Citation Nr: 1007106 Decision Date: 02/25/10 Archive Date: 03/05/10 DOCKET NO. 06-08 644 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a low back disability, claimed as secondary to a service-connected right foot disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. M. Marcus, Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant is a veteran who served on active duty from May 1968 to May 1970. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2005 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri. The case was brought before the Board in March 2009, at which time the claim was remanded to allow the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) to further assist the Veteran in the development of his claims, to include affording him a VA examination. The requested development having been completed, the case is once again before the Board for appellate consideration of the issues on appeal. The Board notes the Veteran also perfected appeals seeking entitlement to service connection for a left thumb disability, a right foot disability and right ear sensorineural hearing loss. The RO granted these claims during the pendency of this appeal in a September 2009 decision and, therefore, the claims have been substantiated and are no longer before the Board here. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran's low back disabilities, to include degenerative disc disease (DDD) of the lumbosacral spine, have not been shown to be caused or aggravated by his service-connected right foot disability or any other incident of service; DDD of the low back was not manifest within one year following service discharge. CONCLUSION OF LAW The Veteran's low back disability is not proximately due to or the result of any service-connected disease or injury, to include a service-connected right foot disability, nor may it be presumed to have occurred therein. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.310 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim. The Veteran must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the veteran). The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The VCAA describes VA's duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a). The notice requirements were met in this case by letters sent to the Veteran in December 2004 and May 2009. Those letters advised the Veteran of the information necessary to substantiate his claim, and of his and VA's respective obligations for obtaining specified different types of evidence. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The 2009 letter also explained how disability ratings and effective dates are determined. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Veteran has not alleged that VA failed to comply with the notice requirements of the VCAA, and he was afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim, and has in fact provided additional arguments at every stage. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005). Ideally, the notice required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005). The claim was previously remanded by the Board in March 2009 because the initial letter sent to the Veteran did not contain all information necessary to satisfy the notice requirements under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a). The subsequent letter, mailed to the Veteran in May 2009 did adequately inform the Veteran of all notice requirements. The Veteran still has the right to VCAA content complying notice and proper subsequent VA process, and that has been done, as discussed above. Any defect with respect to the timing of the VCAA notice requirement was harmless error. See Mayfield, supra. Although the notice provided to the claimant in 2009 was not given prior to the first adjudication of the claim, the content of the notice fully complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b), and, after the notice was provided, the claim was readjudicated and an additional SSOC was provided to the Veteran in September 2009. Not only has he been provided with every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claim and to respond to VA notices, but the actions taken by VA have essentially cured the error in the timing of notice. The Board also concludes VA's duty to assist has been satisfied. The Veteran's service treatment records and VA medical records are in the file. Private medical records identified by the Veteran have been obtained, to the extent possible. The Board notes many identified private treatment records were not available. Many private providers indicated records were destroyed because of the lapse of time. Accordingly, the Board concludes further efforts to attempt to obtain these records would be futile. The Veteran has at no time referenced outstanding records that he wanted VA to obtain or that he felt were relevant to the claim. The duty to assist also includes providing a medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law. With regard to service connection claims, the Court held in the case of McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), that an examination is required when (1) there is evidence of a current disability, (2) evidence establishing an "in- service event, injury or disease," or a disease manifested in accordance with presumptive service connection regulations occurred which would support incurrence or aggravation, (3) an indication that the current disability may be related to the in-service event, and (4) insufficient evidence to decide the case. The Veteran was afforded a medical examination to obtain an opinion as to whether his lo-w back disability can be attributed to his service-connected right foot disability. Cf. Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 517 (2004). Further examination or opinion is not needed because, at a minimum, there is no persuasive and competent evidence that the claimed condition may be associated with the Veteran's military service. This is discussed in more detail below. Thus, the Board finds that VA has satisfied the duty to assist the Veteran. In the circumstances of this case, additional efforts to assist or notify him in accordance with the VCAA would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided). VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the Veteran at every stage of this case. Therefore, the Board may proceed to consider the merits of the claim. Service Connection Service connection means that the facts establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). This may be shown by affirmative evidence showing inception or aggravation during service or through statutory presumptions. Id. When a disease is first diagnosed after service, service connection can still be granted for that condition if the evidence shows it was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection may be established for a current disability on the basis of a presumption under the law that certain chronic diseases manifesting themselves to a certain degree within a certain time after service must have had their onset in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1113 and 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.307 and 3.309(a). Service connection for arthritis may be established based on a legal "presumption" by showing that either manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). Here, no legal presumption is applicable because the earliest evidence of the Veteran's arthritis decades after service. In the absence of a presumption, in order to prevail on the issue of service connection there must be medical evidence of a current disability; medical evidence, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); see also Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999). Additionally, any disability which is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service connected. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) caused by or (b) aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995) (en banc), reconciling, Leopoldo v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 216 (1993), and Tobin v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 34 (1991). Here, the Veteran is service-connected for various residual disabilities due to an in-service mine explosion. The Veteran further claims his low back disability is related to these injuries sustained in an in-service mine explosion, most significantly his right foot. Specifically, the Veteran concedes he did not specifically injure his back in the mine explosion, but his low back began hurting around the same time because he constantly and chronically limped on his right foot. The Veteran believes the years of having this abnormal gait, due to his right foot disability, caused his current low back disabilities, to include DDD. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about what he experienced; for example, he is competent to discuss his current pain and other experienced symptoms. See, e.g., Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). He is not, however, competent to diagnose any medical disorder or render an opinion as to the cause or etiology of any current disorder because he does not have the requisite medical knowledge or training. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997) (stating that competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence). The mine explosion is well documented in the Veteran's service treatment records. The Board notes the Veteran was awarded the Purple Heart for injuries sustained in Vietnam due to a mine explosion. In Collette v. Brown, 82 F.3d 389 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b), a combat Veteran's assertions of an event during combat are to be presumed if consistent with the time, place and circumstances of such service. However, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) can be used only to provide a factual basis upon which a determination could be made that a particular disease or injury was incurred or aggravated in service, not to link the claimed disorder etiologically to a current disorder. See Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 522-23 (1996). Section 1154(b) does not establish service connection for a combat Veteran; it aids him by relaxing the adjudicative evidentiary requirements for determining what happened in service. Accordingly, although the Board accepts the Veteran's recollections of the in-service mine explosion, the evidence must still establish by competent medical evidence tending to show a current disability and a nexus between that disability and those service events. See Gregory v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 563, 567 (1996); see also Kessel v. West, 13 Vet. App. 9, 17- 19 (1999). In this case, for reasons discussed below, such competent medical nexus evidence is lacking. Service treatment records indicate the Veteran was in a mine explosion on April 1969 receiving multiple fragment wounds to the extremities, abdomen, chest and neck. The records are silent as to any complaints, treatment or diagnosis of any low back condition prior to or after the mine explosion. The Veteran separated in May 1970 with no mention of any low back disability. Even if a chronic condition was not shown during service, service connection may be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) by evidence of continuity of symptomatology or under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) if the evidence shows a disease first diagnosed after service was incurred in service. The Veteran does not dispute the fact that he did not incur a low back disability in the military. Rather, he claims he developed a low back disability years later due to limping on his injured right foot, which is service-connected. The crucial inquiry, then, is whether the Veteran's current low back disability is related to his service-connected right foot disability or any other remote incident in service. Based on all the evidence, the Board concludes it is not. After service, the claims folder does not reflect any complaints, treatment or diagnosis of a low back disability until 1999, nearly three decades after service. At that time, the Veteran sought private treatment for back pain following an occupational injury. The Veteran worked as a cowboy at a cattle company and incurred a low back injury in February 1999. During the course of treatment, the Veteran did not mention any prior history of back pain or any service-related injury. VA outpatient treatment records from 2005 indicate treatment and diagnoses of moderate DDD of the lumbar spine, confirmed by x-ray, mild compressure fracture of the T12 vertebra and chronic low back strain. The Veteran was afforded a general VA examination in July 2005 where the examiner noted the Veteran's low back pain since 1969 and his current diagnoses, but found the claims file did not support any in-service injury to the low back. Most recently, the Veteran was afforded a VA examination in August 2009 to ascertain whether the Veteran had any low back diagnosis related to his service-connected right foot. The 2009 VA examiner again noted the Veteran's complaints of back pain since 1969, after the mine explosion, and diagnosed the Veteran with degenerative changes, low back strain and mild compression fracture of the T12 vertebra. With regard to etiology, the examiner fount it "less as likely as not" that the Veteran's low back strain was permanently aggravated by the right foot fragment injury. In support of the opinion, the examiner noted the Veteran spent most of his life working as a cowboy performing strenuous labor, that he injured his back in 1999, and that DDD of the lumbar spine was first found on x-ray in 2005. The Board finds the examiner's opinion persuasive. It is based on a thorough examination and a complete review of the claims folder. Also compelling, no medical professional has ever linked the Veteran's low back disability to his right foot disability or any other incident of his military service. The examiner's opinion is adequately explained and supported by the remainder of the claims folder. It is clear the Veteran suffered a post-service injury in 1999, nearly three decades after service. At that time, the Veteran did not indicate any prior history of back pain or treatment, nor did the Veteran mention his military service, the mine explosion or right foot pain. In accordance with the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (2006), the Board concludes that the lay evidence presented by the Veteran concerning his continuity of symptoms after service is credible regardless of the lack of contemporaneous medical evidence. Accordingly, the Board has considered the Veteran's statements indicating he suffered with back pain since the 1969 in-service mine explosion due to his abnormal gait caused by his right foot injury. The most competent and probative medical evidence, however, does not support this conclusion and indeed opines to the contrary. The claims folder indicates the Veteran worked in a post- service physically demanding job and incurred an occupational back injury in February 1999. The August 2009 VA examiner considered the Veteran's statements of continuity of symptomatology, but still found it less likely than not that the Veteran's current low back disability is causally connected to his right foot disability. The Veteran's private treatment records support the conclusion that the Veteran injured his back in a post-service occupational injury in 1999 and was not seen for back pain prior to 1999. Although the Veteran believes that his service-connected right foot disability is responsible for his low back disability, he is a layman and has no competence to offer a medical diagnosis. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). In summary, the Board finds that the most probative evidence of record does not show that the Veteran's service-connected right foot disability is responsible for his current low back disability nor does the medical evidence suggest a direct link to any incident of his military service. Service connection requires competent medical evidence indicating that the condition is proximately due to or the result of some incident of service or a service-connected disease or injury. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.310. The most probative evidence of record is against such a finding in this case. In light of the foregoing, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed Cir. 2001). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a low back disability, claimed as secondary to a service-connected right foot disability, is denied. ____________________________________________ K. PARAKKAL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs