Citation Nr: 1007207 Decision Date: 02/26/10 Archive Date: 03/05/10 DOCKET NO. 08-27 401 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (claimed as anxiety and depression). ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Shauna M. Watkins, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from May 1968 to December 1969. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from a June 2007 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which denied entitlement to service connection for PTSD and depressive disorder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran served in Vietnam during the Vietnam Era and, although the evidence does not show he engaged in combat with the enemy while there, the evidence does show the event he claims as his primary stressor during service for developing PTSD did occur. Therefore, there is at least one confirmed stressor. 2. There is probative medical evidence for and against the claim on the threshold preliminary question of whether the Veteran has the requisite Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed.) (DSM-IV) PTSD diagnosis, so it is just as likely as not that he does. 3. According to a private physician, the Veteran's current emotional condition, including his PTSD and depressive disorder, is associated with experiences during his active military service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, the Veteran's PTSD was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f). (2009). 2. Resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, the Veteran's depressive disorder was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS In the interest of clarity, the Board will initially discuss whether the claims have been properly developed for appellate review. The Board will then address the claims on their merits, providing relevant VA case law, regulations and statutory provisions, the relevant factual background, and an analysis of its decision. The Duties to Notify and Assist Since the Board is granting the Veteran's claims in full, there is no need to discuss whether there has been compliance with the duty-to-notify-and-assist provisions of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA) because even if for the sake of argument there has not been, this is ultimately inconsequential and, therefore, at most harmless, i.e., non- prejudicial error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (2009); cf. Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). See also Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) (Pelegrini II). General Regulations and Statutes for Service Connection Service connection may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease that was incurred in or aggravated by the Veteran's active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2009). Stated somewhat differently, to establish entitlement to service connection, there must be: (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain cases, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 252 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Certain chronic diseases such as psychoses will be presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree of at least 10-percent disabling within one year after service. This presumption, however, is rebuttable by probative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. And PTSD is a type of neurosis, not psychosis, so not subject to this presumption. 38 C.F.R. § 3.384; 71 Fed. Reg. 42,758-60 (July 28, 2006). So, service connection may be demonstrated either by showing direct service incurrence or aggravation or by using applicable presumptions, if available. Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994). But since PTSD is an anxiety neurosis, rather than a psychosis, it cannot be presumed to have been incurred in service even if manifested to a compensable degree of at least 10 percent within one year after service. This presumption, even if it did apply, which, again, it does not, is nonetheless rebuttable by probative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). Direct service connection generally requires evidence of a current disability with a relationship or connection to an injury or disease or some other manifestation of the disability during service. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A disorder may be service connected if the evidence of record reveals that the Veteran currently has a disorder that was chronic in service or, if not chronic, that was seen in service with continuity of symptomatology demonstrated subsequent to service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494-97 (1997). Evidence that relates the current disorder to service must be medical unless it relates to a disorder that may be competently demonstrated by lay observation. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-97. For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is a required combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic." 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). Disorders diagnosed after discharge may still be service connected if all the evidence, including relevant service records, establishes that the disorder was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, there generally must be competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible; lay assertions in this regard generally do not constitute competent evidence. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997). See also Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124, 127 (1998) citing Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. 494 (a layperson without the appropriate medical training and expertise is not competent to provide a probative opinion on a medical matter, to include a diagnosis of a specific disability and a determination of the origins of a specific disorder). Lay testimony is competent, however, to establish the presence of observable symptomatology and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). When, for example, a disorder may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and to make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a disorder when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical disorder, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination, the benefit of the doubt is resolved in favor of the Veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Entitlement to Service Connection for PTSD Service connection for PTSD, in particular, requires: 1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (i.e., DSM-IV); 2) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and 3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). If the evidence establishes the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d) (regarding combat Veterans). According to the DSM-IV criteria, a diagnosis of PTSD requires that the Veteran have been exposed to a traumatic event, and that he experience a number of specified current symptoms. The traumatic event, or stressor, involves having experienced, witnessed, or being confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others. In addition, the response must involve intense feelings of fear, hopelessness, or horror. In Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997), the Court held that a diagnosis of PTSD is presumably in accordance with the DSM-IV criteria, both insofar as the adequacy and sufficiency of the claimed stressor. Conversely, if the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, or the Veteran did engage in combat but the alleged in-service stressor is not combat related, the Veteran's lay testimony, by itself, is insufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged in-service stressor. Instead, the record must contain credible supporting evidence that corroborates the Veteran's testimony or statements. Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 146-47. And this credible supporting evidence cannot consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996). But that said, the available sources for corroboration of a claimed stressor are not necessarily limited to service records (as previously required prior to the adoption of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)), but may also include other sources of evidence. See Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 143, citing to M21-1, Part VI, para 7.46(f) (Sept. 21, 1992); M21-1, Subch. XII, para 50.45(d) (1989). Moreover, corroboration does not require there be corroboration of every detail, including the Veteran's personal participation in the identifying process. Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1997); Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002). Here, while the evidence does not show the Veteran engaged in combat against enemy forces, including during his tour in Vietnam, the evidence does show the event he claims as his primary stressor during service for developing PTSD did occur. VA has confirmed this incident most regularly described by him as the stressor allegedly causing his PTSD. In his stressor statement, the Veteran described mortar attacks in his unit. The RO confirmed that the Veteran's unit did experience mortar attacks. See Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002) (in which the Court held that a Veteran's unit records constituted independent descriptions of rocket attacks that were experienced by his unit when he was stationed in Vietnam, which, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, objectively corroborated his claim of having experienced rocket attacks). So there is at least one confirmed stressor. In regards to the requisite DSM-IV diagnosis of PTSD, there is probative evidence for and against the issue of whether the Veteran has this diagnosis. The June 2006 private physician, upon a psychiatric examination, determined that the Veteran did have a PTSD diagnosis. However, the March 2007 VA examiner determined that the Veteran met most, but not all, of the criteria for the DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis. Therefore, VA must resolve this reasonable doubt in his favor and conclude he has the necessary DSM-IV PTSD diagnosis. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Furthermore, there is medical evidence of record providing the required link between the Veteran's PTSD diagnosis and the verified in-service stressor. In particular, in June 2006, a private physician, upon a psychiatric examination of the Veteran, determined that the Veteran's current emotional condition, inclusive of his PTSD, was associated with experiences during his active military service. There is no medical evidence of record refuting this opinion that the Veteran's PTSD results from a verified stressor during his military service. An absolutely accurate determination of etiology is not a condition precedent to granting service connection, nor is definite etiology or obvious etiology. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Rather, it is VA's defined and consistently applied policy to administer the law under a broad interpretation consistent with the facts shown in every case. And when, after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. By reasonable doubt it is meant that an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence exists which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. It is a substantial doubt and one within the range of probability, as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3. Hence, the Board finds that the evidence supports the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The aforementioned evidence establishes the required DSM-IV diagnosis of this condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by the medical evidence, between this PTSD diagnosis and the verified in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). So the claim must be granted, certainly with resolution of all reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Entitlement to Service Connection for a Depressive Disorder As explained, the first and indeed perhaps most fundamental requirement for any service-connection claim is there must be competent evidence of the existence of the currently claimed disability. See Boyer, 210 F.3d at 1353; Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992) (service connection presupposes a current diagnosis of the disorder claimed, to at least confirm the Veteran has it; without this minimum level of proof, there is no valid claim). Here, the Veteran has the required diagnosis of a current depressive disorder. This is evident from his VA Medical Center (VAMC) and private outpatient treatment records, which confirm he has depressive disorder. So there is no disputing he has this claimed disorder. Therefore, the determinative issue is whether the Veteran's depressive disorder is attributable to his military service. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See, too, Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). And, here, there is medical evidence of record providing the required link between the Veteran's depression and his active military service. In particular, in June 2006, a private physician, upon a psychiatric examination of the Veteran, diagnosed the Veteran with depressive disorder. The private physician also determined that the Veteran's current emotional condition, inclusive of his depressive disorder, was associated with experiences he lived during his active military service. There is no medical evidence of record refuting this opinion that the Veteran's depressive disorder is due to his military service. An absolutely accurate determination of etiology is not a condition precedent to granting service connection, nor is definite etiology or obvious etiology. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). Rather, it is VA's defined and consistently applied policy to administer the law under a broad interpretation consistent with the facts shown in every case. And when, after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding service origin, the degree of disability, or any other point, such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. By reasonable doubt it is meant that an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence exists which does not satisfactorily prove or disprove the claim. It is a substantial doubt and one within the range of probability, as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3. Here, for the reasons and bases discussed, there is at the very least the relative balance of evidence for and against concluding the Veteran's depressive disorder is traceable to his military service. So resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, his claim for service connection for depressive disorder must be granted. Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). ORDER The claim for service connection for PTSD is granted. The claim for service connection for depressive disorder is granted. ____________________________________________ Michael J. Skaltsounis Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs