Citation Nr: 1007131 Decision Date: 02/26/10 Archive Date: 03/05/10 DOCKET NO. 06-16 828 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Chicago, Illinois THE ISSUE Whether new and material evidence has been received to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for hypertension. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. M. Powell, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from October 1973 to October 1977. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2005 rating decision of Chicago, Illinois Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that reopened a previously denied claim for entitlement to service connection for hypertension. However, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has made it clear that even if an RO makes an initial determination to reopen a claim, the Board must still review the RO's preliminary decision in that regard. Barnett v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 1, 4 (1995). As such, the issue on appeal has been recharacterized as that which is found on the coversheet of the decision. In January 2010 the Veteran testified at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of that hearing has been associated with the claims file. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. By a rating decision in August 1996, the RO denied service connection for hypertension. The Veteran was notified of his right to appeal, but a timely appeal was not filed. 2. Evidence added to the record since the August 1996, considered in conjunction with the record as a whole, is new, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the Veteran's claim, but does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the Veteran's claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The RO's decision of August 1996 which denied service connection for hypertension, is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). 2. New and material evidence has not been received to reopen the Veteran's claim for entitlement to service connection for hypertension. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS VCAA The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009) Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper VCAA notice must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). VCAA notice should be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004); see also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Further regarding notice, on March 3, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) issued its decision in the consolidated appeal of Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). The Court in Dingess/Hartman holds that the VCAA notice requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of a "service connection" claim. As previously defined by the courts, those five elements include: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Upon receipt of an application for "service connection," therefore, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is required to review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application. This includes notice that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned in the award of the benefit sought. In Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App 1 (2006), the Court issued a decision that established significant new requirements with respect to the content of the VCAA notice for reopening claims. According to the Court, in the context of a claim to reopen, the Secretary must look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to respond by providing the appellant with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate that element or elements required to establish service connection that were found insufficient in the previous denial. Further, in providing instruction as to what information would be considered "new and material", the Court indicated that "material" evidence would include (1) evidence on an element where the claimant initially failed to submit any competent evidence; (2) evidence on an element where the previously submitted evidence was found to be insufficient; (3) evidence on an element where the appellant did not have to submit evidence until a decision of the Secretary determined that an evidentiary presumption had been rebutted; or (4) some combination or variation of the above three situations. "New" evidence would be considered new only if it had not been submitted previously to VA and was neither "cumulative nor redundant" of evidence already in the record. With respect to the issue on appeal, the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ), prior to the initial adjudication of the claim, issued a notice letter to the Veteran in July 2004, that informed him of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence and notified that a disability rating and effective date will be assigned in event of award of any benefit sought per Dingess/Hartman. The Veteran was also informed of what new and material evidence could be submitted to reopen his claim for service connection for hypertension, what type of evidence would qualify as "new" evidence, and per the requirements set forth in Kent, specifically informed him of what evidence would be necessary to substantiate the element or elements required to establish the claim that was found insufficient in the previous denial. With regard to the duty to assist, the claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment records, VA and private treatment records, and VA examination reports. Additionally, the claims file contains the Veteran's statements in support of his claim. The Board has carefully reviewed such statements and concludes that he has not identified further evidence not already of record. The Board has also perused the medical records for references to additional treatment reports not of record, but has found nothing to suggest that there is any outstanding evidence with respect to the Veteran's claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). VA examinations and opinions with respect to the issue on appeal were obtained in March 2005, May 2005, and July 2008. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). To that end, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). The Board finds that the VA examinations and opinions obtained in this case are more than adequate, as they were predicated on a review of the Veteran's claims file and the examiners provided a complete rationale for the opinions stated, relying on and citing to the records reviewed. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to obtaining a VA examination or opinion with respect to the issue on appeal has been met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4). Thus, based on the foregoing, the Board finds that all relevant facts have been properly and sufficiently developed in this appeal and no further development is required to comply with the duty to assist the Veteran in developing the facts pertinent to his claim. Essentially, all available evidence that could substantiate the claim has been obtained. Legal Criteria The Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence of record. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence. Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Therefore, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence where appropriate, and the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the claim. If all of the evidence is in relative equipoise, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in the veteran's favor, and the claim should be granted. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). However, if the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the claim must be denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009). In general, rating decisions that are not timely appealed are final. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103 (2009). Pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(c) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.105 (2009), a final decision by the RO may not thereafter be reopened and allowed, in the absence of clear and unmistakable error (CUE), except as provided by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108, which indicates that "[i]f new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim, which has been disallowed, the [VA] shall reopen the claim and review the former disposition of the claim." Therefore, once an RO decision becomes final under section 7105(c), in the absence of CUE, and absent the submission of new and material evidence, the claim cannot be reopened or adjudicated by VA. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105(c)(West 2002); Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105. A claimant may reopen a finally adjudicated claim by submitting new and material evidence. Under the provisions in effect from August 29, 2001, material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with the previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). The Veteran's claim for whether new and material evidence has been presented to reopen a claim for entitlement to service connection for hypertension was received in June 2004. Therefore, the Board finds that the post August 29, 2001 standard of review should be applied. For the purpose of establishing whether new and material evidence has been received, the credibility of the evidence, although not its weight, is to be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). Present disability resulting from disease or injury in service is required to establish entitlement to service connection. Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F. 3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To establish service connection for a disability, there must be competent evidence of a current disability (medical diagnosis), of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service (lay or medical evidence), and of a nexus between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability (medical evidence). Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 507 (1995). Regulations also provide that service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). Legal Analysis The Veteran asserts that new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen his claim for service connection for hypertension. The record reflects that in an August 1996 decision, the RO denied the Veteran's claim for service connection for hypertension on the basis that although the Veteran had an elevated blood pressure reading in April 1975 and had a blood pressure reading that was considered borderline hypertension on his discharge examination, it was not diagnosed as such. The RO also indicated that there was no evidence to show a diagnosis of hypertension in service or a compensable hypertensive reading within one year of the Veteran's discharge from service. The Veteran did not perfect an appeal, and there has been no allegation of CUE in that regard. As such, it is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105. The evidence received since the final August 1996 RO decision includes private and VA outpatient records showing a post- service diagnosis of hypertension. The additional evidence also includes a May 2005 VA examination report in which the examiner opined that the Veteran's hypertension was not as likely as not related to his military service. According to the examiner, who reviewed the Veteran's claims file: One elevated blood pressure is not sufficient to confirm a diagnosis of hypertension... [The Veteran] reports that he was seen for hypertension shortly after discharge. I would be able to offer a favorable opinion if he could supply these records but at the present time I only have records showing hypertension more than 20 years after discharge. Similarly, in July 2008, another VA examiner after reviewing the Veteran's claims file, opined that he was unable to provide an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran's hypertension without resorting to mere speculation. In reaching this conclusion, the examiner indicated that: One isolated elevated BP in 1977 does not meet diagnostic criteria for hypertension. There is no confirmed diagnosis of hypertension until about 9 years following separation. One elevated BP reading in 1977 is not necessarily related to a later diagnosis of hypertension. The additional evidence also includes an October 2008 statement from the Veteran's sister and testimony that the Veteran provided during his January 2010 Board videoconference hearing. The aforementioned evidence is new because it was not of record at the time of the prior final RO denial in August 1996. Further, this evidence relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim, namely whether or not the Veteran's current hypertension is related to his reported in-service finding of borderline hypertension. However, this evidence, particularly the May 2005 VA medical opinion, in which the examiner opined that the Veteran's current hypertension was not as likely as not etiologically related to service and the July 2008 VA medical opinion in which the examiner indicated that he could not provide an opinion as to the etiology of the Veteran's hypertension without resorting to mere speculation, is not material because when considered by itself, or with previous evidence of record, does not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Further, with respect to the statements of the Veteran and his sister, the Board acknowledges that they are competent to provide statements as to their observations. However, they are not competent to offer an opinion as to a medical diagnosis or medical causation. As such, the additional statements by the Veteran and his sister while new, are not material evidence. See Pollard v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 11 (1993) (lay assertions, even if new, still would not be material evidence); Moray v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 211, 214 (1993) (implicitly holding that if lay assertions of medical causation will not suffice initially to establish a plausible basis for the claim, then it necessarily follows that such assertions cannot serve as a predicate to reopen a claim). Accordingly, the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been received to reopen the Veteran's claim for service connection for hypertension. ORDER New and material evidence has not been received to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for hypertension, the claim is not reopened, and the appeal is denied. ____________________________________________ U. R. POWELL Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs