Citation Nr: 1007282	
Decision Date: 02/26/10    Archive Date: 03/05/10

DOCKET NO.  03-08 611A	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in North 
Little Rock, Arkansas


THE ISSUE

Entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia, paranoid 
type.


REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by:	Disabled American Veterans


ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

M. Scott Walker, Associate Counsel







INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from August 1980 to July 
1982.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals 
(Board) on appeal from a December 2002 rating decision by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in 
North Little Rock, Arkansas, which denied entitlement to the 
benefit currently sought on appeal.  The Board notes that the 
claim was originally denied in January 1999 and was not 
appealed.  The Veteran attempted to reopen the claim in 
August 2000.  The RO did so by the December 2002 rating 
decision, due to the enactment of the Veterans Claims 
Assistance Act of 2000, which changed the standards by which 
veterans' claims are adjudicated.  It is this rating decision 
the Veteran has appealed.

It is further noted that the Veteran requested a personal 
hearing before the Board in April 2003.  The Veteran was 
then, and remains, incarcerated in an Arkansas prison.   The 
Board contacted the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) 
in an effort to determine whether the Veteran would be 
permitted to travel to a hearing.  In January 2004, the ADC 
notified the Board that it does not provide transportation to 
this type of hearing.  The Veteran was notified of the ADC's 
decision directly.

In November 2004, the Board denied the Veteran's appeal for 
service connection for his paranoid schizophrenia.  He 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (Court).  In an Order dated in August 2006, the Court 
vacated the November 2004 Board decision and remanded the 
matter.   In its August 2006 Order, the Court noted the 
Veteran's contention that VA was required to obtain and 
consider his service personnel records, as well as private 
records, prior to final adjudication.  The Court noted that 
these records could be pertinent and relevant, and that the 
records should be obtained.  The Court also noted that the 
Veteran requested a medical examination and opinion.  
However, as there was no evidence of psychiatric symptoms in 
service, there was no basis for an opinion and development 
was not needed.  The Court left open the possibility that, 
when obtained, the service personnel records could indicate 
psychiatric symptoms in service and demonstrate a need for 
the requested medical opinion.

As such, the Veteran's claim was remanded in July 2007 so as 
to obtain any additional private medical records, as well as 
a complete copy of the Veteran's service personnel records 
(particularly those relating to his performance and 
separation from service).

The Veteran's service personnel records were associated with 
his claims file in January 2008.  Subsequent to the receipt 
of the Veteran's amended claims file, the Board requested a 
medical opinion from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) 
in September 2009.  That opinion was provided in November 
2009.  Therefore, as all development has been completed, the 
issue on appeal is properly before the Board.

The Board further notes that the Appellant's Brief, dated 
January 18, 2010, waived the right to have additional 
evidence referred to the agency of original jurisdiction for 
review and preparation of a supplemental statement of the 
case (SOC) pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304 (2009).


FINDING OF FACT

Schizophrenia, paranoid type, was not manifest during 
service, was not manifest within one year of separation, and 
the Veteran's current diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid 
type, is not attributable to service.


CONCLUSION OF LAW

Schizophrenia, paranoid type, was not incurred in or 
aggravated by service and may not be presumed to have been 
incurred or aggravated therein.  38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 
1113, 1131, 1137 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 38 C.F.R. 
§§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009).  



REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the 
Veteran's claims file.  Although the Board has an obligation 
to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there 
is no need to discuss, in detail, all of the evidence 
submitted by the Veteran or on his behalf.  See Gonzales v. 
West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must 
review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each 
piece of evidence).  The analysis below focuses on the most 
salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence 
shows, or fails to show, on the claims.  The Veteran must not 
assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that 
are not explicitly discussed herein.  See Timberlake v. 
Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that 
the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence 
favorable to the Veteran).  

The Board must assess the credibility and weight of all 
evidence, including the medical evidence, to determine its 
probative value, accounting for evidence which it finds to be 
persuasive or unpersuasive, and providing reasons for 
rejecting any evidence favorable to the claimant.  Equal 
weight is not accorded to each piece of evidence contained in 
the record; every item of evidence does not have the same 
probative value.  When all the evidence is assembled, VA is 
responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the 
claim or is in relative equipoise, with the appellant 
prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the 
evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is 
denied.  See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990).

I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA)

As a preliminary matter, the Board notes that regulations 
enacted under the VCAA require VA to notify claimants and 
their representatives of any information that is necessary to 
substantiate a claim for benefits.  See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 
5102, 5103, 5103(a), 5106, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 
3.156(a), 3.159(b), 3.326(a).  

In Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 120-21 (2004) 
(Pelegrini II), the United States Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must inform the claimant 
of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is 
necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to 
provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and 
(4) request that the claimant provide any evidence in his 
possession that pertains to the claim.  The Board notes that 
38 C.F.R. § 3.159 was recently revised, effective as of May 
30, 2008, and several portions of the revisions are pertinent 
to the claim at issue.  See 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353-23,356 (April 
30, 2008).  Notably, the final rule removes the third 
sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), which had stated that VA 
will request the claimant to provide any evidence in the 
claimant's possession that pertains to the claim.

In addition, the notice requirements of the VCAA apply to all 
five elements of a service-connection claim, including: (1) 
veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a 
connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; 
(4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the 
disability.  Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 
(2006).  Specifically, the notice must include notice that a 
disability rating and an effective date for the award of 
benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded.  
Id. at 486.

In this case, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice 
and duty to assist provisions.  See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 
5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 
3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2009).  A letter dated in 
December 2001, prior to the initial adjudication of his 
claim, informed the Veteran of the information necessary to 
substantiate his claim.  He was also informed of the evidence 
VA would seek on his behalf and the evidence he was expected 
to provide.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. 
§ 3.159(b)(1) (2009); Quartuccio, at 187.  An October 2007 
letter included information with regard to the assignment of 
a disability rating and effective date.  See Dingess/Hartman 
v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006).

Further, the claimant's service treatment records and 
pertinent post-service medical records have been obtained, to 
the extent available.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. 
§ 3.159 (2009).  Pursuant to a November 2007 Board remand, 
the Veteran's service personnel records were associated with 
his claims file in January 2008.  There is no indication in 
the record that any additional evidence, relevant to the 
issue decided herein, is available and not part of the claims 
file.  

The duty to assist also includes providing a medical 
examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such is 
necessary to make a decision on the claim, as defined by law.  
See Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121 (1991).  Subsequent 
to a Board request, a VHA opinion was obtained in November 
2009 so as to assess whether the Veteran's current diagnosis 
schizophrenia, paranoid type, was incurred in or aggravated 
by active service.  To that end, when VA undertakes to 
provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must 
ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate.  See Barr 
v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007).  The VA opinion 
obtained in this case is adequate, as it is predicated on a 
reading of pertinent medical records and is responsive to the 
medical questions raised in this case.  Accordingly, the 
Board finds that VA's duty to assist with respect to 
obtaining a VA examination with respect to the issue on 
appeal has been met.  See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (4) (2009).  
The opinion is thorough and supported by the record.  The 
opinion noted above is therefore adequate upon which to base 
a decision.  

As there is no indication that any failure on the part of VA 
to provide additional notice or assistance reasonably affects 
the outcome of this case, the Board finds that any such 
failure is harmless.  See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 
103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, Mayfield v. Nicholson, 
444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

II.  Service connection

Following a review of the voluminous collection of letters 
from the Veteran, the Board notes that he essentially 
contends that the stress of his last duty assignment in the 
military caused him to use illegal drugs, which in turn 
caused him to develop a psychiatric disorder.  He has 
asserted, through his representative, that schizophrenia, 
paranoid type, was either present or had its onset during his 
period of active service, or within one year of service, or 
that his disorder is otherwise related to his period of 
active service.  See Appellant's Brief, January 18, 2010.

In order to establish service connection for a claimed 
disability, the facts must demonstrate that a disease or 
injury resulting in current disability was incurred in active 
military service or, if pre-existing active service, was 
aggravated therein.  
See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 
(2009).  Where a Veteran served 90 days or more during a 
period of war or during peacetime service after December 31, 
1946, and schizophrenia, paranoid type, became manifest to a 
degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination 
of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been 
incurred in or aggravated by service, even though there is no 
evidence of such disease during the period of service.  This 
presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the 
contrary.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 
2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009).  

Service connection may also be granted for any disease 
diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including 
that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was 
incurred in service.  See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009).  The 
Court held that, in order to prevail on the issue of service 
connection on the merits, there must be medical evidence of 
(1) a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain 
circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or 
aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence 
of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury 
and the present disease or injury.  See Hickson v. West, 12 
Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999).

It is also noted that the Board may not base a decision on 
its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions but, rather, may 
reach a medical conclusion only on the basis of independent 
medical evidence in the record.  See Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. 
App. 155 (1993).  Neither the Board nor the Veteran is 
competent to supplement the record with unsubstantiated 
medical conclusions.  See Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 
171, 175 (1991).  Conversely, health professionals are 
experts and are presumed to know the requirements applicable 
to their practice and to have taken them into account in 
providing a diagnosis.

At the outset, the Board notes that the Veteran has been 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type.  See Discharge 
summary, December 1989.  Thus, element (1) of Hickson has 
been satisfied, in that the Veteran has demonstrated that he 
has a current diagnosis.  

In October 1998, the RO verified the Veteran's service 
through the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC).  As a 
result of this request, the Veteran's available service 
medical records were forwarded to the RO.  The Veteran's June 
1980 entrance examination was included, in which his 
psychiatric health was evaluated as "Normal."  The service 
records also document treatment for various non-mental health 
related disorders through May 1982.  The Board notes that the 
Veteran separated from service in July 1982 and that there is 
no record of a separation examination.

Post-service, the Veteran was hospitalized in the Arkansas 
State Hospital in August 1986, and he was discharged later 
that month.  At that time, the Veteran reported a two-week 
history of daily crystal methadrine use.  He reported that he 
heard voices coming through the walls of his home, making 
statements such as "I'm gonna kill you."  The Veteran 
proceeded to knock holes in the walls in search of friends he 
thought were in trouble.  At the time of his discharge, he 
thought it was his friends playing tricks on him.  

A mental status examination revealed an alert, oriented 
gentleman who was calm and cooperative.  His conversation had 
become logical and goal directed by the time of the 
examination, and there was no evidence of thought blocking or 
inhibition.  He reported that the voices had discontinued by 
the time he arrived at the hospital.  He was neither 
depressed nor anxious.  His cognitive functioning appeared to 
be normal.  His primary diagnosis was amphetamine-induced 
delirium with secondary diagnoses of mixed substance abuse, 
alcohol abuse, and antisocial personality traits.  

In February 1988, the Veteran was charged with capital felony 
murder in connection with the deaths of two women.  He was 
found guilty and was sentenced to life in prison without 
parole plus twenty years.  During the course of the legal 
proceeding, in September 1988, he underwent psychiatric 
examination.  A full history was taken and an examination was 
conducted.  No mention was made referable to the Veteran's 
military service.  A provisional diagnosis of schizophrenia 
paranoid type versus possible schizoaffective disorder or 
possible bipolar disorder with psychosis was noted.

In February 1989, he was diagnosed, at the same institution, 
with schizophrenia, paranoid type.  At that time, he was 
admitted for forensic evaluation in connection with two 
counts of felony murder.  He was generally uncooperative, and 
made a number of irrational statements.  He noted that he had 
"wheels of knowledge" at his home which allowed him to 
predict the future, and he compared himself to a deity.  The 
Veteran was extremely guarded during the examination, and he 
was generally hostile in mood and demeanor.
        
In December 1989, the Veteran was again examined to determine 
his competency to stand trial.  Upon examination, a full 
history was taken and the Veteran examined.  No mention of 
the Veteran's military service was made.  A diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, paranoid type, was confirmed.  His insight and 
judgment were considered fair upon discharge to the county 
jail.

Other post-service treatment records include psychiatric and 
medical treatment at the state prison facility from July 1990 
to July 2001.  The majority of these records discuss only 
current treatment for the Veteran's psychiatric disorder.  On 
only one occasion was the Veteran's past military service 
referenced.  An inmate report from October 1981 noted that 
the Veteran was still hearing voices.  At that time, the 
Veteran gave a detailed personal history to his treating 
psychiatrist.  He stated that he started having problems when 
he was 15 years old, at which point he began to skip school 
and smoke marijuana.  He went into counseling, which seemed 
to help, per the Veteran.  He then reported entering the 
military, during which time he continued to smoke marijuana 
because of feeling pressure at work as an "orderly room 
specialist."  He eventually attended a drug rehabilitation 
program.  He did not finish the program, and was discharged 
from service.  No further mention is made of his military 
service in the medical records.

To review, service connection requires a medical nexus, or 
causal link, between an in-service incurrence of a disease or 
injury and a current disability.  It is clear that the 
Veteran has a diagnosed current psychiatric disability.  The 
issue, therefore, is whether there was an in-service 
incurrence of a psychiatric disorder which has been linked, 
medically, to the current disability.

The Board notes that although the Veteran's service medical 
records are negative for any complaint, diagnosis, or 
treatment of a psychiatric disorder, a review of his service 
personnel records reveals that, prior to his discharge, he 
was given a letter of admonishment for alcohol abuse, and for 
an incident involving tampering with government property 
(fire extinguisher) in January 1981.  At that time, the 
Veteran was reported to be drunk and disorderly on the second 
floor of his barracks.  According to a January 1981 witness 
statement, the Veteran obtained a fire extinguisher and 
sprayed the floor, ceiling, and hallway with fire retardant.  
It was further noted that the Veteran stated that he was 
tired of being picked on.  Another witness confirmed the 
incident, and reported that the Veteran stated that he would 
not let the witness pick on him.  He was reduced in rank in 
April 1982 as a result of improper use of marijuana, and he 
was ultimately discharged under honorable conditions for that 
offense. 

Although the Veteran was not diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia during his period of active service, or within 
one year thereafter, the Board nonetheless requested a VHA 
opinion in September 2009 in order to determine whether the 
Veteran's in-service behavior was indicative of his 
currently-diagnosed disorder.

A VHA opinion was provided in November 2009.  The examiner 
opined that it was very unlikely that the Veteran's illness 
was present or had its onset during his period of service, or 
within one year of service, or that his disorder was 
otherwise related to his period of active service.  Instead, 
the examiner stated that all of the evidence of record, when 
viewed as a whole, indicates that the Veteran's dysfunction 
during his period of service was directly related to abuse 
of, and dependence on, substances.  Specifically, the 
examiner noted a pattern of fluctuating achievement and 
dysfunction that corresponded directly to periods of 
abstinence from the use of alcohol and marijuana, making it 
more likely than not that his in-service difficulties which 
led to his discharge were better explained by substance abuse 
than any underlying, undetected psychosis or schizophrenia.  
The examiner further stated that the only behavioral symptoms 
he demonstrated in service were during periods of increased 
substance abuse, and did not include any clear signs of 
psychotic thought or behavior.

In support of his opinion, the examiner pointed to documents 
written by the Veteran during service which showed no signs 
of psychotic process such as delusions, disorganized thought 
process, or odd communication style.  It was noted that these 
documents stood in direct contrast to the hundreds of 
documents received since 1988 that show disorganization, 
severe irrelevance, and delusions.  He further noted that a 
psychosis was not diagnosed in any in-service treatment 
reports, nor were symptoms associated with psychosis 
documented.  

Regarding the fire extinguisher incident, the examiner 
pointed to reports that the Veteran was intoxicated, and not 
suffering from a mental disorder.  It was also noted that the 
Veteran denied any history of a mental defect upon entry into 
service, however a history of marijuana and alcohol abuse was 
reported since adolescence.  

The examiner pointed out that the Veteran's first annual 
performance report was excellent, indicating that he was 
outstanding and admirable, and called for immediate 
promotion.  According to the Veteran's own statement to 
police, his marijuana use in the military began near the end 
of this review period and continued until he was caught using 
marijuana several months later.  The examiner also stated 
that all records of admonishment occurred following the 
Veteran's reported period of substance abuse, and not before.  
Further, statements noting a decline in performance, along 
with a lack of drive and self-initiative were consistent with 
the psychological effects of marijuana use.

Although the Veteran maintained that his substance abuse in 
service and decline of functioning were the early signs of 
his disorder, this was not supported by the fact that he 
showed educational dysfunction prior to the service, and that 
these signs disappeared when he attained sobriety.  Again, 
the examiner noted the absence of any psychotic, mood, or 
behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia during his period of 
service.  Regarding the Veteran's claimed use of LSD, the 
examiner pointed out that the only substance use reported 
during service was alcohol and marijuana.

The examiner also stated that it was unlikely the Veteran 
suffered from schizophrenia within one year after service, as 
records from the Veteran's first two hospitalizations 
indicate that his very first psychotic symptoms appeared in 
late 1985 to early 1986.  This time period was marked by 
abuse of many substances, to include crystal methamphetamine.  
Because the psychotic symptoms leading to his first 
hospitalization resolved quickly upon sobriety without the 
aid of antipsychotic medication, he was initially diagnosed 
with Amphetamine Induced Delirium instead of a primary 
psychotic disorder.  Testing during that period revealed no 
organic process, showing only antisocial personality traits.  
The examiner stated that these findings support the 
probability that the Veteran's onset of schizophrenia 
occurred well after discharge from service in 1982, and only 
after substantial use of mind-altering drugs.

As to the Veteran's assertions that his claimed disorder 
first occurred during active service, the Federal Circuit 
held that lay evidence is one type of evidence that must be 
considered, and competent lay evidence can be sufficient in 
and of itself.  The Board, however, retains the discretion to 
make credibility determinations and otherwise weigh the 
evidence submitted, including lay evidence.  See Buchanan v. 
Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  This would 
include weighing the absence of contemporary medical evidence 
against lay statements.

In Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007), 
the Federal Circuit determined that lay evidence can be 
competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a 
condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the 
medical condition (noting that sometimes the layperson will 
be competent to identify the condition where the condition is 
simple, for example difficulty hearing, and sometimes not, 
for example, a form of cancer), (2) the layperson is 
reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay 
testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later 
diagnosis by a medical professional.  The relevance of lay 
evidence is not limited to the third situation, but extends 
to the first two as well.  Whether lay evidence is competent 
and sufficient in a particular case is a factual issue.

Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must 
determine whether such evidence is also credible.  See Layno 
v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1992) (distinguishing between 
competency, a legal concept determining whether testimony may 
be heard and considered, and credibility, factual 
determination going to the probative value of the evidence to 
be made after the evidence has been admitted).  See Barr v. 
Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007).

In Robinson v. Shinseki, the Court held that, in some cases, 
lay evidence will be competent and credible evidence of 
etiology.  Whether lay evidence is competent in a particular 
case is a question of fact to be decided by the Board in the 
first instance.  The Court set forth a two-step analysis to 
evaluate the competency of lay evidence.  First, Board must 
first determine whether the disability is the type of injury 
for which lay evidence is competent evidence.  If so, the 
Board must weigh that evidence against the other evidence of 
record.  See Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).  

The Board does not find that the Veteran is competent to 
determine the etiology of his current disorder.  Not only has 
the Veteran been diagnosed with a severe mental disorder, he 
has also not been shown to be possess the medical expertise 
to link his claimed disorder to his period of active service.  
See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 495 (1992); see 
also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(1) [competent medical evidence 
means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through 
education, training, or experience to offer medical 
diagnoses, statements, or opinions].  Therefore, although the 
statements of the Veteran offered in support of his claim 
have been given full consideration by the Board, they are not 
considered competent medical evidence and do not serve to 
establish a medical nexus between his claimed disorder and 
his period of service.

In sum, the competent evidence does not establish that the 
Veteran's currently-diagnosed schizophrenia, paranoid type, 
had its onset in service, or a year following service, or is 
etiologically related to service.  The record establishes 
that the first notation of a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
paranoid type, within the Veteran's claims file was provided 
in February 1988, approximately six years after separation.  
This significant lapse of time is highly probative evidence 
against the Veteran's claim of a nexus between a current 
hypertension and active military service.  See Maxson v. 
Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
significant lapse in time between service and post-service 
medical treatment may be considered in the analysis of a 
service connection claim).  Moreover, the Veteran's record 
does not contain medical evidence to demonstrate that his 
psychiatric disorder was diagnosed within a year following 
separation from active duty.  Therefore, although the Board 
does not doubt the sincerity of his claims, the Veteran's 
claim for service connection for schizophrenia, paranoid 
type, must be denied due to the lack of any evidence of this 
disorder during service or within a year following service, 
coupled with the absence of a medical nexus linking his 
current disorder to his period of active duty.  

In this case, the record is simply insufficient to grant 
service connection for schizophrenia, paranoid type.  The 
evidence in this case is not so evenly balanced so as to 
allow application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule as 
required by law and VA regulations.  See 38 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102.  Accordingly, the Board finds 
that the preponderance of the evidence is against the 
Veteran's claim for entitlement to service connection, and it 
must be denied.


ORDER

Entitlement to service connection for schizophrenia, paranoid 
type, is denied.



____________________________________________
S. L. Kennedy
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals




 Department of Veterans Affairs