Citation Nr: 1007377 Decision Date: 03/01/10 Archive Date: 03/11/10 DOCKET NO. 06-29 372 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for lumbar spine degenerative disc disease and degenerative joint disease (a low back disorder). 2. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disorder including secondary to a low back disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD N. T. Werner, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from May 1978 to May 1982. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2003 decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Louisville, Kentucky. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the competent and credible evidence is against finding that a chronic low back disorder was present in-service, arthritis of the lumbar spine manifested to a compensable degree in the first post-service year, or that a current low back disorder is related to service. 2. The preponderance of the competent and credible evidence is against finding that a chronic right knee disorder was present in-service, arthritis of the right knee manifested to a compensable degree in the first post-service year, that a current right knee disorder is related to service, or that a current right knee disorder was caused or aggravated by a service connected disability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A low back disorder was not incurred in or aggravated by active service nor may arthritis of the lumbar spine be presumed to have been so incurred. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). 2. A right knee disorder was not incurred or aggravated during military service, arthritis of the right knee may not be presumed to have been so incurred, and a right knee disorder was not caused or aggravated by a service connected disability. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (2006); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The VCAA describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5102 VA first has a duty to provide an appropriate claim form, instructions for completing it, and notice of information necessary to complete the claim if it is incomplete. Second, under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), VA has a duty to notify the claimant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim, i.e., existence of a current disability, the degree of disability, and the effective date of any disability benefits. The appellant must also be notified of what specific evidence he is to provide and what evidence VA will attempt to obtain. VA thirdly has a duty to assist claimants in obtaining evidence needed to substantiate a claim. This includes obtaining all relevant evidence adequately identified in the record and, in some cases, affording VA examinations. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A. Initially, the Board notes that in the current appeal there is no issue as to providing an appropriate application form or completeness of the application. Next, the Board finds that written notice provided in March 2003, prior to the July 2003 rating decision, along with the notice provided in November 2004, November 2006, and April 2007 fulfills the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) including notice of the laws and regulations governing the assignment of disability ratings and effective dates as required by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) in Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Moreover, while the Veteran was not provided complete 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice prior to the initial adjudication of his claims, thereafter providing adequate notice in November 2006 and April 2007, followed by a readjudication of the claims in the October 2007 supplemental statement of the case, "cures" any timing problem associated with inadequate notice or the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 537 (2006) (Mayfield III), citing Mayfield II, 444 F.3d at 1333-34. Moreover, the Board finds that even if the above letters failed to provide the Veteran with adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice, this notice problem does not constitute prejudicial error in this case because the record reflects that a reasonable person could be expected to understand what was needed to substantiate the claims after reading the above letters as well as the July 2003 rating decision, August 2006 statement of the case, and January 2007 and October 2007 supplemental statements of the case. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009). Furthermore, the Board finds that there can be no prejudice to the Veteran due to a lack of adequate 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) notice where, as here, none has been specifically alleged. Id. VA has also secured all available pertinent evidence and conducted all appropriate development. Specifically, a review of the record on appeal shows that VA obtained and associated with the record all available and identified in- service and post-service records including the Veteran's treatment records from the Spine Institute and his records on file with the Social Security Administration (SSA). The record also shows that the Veteran was afforded VA examinations in June 2003 and July 2007 which are adequate for the Board to adjudicate the claims because the examiners provided medical opinions as to the origin of the Veteran's low back and right knee disorders as well as a rational for these opinions after a review of the record on appeal and an examination of the claimant. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002); Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet App 303 (2007); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). Accordingly, the Board finds that there is no identified, available, and pertinent evidence which is not currently part of the claims files. Hence, VA has fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in the prosecution of his claims and adjudication of this appeal may go forward. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001). The Claims The Veteran contends that his low back and right knee disorder were caused by falls he took in-service, including falling off of a truck. In the alternative, it is alleged that his right knee disorder was caused or aggravated by his low back disorder. It is also requested that the Veteran be afforded the benefit of the doubt. Service connection is warranted where the evidence of record establishes that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated thereby. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. If a condition noted during service is not shown to be chronic, then generally a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required for service connection. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In addition, service connection may also be granted on the basis of a post-service initial diagnosis of a disease, where the physician relates the current condition to the period of service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Arthritis, if manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year after separation from active duty, may be presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may also be granted where disability is proximately due to or the result of already service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Compensation is payable when service-connected disability has aggravated a non-service- connected disorder. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995) (en banc). The Board notes that there was a recent amendment to the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. See 71 Fed. Reg. 52744-47 (Sept. 7, 2006). The amendment sets a standard by which a claim based on aggravation of a non-service-connected disability by a service-connected one is judged. Although VA has indicated that the purpose of the regulation was merely to apply the Court's ruling in Allen, it was made clear in the comments to the regulation that the changes were intended to place a burden on the claimant to establish a pre- aggravation baseline level of disability for the non-service- connected disability before an award of service connection based on aggravation may be made. This had not been VA's practice, which suggests the possibility that the recent change amounts to a substantive change in the regulation. For this reason, and because the Veteran's claim was pending before the regulatory change was made, the Board will consider the version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 in effect before the change, which is more favorable to the claimant. In evaluating the evidence in any given appeal, it is the responsibility of the Board to weigh the evidence and decide where to give credit and where to withhold the same and, in so doing, accept certain medical opinions over others. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 310-11 (1999). In this regard, the Board has been charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002); Klekar v. West, 12 Vet. App. 503, 507 (1999); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). Indeed, the Court has declared that in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to do so. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992). In doing so, the Board is free to favor one medical opinion over another, provided it offers an adequate basis for doing so. Evans v. West, 12 Vet. App. 22, 30 (1998); Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995). As to service incurrence under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), service treatment records document the Veteran's complaints and treatment for low back pain with tenderness and muscle spasms, due to a fall in January 1979 and a subsequent fall from a truck in July 1981, diagnosed as a lumbar strain starting in January 1979. See service treatment records dated in January 1979, July 1979, and September 1981. In addition, the Veteran's December 1982 separation examination both noted a history of back pain and diagnosed the Veteran with recurrent back pain. Likewise, service treatment records document the Veteran's complaints and treatment for right knee pain diagnosed as a sprain in May 1979 and a contusion in August 1981. Furthermore, the Board finds that the Veteran is both competent and credible to report on the fact that he had problems with low back and right knee pain, swelling, and/or limitation of motion while on active duty. Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra; Charles, supra. Therefore, the Board will concede that the Veteran injured his low back and right knee while on active duty. However, lumbar spine x-rays in January 1979 and right knee x-rays in August 1981 were negative. Moreover, the February 1982 separation examination was negative for complaints or diagnoses related to the right knee and, while it reported that the Veteran had recurrent back pain, the Court has said that pain alone, without a diagnosed related medical condition, does not constitute a disability for which service connection may be granted. See Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282 (1999). Accordingly, the Board finds that entitlement to service connection for low back and right knee disorders based on in- service incurrence must be denied despite the Veteran's documented in-service injuries because the record does not show that he suffered any chronic disability due to these injures. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Stated another way, the Board must deny his claims because, while the record shows the Veteran injured his low back and right knee while on active duty, his residuals from those injuries were transitory in nature and cannot form a basis for service connection. Id. As to the presumptions found at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309, the Board notes that the post-service record does not show the Veteran being diagnosed with arthritis of the lumbar spine and/or right knee in the first post-service year. Accordingly, entitlement to service connection for low back and a right knee disorders based on the presumptions found at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 must also be denied. As to post-service continuity of symptomatology under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), the Board finds that the length of time between the Veteran's separation from active duty in 1982 and first seen complaining of low back problems in 2001, thereafter diagnosed as degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, stenosis, and/or a herniated nucleus pulposus, status post lumbar spine fusions in 2002 and 2004, and first seen complaining of right knee problems in 1992, thereafter diagnosed as a meniscus tear, status post arthroscopic surgeries in 1992 and 1996, to be compelling evidence against finding continuity. Put another way, the at least decade long gap between the Veteran's discharge from active duty and the first evidence of the claimed disorders weighs heavily against his claims. See Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453 (1999), aff'd., 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (service incurrence may be rebutted by the absence of medical treatment for the claimed condition for many years after service); Forshey v. West, 12 Vet. App. 71, 74 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that the definition of evidence encompasses "negative evidence" which tends to disprove the existence of an alleged fact); Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (holding that VA did not err in denying service connection when the Veteran failed to provide evidence which demonstrated continuity of symptomatology, and failed to account for the lengthy time period for which there is no clinical documentation of his low back condition); Shaw v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 365 (1992) (a Veteran's delay in asserting a claim can constitute negative evidence that weighs against the claim). In this regard, the Board acknowledges, as it did above, that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about what he sees and feels; for example, the claimant is competent to report that he had problems with pain, swelling, and/or limitation of motion since service. See Davidson, supra; Buchanan, supra; Jandreau, supra; Charles, supra. The Board also acknowledges that the Veteran's representative, wife, and cousin are competent to give evidence about what they see. Id. However, upon review of the claims folders, the Board finds that the assertions that the Veteran has had these problems since service are not credible. In this regard, the Veteran, his wife, his cousin, and his representative's claims are contrary to what is found in the post-service medical records which is negative for complaints, diagnoses, or treatment for either of the claimed disorders for at least a decade after his separation from military service. Moreover, the Board notes that some of the treatment records document the Veteran's claim that he had had problems with his low back and/or knee since service. Moreover, in a December 2002 statement from Hugh H. Wilhite, M.D., it was reported that the Veteran did not have a history of low back trouble while in high school. However, the Board also finds it significant that in some other treatment records the appellant reported that he had had problems with his back since high school, since he was 18 and played football, and/or since he was a teenager. In yet other records, the Veteran reported that he had had increased problems with low back pain with radiculopathy since a September 1981 work injury. In yet other treatment records, the Veteran reported that he had had problems with right knee pain since January 1992 when his knee locked-up when he was crawling under a table to plug-in an electric train set. In these circumstances, the Board gives more credence to the independent medical evidence of record, which is negative for complaints, diagnoses, or treatment for the claimed disorders for at least a decade following his separation from active duty, than the Veteran's, his wife's, his cousin's, and his representative's claims. Therefore, entitlement to service connection for a low back disorder and a right knee disorder based on post-service continuity of symptomatology must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). As to service connection for a right knee disorder, based on the initial documentation of the disability after service under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d), the Board notes that the record is negative for a medical opinion finding a causal association or link between any current right knee disorder and an established injury, disease, or event of service origin. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 141, 143 (1992) (establishing service connection requires finding a relationship between a current disability and events in service or an injury or disease incurred therein). In fact, both the June 2003 and the July 2007 VA examiners opined that it was not. These opinions were based on a claims file review and an interview and evaluation of the Veteran. In addition, a rationale was provided which highlighted the Veteran's in-service and post-service medical history and lack of continuity of symptomatology since service in order to explain the lack of nexus to service. These opinions are not contradicted by any other medical opinion of record. See Colvin v. Derwinski 1 Vet. App. 171, 175 (1991) (VA may only consider independent medical evidence to support its findings and is not permitted to base decisions on its own unsubstantiated medical conclusions). As to service connection for a low back disorder based on the initial documentation of the disability after service under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d), the Board notes that in May 2004 one of the Veteran's physician's from the Spine Institute provided the following opinion: We discussed his original injuries from his back going back to the Military and I have reviewed those records and gone on record as saying this was contributory to his problems that he has had leading to the original surgery and the original surgery has led to this surgery. On the other hand, in the addendum to the June 2003 VA spine examination, it was opined, after a review of the record on appeal and an examination of the claimant, as follows: According to the records . . . the Veteran has had problems with back pain since high school and since he was a teenager . . . [H]e . . . had an acute lumbosacral strain on two occasions during his military service. Then there are no medical records for 20 years [but the record] . . . stated that he works . . . building refrigerators and does a lot of bending and lifting. [The record also] . . . stated that . . . in September of 2001[,] he developed an increased onset of fairly severe back pain. There are no medical records to document any continuity of ongoing problems after he left service until . . . 2002. As a result of this[,] I would find that it is less likely than not that the acute lumbosacral strains that he sustained in the service were the main cause of his degenerative joint disease and degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine with spinal stenosis and lower extremity radiculopathy. At the subsequent July 2007 VA examination conducted by a physician, it was likewise opined, after a review of the record on appeal and an examination of the claimant, as follows: [The Veteran's] low back condition is less likely as not (less than 50/50 probability) caused by or a result of [the V]eteran's military service [because b]ased on examination [of the Veteran] and all available documentation, . . . [b]ack injuries sustained during service were evidently resolved by date of discharge, and no structural abnormalities were ever documented during service. Finally, a 17-year gap exists from last notation of back care while in service . . . [and until the time the record next shows his seeking treatment for his low back disorder post-service]. Obesity and opioid dependence are principal factors aggravating his chronic back pain. Initially, the Board finds the May 2004 private examiner's opinion that the Veteran's in-service low back injuries were "contributory" to his current low back disorders to speculative and inconclusive in nature to support his claim. See Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996); Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996) (medical opinions which are speculative, general, or inconclusive in nature cannot support a claim.). The Board also finds the VA opinions more competent and credible than the May 2004 private opinion because the VA opinions were provided after a review of the entire record on appeal, including the private opinion, and the VA opinions included detailed reasons, with citation to relevant evidence found in the record, for why the claimant's low back disorders were not caused by his military service. See Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998) (the failure of the health care provider to provide a basis for his/her opinion goes to the weight or credibility of the evidence); see also Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999) (the probative value of a physician's statement is dependent, in part, upon the extent to which it reflects "clinical data or other rationale to support his opinion."). On the other hand, the private opinion did not provide any basis for it conclusion. See Black v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 177, 180 (1995) (holding that a medical opinion is inadequate when it is unsupported by clinical evidence). Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the competent and credible evidence of record shows that the Veteran's low back disorder was not caused by his military service, including his documented in-service back injuries. See Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995) (holding that VA may favor the opinion of one competent medical expert over that of another when decision makers give an adequate statement of reasons and bases). As to the Veteran's, his wife, his cousin, and his representative's claims that his low back and right knee disorders were caused by his military service, including his documented in-service injuries, the Board finds that because diagnosing degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, stenosis, a herniated nucleus pulposus, and a meniscus tear requires special medical testing such as x- rays, magnetic resonance imaging evaluations, an electromyography (EMG), and/or nerve conduction study as well as special medical training, that these conditions may not be diagnosed by their unique and readily identifiable features and therefore the presence of the disorders is a determination "medical in nature" and not capable of lay observation. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997); see also Bostain, supra, at 127; citing Espiritu, supra. Therefore, since laypersons are not capable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge, the Board finds the Veteran's, his wife, his cousin, and his representative's opinions that these disabilities were caused by service not competent. Routen, supra; see also Bostain, supra. The Board also finds that the lay statements as to a nexus are outweighed by the record outlined above which is negative for complaints, diagnoses, or treatment for a low back disorder and a right knee disorder for at least a decade following service and which includes medical opinions which says they are not due to service. Davidson, supra; Jandreau, supra; Buchanan, supra; Charles, supra. Based on the discussion above, the Board also finds that service connection for low back and right knee disorders are not warranted based on the initial documentation of the disabilities after service because the weight of the competent and credible evidence is against finding a causal association or link between the post-service disorders and an established injury, disease, or event of service origin. See 8 U.S.C.A. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Rabideau, supra. As to service connection for a right knee disorder under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, for the reasons explained above the Board found that Veteran was not entitled to service connection for a low back disorder. In the absence of service connection for a low back disorder, the Board finds that his claim of service connection for a right knee disorder secondary to a low back disorder must be denied as a matter of law. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.310; Allen, supra; Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994) (where the law and not the evidence is dispositive, the Board should deny the claim on the ground of lack of legal merit). Accordingly, the Board must conclude that the weight of the evidence is against the claims of service connection for a low back disorder on a direct bases and a right knee disorder on a direct and secondary basis. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310. In reaching the above conclusions, the Board also considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). However, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the doctrine is not for application. See also, e.g., Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F. 3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). ORDER Service connection for a low back disorder is denied. Service connection for a right knee disorder is denied. ____________________________________________ K. Parakkal Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs