Citation Nr: 1007706 Decision Date: 03/02/10 Archive Date: 03/11/10 DOCKET NO. 07-22 062 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Phoenix, Arizona THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to ionizing radiation. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. Heneks, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1955 to March 1959. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) on appeal from a September 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Phoenix, Arizona, which denied the benefit sought on appeal. In December 2009, the Veteran presented testimony at a personal hearing conducted at the Phoenix RO before the undersigned who was designated by the Chairman to conduct the hearing pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(c) (West 2002) and who is rendering the determination in this case. A transcript of this personal hearing is in the Veteran's claims folder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. All relevant evidence necessary for an equitable disposition of the Veteran's appeal has been obtained. 2. The Veteran participated in Operation HARDTACK I and is considered a radiation-exposed Veteran. 3. In August 2006, the Chief Public Health and Environmental Hazards Officer opined that it was unlikely that the Veteran's adenocarcinoma of the prostate can be attributed to exposure to ionizing radiation in service. 4. Prostate cancer has not been shown to be causally or etiologically related to the Veteran's military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Prostate cancer was not incurred in service, including as a result of exposure to ionizing radiation. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1112, 1113, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.307, 3.309, 3.311 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, and 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his/her representative, if applicable, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Further, in Dingess v. Nicholson, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that, upon receipt of an application for a service-connection claim, VA is required to review the evidence presented with the claim and to provide the claimant with notice of what evidence not previously provided will help substantiate his/her claim. 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). Specifically, VA must notify the claimant of what is required to establish service connection and that a disability rating and effective date for the award of benefits will be assigned if service connection is awarded. The Board finds that the duty to notify was fully satisfied by letters sent to the Veteran in May 2003 and September 2003 with regard to the claim for service connection for prostate cancer. The letter addressed all of the notice elements. In particular, the May 2003 letter asked the Veteran to answer a series of questions regarding his prostate cancer claim based on radiation exposure, and it was requested in the September 2003 letter that he complete an enclosed radiation questionnaire. In a March 2006 letter, the Veteran was provided with notice that addresses the relevant rating criteria and effective date provisions. All of the letters were sent prior to the initial unfavorable decision by the AOJ in September 2006. Therefore, the Board finds that VA has fulfilled its duty to notify. VA has also satisfied its duty to assist the Veteran at every stage of this case with regard to the claim for service connection for prostate cancer. All available service treatment records as well as all identified and available medical records pertinent to the years after service are in the claims file and were reviewed by both the RO and the Board in connection with the Veteran's claim. Although the Veteran referenced receiving treatment for high prostate specific antigen (PSA) in the 1960s, he indicated that one facility, T.D.C., had closed and that other providers had indicated that facilities only keep records so long and then dispose of them. Thus, it appears that any private records from the 1960s are no longer available. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1). In addition, as will be discussed below, dose estimates of the Veteran's ionizing radiation were obtained in this case. In August 2006, an opinion was also obtained from VA which fully addresses the relationship between the Veteran's prostate cancer and his radiation exposure. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). To the extent that the Veteran is contending that his prostate cancer is otherwise related to his service, an examination or opinion was not warranted as there is no indication that his prostate cancer is in anyway related to his military service. Indeed, there is no evidence showing that there was an event, disease, or injury in service other than radiation exposure to which a current disorder could be related. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). VA has also assisted the Veteran and his representative throughout the course of this appeal by providing them with a SOC, which informed them of the laws and regulations relevant to his claim for service connection for prostate cancer. For these reasons, the Board concludes that VA has fulfilled the duty to assist the Veteran in this case. LAW AND ANALYSIS Service connection may be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty in the active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131. That an injury or disease occurred in service is not enough; there must be chronic disability resulting from that injury or disease. If there is no showing of a resulting chronic condition during service, then a showing of continuity of symptomatology after service is required to support a finding of chronicity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). In relevant part, 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) requires that the VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim to disability benefits. Generally, in order to establish direct service connection for a disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of the current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of the in-service incurrence of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2004) (citing Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999)). However, medical evidence of a current disability and nexus is not always required to establish service connection. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. Competent medical evidence may also mean statements conveying sound medical principles found in medical treatises. It would also include statements contained in authoritative writings such as medical and scientific articles and research reports or analyses. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). Service connection for conditions claimed to be due to exposure to ionizing radiation in service can be established in any of three different ways. See Davis v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 209, 211 (1997); Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 71 (1997). First, there are diseases that are presumptively service connected in radiation-exposed veterans under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(c) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d). Second, service connection can be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) with the assistance of the procedural advantages prescribed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.311, if the condition at issue is a radiogenic disease. Third, direct service connection can be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) by showing that the disease was incurred during or aggravated by service without regard to the statutory presumptions. See Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Under Combee, VA must not only determine whether a veteran had a disability recognized by VA as being etiologically related to exposure to ionizing radiation, but must also determine whether the disability was otherwise the result of active service. In other words, the fact that the requirements of a presumptive regulation are not met does not in and of itself preclude a claimant from establishing service connection by way of proof of actual direct causation. A "radiation-exposed veteran" is defined as a veteran who while serving on active duty or on active duty for training or inactive duty training, participated in a radiation-risk activity. "Radiation-risk activity" is defined to mean onsite participation in a test involving the atmospheric detonation of a nuclear device; the occupation of Hiroshima, Japan or Nagasaki, Japan by United States forces during the period beginning on August 6, 1945, and ending on July 1, 1946; or internment as a prisoner of war (or service on active duty in Japan immediately following such internment) during World War II which resulted in an opportunity for exposure to ionizing radiation comparable to that of the United States occupational forces in Hiroshima or Nagasaki during the period from August 6, 1945 through July 1, 1946. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(3)(i), (ii) (2009). The term "onsite participation" means during the official operational period of an atmospheric nuclear test, presence at the test site, or performance of official military duties in connection with ships, aircraft or other equipment used in direct support of the nuclear test. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(3)(iv)(A). For tests conducted by the United States, the term operational period for Operation HARDTACK I means the period April 28, 1958 through October 31, 1958. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(3)(v)(O). If a claimant does not qualify as a "radiation-exposed veteran" under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(3) and/or does not suffer from one the presumptive conditions listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(2), the veteran may still benefit from the special development procedures provided in 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 if he suffers from a radiogenic disease and claims exposure to ionizing radiation in service. In this case, the Veteran is claiming that he has prostate cancer that is related to exposure to ionizing radiation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(2)(xxiii). Under the special development procedures in § 3.311(a), dose data will be requested from the Department of Defense in claims based upon participation in atmospheric nuclear testing, and claims based upon participation in the American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan, prior to July 1, 1946. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(a)(2). In all other claims, 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(a) requires that a request be made for any available records concerning the veteran's exposure to radiation. These records normally include but may not be limited to the veteran's Record of Occupational Exposure to Ionizing Radiation (DD Form 1141), if maintained, service medical records, and other records which may contain information pertaining to the veteran's radiation dose in service. All such records will be forwarded to the Under Secretary for Health, who will be responsible for preparation of a dose estimate, to the extent feasible, based on available methodologies. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(a)(2)(iii). In rendering a decision on appeal, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence that it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to the claimant. See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36, 39-40 (1994); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 57 (1990). Competency of evidence differs from weight and credibility. The former is a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered by the trier of fact, while the latter is a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted. See Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 74 (1997); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994); see also Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991) ("Although interest may affect the credibility of testimony, it does not affect competency to testify."). In considering the evidence of record under the laws and regulations as set forth above, the Board concludes that the Veteran is not entitled to service connection for prostate cancer. Initially, the Board observes that the Veteran has been determined to be a radiation-exposed Veteran as he was noted to have participated in Operation HARDTACK I. 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(3)(i), (v)(O). However, as a preliminary matter, prostate cancer is not a disease that has been determined to be presumptively service connected in radiation-exposed veterans under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112(c) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(d)(2). Nevertheless, the Veteran's claim can be considered under the second theory of entitlement referenced above, as prostate cancer is listed as a "radiogenic disease" pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(b)(2)(xxiii). In this regard, private treatment records from Dr. C.B. reflected that the Veteran was diagnosed with prostatic adenocarcinoma in January 2000. The Board finds that the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.311 were fully met. In November 2005, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) provided a scenario of the Veteran's radiation exposure based on his military records, recollections, and statements. It was explained that the Veteran's statements were combined with historical and technical information that describes the radiation environment to which he was potentially exposed. To fully characterize the Veteran's radiation exposure, estimates, worst-case conditions, and assumptions were provided. All the above combined (what the Veteran did and when, whether, and how he did it in relation to the radiation environment) constitute the Scenario of Participation and Radiation Exposure. In relevant part, the Veteran stated that he served as an airman and third class petty officer aboard the USS Boxer during Operation HARDTACK I; had liberty at Enewetak, Japtan, Bikini, and Johnston Islands up to twice a week with each visit lasting approximately 3 to 4 hours; spent approximately 12 hours per day topside; observed shots WAHOO, UMBRELLA, and ORANGE; was issued goggles and white uniforms during each detonation; was topside on the flight deck during each detonation; was exposed to fallout; steamed under fallout and had to use showers until decontaminated and had to throw clothing away; was issued film badges; was in contact with radioactive materials while moving planes around the ship; and, was contaminated on his entire body. Information from historical records do indicate that the Veteran served aboard the USS Boxer from April 1957 until January 1959. He was issued a film badge covering the period from April 1, 1958, until an unspecified turn-in date. A history of radiation exposure on Operation HARDTACK I and the USS Boxer based on operational records and reports as well as on scientific principles and studies was also provided. In particular, Operation HARDTACK I was a series of 35 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests conducted in the Pacific Ocean from April 1958 to August 1958. The USS Boxer arrived at Enewetak Atoll in March 1958 and made numerous passages between Enewetak and Bikini Atolls during May 1958 and June 1958. The USS Boxer arrived at Johnston Island in July 1958 and August 1958. In a section entitled basis for dose assessment, DTRA complied a scenario based on the Veteran's statements, historical records, operational records and reports, and scientific principles and studies. Of note was that the Veteran accrued external gamma doses from fallout from shots FIR, KOA, and REDWOOD that descended on the USS Boxer as well as from deposited fallout from shots TEWA, FIR, KOA, and REDWOOD at Enewetak and shots FIR and HICKORY at Bikini during liberty ashore. He also accrued internal doses from inhalation from descending and subsequently resuspended fallout from the HARDTACK I shots that impacted the USS Boxer; inhalation of resuspended fallout from the shots during liberty at the residence islands of Enewetak and Bikini Atolls; and, ingestion of fallout that potentially contaminated the food or water he consumed during the periods of descending fallout. It was also referenced that his film badge dosimeter recorded external gamma dose from April 1958 until an unknown turn-in date, probably June 1958 (based on information of all USS Boxer dosimetry records, ship logs and diaries, and interviews with members of the ship's crew). External gamma doses that he accrued during unbadged periods were reconstructed. Additionally, the following information was not readily characterized based on available information, but such impact on doses was found by using worst-case presumptions. Of note was that is was presumed that the Veteran was topside continuously for twelve hours per day and was fully exposed to descending fallout; internal doses at Enewetak, Japtan, Bikini, and Johnston Islands were maximized; and, as radioactive decay is the only mechanism for reducing land- based radiation levels, removal through weathering and decontamination was not considered. Further, it was assumed that the Veteran went ashore on liberty from 1600 to 2000 every other day when the USS Boxer was anchored at Bikini or Enewetak on the days the recreational facility was open. In November 2005, the Veteran signed a statement reflecting that he agreed with the scenario and had no additional information to provide. The Board notes the Veteran's concerns raised during his hearing that his complete exposure to radiation was not considered for purposes of the dose estimate, to include his entire deployment, his time on land during liberty, and touching contaminated helicopters. However, as detailed above, the Veteran's entire participation in Operation HARDTACK I was considered, which was noted to have spanned from March 1958 to August 1958. This is corroborated by a service personnel record which reflected the USS Boxer's participation in the Joint Task Force Seven from March 1958 to August 1958. Although the Veteran asserts that he was deployed for nine months (the Board notes the Veteran was aboard the USS Boxer from April 1957 to October 1958), the Board affords more probative value to the operational records and reports which reflect potential radiation exposure until August 1958. Importantly, the Veteran's exposure to radiation while on liberty, to include worst-case scenario consideration, was fully referenced in the scenario. Moreover, his time on the flight deck, to include 12 hour shifts topside, was referenced. Thus, the Board concludes that the Veteran's complete possible exposure to radiation was considered. The December 2005 Radiation Dose Assessment provided a detailed discussion of the information and evidence considered when arriving at the radiation dose to the Veteran's whole body and prostate. It was specifically stated that the Veteran's radiation exposure potential was based on his recollection, service records, operational documents and reports, and scientific principles and studies, as detailed in his Scenario of Participation and Radiation Exposure (SPARE), which the Veteran reviewed. The doses were summarized as follows: mean total external gamma dose 1.3 rem; upper bound gamma dose 1.7 rem; mean total external neutron dose 0.0 rem; upper bound neutron dose 0.0 rem; internal committed dose to the prostate 0.01 rem; and, upper bound committed dose to the prostate 0.1 rem. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(a)(2)(i). In August 2006, the Director of Compensation and Pension Service requested a VA medical opinion from the Under Secretary for Health based on the Veteran's dosage assessment, circumstances of exposure, and relevant medical history. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(c). In an August 2006 opinion, the Chief Public Health and Environmental Hazards Officer stated that the sensitivity of the prostate to radiation carcinogenesis appears to be relatively low and not clearly established. The Interactive Radioepidemiological Program (IREP) of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was utilized to estimate the likelihood that exposure to ionizing radiation was responsible for prostate cancer. The computer software calculated a 99th percentile value for the probability of causation of 1.90 percent. Based on the forgoing, the Chief Public Health and Environmental Hazards Officer opined that it was unlikely that the Veteran's adenocarcinoma of the prostate can be attributed to exposure to ionizing radiation in service. The Board affords the August 2006 opinion great probative value. The finding that the sensitivity of the prostate to radiation carcinogenesis appears to be relatively low and not clearly established was based on published scientific/medical literature. Moreover, the IREP of the NIOSH was utilized to estimate the likelihood that exposure to ionizing radiation was responsible for prostate cancer, indicating that the calculation was based on accepted scientific principles. Additionally, the examiner had access to the Veteran's medical history, to include that he was exposed to ionizing radiation at age 20, diagnosed with adenocarcinoma of the prostate in 2000, denied having a family history of cancer or leukemia, and worked in the heating and air-conditioning business after service. Lastly, the examiner considered the dose estimates supplied by the DTRA. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(e). As such, the Board affords this opinion great probative value. The Board also notes that the August 2006 opinion is the only discussion of any possible relationship between the Veteran's current prostate cancer and his exposure to ionizing radiation. As there is no other medical evidence for consideration, the Board finds that there is no competent medical evidence indicating that the Veteran's prostate cancer resulted from radiation exposure in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.311(f). Thus, the claim cannot be granted pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) with the assistance of the procedural advantages prescribed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.311. The Board has also considered whether the Veteran's prostate cancer can be established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) by showing that the disease was incurred during or aggravated by service on a direct basis. The Veteran's service treatment records are negative for any complaints, treatment, findings, or diagnoses of prostate problems. Thus, there was no showing of a prostate-related condition during the Veteran's service. As such, there is no medical evidence establishing that there was an event, disease, or injury in service (other than radiation exposure) to which a current disorder could be directly related. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(i); cf. Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 517 (2004), citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a medical examination conducted in connection with claim development could not aid in substantiating a claim when the record does not already contain evidence of an in-service event, injury, or disease). In fact, the Board notes that the first diagnosis of prostatic adenocarcinoma was in a January 2000 private treatment record from Dr. C.B., which was approximately 40 years after his separation from service. A prolonged period without medical complaint can be considered, along with other factors concerning a claimant's health and medical treatment during and after military service, as evidence of whether an injury or a disease was incurred in service which resulted in any chronic or persistent disability. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Board must consider all the evidence including the availability of medical records, the nature and course of the disease or disability, the amount of time that elapsed since military service, and any other relevant facts in considering a claim for service connection. Id.; cf. Dambach v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1376, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the absence of medical records during combat conditions does not establish absence of disability and thus suggesting that the absence of medical evidence may establish the absence of disability in other circumstances). Thus, when appropriate, the Board may consider the absence of evidence when engaging in a fact finding role. See Jordan v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 261 (2003) (Steinberg, J., writing separately) (noting that the absence of evidence may be considered as one factor in rebutting the aggravation part of the section 1111 presumption of soundness). The Board acknowledges the Veteran's testimony that he was told that he had a high acid content and high prostate specific antigen (PSA) in approximately 1965. He stated that he felt fine at the time, but was scared of anything related to cancer and decided not to follow-up. As referenced above, the Veteran indicated that any PSA readings taken in the 1960s were not available because they had been destroyed due to the passage of time. The Veteran testified that he was later told that his PSA was high while working in Alaska in the 1990s and decided to seek regular treatment. A 1997 record from A.C.F.F.M. confirmed that PSA readings were taken at that time. However, as noted above, the first diagnosis of prostate cancer was not until many years after the Veteran's separation from service. Importantly, the prostate cancer diagnosis was made approximately two years after the 1997 PSA findings. To the extent the Veteran is contending that PSA readings in the 1960s are related to his current diagnosis of prostate cancer, he, as a layperson, is not qualified to render a medical opinion as to etiology or diagnosis. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). Although the Board does not doubt the Veteran's account that he was told in the 1960s that his PSA readings were high, the Veteran is not qualified to interpret the significance of a high PSA. Moreover, without the actual 1960 records, an interpretation of such findings is not possible. As such, even after considering the Veteran's testimony that he had high PSA readings in the 1960s, the Board finds the lack of medical evidence of prostate cancer until 2000 weighs more heavily against an association between prostate cancer and the Veteran's military service. In conclusion, the Veteran was not shown to have prostate cancer until many years after his separation from service. Importantly, the competent medical evidence does not reveal a relationship between the Veteran's service and prostate cancer. As such, service connection for prostate cancer must be denied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for prostate cancer, to include as due to ionizing radiation, is denied. ____________________________________________ JESSICA J. WILLS Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs