Citation Nr: 1007969 Decision Date: 03/03/10 Archive Date: 03/11/10 DOCKET NO. 09-00 358 ) DATE ) ) THE ISSUE Whether a December 4, 2006 decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board), which denied entitlement to service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain, should be revised on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE). (The issue of entitlement to a compensable rating for right knee disability is addressed in separate Board decision.) REPRESENTATION Moving party represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Dan Brook, Counsel INTRODUCTION The moving party is a Veteran who served on active duty from May 1968 to April 1969 and from April 1969 to May 1972. This matter comes before the Board from a December 2008 motion from the Veteran to revise or reverse a December 4, 2006 decision, in which the RO reopened the Veteran's claim for service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain, and then denied entitlement to service connection on the merits. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In the December 4, 2006 decision, the Board denied entitlement to service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain. 2. The December 4, 2006 decision was adequately supported by the evidence then of record and was not undebatably erroneous or fatally flawed for failing to grant service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain. CONCLUSION OF LAW The December 4, 2006 decision denying service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain is not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-20.1411 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) describes VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that the VCAA is not applicable to motions for revision of a Board decision on the grounds of CUE. Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165 (2001). In any event, review for CUE in a prior Board decision is based on the record that existed when that decision was made. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(b). II. Factual Background The Veteran's service personnel records include an August 1971 enlistment qualification record showing that the Veteran was qualified for duty with temporary assignment limitations, which included 'no crawling, stooping, running, jumping, prolonged standing or marching.' The limitations resulted from an old strain of the ligament of the right knee. Service treatment records reveal that the Veteran was seen for complaints of low back pain on four separate occasions, once each in September 1971, October 1971, December 1971 and January 1972. A September 1971 note reflects a general complaint of low back pain but an examination of the back was negative with full range of motion without pain. An October 1971 note reflects that the Veteran had been having pain for the past four days, a December 1971 note reflects that the Veteran had been having pain for the past 3 days with a prior history of pain, and a January 1972 note reflects that the Veteran was seen for complaints of 'back pain, old injury.' The note indicates that the Veteran was treated with pain medication and chemical heat. The report of a January 1972 examination reveals that the Veteran reported a medical history of having had recurrent back pain. On examination, the evaluation of the spine and the rest of the musculoskeletal system was normal. There are no subsequent records of any treatment in service for back complaints and in a May 1972 statement the Veteran indicated that there had been no change in his medical condition since his separation examination. In June 1985 the Veteran had notified the RO that he had been treated for his back condition at Suburban General Hospital in Norristown, Pennsylvania, and indicated he was also treated at Doctor's Urgent Care Center. The first provider, however, notified VA in September 1985 that on careful search of their files, they found no evidence of the Veteran ever having been treated there. Doctor's Urgent Care Center provided records of treatment in March 1985, however, these records were associated with treatment for complaints of pain at the scapula area, and there are no records showing treatment of the low back. The report of treatment from L. C. Hammond, B.A., D.C., shows that the Veteran was treated at a chiropractic low back pain clinic for complaints of back pain in October 1987. That report indicates that the Veteran reported having a twenty- year history of lower mid back and low back pain after injuring his back in the Army. After examination, the report contains diagnoses of lumbar facet syndrome; lumbalgia; muscle spasms; and lumbar segmental dysfunction. The Veteran was treated at the chiropractic clinic from 1987 to 1989. On an April 1989 patient information sheet, the Veteran indicated that he had had low back pain, mid back pain and back pain between the shoulders for two years. Private medical records from Dr. Davis reveal treatment from 1994 to 1998 for low back pain. The initial pertinent diagnosis in May 1994 was lumbar sprain/strain with subluxation of L5. In September 1996 the Veteran was in an automobile accident, which had worsened his symptoms. The pertinent diagnosis was lumbar sprain/strain with associated lumbar myofascitis. Private treatment records from Dr. Cromshaw from 1998 to 2002 show ongoing chiropractic treatment for low back pain. VA treatment records from January 2000 to September 2002 show some ongoing treatment for low back pain. In January 2000 the Veteran was treated for complaints of back pain radiating into the legs. The Veteran indicated that he had had the problem for several years. The assessment at that time was low back pain. Private treatment records from Atlantic Orthopedics include a May 2002 report of an MRI of the lumbar spine with findings including mildly degenerated discs seen at all lumbar levels characterized by diminished stature and signal and moderately degenerated L5-S1 disc. A private medical note in July 2002 addressed that MRI report, indicating that there was no disc herniation but there was a question of a component of central stenosis at 4- 5. In his January 2003 notice of disagreement, the Veteran indicated that he injured his back in 1969 at his barracks in Germany and was in a car accident and hospitalized at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri in 1971. He stated that at that time he was in the post hospital for three weeks. In a December 2002 statement, a private chiropractor, Dr. Cromshaw stated that the Veteran had been his patient since April 1998. Dr. Cromshaw indicated that the Veteran had been treated for chronic lower back pain and bilateral leg pain, which started in 1969 when the Veteran was in the Army. Dr. Cromshaw related that the Veteran stated he injured his back severely while lifting a trailer attached to a jeep; and he was initially treated in the Army and prescribed pain medications. The Veteran further reported that he continued to seek medical help in the Army over the next few years but the pain never got better. Dr. Cromshaw concluded his statement with an opinion that he strongly believed that the initial injury in 1969 set the stage for the Veteran's eventual chronic problems, noting that it was his experience that in most cases of chronic low back pain there was often one event, which precipitates the chronic problem. The June 2003 report of a May 2003 examination done on behalf of VA shows that the Veteran reported having problems with his back since 1969 when he injured his back while in Germany. The Veteran reported complaints of constant pain in the lower back, and also numbness and tingling that traveled down his left leg. Review of the examination report shows that the examiner reviewed Dr. Cromshaw's statement and the May 2002 MRI report. The examiner's report noted that lumbar spine X-ray findings were within normal limits. The X-ray examination report shows that examination demonstrated no fracture, dislocation, radiopaque foreign body or abnormality of disc spacing; and no significant degenerative change. The impression was normal lumbar spine. After examination, the examiner diagnosed the Veteran as having degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with radiculopathy. The examiner essentially opined that the Veteran's current low back disorder was not related to symptoms treated in service. In this connection, the examiner noted that this statement was rationalized by the MRI in June 2002 which demonstrated only mild degenerative disk disease, and no lumbar stenosis or disc herniation; the changes were so mild they were not noticed on plain film in May 2003 and were consistent with normal arthritis due to age. In the December 4, 2006 Board decision, the Board found that the Veteran's current lumbar spine disability was not incurred or aggravated by service and that arthritis was not incurred within the first postservice year so as to warrant service connection on a presumptive basis. At the time of the decision, the record included the evidence summarized above. In the decision, the Board noted that the service treatment records revealed only a single January 1972 note indicating the Veteran's complaint of back pain, old injury, and that although the Veteran did report a history of recurrent back pain at separation, on separation examination the evaluation of the spine and muscoleskelatal system was normal. The Board also noted that there was no evidence that the Veteran sought treatment for any back condition until the late 1980s, many years after separation and that this fact, also weighed against a finding that the low back disability was incurred in service. Additionally, the Board attached little probative weight to the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw, finding that it was based on a history provided by the Veteran (i.e. that he injured his low back in service in 1969 and continued to have back problems ever since), and that that history was not supported by the evidence of record. Further, the Board noted that the May 2003 VA examiner opined that the Veteran's low back disability was not related to service but was consistent with normal arthritis due to age. In his December 2008 motion, the Veteran asserted that the Board committed clear and unmistakable error in the December 2006 decision by not addressing other service treatment records that clearly showed treatment for back problems. The Veteran noted that the service treatment records from September and October 1971 showed treatment for back pain yet the Board noted in its decision that these records only showed a solitary note from January 1972 indicating back pain from an old injury. The Veteran also noted that the records from September and October 1971 were clearly in the record at the time of the Board decision. The Veteran also essentially asserted that if the Board had properly addressed the September and October 1971 service medical records it would have never arrived at the conclusion that the Veteran's low back disability was not incurred in service. More particularly, he contended that the presence of September and October 1971 service treatment records in conjunction with the Veteran's report of recurrent low back pain at separation established that Dr. Cromshaw's opinion was not based solely on the Veteran's reported history but instead was based on objective medical evidence in the record. In this regard the Veteran noted that the January 1972 treatment record actually referred to an old injury, which the Veteran appeared to suggest was actually a reference to his alleged initial injury in 1969. In addition, the Veteran appeared to contend that the Board disregarded the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw solely on the rationale that the opinion was based on a history provided by the claimant and that instead the Board was required to evaluate the credibility and weight of the history upon which the medical opinion was predicated. Similarly, the Veteran asserted that the Board in rejecting Dr. Cromshaw's opinion, impermissibly rejected the lay testimony (i.e. the Veteran's reported history) on which the opinion was based by finding that that testimony was not credible simply on the basis that it was uncorroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence (e.g. records of an injury in 1969 or a car accident in 1971). In sum, the Veteran contended that the rejection of Dr. Cromshaw's opinion was based on an erroneous application of the law and erroneous fact finding and that this rejection did manifestly change the outcome of his claim for service connection. The Veteran also asserted that the Board committed error by requiring the Veteran to show continued medical treatment through just medical treatment alone for his low back disability after discharge from military service. The Veteran noted that under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), to show continuity of symptomatology, a showing of continued medical treatment is not required. Instead, he appeared to assert that the regulation only requires competent evidence of continuity after discharge to support the claim. The Veteran further argued that lay evidence may suffice to demonstrate continued symptoms under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). The Veteran then noted that he was certainly competent to provide testimony and written statements regarding the fact that he injured his back in military service and since that time had continued back pain. Thus, the Board had improperly used the absence of continued medical treatment as a basis to deny the presence of continuity of symptomatology and to reject the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw. Finally, the Veteran argued that the Board committed CUE by relying on the "inadequate" May 2003 examination report. The Veteran noted that the Board had a mandatory duty to return an inadequate examination report to an appropriate medical professional so that the inadequacies of the report could be appropriately addressed. The Veteran contended that the report was inadequate because the VA examiner did not provide any kind of medical opinion as to whether it was at least as likely as not that the Veteran's current low back disability had its onset in military service or whether it was aggravated by military service. The Veteran also contended that there was nothing in the report to indicate how the examiner arrived at the conclusion that the Veteran's low back disorder was not related to symptoms treated in service other than his mentioning of the June 2002 MRI results. The examiner never stated in his report that he had reviewed the service medical records and all the treatment records in the claims folder. The Veteran went on to contend that reliance by the Board on the report manifestly changed the outcome of the Veteran's claim because the report was used to refute the report of Dr. Cromshaw. III. Law and Regulations At the time of the December 4, 2006, Board decision, the laws and regulations concerning the issue of entitlement to service connection were essentially the same as today. Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.Cir.1996) (table); see also Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza element is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007); see Savage 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); see also Clyburn v. West, 12 Vet. App. 296, 302 (1999). Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post- service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 495-96; see Hickson, 12 Vet. App. at 253 (lay evidence of in-service incurrence sufficient in some circumstances for purposes of establishing service connection); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). In relevant part, 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) requires that the VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim to disability or death benefits. Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional." Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2007) In fact, competent medical evidence is not necessarily required when the determinative issue involves either medical etiology or a medical diagnosis. Id. at 1376-77; see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F .3d 1331, 1337 (Fed.Cir.2006); Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept 14, 2009). "Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology." Savage, 10 Vet. App. at 496 (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno, supra (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted"). If degenerative arthritis becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year of separation from active service, then it is presumed to have been incurred during active service, even though there is no evidence of arthritis during service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. Presumptive periods are not intended to limit service connection to diseases so diagnosed when the evidence warrants direct service connection. The presumptive provisions of the statute and VA regulations implementing them are intended as liberalizations applicable when the evidence would not warrant service connection without their aid. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). A disorder may be service connected if the evidence of record, regardless of its date, shows that the veteran had a chronic disorder in service or during an applicable presumptive period, and that the veteran still has such a disorder. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494-95 (1997). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). Any party to a Board decision can make a motion to have the decision revised or reversed on the grounds of CUE. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400(a), 20.1401(b) (2009). Motions for review of prior Board decisions on the grounds of CUE are adjudicated pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the Board, found at 38 C.F.R. Part 20. Rule 1403, found at 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403, relates to what constitutes CUE and what does not, and provides that: Clear and unmistakable error is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). A finding of CUE in a prior Board decision must be based on the record and the law that existed when that decision was made. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(b). To warrant revision of a Board decision on the grounds of CUE, there must have been an error in the Board's adjudication of the appeal which, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome when it was made. If it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be clear and unmistakable. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. Any party to a Board decision can make a motion to have the decision revised or reversed on the grounds of CUE. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400(a), 20.1401(b). Rule 1403 offers the following examples of situations that are not clear and unmistakable error. (1) Changed diagnosis. A new medical diagnosis that 'corrects' an earlier diagnosis considered in a Board decision. (2) Duty to assist. The Secretary's failure to fulfill the duty to assist. (3) Evaluation of evidence. A disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d). Moreover, CUE does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision challenged, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e). A motion for revision of a Board decision based on CUE must be in writing, and must be signed by the moving party or that party's representative. The motion must include the name of the Veteran; the name of the moving party if other than the Veteran; the applicable Department of Veterans Affairs file number; and the date of the Board decision to which the motion relates. If the applicable decision involved more than one issue on appeal, the motion must identify the specific issue, or issues, to which the motion pertains. Motions which fail to comply with the requirements set forth in this paragraph shall be dismissed without prejudice to refiling. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(a). If the evidence establishes CUE, an undebatable, outcome- determinative error, the prior decision must be reversed or revised, and the decision constituting reversal or revision has the same effect as if the decision had been made on the date of the prior decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111; 38 C.F.R. § 20.106. Moreover, CUE does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision challenged, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e). If the evidence establishes CUE, an undebatable, outcome- determinative error, the prior decision must be reversed or revised, and the decision constituting reversal or revision has the same effect as if the decision had been made on the date of the prior decision. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111. IV. Analysis Despite the Veteran's assertions, the Board finds no clear and unmistakable error in the December 4, 2006 Board decision. That is, the moving party has failed to demonstrate any error of fact or law that compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the errors. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). At the outset, the Board notes that the Veteran has correctly identified some errors in the December 4, 2006 Board decision. However, as will be explained below, even if the errors had not been made, the evidence of record at the time of the decision does not compel the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the Veteran was entitled to service connection for low back disability. Initially, the Veteran has correctly asserted that the Board erred when it found only one documented instance of treatment for low back pain in the service treatment records, from January 1972. In fact, as noted above, there are four documented instances of treatment for low back pain, one each in September 1971, October 1971, December 1971 and January 1972. Also, as noted by the Board, at the time of his January 1972 examination prior to subsequent separation from service in May 1972, the Veteran reported that he had suffered from recurrent back pain. However, even if the Board had appropriately recognized the four instances of treatment, it is not established that this recognition would have compelled a different outcome (i.e. an award of service connection). Notably, the record still contains the January 1972 examination report prior to separation where the spine and musculoskeletal system were found to be normal and no back pathology was diagnosed. Also, there are no treatment records from the time frame between the January 1972 low back treatment record and the Veteran's separation in May 1972 showing any treatment for, or complaints of, low back pain or other pathology. Additonally, in a May 1972 statement the Veteran indicated that there had been no change in his medical condition since the January 1972 examination. Further, the service treatment records from September 1971 to January 1972 do not show any specific diagnosis of low back disability but instead merely document complaints of low back pain. The Board notes that pain alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition, does not in and of itself constitute a disability for purposes of awarding service connection. See Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282, 285 (1999). In sum, even if the Veteran's treatment for low back pain from September 1971 to January 1972 had been appropriately recognized, the overall evidence of record did not compel the conclusion that the Veteran had a residual back disability when he separated from service in May 1972. Thus, it would not have been unreasonable for the Board to conclude that the record did not establish that the Veteran had such a disability at separation, which the essential conclusion was made by the Board in the December 4, 2006 decision. Accordingly, it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued in the absence of the Board's error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. The Veteran also has correctly asserted that the Board erred in the manner in which it assigned minimal probative value to the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw. The Board essentially afforded the opinion minimal probative value solely on the basis that it was based on the Veteran's reported history of an injury in service and subsequent continuity of symptomatology; a history which the Board found was not supported by the medical evidence of record. However, as noted by the Veteran, he is competent to testify concerning an injury, which occurred in service and to subsequent continuity of symptomatology he may have experienced. Consequently, it appears that in order for the Board to have appropriately rejected or to have afforded only minimal probative value to Dr. Cromshaw's opinion on the basis that it was not supported by the evidence of record, it was necessary for the Board to have made an explicit determination that the Veteran's competent testimony was not credible. However, once again it is not established that this error was outcome determinative. Even if the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw may not be rejected outright, or afforded only de minimus probative value without finding the Veteran non-credible, the record still contains a contrary opinion provided by the May 2003 examiner. In this regard, the Board notes that neither practitioner actually reviewed the claims file and both practitioners provided what appeared to be reasoned rationales for their findings. Dr. Cromshaw indicated that it was his experience that chronic low back pain was often precipitated by one event such as the Veteran's reported injury in service. In contrast, the May 2003 examiner indicated that the Veteran's degenerative changes of the lumbar spine were consistent with normal arthritis due to age, and thus were not related to the instances of back pain the Veteran experienced in service. Additionally, the Board notes that Dr. Cromshaw is a chiropractor whereas the QTC examiner is an osteopathic physician. Generally, the probative value of medical evidence is based on the physician's knowledge and skill in analyzing the data, and the medical conclusion the physician reaches. Guerieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467 (1993) When reviewing such medical opinions, the Board may appropriately favor the opinion of one competent medical authority over another. See Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995). In assessing medical opinions, the failure of the physician to provide a basis for his opinion goes to the weight or credibility of the evidence in the adjudication of the merits. See Hernandez-Toyens v. West, 11 Vet. App. 379, 382 (1998). Other factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion are the physician's access to the claims file and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-9 (2000). In the instant case, given that both opinions of record are supported by apparent reasoned rationales and given that neither examiner reviewed the claims file, to include the service treatment records, the Board does not find a basis to conclude that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether to afford more probative value to the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw or more probative value to the opinion of the May 2003 examiner. Accordingly, even in the absence of the Board's error in the manner of assigning minimal probative value to Dr. Cromshaw's opinion, given that the medical opinion evidence of record does not compel the conclusion that Dr. Cromshaw's opinion is more or equally probative in comparison to the May 2003 examiner's opinion, it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued (i.e. a finding by the Board that a nexus did exist between the Veteran's service and his current low back disability) in the absence of the Board's error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. It also appears that the Veteran is correct in pointing out that the Board erred by generally finding that there was a lack of continuity of low back symptomatology post-service as evidenced by the lack of any documentation of low back treatment from separation in 1972 until 1987. Inasmuch, as the Board made such a finding on the basis of the lack of evidence of medical treatment for low back problems during this time frame without explicitly making a finding concerning the Veteran's credibility, the Board appears to have erred. However, once again, such error is not shown to be outcome determinative. Quite simply, the record does not compel the conclusion to which reasonable minds could not differ that the Veteran's competent testimony that he continued to experience low back symptomatology from service to the present day is actually credible. Notably, the Veteran alleges that he has had continuous low back pain from service until the present day. However, he did not actually file a claim for service connection for low back disability until 1985 some 13 years after service and the record contains no explanation from him as to why he would delay this filing. Similarly, the earliest treatment of record for low back disability is from 1987, some 15 years after service, and once again the record contains no explanation from the Veteran as to why, if he was experiencing continuous back pain, that he would wait for 15 years prior to seeking treatment for that pain. In addition although the Veteran did report a 20 year history of low back pain in 1987, later, in 1989, he reported only a two year history of low back pain. Given these unexplained delays and the discrepancy in his reported history of the duration of his low back pain, the Board cannot find that the Veteran's alleged continuity of symptomatology is undebatably credible. Consequently, given the absence of any contemporaneous medical evidence actually establishing continuity of symptomatology and given the debatable credibility of the Veteran's report of continuity of symptomatology, it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued (i.e. a finding by the Board that continuity of symptomatology was actually shown) in the absence of the Board's error. Regarding the Veteran's contention that the May 2003 examination done on behalf of VA was inadequate, at the outset the Board notes that inasmuch as the Veteran is simply contending that VA did not appropriately develop his claim by providing an adequate examination, failure in the duty to assist cannot be grounds for CUE. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d). Also, from an evidentiary perspective, as explained above, the May 2003 examiner, contrary to the Veteran's contentions did provide a clear opinion that the Veteran's current low back disability was not related to service. Although this opinion was not expressed using the "less likely than not" terminology, it is clear from the opinion that the examiner attributed the disability to the normal aging process and not to any event in service. Additionally, as explained above neither the May 2003 examiner nor Dr. Cromshaw reviewed the claims file so this omission by the May 2003 examiner can't form the basis for discounting the examiner's opinion in relation to Dr. Cromshaw's. The Board also notes that the May 2003 examiner was explicitly instructed by the RO not to consider the Veteran's reported severe injury to his back in 1969 when formulating his opinion. Although this instruction should have led the Board in its December 2006 decision to make an explicit determination as to the credibility of the Veteran's report of his 1969 injury, once again the Board's error was not outcome determinative. Notably, the examiner did not base his opinion on whether or not an injury actually took place in service but instead found that the Veteran's disc disease was so mild that it was consistent with the aging process and was not caused by any event in service. Thus, even assuming arguendo, that the Veteran's report of the 1969 injury is credible, the May 2003 examiner's opinion amounts to independent evidence, which in conjunction with the other evidence of record could provide a reasonable basis for not finding a nexus between the Veteran's current low back disability and his military service. Consequently, even assuming arguendo, that the Veteran's report of the 1969 injury is credible, the evidence pertaining to medical nexus does not compel the conclusion that his current low back disability is related to this injury. Accordingly, it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued (i.e. the Board discounting the opinion of the VA examiner and thus finding that a nexus did exist between the Veteran's service and his current low back disability based on attaching more probative value to the opinion of Dr. Cromshaw) in the absence of the Board's error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. Further, similar to the credibility finding above, the record does not compel the conclusion to which reasonable minds could not differ that the Veteran's competent testimony that he severely injured his back in service in 1969 is actually credible. Once again given that it is unexplained why the Veteran did not actually file a claim for service connection for low back disability until 1985, some 13 years after service; given that it is unexplained why he did not seek treatment for low back problems until some 15 years after service; given the unexplained discrepancy between his report of a 20 year history of low back pain in 1987 and a two year history of low back pain in 1989, the Veteran's general credibility regarding the nature and duration of his low back problems has been called into question. Consequently, the Board cannot conclude that the Veteran's report of his 1969 injury is undebatably credible. Accordingly, once again, it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued (i.e. the Board finding the Veteran's account of his 1969 injury in service credible) in the absence of the Board's error. In summary, although the Board did make a number of errors, none of them, when considered individually or in combination, was outcome determinative. In the absence of all of the above errors, the record still contains evidence, which leaves open to question whether the Veteran incurred a back injury in service in 1969, whether he could be deemed to have any back disability when he separated from service in 1972, whether he had continuity of low back symptomatology after service and whether his current low back disability is actually related to service. The evidence also more generally leaves open to question the credibility of the Veteran's report of his injury in service and continuity of low back symptomatology after service. Consequently, based on the evidence of record at the time of the December 4, 2006 decision, the Board's combination of errors, does not compel the conclusion to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40 (1993). Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, the moving party has not demonstrated grounds for revision or reversal of the Board decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111; 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-1411. ORDER The motion to reverse and revise the December 4, 2006 Board decision, which denied entitlement to service connection for lumbosacral sprain, also claimed as low back pain, on the basis of clear and unmistakable error is denied. ____________________________________________ WAYNE M. BRAEUER Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs