Citation Nr: 1007669 Decision Date: 03/02/10 Archive Date: 03/11/10 DOCKET NO. 06-04 171 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUE Whether new and material evidence has been received in order to reopen a previously denied claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major depression, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed features, and depressive disorder. REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. M. Watkins, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from November 1981 to November 1984 and from October 1990 to May 1991. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision issued in January 2005 by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. In this decision, the Board is reopening the claim on the basis of new and material evidence. However, the Board will then remand this claim to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC) for further development before readjudicating the claim for service connection on the underlying merits - i.e., on de novo basis. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a February 2003 rating decision, the RO denied the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. The RO sent her a letter in February 2003 notifying her of that decision and apprising her of her procedural and appellate rights, and she did not appeal. 2. Additional evidence pertaining to the claim of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder received since the February 2003 decision is not duplicative or cumulative of evidence previously considered and relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The RO's February 2003 decision denying service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.160(d), 20.200, 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). 2. New and material evidence has been received to reopen the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board's decision to reopen the Veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is completely favorable and, in that regard, no further action is required to comply with the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations. Consideration of the merits of the Veteran's claim is deferred, however, pending additional development consistent with the VCAA. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The RO denied the Veteran's petition to reopen her claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder in the January 2005 rating decision, determining she had not submitted new and material evidence to warrant reopening the claim. The Board also must make this threshold preliminary determination as to whether new and material evidence has been submitted, before proceeding further, because it affects the Board's jurisdiction to reach the underling claim for service connection and adjudicate it on the merits on a de novo basis. See Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380 (1383-4 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Bulter v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 167, 171 (1996). If the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been submitted, then its analysis must end, as further analysis is neither required nor permitted. See Barnett, 83 F.3d at 1383-4. Prior to the January 2005 rating decision, the RO most recently denied this claim in February 2003. In such decision, while the RO styled the issue as entitlement to service connection for PTSD, the RO denied entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and major depressive disorder. As cause for denying this claim, the RO pointed out there was, at that time, no evidence establishing that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder was incurred in or aggravated by her active military service. The RO sent her a letter later in February 2003 notifying her of that decision and apprising her of her procedural and appellate rights, and she did not appeal. So that decision is final and binding on her based on the evidence then of record. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.302, 20.1103 (2009). If, however, new and material evidence is presented or secured with respect to a claim that has been denied, and not appealed, VA must reopen the claim and review its former disposition. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002). The Veteran filed her petition to reopen this claim in September 2004. For petitions to reopen, as here, filed on or after August 29, 2001, new evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence already of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be opened. It must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). In determining whether evidence is "new and material," the credibility of the evidence in question must be presumed. Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). But see Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 216 (1994) ("Justus does not require the Secretary [of VA] to consider the patently incredible to be credible"). The evidence that must be considered in determining whether there is a basis for reopening the Veteran's claim is evidence that has been added to the record since that final and binding February 2003 rating decision. See Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273 (1996) (indicating the evidence to be considered in making this new and material determination is that added to the record since the last final denial on any basis). The additional evidence received since that February 2003 denial consists of: VA treatment records and a lay statement by the Veteran. Except for some VA treatment records from 2000 to 2002, all of this additional evidence is new in the sense that it has not been submitted to VA before and, thus, never considered. And, the Veteran's September 2004 lay statement is also material because it relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). Specifically, in this statement, the Veteran describes in detail her PTSD in-service stressor, which the RO has not attempted to verify. So this statement is material to the claim because it suggests that the Veteran's acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, may be due to her active military service from November 1981 to November 1984, and from October 1990 to May 1991 - including especially to a specific incident or event in service that she thought particularly traumatic or stressful. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that new evidence could be sufficient to reopen a claim if it could contribute to a more complete picture of the circumstances surrounding the origin of a Veteran's injury or disability, even where it would not be enough to convince the Board to grant a claim). As also indicated in Evans v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 273, 284 (1996), the newly presented evidence need not be probative of all the elements required to award the claim, but it must be probative as to each element that was a specified basis for the last disallowance. Therefore, since there is new and material evidence, the claim is reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. It now must be readjudicated on the underlying merits, i.e., on a de novo basis. However, as mentioned, this will be deferred pending completion of the additional development of the claim on remand. ORDER As new and material evidence has been submitted, the petition to reopen the claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder is granted. REMAND Although the Board sincerely regrets the additional delay that will result from this remand, it is necessary to ensure there is a complete record upon which to decide this appeal so the Veteran is afforded every possible consideration. The Veteran is trying to establish her entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. Service connection for PTSD requires a current medical diagnosis of this condition (in accordance with DSM-IV, presumed to include the adequacy of the PTSD symptomatology and the sufficiency of a claimed in-service stressor); credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor(s) actually occurred; and medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor(s). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 138 (1997) (citing Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996)). The evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a stressor during service to support a claim for PTSD will vary depending on whether the Veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy." See Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993). If the evidence establishes the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy or was a prisoner of war (POW), and the claimed stressor is related to combat or POW experiences (in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service), the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 2007); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(d), (f)(2), and (f)(3) (2009). Where, however, VA determines either that the Veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy and was not a POW, or that her stressors do not relate to combat, the Veteran's lay statements, by themselves, will not be sufficient to establish the occurrence of the alleged stressor. Instead, the record must contain service records or other credible evidence which corroborates the stressor. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d) and (f)(4) (2009); Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353, 357-58 (1998). This corroborating evidence cannot consist solely of after- the-fact medical nexus evidence. See Moreau, 9 Vet. App. at 396. While the Veteran's military personnel records, including her DD Form 214, confirm she served in Southwest Asia from November 1990 to April 1991, her mere presence there does not immediately establish that she served in a combat position. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991), affirmed on reconsideration, 1 Vet. App. 406 (1991). Nor is her military occupational specialty (MOS) of Unit Supply Specialist prima facie evidence of combat experience. See VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (October 18, 1999). Further, as the RO has noted correctly, she did not receive any combat-related awards or commendations that would serve to establish combat with the enemy. Therefore, independent evidence is necessary to corroborate her alleged stressors. In September 2004, the Veteran submitted a statement describing her in-service stressors. She stated that, while she was stationed with the 138th MI Company in Riyadh and Dhahran, Persian Gulf, from January 1991 to February 1991, her unit experienced multiple mortar attacks. The RO has not made an attempt to verify this stressor. VA must attempt to corroborate this alleged stressor before deciding the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. Furthermore, recent VA treatment records show additional diagnoses of major depression, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed features, and depressive disorder, and thus these must be considered as part of the Veteran's claim. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet App 1 (2009) (the scope of a mental health disability claim includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by the claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and the other information of record). In this regard, the Board observes that an August 2002 VA treatment record reflects a diagnosis of major depressive disorder that the Veteran's treatment provider indicated was related to her combat experience during the Gulf War. However, as indicated previously, the evidence does not show that the Veteran engaged in combat. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran should be afforded a VA evaluation to determine if her major depression, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed features, and depressive disorder, as well as her PTSD, are etiologically related to service. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006), citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4) (2009). Finally, upon filing her claim in September 2004, the Veteran did not receive proper notice to satisfy the VA duties prescribed in the VCAA and the recent Court decisions in Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). She must be provided these required notices before her claim can be decided. Accordingly, this claim is REMANDED for the following additional development and consideration: 1. Send the Veteran a corrective VCAA notice letter under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) that is specific to her claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, major depression, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed features, and depressive disorder, and affords her notice consistent with Dingess/Hartman, supra. 2. Forward the Veteran's stressor information as described in her September 2004 statement (i.e., exposure to mortar attacks while serving in the Persian Gulf from January 1991 to February 1991) to the U.S Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC), and any other appropriate records repository, for research into corroboration of the claimed stressors. The JSRRC should be provided a copy of any information obtained concerning the events in question. Follow up on any additional action suggested by the JSRRC. 3. Schedule the Veteran for a VA psychiatric examination. The claims file, a separate copy of this remand, and a list of the in-service stressor(s) found to be corroborated by the evidence, must be provided to the examiner for review, the receipt of which should be acknowledged in the examination report. The examiner must first determine whether the Veteran currently has an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD according to the requirements of DSM-IV, major depression, major depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed features, or depressive disorder. If the Veteran does have the appropriate PTSD diagnosis, the examiner should also determine whether any in-service stressor(s) found to be established by the evidence is the cause of this condition. The examiner must be instructed that only the events objectively verified may be considered as valid stressors and have the examiner specify the stressor(s) that provided the basis of the diagnosis. If the Veteran is found to currently have another type of acquired psychiatric disorder, the examiner should provide an opinion as to whether it is more likely than not, less likely than not, or at least as likely as not, that any current disability found during the examination had its clinical onset during service or is related to any in-service disease, event, or injury. The Veteran's active military service was from November 1981 to November 1984 and from October 1990 to May 1991. The examiner should provide a complete rationale for all opinions expressed and conclusions reached. 4. Then readjudicate the Veteran's claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder in light of the additional evidence. If the claim is not granted to her satisfaction, send the Veteran and her representative a supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) and give them an opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of the claim. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ A. JAEGER Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs