Citation Nr: 1008359 Decision Date: 03/05/10 Archive Date: 03/11/10 DOCKET NO. 05-12 698 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in San Juan, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. 2. Entitlement to service connection for fibromyalgia. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD E. Woodward Deutsch, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from April 1969 to April 1971. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a September 2004 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) that denied service connection for a psychiatric disability and fibromyalgia. In January 2007, the Board remanded those claims for additional development. Additionally, the Board reopened and remanded a previously denied claim of service connection for peripheral neuropathy. However, that claim was granted in a November 2009 rating decision and is no longer on appeal. At the outset, the Board recognizes that, while the RO framed the first issue on appeal as entitlement to service connection for PTSD, a review of the record indicates that the Veteran has also been diagnosed with depression. Claims for service connection for PTSD encompass claims for service connection for all psychiatric disabilities that are reasonably raised by the record. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Accordingly, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim is most appropriately characterized as reflected on the title page of this decision. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the Veteran served in combat and that he has a diagnosis of PTSD in conformance with the standards of DSM-IV that is based on reported stressors consistent with the circumstances, conditions, and hardships of his service. 2. The preponderance of the evidence of record is at least in equipoise as to whether the Veteran's currently diagnosed depression is related to his period of active service. 3. The preponderance of the evidence does not demonstrate that the Veteran has a current diagnosis of fibromyalgia that is related to his active service or to any incident therein. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD and depression, have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1132, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306 (2009). 2. The criteria for service connection for fibromyalgia have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1132, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Service Connection Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there must be a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. If chronicity in service is not established, evidence of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). Service connection may also be granted for a disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). Service connection may also be established for certain chronic diseases, including psychoses, which are manifested to a compensable degree within a presumptive period following separation from service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. The Veteran's fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, however, are not conditions subject to presumptive service connection. In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the Veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2009); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Here, the Veteran asserts that service connection is warranted for a psychiatric disability and fibromyalgia. Those claims will be examined in turn. Psychiatric Disability, to include PTSD and Major Depressive Episode In order to establish service connection for a claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999). VA considers diagnoses of mental disorders in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (1994) (DSM-IV). The DSM-IV criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD include: A) exposure to a traumatic event; B) the traumatic event is persistently experienced in one or more ways; C) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness is indicated by at least three of seven symptoms; D) persistent symptoms of increased arousal are reflected by at least two of five symptoms; E) the duration of the disturbance must be more than one month; and F) the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. If the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2009). When the evidence does not establish that a Veteran is a combat Veteran, his assertions of service stressors are not sufficient to establish the occurrence of such events. Rather, his alleged service stressors must be established by official service record or other credible supporting evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002); Fossie v. West, 12 Vet. App. 1 (1998); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994). It is the Board's principal responsibility to assess the credibility, and therefore the probative value of proffered evidence of record in its whole. Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429 (1995); Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Guimond v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 69 (1993); Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). In determining whether documents submitted by a Veteran are credible, the Board may consider internal consistency, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board is not required to accept an appellant's uncorroborated account of his active service experiences. Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190 (1991). The Veteran in essence contends that while serving in Vietnam he was exposed to a variety of combat stressors that support a PTSD diagnosis. A review of the Veteran's service personnel records reveals that he served in the Army as an infantryman and was deployed to Vietnam from September 1969 to September 1970. Additionally, those records show that, in addition to the Vietnam Service Medal and two Overseas Bars, the Veteran received the Combat Infantry Badge, thus indicating that he engaged in combat with the enemy. Accordingly, he Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of any claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Veteran's service medical records, including his May 1968 enlistment and January 1971 separation examinations, are negative for complaints or clinical findings of psychiatric problems. The first post-service evidence related to the Veteran's claim is a February 2002 VA psychiatric examination in which he reported that he had been exposed to a series of combat- related stressors in Vietnam, including a Viet Cong attack on the fire base where he was stationed that resulted in numerous casualties, the discovery of a mass grave site, and participation in an effort to rescue a helicopter carrying wounded soldiers that was shot down by the enemy. He stated that, shortly after returning from Vietnam, he had experienced a "sensation at night of being unable to move," which he related to the limited mobility he experienced in combat. The Veteran added that, although this sensation had "basically disappeared" for many years, it had recently returned, and that he was also currently experiencing a "sensation of being tired" all the time. The Veteran did not report any other psychiatric symptoms. Nor did he indicate that he had ever sought treatment for any psychiatric problems. On mental status examination, the Veteran displayed an "adequate" affect and a calm mood, and was oriented to person, place, and time. He appeared alert and "in full contact with reality." He did not demonstrate any abnormal tremors, tics, or mannerisms. Nor did he show any signs of cognitive or emotional impairment. Based on the results of the examination, the VA examiner determined that the Veteran did not meet the diagnostic criteria for any specific mental disorder and assigned him a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 80. No rationale was provided for that assessment. The Veteran submitted an April 2003 written statement challenging the VA examiner's findings and elaborating on his combat-related stressors. Specifically, he described an incident in which he accidentally strayed from a fox hole in Vietnam and some of his fellow soldiers "threw hand grenades past [him]" and set off a claymore mine in his direction. The Veteran added that only the intervention of an experienced squadron member saved him from getting fired on by M-16s and, presumably, dying that day. Additionally, the Veteran reported that from October to December 1969, he was involved in heavy fighting, during which he endured many sleepless nights, was constantly on alert, and witnessed helicopter crashes and rocket, mortar, and grenade attacks. The Veteran also stated that he was present during the invasion of Cambodia in May 1970 and narrowly missed boarding a helicopter at that time that crashed, killing all the passengers and crew. Thereafter, the Veteran submitted private medical records in support of his claim, including a March 2003 statement from his longtime treating physician who indicated that the Veteran's complaints of headaches, sore throat, and generalized fatigue since his period of active service were consistent with a diagnosis of fibromyalgia and that it was "also evident that a chronic depression (and/or associated with [PTSD]) ha[d] been masquerarading under all [his] syndromes and need[ed] further evaluation." The Veteran also submitted a report of an April 2005 private psychiatric evaluation in which he complained of anxiety, hyperalertness, irritability, insomnia, poor impulse control, depression, nightmares, and constant fatigue. Additionally, the Veteran stated that he had recurrent flashbacks in which he "reliv[ed] traumatic incidents experienced while in the Army," was unable to concentrate, and felt that "his personality ha[d] changed dramatically" as a result of his combat-related stressors. The Veteran further stated that he spent the majority of his time "at home restless and distressed," adding that he "hardly [went] out" and did not socialize. Mental status examination revealed a depressed affect and an anxious mood. While the Veteran was oriented to person and place and displayed a fair grasp of general information, he had difficulty remembering dates and "significant information." His recent and long-term memory was fair, but his immediate and short-term recall was poor. His judgment was logical, but his concentration was poor and he "seemed easily distracted." Additionally, while the Veteran denied episodes of auditory or visual hallucinations and suicidal ideations, he admitted feelings of worthlessness and low self-esteem. Based on the results of the examination, the private psychiatrist diagnosed the Veteran with late-onset PTSD and opined that disorder was "directly related to the traumatic incidents suffered while in the Army." The record indicates that, since the April 2005 evaluation, the Veteran has returned to the private psychiatrist for treatment for PTSD and related symptoms. He has also been diagnosed with and treated for depressive disorder, not otherwise specified, and alcohol abuse. The Veteran underwent a second VA examination in November 2005 in which he reported a history of depression, memory problems, and fatigue, but indicated that he was not currently depressed or anxious. Additionally, he stated that he had recently retired from his job as a postal worker, but denied that he had done so on account of PTSD or other mental health problems. Mental status examination was negative for any cognitive, emotional, or behavioral abnormalities. The Veteran denied any history of suicidal or homicidal ideations. Nor did he report any hallucinations or other mental impairment. Based on the results of the examination, the VA examiner assigned the Veteran a GAF score of 80 and determined that he did not meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and displayed no other "neuropsychiatric condition that could be considered due to, caused by, the result of, or secondary to his military service." Significantly, however, the VA examiner did not provide a rationale for that opinion. Additionally, while that examiner indicated that he had reviewed the claims folder, he did not address the April 2005 private psychiatrist's findings, most notably her opinion that the Veteran had PTSD that was directly related to his combat-related stressors. Pursuant to the Board's January 2007 remand, the Veteran was afforded a third VA examination in September 2009 in which he recounted his combat-related stressors. He stated that, since his return from Vietnam, he had experienced flashbacks and nightmares about the war that caused him to "get up sweating at night." He also reported a history of chronic fatigue, depression, and withdrawal tendencies manifested by a "severe unwillingness to go out." On mental status examination, the Veteran displayed memory problems, but did not demonstrate any other psychiatric problems or signs of impairment. Based on the results of the examination and a review of the claims folder, the September 2009 VA examiner concurred with the findings of the February 2002 and November 2005 examiners that the Veteran did not have a current psychiatric disability. In so doing, the September 2009 VA examiner acknowledged the prior diagnosis of depressive disorder, but did not attempt to reconcile it with his own clinical findings of a lack of any disability. Additionally, the September 2009 examiner noted that the Veteran had been diagnosed with PTSD by the April 2005 private psychiatrist. However, that examiner opined that diagnosis was "not substantiated adequately with the DSM-IV criteria" because it did not state the specific traumatic experiences from the Army that triggered the Veteran's PTSD and did not "clearly state to the criteria (one or more reexperiencing symptoms, three avoidance and three hyperarousal symptoms as required by current DSM-IV criteria.)" An evaluation of the probative value of medical opinion evidence is based on the medical expert's personal examination of the patient, the examiner's knowledge and skill in analyzing the data, and the medical conclusion reached. The credibility and weight to be attached to such opinions are within the province of the Board as adjudicators. Guerrieri v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 467 (1993). Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36 (1994). Greater weight may be placed on one physician's opinion over another depending on factors such as reasoning employed by the physicians and whether or not and the extent to which they reviewed prior clinical records and other evidence. Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 36 (1994). The probative value of a medical opinion is generally based on the scope of the examination or review, as well as the relative merits of the expert's qualifications and analytical findings, and the probative weight of a medical opinion may be reduced if the examiner fails to explain the basis for an opinion. Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). The Board finds that the March 2003 and April 2005 opinions set forth by the Veteran's private treating physician and psychiatrist, respectively indicating that the Veteran had suffered from chronic depression since his period of active service and that he met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD based on combat-related stressors experienced in Vietnam, are more probative and persuasive than the February 2002, November 2005, and September 2009 VA examiners' findings that the Veteran did not have PTSD or any other psychiatric disability. The March 2003 and April 2005 opinions were based on the examiners' thorough and detailed examination of Veteran and supported by a rationale. Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444 (2000) (factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include the physician's access to the claims folder and the Veteran's history, and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). Additionally, the Board considers it significant that each opinion was rendered by a medical professional who had treated the Veteran extensively for PTSD, depression, and related metal health problems. That adds to the probative value of their opinions. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)(1). In contrast, the February 2002 and November 2005 VA examiners who determined that the Veteran did not have a current psychiatric disability did not provide a rationale for that finding. If the examiner does not provide a rationale for the opinion, that weighs against the probative value of the opinion. Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). Moreover, neither the February 2002 nor the November 2005 VA examiner considered the evidence of record showing that the Veteran had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and PTSD and that those conditions had been clinically related to his period of active service. Instead, those VA examiners appear to have based their determinations regarding the Veteran's mental health status on his own unsubstantiated statements indicating he was not depressed or anxious and his lack of some reported symptoms at the times he was examined. Thus, those VA examiners' findings are no more probative than the facts alleged by the Veteran himself. Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229 (1993). The Board recognizes that the September 2009 VA examiner did indicate that he had reviewed the Veteran's claim folder and acknowledged the prior diagnosis of depression. Nevertheless, the Board finds that that VA examiner's opinion is also not supported by an adequate rationale as he did not reconcile the prior depression diagnosis with his own finding of a lack of any psychiatric disorder. That weighs against the probative value of that opinion. Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). Additionally, the Board acknowledges that the September 2009 VA examiner addressed the PTSD diagnosis rendered by the April 2005 private psychiatrist and concluded that this diagnosis was inadequate because it did not state the specific in-service stressors on which it was predicated or otherwise conform to the DSM-IV criteria. However, while cognizant that the April 2005 private psychiatrist's report did not expressly cite the DSM-IV criteria, the Board nonetheless observes that her clinical findings support a diagnosis of PTSD under those criteria. The April 2005 private psychiatrist noted that the Veteran repeatedly "relived traumatic incidents experienced while" in Vietnam, thereby meeting criteria A and B under the DSM-IV (i.e., exposure to a traumatic event and persistent reexperiencing of that traumatic event). Additionally, the private psychiatrist noted that the Veteran experienced anxiety, hyperalertness, irritability, poor impulse control, insomnia, flashbacks, depression, fatigue, memory loss, and difficulty concentrating, and demonstrated withdrawal tendencies manifested by an unwillingness to leave his house or socialize. Those findings collectively meet the criteria covered by C) persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness is indicated by at least three of seven symptoms, and D) persistent symptoms of increased arousal are reflected by at least two of five symptoms, in accordance with DSM-IV. Additionally, while the private psychiatrist declined to comment on how long the Veteran's PTSD symptoms had persisted, the fact that he had a prior diagnosis of depression dating back to March 2003 and has continued to seek treatment for PTSD and related problems on an ongoing basis seems to indicate that he meets criterion E under DSM-IV (i.e., the duration of the disturbance must be more than one month). Finally, the private psychiatrist's finding that the Veteran seldom left the house and felt that his entire personality had changed dramatically as a result of his PTSD satisfies the final DSM- IV criterion (i.e., that the disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning). Accordingly, the Board finds that the private psychiatrist's report contains a diagnosis of PTSD that conforms to the DSM IV criteria, despite that the recitation of symptomatology was not delivered in the framework of the DSM-IV criteria. Nevertheless, symptoms substantiating the diagnosis pursuant to DSM-IV were demonstrated at that examination. After a careful review of the evidence, the Board finds that the Veteran's service and post-service medical records and, in particular, the positive nexus opinions provided by the March 2003 private treating physician and the April 2005 private psychiatrist, demonstrate that the Veteran currently suffers from a psychiatric disability that is related to his period of active service. The March 2003 private treating physician opined that the Veteran's depression had persisted since his period of active service. Moreover, the April 2005 private psychiatrist expressly determined that the Veteran's symptoms were consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD, which, for the reasons noted above, was in conformance with DSM-IV criteria. Additionally, the Veteran's service records clearly indicate that he served in combat in Vietnam. His reported stressors, including exposure to enemy and friendly fire and mortar, rocket, and grenade attacks, the discovery of a mass grave site, participation in rescue efforts involving many casualties, and the witnessing of a helicopter crash, are consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of his combat service. A combat-decorated Veteran's lay statements alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Finally, the Board observes that the April 2005 private psychiatrist expressly related the Veteran's current PTSD symptoms to the traumatic events he experienced in Vietnam. In sum, the Board finds that the competent evidence of record consists of a diagnosis of PTSD in conformance with DSM IV, credible supporting statements establishing the occurrence of combat-related stressors, and a link, established by the April 2005 private psychiatrist, between the current symptomatology and the verified in-service stressors. Thus, the criteria for service connection for PTSD have been met. Moreover, the evidence of record is at least in equipoise as to whether the Veteran's currently diagnosed depression had its onset in service. The Veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt when there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence. Where the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, the appellant prevails. 38 U.S.C.A. 5107 (b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Accordingly, the Board finds that service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD and depression, is warranted. Fibromyalgia The Veteran contends that since his period of active service he has experienced symptoms, including chronic fatigue, headaches, pain and numbness in his upper and lower extremities, concentration problems, and depression, which support a diagnosis of fibromyalgia and that he is therefore entitled to service connection for that disorder. The service medical records reflect several instances in which the Veteran sought treatment for headaches, throat soreness, and nasal congestion, which were found to be symptoms of a common cold or allergies. His separation examination was negative for any complaints or clinical findings of fibromyalgia or related symptoms. Consequently, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that chronicity in service is not established. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). As chronicity in service has not been established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the Veteran's claim for service connection for fibromyalgia. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). The Veteran's post-service medical records reflect complaints of chronic headaches and fatigue beginning in 1976. Those symptoms persisted throughout the 1980s, when he was diagnosed with chronic fatigue syndrome and chronic Epstein Barr syndrome. Thereafter, the Veteran continued to seek periodic treatment for fatigue and difficulty concentrating. On the basis of those symptoms, he was diagnosed with fibromyalgia by a private treating physician in December 2001. Two months later, in February 2002, the Veteran underwent a VA examination in which he reported a history of fatigue and joint problems since service, but acknowledged that he had never gone to sick call due to fibromyalgia during his period of active duty. It was noted that the Veteran had recently received treatment for a torn rotator cuff and had also been diagnosed with degenerative joint disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, as well as fibromyalgia. On physical examination, the Veteran was found to have no muscle spasms in his upper or lower extremities. The examination also included a trigger test, which was negative for any tender points in the skeletal spine or the upper or lower extremities. Based on those findings, the VA examiner concluded that the Veteran did not meet the diagnostic criteria for fibromyalgia. The record thereafter shows that the Veteran's private physician submitted a March 2003 report indicating that he had treated the Veteran since March 1998 for various musculoskeletal symptoms and opined that those symptoms were now "being covered under the diagnosis of fibromyalgia." Significantly, however, the March 2003 private physician did not indicate that his diagnosis was based on a trigger test or otherwise provide a rationale for his clinical findings. Additionally, as noted in the discussion of the Veteran's psychiatric claim, the March 2003 private physician found evidence of a "chronic depression (and/or associated with PTSD) that had been masquerading under all this syndromes[s] and need[ed] further evaluation," adding that "it had not been addressed before and was the most common entity to be considered as a differential or concomitant diagnosis." In accordance with the Board's remand, the Veteran was afforded a second VA examination in September 2009, which included a review of his claims folder. The Veteran reported a history of unexplained fatigue, pain and numbness in his upper and lower extremities, headache, depression, and anxiety, which had persisted since service. At that time, his complaints of fatigue and extremity numbness and pain were found to consistent with a diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy, for which the RO granted service connection in a November 2009 rating decision. Significantly, however, the September 2009 VA examiner determined, after administering a trigger test, that the Veteran's reported symptoms were not consistent with a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. As a rationale for that opinion, the VA examiner noted that the Veteran id not demonstrate "at least 11 of the 18 specified tender points suggested by the American College of Rheumatology to confirm the diagnosis" of fibromyalgia. Additionally, the VA examiner determined that there was "no major disability cause[d] by easy fatigability" and that the Veteran's "current suspected fibromyalgia or disability characterized by easy fatigability and generalized body aches [was] not caused by or a result of the Veteran's in-service complaints of chronic headaches and sore throat." The Board finds that the February 2002 and September 2009 VA examiners' opinions, collectively indicating that the Veteran did not meet the diagnostic criteria for fibromyalgia and that his complaints of easy fatigability, generalized body aches, and related physical and psychiatric symptoms were not related to his in-service treatment for chronic headaches and throat soreness, are more probative and persuasive than the March 2003 private physician's finding that those symptoms were all attributable to fibromyalgia that had existed since service. The February 2002 and September 2009 opinions were based on the VA examiners' thorough and detailed examination of claims folder and supported by a rationale. Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444 (2000) (factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion include the physician's access to the claims folder and the Veteran's history, and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). Both VA examiners expressly noted that their conclusions were based on the administration of trigger tests, which did not yield findings of tender points sufficient to support a diagnosis of fibromyalgia. Additionally, the September 2009 VA examiner's opinion included analysis of pertinent medical literature from the American College of Rheumatology, which adds to the probative value of that opinion. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)(1). Moreover, the Board considers it significant that the September 2009 examination directly addressed the issue on appeal and that the VA examiner's opinion is consistent with other competent evidence of record, including the Veteran's service medical records showing complaints of headaches and throat soreness, but no diagnoses of fibromyalgia or related conditions; the February 2002 VA examiner's finding that a diagnosis of fibromyalgia was not warranted; the Veteran's post-service treatment for chronic fatigue, headaches, concentration problems, depression, and pain and numbness in the upper and lower extremities; and his current diagnoses of depression and peripheral neuropathy, for which service connection has been established. In contrast, the March 2003 private physician did not indicate that his diagnosis of fibromyalgia was based on a trigger test. Nor did that physician provide any other rationale to substantiate a diagnosis of fibromyalgia or to relate that condition to the Veteran's period of active service. If the examiner does not provide a rationale for the opinion, that weighs against the probative value of the opinion. Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 140 (1993). Additionally, the private physician did not indicate that he had reviewed the Veteran's service medical records or other pertinent evidence in the claims folder, which further limits the probative value of that examiner's opinion. The Board finds that the evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the Veteran has a currently diagnosis of fibromyalgia and that his claim for service connection for that disorder must therefore be denied. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). The February 2002 and September 2009 VA examiners determined that the Veteran's reported symptoms did not support a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, and the Board has afforded those opinions great probative weight. Symptoms alone, without a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition, do not constitute a disability. Without a pathology to which such symptoms can be attributed, there is no basis upon which service connection may be granted. Sanchez-Benitez v. West, 13 Vet. App. 282 (1999). Even if the weight of the competent evidence showed that the Veteran had a current diagnosis of fibromyalgia, however, service connection would still not be warranted absent evidence showing that it is at least as likely as not that such condition was related to service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. That has not been shown here. Indeed, the September 2009 VA examiner expressly determined that, while the Veteran's current symptoms did not support a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, even if they had, those symptoms were unrelated to the Veteran's in-service complaints of chronic headaches and throat soreness. There are no other competent contrary medical opinions of record. Moreover, the Board considers it significant that many of the symptoms that the Veteran has attributed to fibromyalgia have been clinically found to overlap with the symptoms underlying his diagnoses of depression and peripheral neuropathy. Indeed, the March 2003 private examiner who diagnosed the Veteran with fibromyalgia opined that his underlying symptoms of generalized fatigue and headaches, which had existed since service, were also characteristic of depression, while the September 2009 VA examiner who diagnosed the Veteran with peripheral neuropathy based that diagnosis, at least in part, on his complaints of including fatigue and pain and numbness in the extremities. The Veteran was granted service connection for peripheral neuropathy in November 2009 and the Board has found that service connection is also warranted to a psychiatric disability, to include depression. Accordingly, the Board finds that, although Veteran has attributed his symptoms of fatigue, depression, headaches, pain and numbness, to fibromyalgia, those symptoms are already contemplated in his awards of service connection for peripheral neuropathy and psychiatric disability. To grant a separate award of service connection and compensate for the same symptomatology twice would therefore constitute impermissible pyramiding. 38 C.F.R. § 4.14 (2009). The Board has considered the Veteran's contentions that he has fibromyalgia that arose in service. However, as a layperson, the Veteran is not competent to give a medical opinion on diagnosis, causation, or aggravation of a medical condition. Bostain v. West, 11 Vet. App. 124 (1998); Routen v. West, 142 F.3d. 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to give evidence about fatigue, pain and numbness in the extremities, depression, and related symptoms that he has experienced. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994). Competency must be distinguished from weight and credibility, which are factual determinations going to the probative value of the evidence. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67 (1997). Accordingly, the Board finds the weight of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim for service connection for fibromyalgia, and that claim must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Duties to Notify and Assist the Appellant Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application, VA must notify the claimant and any representative of any information, medical evidence, or lay evidence not previously provided to VA that is necessary to substantiate the claim. This notice requires VA to indicate which portion of that information and evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which portion VA will attempt to obtain on the claimant's behalf. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2007). The notice must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; and (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide. Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Here, the RO sent correspondence in July 2004, a rating decision in September 2004, and a statement of the case in February 2005. These documents discussed specific evidence, the particular legal requirements applicable to the Veteran's claim for service connection for fibromyalgia, the evidence considered, the pertinent laws and regulations, and the reasons for the decisions. VA made all efforts to notify and to assist the appellant with regard to the evidence obtained, the evidence needed, the responsibilities of the parties in obtaining the evidence, and the general notice of the need for any evidence in the appellant's possession. The Board finds that any defect with regard to the timing or content of the notice to the appellant is harmless because of the thorough and informative notices provided throughout the adjudication and because the appellant had a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of the claim with an adjudication of the claim by the RO subsequent to receipt of the required notice. There has been no prejudice to the appellant, and any defect in the timing or content of the notices has not affected the fairness of the adjudication. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 103 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (specifically declining to address harmless error doctrine); see also Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Thus, VA has satisfied its duty to notify the appellant and had satisfied that duty prior to the final adjudication in the November 2009 supplemental statement of the case. In addition, all relevant, identified, and available evidence has been obtained, and VA has notified the appellant of any evidence that could not be obtained. The appellant has not referred to any additional, unobtained, relevant, available evidence. VA has also obtained medical examinations in relation to the Veteran's fibromyalgia claim. Thus, the Board finds that VA has satisfied both the notice and duty to assist provisions of the law. ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include PTSD and depression, is granted. Service connection for fibromyalgia is denied. ____________________________________________ Harvey P. Roberts Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs