Citation Nr: 1007339 Decision Date: 02/26/10 Archive Date: 03/05/10 DOCKET NO. 04-17 535 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Waco, Texas THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, claimed as dermatophytosis. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a left foot disorder. 5. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Texas Veterans Commission WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD B. Berry, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from July 1969 to February 1971. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from rating decisions dated in January 2004 and March 2007 by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Waco, Texas. In January 2008, the Veteran testified during a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge at the Texas, Waco RO. A transcript of the hearing is of record. In April 2008, the Board remanded this matter to the RO to provide the Veteran with proper VCAA notice and VA examinations for his service connection claims for bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, dermatophytosis and PTSD. After accomplishing the requested actions to the extent possible, the RO continued the denial of the claim in the December 2009 supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) and returned this matter to the Board for further appellate consideration. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Bilateral sensorineural hearing loss was not diagnosed during military service or within one year after military service and the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss is not etiologically related to his military service. 2. Tinnitus was not diagnosed during military service and the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Veteran's current tinnitus is not etiologically related to his military service. 3. The preponderance of the evidence of record shows that a current left foot disorder is not related to military service. 4. The preponderance of the evidence of record shows that the current skin disorders are not related to military service. 5. The evidence of record demonstrates that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD related to stressors from military service in Vietnam and there is credible supporting evidence that corroborates the claimed in-service stressor. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A bilateral hearing loss disability was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service, nor may it be presumed related to service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.385 (2009). 2. Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). 3. A left foot disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). 4. A skin disorder, claimed as dermatophytosis, was not incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). 5. PTSD was incurred during active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1154, 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) imposes a duty on VA to notify and assist a claimant in developing a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his or her representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; (3) that the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) must ask the claimant to provide any evidence in her or his possession that pertains to the claim in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). The requirement of requesting that the claimant provide any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim was eliminated by the Secretary during the course of this appeal. See 73 Fed. Reg. 23353 (final rule eliminating fourth element notice as required under Pelegrini II, effective May 30, 2008). Thus, any error related to this element is harmless. This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). With regard to claims for service connection for a disability, the notice requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) apply to all five elements of the claim: (1) Veteran status; (2) existence of a disability; (3) a connection between the Veteran's service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of the disability. Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Thus, upon receipt of an application for a service-connection claim, VA must review the information and the evidence presented with the claim and provide the claimant with notice of what information and evidence not previously provided, if any, will assist in substantiating or is necessary to substantiate the elements of the claim as reasonably contemplated by the application including notice that a disability rating and an effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. Id. With respect to the Veteran's service connection claim for PTSD, the Board is granting in full the benefit sought on appeal. Accordingly, assuming, without deciding, that any error was committed with respect to either the duty to notify or the duty to assist, such error was harmless and will not be further discussed. After careful review of the claims folder, the Board finds that a May 2008 VCAA letter, satisfied the duty to notify provisions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). In this regard, the May 2008 letter advised the Veteran what information and evidence was needed to substantiate his service connection claims for hearing loss, tinnitus, dermatophytosis and a left foot disorder. The Veteran was informed how VA determines the disability rating and effective date if his claim is granted. The letter also informed the Veteran of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The letter requested that he provide enough information for the RO to request records from any sources of information and evidence identified by the Veteran. The Board observes that this information was provided subsequent to the initial AOJ decision. Nonetheless, this error is not prejudicial to the Veteran because the actions taken by VA after providing the notice have essentially cured the error in the timing of the notice. Not only has the Veteran been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim and given ample time to respond, but the AOJ readjudicated the case by way of the supplemental statement of the case issued in December 2009 after the notice was provided. See Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (the issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by readjudication of the claim, such as an SOC or an SSOC, is sufficient to cure a timing defect). For the reasons stated above, it is not prejudicial to the Veteran for the Board to proceed to decide this appeal as the timing error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. Regarding VA's duty to assist, the Board finds that VA has fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in making reasonable efforts to identify and obtain relevant records in support of the Veteran's claim and providing a VA examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The claims file contains the Veteran's service treatment records, VA treatment records, private treatment records, VA examinations for hearing loss, tinnitus, a foot disorder and skin disorders and a transcript of the January 2008 Board hearing. The June 2009 VA examination reports reflect that the examiners conducted a review of the Veteran's claims file in addition to obtaining an oral history and providing a physical evaluation of the Veteran. Following the above, the examiners provided an assessment of the Veteran's current conditions. The examiners provided a rationale for their opinions, which appear to be based on both the medical and lay evidence of record. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the examinations are adequate for rating purposes. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 311 (2007) (VA must ensure that any VA examination undertaken during an appeal is adequate for rating purposes). In addition, as noted, this claim was previously remanded in April 2008 in order to provide the Veteran with proper VCAA notice for his service connection claims and to provide the Veteran with VA examinations and opinions for the issues on appeal. The Veteran was provided with proper VCAA notice, as discussed in detail above, in May 2008. In addition, the Veteran underwent VA examinations in June 2009 for his skin, feet and hearing problems. The examiners reviewed the record and provided a complete rationale for their opinions. Following the examinations, the RO reviewed the evidence of record and issued a supplemental statement of the case in December 2009. Accordingly, the Board finds that there has been substantial compliance with the April 2008 remand directive. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). In addition, there is no indication in the file that there are additional relevant records available that have not yet been obtained. Therefore, the Board finds that all relevant facts have been developed properly and sufficiently in this appeal and no further development is required to comply with the duty to assist the Veteran in developing the facts pertinent to his claims. II. Merits of the Claims for Service Connection Service connection may be granted to a veteran for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. For the showing of chronic disease in service, there must be a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. If chronicity in service is not established, evidence of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may be granted for a disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In addition, service connection may be presumed for certain chronic diseases that are manifested to a compensable degree within one year after separation from service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). To establish service connection for a claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in- service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in- service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999); Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Such determination is based on an analysis of all the evidence of record and evaluation of its credibility and probative value. Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1, 8 (1999). Hearing Loss The Veteran contends that he currently has bilateral hearing loss related to military service. Specifically, he asserts that he experienced acoustic trauma from exposure to helicopter noise as a helicopter repairman and gunfire and rocket attacks while stationed in Vietnam. For purposes of applying VA laws, impaired hearing is considered a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Hertz is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Hertz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. Additionally, the Court has held that the threshold for normal hearing is from 0 to 20 decibels, and that threshold levels of above 20 decibels indicate at least some degree of hearing loss. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). In assessing the Veteran's service connection claim for hearing loss, the Board must first determine whether the Veteran has a current hearing disability under VA regulations. As noted above, hearing loss is determined for VA purposes using the criteria provided under 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. A June 2009 VA audiology examination report shows auditory thresholds of 40 decibels (dB) or higher in at least one of the required frequencies for both ears. The VA examiner noted that the audiological evaluation revealed bilateral mild sloping to severe sensorineural hearing loss. As such, the evidence shows that the Veteran has a current bilateral hearing loss disability. Initially, the Board observes that sensorineural hearing loss (as an organic disease of the nervous system) may be presumed to have been incurred in service if manifest to a compensable degree within one year of discharge from service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a) (2009). The Veteran contends that he had hearing problems in service. The service treatment records do not reveal that the Veteran had a bilateral hearing loss disability during his active military service. The Veteran's May 1969 enlistment examination revealed that his ears were clinically evaluated as normal. The audiometric results revealed that the Veteran's pure tone threshold for the right ear was 15 dB at 500 Hz, 10 dB at 1000 Hz, 10 dB at 2000 Hz and 15 dB at 4000 Hz. The pure tone thresholds of the left ear were 15 dB at 500 Hz, 1000 Hz, 2000 Hz and 4000 Hz. There is no evidence of any complaints of or treatment for hearing loss during military service. The Veteran's February 1971 separation examination shows that the Veteran's ears were evaluated as clinically normal and his hearing was 15/15 in both ears for whispered voice. The Veteran was not provided with an audiometric evaluation with his separation examination. The first medical evidence of hearing loss was in June 2009. The Board notes that the Veteran, as a lay person, is competent to note a decrease in his hearing during service. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994) (the veteran as a lay person is competent to report information of which he has personal knowledge, i.e., information that he can gather through his senses). However, he is not competent to provide evidence that he had a chronic hearing loss disability which met the requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). The Veteran testified that he did not seek treatment for hearing loss during service or when he first left military service and he has never had a hearing test. See Hearing Transcript at 35. The Veteran has never asserted that he received treatment for hearing loss or that he was diagnosed with hearing loss within the first year after service. Furthermore, the first medical evidence of hearing loss, which meets VA's definition of a disability, is the June 2009 VA audiometric examination, more than 38 years after separation from service. Thus, service connection for hearing loss may not be awarded on a presumptive basis. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). Based on the foregoing, the critical question in the present case turns upon whether the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss disability is etiologically related to his active duty service. This may be shown either through continuity of symptomatology since service or through competent evidence of a nexus between his current complaints and service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The Veteran contends that he injured his ears in military service due to loud noise exposure as a helicopter repairman. The Board observes that the service personnel records indicate that his military occupational specialty (MOS) during service was a helicopter repairman. In a case where a veteran is seeking service connection for any disability, due consideration must be given to the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a). As a helicopter repairman it is likely that the Veteran was exposed to loud noises; thus, noise exposure is consistent with the conditions of his active military service. Accordingly, the Board finds that the Veteran's history of in-service acoustic trauma is credible. The Board observes that the Veteran does not assert that he had hearing loss in service or a continuity of hearing loss symptomatology since military service. Specifically, the Veteran testified that he first realized that he had hearing problems in 1989 or 1990. See Hearing Transcript at 32. He reported his hearing became worse between 1972 and 1990 and he first sought treatment for hearing loss around 1989 or 1990 through VA. Id at 38. He testified that he believed his current hearing problems are related to working with helicopters and engines during military service. Id at 36. With no lay or medical evidence of bilateral sensorineural hearing loss in service or continuity of symptomatology of decreased hearing, the threshold question is whether there is sufficient medical evidence to establish an etiological link between the Veteran's current hearing loss disability and his active service. The Veteran was provided with a VA examination in June 2009. After the examiner reviewed the record, obtained a lay history of the Veteran's hearing loss and conducted a physical examination of the Veteran's ears to include an audiogram, the examiner provided the opinion that she could not determine if the Veteran's current hearing was related to acoustic trauma in military service without resorting to mere speculation because the service medical records documented normal hearing on the enlistment physical and 15/15 bilaterally on the whispered speech test at the 1971 separation examination. She noted that the whisper test is known to be unreliable because it is insensitive to high frequency loss. As the examiner was unable to provide a clear or definite opinion, the Board finds that this opinion has no probative value. See Perman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 237, 241 (1993) (where a physician is unable to provide a definite causal connection, the opinion on that issue constitutes "what may be characterized as non- evidence" that has no probative value) overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545, 550-51 (2008); Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the Court did not err as a matter of law when it treated as "non-evidence" an examiner's statement that recites the inability to come to an opinion). The record does not contain any competent medical evidence or opinion that would indicate the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss is related to loud noise exposure in service. The Veteran contends that his bilateral hearing loss was caused by military service. Lay persons can provide an account of observable symptoms, such as in this case the Veteran's observation that he has difficulty hearing. See Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). However, lay assertions regarding medical matters such as an opinion whether a disability is related to an injury or disease in service has no probative value because lay persons are not competent to offer medical opinions. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992). The Veteran is not a licensed health care professional; therefore, the lay evidence offered by the Veteran is not competent medical evidence and does not prove a relationship between the Veteran's hearing loss and exposure to loud noise during military service. As discussed above, the only competent medical evidence of record asserts that the Veteran's bilateral hearing loss is not related to his military service. As the probative evidence of record does not establish a relationship between the Veteran's current hearing loss and his period of active service, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence weighs against the claim and service connection for bilateral hearing loss is not warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Board notes that under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b), the benefit of the doubt is to be resolved in the claimant's favor in cases where there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence in regard to a material issue. Tinnitus The Veteran contends that he developed tinnitus as a result of acoustic trauma during service. He asserts that he has experienced ringing in his ears since military service. See Hearing Transcript at 41. The Board notes that the medical evidence of record establishes that the Veteran currently suffers from bilateral tinnitus. The Veteran has reported that he experiences tinnitus and the Veteran is considered competent to report the observable manifestations of his claimed disability. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374-75 (2002) (a veteran competent to testify as to the presence of tinnitus); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Additionally, a June 2009 VA audiologist diagnosed the Veteran with bilateral recurrent tinnitus. Similar to hearing loss, the Veteran's service treatment records do not reveal any complaints of tinnitus or ringing in his ears during service. The February 1971 separation examination reflects a normal clinical evaluation of the ears and no diagnosis of tinnitus was indicated. The first documented evidence of tinnitus is his April 2003 claim for compensation, approximately 32 years after military service. See Charles, 16 Vet. App. at 374-75. The first evidence of a diagnosis of tinnitus is in June 2009. Thus, the critical question in the present case turns upon whether the Veteran's currently manifested tinnitus is etiologically related to service. The Veteran testified that he heard 175 mm gunfire during military service, which would cause ringing in his ears. See Hearing Transcript at 37. The Veteran testified that he had ringing in his ears from military service to the present. Id. at 41. The Court has determined that with respect to claims for tinnitus a veteran is competent to present evidence of a diagnosis and continuity of symptomatology. See Charles, 16 Vet. App. at 374-75. Therefore, the Veteran's lay statements that tinnitus began during service and have continued ever since is competent evidence tending to show chronicity and continuity. These statements, however, remain subject to a Board analysis of credibility. See Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 69-70 (1993), citing Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 192-193 (1992). In this case, the Board concludes that his lay assertions regarding chronicity and continuity of symptomatology of tinnitus since service are not shown to be credible. Initially, the Veteran's lay assertions of continuity of symptomatology are entirely uncorroborated by any objective evidence of chronicity or continuity of symptomatology of tinnitus after service. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Specifically, there is no contemporaneous medical evidence of record, which reflects in-service or post-service complaints of tinnitus. But see Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (2006) (the Board cannot determine that lay evidence of onset in service lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous service medical evidence). Furthermore, the Veteran's own statements indicate that he did not have continuous symptoms of tinnitus. In this regard, the Veteran testified that he did not complain of ringing in his ears during the separation examination and that he did not have any problems before he left active duty. See Hearing Transcript at 38. He also asserted that recently his ears began ringing all of the time. Id. at 36. During the June 2009 VA examination, the Veteran responded that he had tinnitus on and off for years with respect to the question of the date and circumstances of the onset of tinnitus. He did not report to the examiner that his tinnitus began during service. Based on the foregoing, the Veteran's own lay statements are inconsistent with the claim that he had continuity of tinnitus symptoms since noise exposure in military service. In addition, the February 1971 separation examination report did not document any complaints of or diagnosis of tinnitus and the post-service evidence does not show any indication of complaints of tinnitus until 2003, over 32 years after the Veteran left active military service or a diagnosis of tinnitus until 2009, over 45 years after the Veteran left active military service. This gap in the evidentiary record preponderates strongly against this claim based on continuity of symptomatology. See Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354 (1991). In light of the Veteran's inconsistent statements, the lack of complaint during service and the long evidentiary gap with no claim for compensation, the Board can find no plausible reason to afford any probative value to the Veteran's lay assertions that he has had constant tinnitus since service. As such, service connection cannot be granted on the basis of chronicity and continuity of symptomatology. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). With regard to any other evidence of a relationship between the Veteran's tinnitus and military acoustic trauma, the record contains a June 2009 VA examination. The VA examiner, having evaluated the Veteran, reviewed the claims folder, and interviewed the Veteran for a complete history, concluded that she could not determine if the Veteran's current tinnitus was related to acoustic trauma in military service without resorting to mere speculation because the service medical records documented normal hearing on the enlistment physical and 15/15 bilaterally on the whispered speech test at the 1971 separation examination. She noted that the whisper test is known to be unreliable because it is insensitive to high frequency loss. As the examiner was unable to provide a clear or definite opinion, the Board finds that this opinion has no probative value. See Perman v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 237, 241 (1993) (where a physician is unable to provide a definite causal connection, the opinion on that issue constitutes "what may be characterized as non- evidence" that has no probative value) overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545, 550-51 (2008); Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The record does not contain any competent medical evidence that would indicate the Veteran's tinnitus is related to loud noise exposure in service. The Veteran contends that his bilateral tinnitus was caused by military service. Lay persons can provide an account of observable symptoms, such as in this case the Veteran's observation that he has ringing in the ears and when he first noticed having problems with his hearing. See Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). However, lay assertions regarding medical matters such as an opinion whether a disability is related to an injury or disease in service has no probative value because lay persons are not competent to offer medical opinions. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992). The Veteran is not a licensed health care professional; therefore, the lay evidence offered by the Veteran is not competent medical evidence and does not prove a relationship between the Veteran's tinnitus and exposure to loud noise during military service. As discussed above, the only competent medical evidence of record asserts that the Veteran's bilateral tinnitus is not related to his military service. Absent any competent medical evidence linking the Veteran's currently diagnosed tinnitus to military service, service connection may not be awarded. Although the Veteran has presented competent evidence of chronicity and continuity of symptomatology since service, the Board finds conflicting statements of record and contemporaneous evidence from his military service, which reveal no tinnitus on separation to be far more persuasive than his own recent assertions to the effect that he had tinnitus in service. See Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59, 68 (1994) (contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the veteran). Thus, the competent and credible evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the Veteran has tinnitus related to service or any incident thereof, and accordingly service connection for this disability must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Left Foot Disorder The Veteran contends that he injured his left foot when he fell off a helicopter in Vietnam in 1970. He asserts that his foot developed swelling and it was treated with an ace bandage. He also indicated that after service he had periodic pain in his left foot with occasional swelling. A June 2009 VA examination noted that the Veteran had swelling around his left lateral malleolus and it was mildly tender. The examiner provided a diagnosis of degenerative joint disease of the first metatarsophalangeal joint. Thus, the medical evidence of record shows that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of a left foot disorder. A review of the Veteran's service treatment records show that the Veteran complained of left foot pain in December 1970. The physician noted that the Veteran had a slight twisted ankle and an ace bandage was applied. He also diagnosed the Veteran with athlete's foot. The Veteran's February 1971 separation evaluation reveals that his feet were evaluated as normal. The Veteran was provided with a VA orthopedic examination in April 1971, where the Veteran reported a left ankle injury in service. The examiner did not find any residual injury from the in-service left ankle injury to include a foot disability. The first medical evidence of degenerative changes of the metatarsal joint was in August 2006, approximately 35 years after his discharge from military service. The passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical documentation of a claimed disability is evidence against a claim of service connection. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the VA examiner in June 2009 provided the opinion that it was less likely than not that any left foot condition is attributable to military service. He asserted that the Veteran's degenerative changes are due to the aging process. The examiner also noted he did not find any notes for treatment for an injury to the left foot during military and he did not see any relationship to any injury during military service. As the examiner's opinion was based on a clear rationale after he reviewed the claims file, obtained a history from the Veteran, and conducted a physical evaluation, the Board finds this opinion to be highly probative. See Nieves- Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008) (the probative value of a medical opinion comes from when it is the factually accurate, fully articulated, and sound reasoning for the conclusion, not the mere fact that the claims file was reviewed). Furthermore, the record does not contain any medical opinion that indicates the Veteran's current left foot disorder is related to military service to include the left ankle injury in service. The Board notes that the Veteran contends that his left foot disorder is related to military service. Lay persons can provide an account of observable symptoms, such as in this case pain and swelling of the foot. See Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). However, the Board concludes that the Veteran is not competent to provide an opinion on a complex question such as the etiology of his degenerative joint disease of the first metatarsophalangeal joint. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining in footnote 4 that a Veteran is competent to provide a diagnosis of a simple condition such as a broken leg, but not competent to provide evidence as to more complex medical questions); see also Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992) (professional opinions are required to address areas of knowledge requiring expertise). The Veteran is not a qualified health care professional; therefore, the lay evidence offered by the Veteran is not competent medical evidence and does not prove a relationship between the Veteran's current left foot disorder and military service. The Board observes that the Veteran testified that he had intermittent left foot pain ever since Vietnam. See Hearing Transcript at 66. He indicated that the left foot pain started increasing in pain a few years ago. As noted above, the Veteran is competent to report observable symptoms, such as pain in the left foot. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994) (lay testimony iterating knowledge and personal observations of witness are competent to prove that claimant exhibited certain symptoms at particular time following service). Therefore, the Veteran's statements that his left foot pain began during service and has continued intermittently since service is competent evidence tending to show chronicity and continuity. Nonetheless, the Board finds that the Veteran's statements are not credible as they are inconsistent with other evidence of record. In this respect, the Veteran has provided conflicting statements. A March 2007 VA treatment record reveals that the Veteran reported he had left foot pain that had started in the past year. In addition, the first reference to left foot pain in the medical record is not shown until 2006, approximately 35 years after service and consistent with the Veteran's statements to a medical professional. See Maxson, 230 F.3d at 1333 (the passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical documentation of a claimed disability is evidence against a claim of service connection); Shaw v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 365 (1992). Accordingly, the Board finds that the Veteran's assertions regarding chronicity and continuity of symptomatology of a left foot disorder since service are not credible. As such, service connection cannot be granted on the basis of chronicity and continuity of symptomatology. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Based on the evidence discussed above, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim and the benefit of the doubt rule is not for application. See Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107. Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for a left foot disorder is not warranted. Dermatophytosis The Veteran contends that he has had dermatophytosis or a skin condition on his legs and feet for approximately three to four years. See Board Hearing Transcript at 41. He believes that this skin condition is related to the athlete's foot or jungle rot that was diagnosed in service. Id. at 42. A May 2009 VA examination provided a diagnosis of statis dermatitis of both legs, seborrheic dermatitis, xerosis and nummular eczema. Accordingly, the evidence of record shows that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of a skin disorder. A review of the Veteran's service treatment records show that the Veteran was diagnosed with athlete's foot. The February 1971 separation examination revealed that the Veteran had normal skin and feet on clinical evaluation and the physician did not note any skin disorder to include statis dermatitis, seborrheic dermatitis, xerosis and nummular eczema. The Board notes that the Veteran does not contend that statis dermatitis, seborrheic dermatitis, xerosis and nummular eczema were incurred in service or that he had a continuity of symptoms since service. In the absence of any lay assertions and/or competent medical evidence indicating continuity of symptomatology since service, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted pursuant to 3.303(b). However, he does assert that his skin disorders are related to military service and that his symptoms are similar to the athlete's foot he had in service. See Board Hearing Transcript at 43. Lay persons can provide an account of observable symptoms, such as in this case the Veteran's observation of his skin disorders. See Caldwell v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 466, 469 (1991). However, the Board concludes that the Veteran is not competent to provide an opinion on a complex question such as the etiology of his claimed skin disorders. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494-95 (1992) (professional opinions are required to address areas of knowledge requiring expertise). The Veteran is not a qualified health care professional; therefore, the lay evidence offered by the Veteran is not competent medical evidence and does not prove a relationship between the Veteran's current statis dermatitis of both legs, seborrheic dermatitis, xerosis and nummular eczema and military service to include athlete's foot. Furthermore, the VA examiner in June 2009 provided the opinion that the Veteran's current stasis dermatitis, seborrheic dermatitis, xerosis and nummular eczema are less likely than not related to military service. In this respect, the examiner emphasized that the Veteran was diagnosed with tinea versicolor and tinea pedis in service and no other skin condition was found in the service medical records. The Board finds the examiner's opinion to be probative and persuasive, as the examiner reviewed the claims file, physically evaluated the Veteran and he provided a clear rationale for his opinion. See Nieves- Rodriguez, 22 Vet. App. at 304. The Board also notes that there is no other medical evidence of record that indicates the Veteran's skin disorders are related to military service. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim and the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not applicable. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Thus, the Veteran's claim of entitlement to service connection for dermatophytosis is not warranted. PTSD The Veteran filed a claim for PTSD in April 2003. He contends that he currently suffers from PTSD due to various stressors, including rocket and mortar attacks that occurred while he was stationed in Chu Lai, Vietnam as a helicopter repairman from February 1970 to February 1971. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Establishment of service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). See also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). As noted above, in order for the Veteran to be entitled to service connection for PTSD, the medical evidence must show a diagnosis of PTSD linked to an in-service stressor. The Board observes that a March 2007 mental health evaluation documents that the Veteran reported that he experienced incoming rockets and mortars while he served near Chu Lai, Vietnam. The psychologist noted that the Veteran might not meet the full criteria for PTSD. After receiving counseling for a few months, the same psychologist determined that the Veteran met the criteria for PTSD and provided the Veteran with an Axis I diagnosis of PTSD based on his experiences in Vietnam. However, a September 2009 VA examination for mental health reveals that the examiner determined that the Veteran lacked sufficient criteria for PTSD and he did not see sufficient PTSD symptoms to warrant a full PTSD diagnosis related to his Vietnam experiences. The examiner diagnosed the Veteran with a depressive disorder. The examiner noted that while the Veteran endorsed some symptoms of PTSD, he required a good deal of prompting and psychological testing suggested the Veteran over-reported symptoms bringing the severity of his symptoms into question. He also noted that the Veteran was not receiving current treatment for PTSD. The Board observes that there are conflicting medical opinions on whether the Veteran has PTSD. In this case, the Board finds the diagnosis of PTSD by his treating physician to be more persuasive as he evaluated the Veteran over several months and treated the Veteran with respect to his PTSD symptoms. Furthermore, the Board notes that the requirement that a current disability be present is satisfied "when a claimant has a disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or during the pendency of that claim...even though the disability resolves prior the Secretary's adjudication of the claim." McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319 (2007). Resolving any reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor, the Board finds that medical evidence reveals that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD related to the claimed in-service trauma of being exposed to mortar and rocket attacks in Vietnam. Thus, two of the three elements for establishing service connection for PTSD have been satisfied. As noted above, the Veteran contends that he was exposed to mortar and rocket attacks while he was stationed in Chu Lai, Vietnam between February 1970 and February 1971. The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service will vary depending on whether the Veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy." See Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60 (1993). If the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Service-connection of such injury or disease may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d). The term "combat" is defined to mean "a fight, encounter, or contest between individuals or groups" and "actual fighting engagement of military forces." VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (Oct. 1999) citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 452 (1981). The phrase "engaged in combat with the enemy" requires that the veteran "have personally participated in events constituting an actual fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality." VAOPGCPREC 12-99. Whether or not a veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy" must be determined through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence. The Veteran's service personnel records show that the Veteran's military occupations specialty in Vietnam was helicopter repairman with the 178th Assault Support Helicopter Company, 16th Aviation Group between March 1970 and February 1971. There is no indication that he was assigned to or participated in combat duties. In addition, the Veteran's service records do not show that he received any awards or decorations indicative of combat service, such as a Bronze Star with V Device or a Purple Heart. The Board does acknowledge that the Veteran was awarded the National Defense Service Medal, the Vietnam Campaign Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with device 60 and the Army Commendation Medal. However, these awards are not indicative of combat. As such, the Board finds that the Veteran is not shown to have engaged in combat with the enemy. Accordingly, there must be credible supporting evidence of record that the alleged stressors actually occurred in order to warrant service connection. With respect to the Veteran's claimed in-service stressors of being exposed to mortar and rocket attacks while he was stationed in Chu Lai, Vietnam as a helicopter repairman with the 178th Assault Helicopter Company between February 1970 and February 1971, the Board observes that the evidence of record supports the Veteran's contentions. The record shows that VA confirmed the 178th Aviation Company was located at Chu Lai during the period of June 1969 to June 1970. A summary report from the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC) (formerly U.S. Armed Services Center for Unit Records Research (CURR)) noted that the documentation retired by the 16th Aviation group revealed an operational report submitted for the period ending April 30, 1970 noting that there was a rocket attack at Chu Lai on April 30, 1970 but there was no damage done to any of the units of the 16th Aviation Group. The Group also submitted a Report of Mortar/Rocket Attack on May 5, 1970 revealing no casualties but vehicles were destroyed or damaged in the units of the 16th Aviation Group. The Board recognizes that the record does not specifically document that the Veteran was exposed to the rocket and mortar attacks; however, in determining whether corroborative evidence substantiates or verifies the Veteran's statements as to the occurrence of the claimed stressors, corroborating every detail of an alleged stressor, including the Veteran's personal participation, is not necessary. See Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1997). It is sufficient for a veteran to submit evidence of the occurrence of a stressful event, and the evidence implies his personal exposure. Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124, 128 (2002). In this case, the unit records are sufficient to show that his unit was exposed to various rocket and mortar attacks in Chu Lai and it implies that the Veteran was personally exposed to the stressful events. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the evidence corroborates the Veteran's claimed stressor that he experienced rocket and mortar attacks during active military service. Affording the benefit of the doubt to the veteran, the Board finds that all three elements for service connection for PTSD have been met. Accordingly, service connection for PTSD is warranted. ORDER 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is denied. 3. Entitlement to service connection for a left foot disorder is denied. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder, claimed as dermatophytosis, is denied. 5. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is granted. ____________________________________________ John E. Ormond, Jr. Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs