Citation Nr: 1009751 Decision Date: 03/15/10 Archive Date: 03/24/10 DOCKET NO. 09-29 600 ) DATE ) ) THE ISSUES 1. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board), which denied entitlement to service connection for weakness and lack of energy, claimed as a qualifying chronic disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, should be reversed on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error (CUE). 2. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for memory loss, claimed as a qualifying chronic disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. 3. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for insomnia, claimed as a qualifying chronic disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. 4. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for sore muscles, claimed as a qualifying chronic disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. 5. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for joint aches, claimed as a qualifying chronic disability under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. 6. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for a skin disability, claimed as intertrigo and tinea cruris, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. 7. Whether a July 15, 2005, decision of the Board, which denied entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability, to include depression and anxiety, should be reversed on the grounds of CUE. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Anthony M. Flamini, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1951 to April 1958 and from September 1990 to May 1991, including service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations from November 1990 to April 1991. This matter is before the Board as an original action on the motion of the Veteran in which he alleges CUE in a July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied entitlement to service connection for weakness and lack of energy, memory loss, insomnia, sore muscles, joint aches, a skin disability, and a psychiatric disability. Please note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2009). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a)(2) (West 2002). FINDINGS OF FACT 1. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for weakness and lack of energy; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 2. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for memory loss; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 3. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for insomnia; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 4. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for sore muscles; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 5. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for joint aches; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 6. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for a skin disability; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. 7. In a July 15, 2005, decision, the Board denied service connection for a psychiatric disability; however, the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision were before the Board, and the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were correctly applied. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for weakness and lack of energy was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 2. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for memory loss was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 3. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for insomnia was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 4. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for sore muscles was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 5. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for joint aches was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 6. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for a skin disability was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). 7. The July 15, 2005, Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400, 20.1403 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). However, VA's duties to notify and assist are not applicable to CUE claims. See Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165, 178-79 (2001) (en banc). As noted above, the Veteran served on active duty from January 1951 to April 1958 and from September 1990 to May 1991. The service treatment records, which were associated with the claims folder and considered by the Board in its July 15, 2005, decision, reveal no complaints of, treatment for, or diagnosis of weakness or lack of energy, memory loss, insomnia, sore muscles, joint aches, skin symptomatology, or psychiatric symptomatology. Following separation from service, the Veteran was afforded a VA Persian Gulf Examination in May 1994. The Veteran indicated that he was stationed in Saudi Arabia during his service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations and was exposed to heavy smoke from the oil and gas fires. He reported that his left big toe had become intermittently painful and swollen since his time in Saudi Arabia, and that he occasionally experienced numbness in his left second and third toes. He also noted occasional pain in the muscles of his forearms, legs, and neck. He further reported occasional, short-lived bouts of anxiety and depression. The Veteran's spouse indicated that his memory was not as good as it used to be. In May 1996, the Veteran filed claims for service connection for "rashes, sore muscles, weakness, no energy, and memory loss," which he believed were caused by exposure to "nerve chemicals and oil well smoke." The Veteran was afforded a VA general examination in September 1996, at which time his skin rash was diagnosed as mild intertrigo and his toe pain was diagnosed as osteoarthritis possibly secondary to an old injury. He was also diagnosed with "anxiety and forgetfulness." The Veteran was also afforded a VA mental disorders examination in September 1996, at which time the examiner noted that the Veteran related that his psychiatric symptoms and physical symptoms appeared to be most compatible with what is known as "Gulf War Syndrome." The examiner noted that there was no reason to doubt the Veteran's reported history, but failed to provide any diagnosis of his own. The Veteran was afforded a VA mental disorders examination in January 1997, at which time he was diagnosed with cognitive disorder and dyssomnia. VA treatment records from this time revealed ongoing treatment for depression and hypertension. The RO denied all of the Veteran's claims in a September 2001 rating decision. Specifically, the RO denied his claim for a skin rash because the disability resulted from a known clinical diagnosis of intertrigo which neither occurred in nor was caused or aggravated by service. His claims for weakness and lack of energy, memory loss, insomnia, and sore muscles were denied because no evidence was found of chronic, compensable disabilities. His claim for a psychiatric disorder was denied because the disability resulted from a known clinical diagnosis of dysthymic disorder which neither occurred in nor was caused or aggravated by service. His claim for joint aches was denied because his left big toe pain and swelling resulted from a known clinical diagnosis of osteoarthritis which neither occurred in nor was caused or aggravated by service, and there was no additional evidence of chronic, compensable disabilities manifested by joint aches. The Veteran perfected an appeal to the Board and gave testimony at a December 2002 Travel Board hearing. He testified that all of his medical disorders began approximately "a year or two" after returning from Saudi Arabia. In July 2003, the Board remanded the case to the RO so that the Veteran could be afforded an appropriate VA examination to determine the nature and etiology of his claimed fatigue, skin disorder, muscle pain, joint pain, neurologic disorder, neuropsychological disorder, and sleep disturbances, as well as a VA psychiatric examination to determine the nature and etiology of any psychiatric disorder. The Veteran was afforded a VA mental disorders examination in December 2003, at which time he was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and some impairment of his memory for remote and recent events. The examiner opined that the etiology of the major depressive disorder was most probably biological in nature in the form of decreased neurotransmitters, particularly serotonin, epinephrine, and dopamine. Furthermore, the examiner elaborated that the Veteran's symptomatology, to include depression, poor appetite, sleep disturbances, difficulty concentrating, and low energy level, began in 1996. He noted that people with depression also suffer from memory and concentration problems. The Veteran was afforded a VA general examination in January 2004, at which time he was diagnosed with type II diabetes mellitus, bilateral hammer toe deformity and mild hallus valgus with mild functional impairment secondary to the deformity, intermittent pain of the cervical spine with degenerative spondylosis, muscle spasms, and bilateral neuroforaminal encroachment, osteoarthritis of the bilateral knees, and chronic intermittent tinea cruris. Private treatment records dating from 1996 to 2004 were also received during this period, showing treatment for low back and hip pain, high blood pressure, diabetes, and cataracts. Considering all of the aforementioned evidence, the Board denied service connection for the conditions listed on the title page in a July 15, 2005, decision. Citing the December 2003 VA mental disorders examination report, the Board found that the Veteran's fatigue, weakness, memory loss, insomnia, and lack of energy were attributed the Veteran's clinically diagnosed major depressive disorder, which was unrelated to service. With respect to his claims for sore muscles and joint aches, the Board found that these disorders were attributed to the Veteran's clinically diagnosed osteoarthritis, degenerative spondylosis, and arthritis in his bilateral feet and knees, which were unrelated to service. With respect to his claim for a skin condition, the Board found that this disorder was attributed to the Veteran's clinically diagnosed intertrigo and tinea cruris, which were unrelated to service. With respect to his claim for a psychiatric condition, the Board found that this disorder was attributed to the Veteran's clinically diagnosed major depressive disorder, which was unrelated to service. In January 2009, the Veteran filed to reopen his previously- denied service connection claims, which were again denied in an October 2009 rating decision that the Veteran has not yet appealed. The Veteran now alleges CUE in the Board's July 15, 2005, decision, on the basis that his former Veterans' service organization representatives failed to pursue his due process rights. Specifically, he asserts that the documents from the Department of Defense in July 1997 and December 2000 as well as his own lay statements should have provided all the evidence needed to show that he was exposed to sarin and cyclosarin in service and grant his claims. Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7111, a prior Board decision may be reversed or revised on the grounds of CUE. Motions for review of prior Board decisions on the grounds of CUE are adjudicated pursuant to the Board's Rules of Practice at 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-1411. The motion alleging CUE in a prior Board decision must set forth clearly and specifically the alleged CUE, or errors of fact or law in the Board decision, the legal or factual basis for such allegations, and why the result would have been different but for the alleged error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b). The determination of whether a prior Board decision was based on CUE must be based on the record and the law that existed when that decision was made. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(b)(1). CUE is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a); see also Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993). To warrant revision of a Board decision on the grounds of CUE, there must have been an error in the Board's adjudication of the appeal that, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome when it was made. If it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be CUE. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(c); see also Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.) (expressly holding that in order to prove the existence of CUE, a claimant must show that an error occurred that was outcome-determinative, that is, an error that would manifestly have changed the outcome of the prior decision). Examples of situations that are not CUE include a new medical diagnosis that "corrects" an earlier diagnosis considered in a Board decision; the Secretary's failure to fulfill the duty to assist; and disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d). CUE does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e). Here, as a threshold matter, the Board finds that the arguments advanced by the Veteran allege CUE with the requisite specificity. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b). At the time of the July 15, 2005, Board decision, the laws and regulations concerning the issue of entitlement to service connection were essentially the same as now. Service connection could be established for disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a pre-existing injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2004). Regulations also provided that service connection could be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, established that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2004). If the disorder was a specified chronic disease, such as a psychosis, service connection could have been granted if it were manifest to a degree of 10 percent within the presumptive period; the presumptive period for a psychosis was one year from the date of service separation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307 (2004). In addition, because the Veteran served in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, service connection may have also been established under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317. Under that section, service connection was warranted for a Persian Gulf Veteran who exhibited objective indications of a qualifying chronic disability that became manifest during active military, naval or air service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, or to a degree of 10 percent or more not later than not later than December 31, 2006. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(1) (2004). For purposes of 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, there were three types of qualifying chronic disabilities: (1) an undiagnosed illness; (2) a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness; and (3) a diagnosed illness that the Secretary determined in regulations prescribed under 38 U.S.C.A 1117(d) warranted a presumption of service connection. An undiagnosed illness was defined as a condition that by history, physical examination and laboratory tests could not be attributed to a known clinical diagnosis. In the case of claims based on undiagnosed illness under 38 U.S.C.A. § 1117; 38 C.F.R. § 3.117, unlike those for "direct service connection," there was no requirement that there be competent evidence of a nexus between the claimed illness and service. Gutierrez v. Principi, 19 Vet. App. at 8-9. Further, lay persons were competent to report objective signs of illness. Id. To determine whether the undiagnosed illness manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more the condition must have been rated by analogy to a disease or injury in which the functions affected, anatomical location or symptomatology were similar. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(5) (2004). A medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illnesses was one defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms, and specifically included chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome, as well as any other illness that the Secretary determined met the criteria in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section for a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness. A "medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness" meant a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology that was characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and had features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities. Chronic multisymptom illnesses of partially understood etiology and pathophysiology were not considered medically unexplained. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(ii) (2004). There were no diagnosed illnesses determined by the Secretary to warrant a presumption of service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(C) (2004). "Objective indications of chronic disability" included both "signs," in the medical sense of objective evidence perceptible to an examining physician, and other, non-medical indicators that are capable of independent verification. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(3). Signs or symptoms that may have been manifestations of undiagnosed illness or medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness included, but were not limited to, the following: (1) fatigue; (2) signs or symptoms involving skin; (3) headache; (4) muscle pain; (5) joint pain; (6) neurologic signs or symptoms; (7) neuropsychological signs or symptoms; (8) signs or symptoms involving the respiratory system (upper or lower); (9) sleep disturbances; (10) gastrointestinal signs or symptoms; (11) cardiovascular signs or symptoms; (12) abnormal weight loss; and (13) menstrual disorders. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(b) (2004). For purposes of section 3.317, disabilities that existed for six months or more and disabilities that exhibited intermittent episodes of improvement and worsening over a six-month period were considered chronic. The six-month period of chronicity was measured from the earliest date on which the pertinent evidence established that the signs or symptoms of the disability first became manifest. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(4) (2004). After a careful review of the record before VA on July 15, 2005, the Board concludes that that there was a tenable basis for the July 15, 2005, decision. Therefore, because there was no error of fact or law which, when called to the attention of later reviewers, compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would be manifestly different but for such error, the decision was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. In reaching this conclusion, the Board observes that the evidence of record at the time of the July 15, 2005, decision was correctly reported. In addition, the pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions extant at that time were correctly applied. As discussed above, the Veteran's service treatment records were negative for complaints of, treatment for, or diagnoses of weakness or lack of energy, memory loss, insomnia, sore muscles, joint aches, skin symptomatology, or psychiatric symptomatology. There was no evidence of toe pain and numbness; occasional pain in the muscles of his forearms, legs, and neck; short-lived bouts of anxiety and depression; or memory loss until his May 1994 VA Persian Gulf Examination. By the time of the July 15, 2005, Board decision, all of the Veteran's claimed disabilities were attributed to known clinical diagnoses such as major depressive disorder, osteoarthritis, degenerative spondylosis, intertrigo, and tinea cruris. Furthermore, none of these disabilities were shown to have been incurred in or resulting from service. To the contrary, the Veteran testified that they began "a year or two" after service. As such, the medical evidence of record supports the Board's findings that the Veteran's weakness and lack of energy, memory loss, insomnia, sore muscles, joint aches, skin disability, and psychiatric disability are unrelated to service and are not qualifying chronic disabilities under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317. Moreover, there was no medical evidence of record contradicting either the clinical findings discussed above or the Board's conclusion. In addition, notwithstanding the Veteran's contentions to the contrary, the Board cited and applied the pertinent laws and regulations extant at the time. Thus, there was clearly a sound basis for the Board's July 2005 decision, and accordingly, it could not be clearly and unmistakably erroneous. In sum, there is no indication that the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or that the statutory or regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a); see also Russell. As such, the Board's July 15, 2005, decision was not clearly and unmistakably erroneous. ORDER The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for weakness and lack of energy is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for memory loss is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for insomnia is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for sore muscles is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for joint aches is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for a skin disability is denied. The Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the July 15, 2005, Board decision that denied his claim of service connection for a psychiatric disability is denied. ____________________________________________ STEVEN D. REISS Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs