as it shows continuous treatment for the claimed major depressive disorder. As such, it is clearly new and material and reopening of the claim is in order. ORDER Service connection for PTSD is granted. New and material evidence has been received; the claim for entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder is reopened. REMAND As noted above, the Veteran received a VA psychiatric examination in February 2007. The examiner diagnosed PTSD on a direct basis and depressive disorder and anxiety disorder secondary to PTSD. However, the examiner did not provide a rationale for finding the depressive disorder to be secondary to PTSD rather than due to service and did not provide an opinion as to whether it was possible to separate the PTSD symptoms from the depressive and anxiety disorder symptoms. Furthermore, the examiner did not review the Veteran's claims file and therefore did not see evidence that the Veteran complained of nervousness, anxiety, and depression as early as July 1986, during the Veteran's first period of active duty service. The Court has held that an examination is inadequate where the examiner formulates an opinion without considering the Veteran's statements. Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23 (2007). Furthermore, an examination is inadequate where the examiner does not review the medical history and provide a factually accurate rationale for the opinions provided in the examination report. Nieves-Rodriquez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 303-4 (2008). Therefore, clarification from the 2007 VA examiner or a new VA examination is required. Service connection is provided for a disability, which is proximately due to, or the result of a service connected disease or injury. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2009). The Court has held that service connection can be granted under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, for a disability that is aggravated by a service connected disability and that compensation can be paid for any additional impairment resulting from the service- connected disorder. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). VA has amended 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 to explicitly incorporate the holding in Allen, except that the new regulation requires that the aggravation be supported by medical evidence created prior to the claimed aggravation. 71 Fed. Reg. 52,744-52,747 (Sept. 7, 2006) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a)). In light of the Board's grant of service connection for PTSD and the new evidence that depressive disorder and anxiety disorder may be secondary to PTSD, the claim must be readjudicated. Moreover, under the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must request that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim. Pelegrini v. Principi (Pelegrini II), 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004), see 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The Veteran was not sent notice in compliance with the VCAA. Proper notice must be provided in connection with the claim for entitlement to service connection for major depressive disorder on a direct and secondary basis. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. The Veteran should be provided with a VCAA notice letter that tells him what evidence is needed to substantiate entitlement to service connection on a direct and secondary basis. 2. The claims folder should be forwarded to the 2007 VA examiner or, if that examiner is not available, the Veteran should be scheduled for a new VA psychiatric examination to determine whether he has a current psychiatric disability, other than PTSD and including major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, that was incurred or aggravated in service or is secondary to the Veteran's service-connected PTSD. The examiner should review the claims folder and note such review in the examination report or in an addendum. Based on a review of the claims folder and the examination findings, including the service treatment records and private treatment reports, the examiner should: (a). Provide an opinion as to whether there is at least a 50 percent probability or greater (at least as likely as not) that any currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder, other than PTSD, had its onset in active service; is otherwise the result of disease or injury in service; or underwent an increase in underlying disability in service. (Even if the examiner does not diagnose a current disability at the time of the examination, depressive disorder and anxiety disorder have been noted during the pendency of this appeal and this satisfies the requirement that there be a current disability. McLain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007).) (b). The examiner should opine whether the Veteran's psychiatric disorder, at least as likely as not, was either (1) proximately caused or (2) aggravated by his service-connected PTSD. (c). The examiner should provide an opinion as to the impact any currently diagnosed psychiatric disorder(s), including service-connected PTSD, has on the Veteran's employability. (d). Provide the rationale for all opinions expressed. 3. Readjudicate the claim for service connection for major depressive disorder on a direct and secondary basis. If the benefits sought on appeal remain denied, issue a supplemental statement of the case, before the claims file is returned to the Board, if otherwise in order. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ Cheryl L. Mason Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs