Citation Nr: 1009828 Decision Date: 03/15/10 Archive Date: 03/24/10 DOCKET NO. 02-20 535 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUE Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability (TDIU) for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Kenneth M. Carpenter, Attorney at Law ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD C. Fleming, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from August 1985 to July 1986. He was medically retired from service by reason of an above-the-knee amputation of his left leg resulting from an in-service motorcycle accident. Within a few weeks of his discharge, the Veteran filed a claim for VA benefits, including a claim for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability (TDIU). In August 1986, the RO granted service connection for amputation of the left leg, assigned a 60 percent evaluation therefor, and denied TDIU. The RO notified the Veteran of its decision as to the left leg amputation. However, it did not provide any notice of its determination with respect to TDIU. On March 11, 1998, the Veteran submitted VA Form 21-8940, Veteran's Application for Increased Compensation based on Unemployability. Later that same month, the RO granted TDIU effective from March 11, 1998. The Veteran was notified of the RO's decision, and of his appellate rights, but he did not initiate an appeal within one year. As a result, that decision became final. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302. 20.1103 (2009). In January 2002, the RO informed the Veteran that it had failed to notify him of its August 1986 denial of TDIU. He was invited to file a notice of disagreement (NOD) with that decision, if he so desired. The Veteran filed an NOD in April 2002. A statement of the case (SOC) was issued in October 2002, and an appeal was perfected by virtue of a substantive appeal received in November 2002. In December 2003, the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) remanded the matter to the RO for additional development. In September 2004, while the case was in remand status, the RO determined that it had committed clear and unmistakable error in its March 1998 decision, specifically, that it had failed to recognize that the Veteran had never received notice of the August 1986 denial of TDIU, and that his July 1986 claim for TDIU therefore remained open and pending at the time of the March 1998 decision. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5109A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (2009). Based on that determination, and in light of the evidentiary record, the RO found that January 1, 1996, was the proper effective date for the award of TDIU. In May 2005, the Board remanded the case for additional development. The RO confirmed and continued the prior determination, and the case was returned to the Board in February 2006. In March 2006, the Board denied the appeal. The Board also denied a subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Veteran appealed the Board's March 2006 decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In April 2007, the parties to the appeal filed a joint motion asking the Court to vacate and remand the Board's decision. The Court granted the motion later that same month. The Board remanded the case for further development in August 2007, April 2008, and December 2008. On the first two occasions, the RO confirmed and continued the prior determination. However, pursuant to the Board's December 2008 remand, the RO issued a rating decision and supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) in November 2009 granting the Veteran TDIU for the period from July 4, 1986, through May 18, 1989. In that decision and SSOC, the RO further denied TDIU for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. The case was most recently returned to the Board following the November 2009 SSOC. Thus, the issue on appeal has been re-characterized as entitlement to TDIU for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. For the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995, the Veteran was service connected for left above-the- knee amputation, rated as 60 percent disabling. This was his only service-connected disability. 2. The evidence does not show that the Veteran was unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disability for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for the assignment of a total rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995, have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103, 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.16 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. Duties to Notify and Assist At the outset, the Board notes that during the pendency of the Veteran's appeal, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was enacted in November 2000. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, and 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009). To implement the provisions of the law, VA promulgated regulations codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). The VCAA and its implementing regulations include, upon the submission of a substantially complete application for benefits, an enhanced duty on the part of VA to notify a claimant of the information and evidence needed to substantiate a claim, as well as the duty to notify the claimant of what evidence will be obtained by whom. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). In addition, they define the obligation of VA with respect to its duty to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The VCAA is applicable to all claims filed on or after the date of enactment, November 9, 2000, or filed before the date of enactment and not yet final as of that date. In this case, the Veteran's claim was not final as of the date of the VCAA's enactment and has remained pending since the Veteran's initial filing in July 1986. (Although the 1998 decision might have reasonably been construed as a final decision with respect to the 1986 claim, the RO concluded that the 1998 decision was not final when it invited the Veteran to file an NOD with respect to the August 1986 denial.) The provisions of the VCAA and the implementing regulations are accordingly applicable. See Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 280 (2001) (the Board must make a determination as to the applicability of the various provisions of the VCAA to a particular claim). In this case, the Board finds that all notification and development action needed to render a decision on the claim on appeal has been accomplished. Through March 2004 and July 2005 notice letters, the RO notified the Veteran of the information and evidence needed to substantiate his claim for TDIU. In a March 2006 notice letter, the RO also provided the general criteria for assigning effective dates. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006), aff'd, Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board also finds that the March 2004 and July 2005 notice letters satisfy the statutory and regulatory requirement that VA notify a claimant which evidence, if any, will be obtained by the claimant and which evidence, if any, will be retrieved by VA. See Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002) (addressing the duties imposed by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)). In the letters, the RO notified the Veteran that VA was responsible for obtaining relevant records from any Federal agency and that VA would make reasonable efforts to obtain relevant records not held by a Federal agency, such as from a state, private treatment provider, or an employer. Additionally, the notice letters invited the Veteran to submit evidence, statements, and legal opinion to support his claim. Although the totality of the required notice was not provided until after his claim was initially adjudicated, the Veteran's claim was subsequently re-adjudicated in December 2007, July 2008, and November 2009 supplemental statements of the case, thereby correcting any defect in the timing of the notice. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006). No further corrective action is necessary. The Board thus finds that "the appellant [was] provided the content-complying notice to which he [was] entitled." Pelegrini, 18 Vet. App. at 122. Nothing about the evidence or any response to the RO's notification suggests that the case must be re-adjudicated ab initio to satisfy the requirements of the VCAA. The Board also points out that there is no indication that any additional action is needed to comply with the duty to assist in connection with the claim on appeal. Records of the Veteran's ongoing post-service treatment with Army treatment providers have been associated with the claims file and were reviewed by both the RO and the Board in connection with the Veteran's claim, as was evidence concerning the Veteran's post-service employment history. In addition, the Veteran was provided VA medical examinations in May 2008 and May 2009; reports of those examinations are of record. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). To that end, when VA undertakes to provide a VA examination or obtain a VA opinion, it must ensure that the examination or opinion is adequate. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 312 (2007). As noted below, the Board finds that the May 2009 VA opinion obtained in this case is adequate, as it is predicated on consideration of the medical and employment records in the Veteran's claims file. It considers all of the pertinent evidence of record, to include the Veteran's treatment records and the statements of the Veteran, and provides a complete rationale for the opinion stated, relying on and citing to the records reviewed. (The May 2009 VA opinion was reviewed and electronically signed by a physician. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 MR, Part III, Subpart iv, Ch. 3, § D, 18(a) (2007).) Neither the Veteran nor his representative has otherwise alleged that there are any outstanding medical records probative of his claim that need to be obtained. Additionally, the Veteran and his representative have both submitted written argument. Under these circumstances, the Board finds that VA has complied with all duties to notify and assist required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159. II. Analysis The Veteran has alleged that his service-connected above-the- knee amputation of the left leg rendered him unable to maintain gainful employment for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995, during which time his service- connected disability was rated as 60 percent disabling. Specifically, he contends that although he was employed for portions of the time period in question, he was unable to maintain consistent, full employment that was more than marginal due to his service-connected disability. In that connection, the Board notes that total disability is considered to exist when there is any impairment that is sufficient to render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.340(a)(1) (2009). Total ratings are authorized for any disability or combination of disabilities for which the VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities, 38 C.F.R. Part 4, prescribes a 100 percent evaluation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.340(a)(2) (2009). The law also provides that a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability may be assigned where the Veteran is rated at 60 percent or more for a single service-connected disability, or rated at 70 percent for two or more service-connected disabilities and at least one disability is rated at least at 40 percent, and when the disabled person is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16(a) (2009). For the purpose of determining whether there is a single service-connected disability rated as 60 percent, disabilities of a common etiology or a single accident are considered as one disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). In addition, TDIU may be awarded on an extra-schedular basis if a Veteran fails to meet the applicable percentage standards enunciated in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), but is still unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation by reason of service-connected disabilities. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b). Marginal employment shall not be considered substantially gainful employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). Moreover, while the term "substantially gainful occupation" is not defined by regulation, the Court has interpreted the term, as used in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), as referring "at a minimum, the ability to earn a living wage." Bowling v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 1, 7 (2001) (citing Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 356, 358 (1991)). Additionally, a claimant is not engaged in a substantially gainful occupation if his annual income does not exceed the amount established by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, as the poverty threshold for one person. Id. Marginal employment may also be held to exist, on a facts-found basis (including but not limited to employment in a protected environment such as a family business or sheltered workshop), when earned annual income exceeds the poverty threshold. Consideration shall be given in all claims to the nature of the employment and the reason for termination. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2009). A determination whether a person is capable of engaging in a substantially gainful occupation must consider both that person's abilities and his employment history. See Faust v. West, 13 Vet. App. 342, 355 (2000), citing Gleicher v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 26, 28 (1991). Factors to be considered are the Veteran's education and employment history and loss of work-related functions due to pain. Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326, 330, 332 (1991). Individual unemployability must be determined without regard to any non- service-connected disabilities or the Veteran's advancing age. 38 C.F.R. § 3.341(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.19 (2009) (age may not be a factor in evaluating service-connected disability or unemployability); Van Hoose v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 361, 363 (1993). The fact that a claimant is unemployed or has difficulty obtaining employment is not enough. The question is whether the Veteran is capable of performing the physical and mental acts required by employment, not whether the Veteran can find employment. See Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363. It is also the policy of VA, however, that all Veterans who are unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation by reason of service-connected disabilities shall be rated totally disabled. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b). Where the Veteran fails to meet the applicable percentage standards enunciated in 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), an extra-schedular rating is for consideration where the Veteran is unemployable due to service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b); see also Fanning v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 225 (1993). Thus, the Board must evaluate whether there are circumstances in the Veteran's case, apart from any non-service-connected conditions and advancing age, which would justify a total rating based on unemployability. Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363; see also Hodges v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 375 (1993); Blackburn v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 395 (1993). At the outset, the Board acknowledges that upon being service connected for left above-the-knee amputation in August 1986, the Veteran's disability rating did meet the percentage requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) because he had at least one disability rated 60 percent disabling. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2009). Relevant evidence consists of records of the Veteran's ongoing post-service treatment with Army treatment providers, as well as evidence concerning the Veteran's post-service employment history and vocational rehabilitation through VA. In addition, the Veteran was provided VA medical examinations in May 2008 and May 2009. Review of the claims file reflects that the Veteran's service treatment records include the findings of a physical evaluation board dated in May 1986, which reflect that the Veteran was involved in a motorcycle accident in February 1986 resulting in a left above-the-knee amputation for which he was medically discharged from service. A claim was received from the Veteran in July 1986 requesting service connection for left leg amputation. He also indicated at that time that because of unemployability, he wished to be considered for a 100 percent disability rating. By rating action dated in August 1986, service connection was established for left above-the-knee amputation, rated 60 percent disabling. The Veteran was afforded a VA psychiatric evaluation in August 1987 for purposes not pertinent to this appeal, in which his examiner noted that the Veteran had been fitted with a prosthesis and walked fairly well with it. The examiner related that the Veteran was a high school graduate, but that the only work available was physical labor that he felt was beyond his capabilities, and that he had not "gotten himself organized to the point of going to school and learning any skilled occupation." The examiner further noted that the Veteran wanted to find work within his physical limitations. The examiner stated that the Veteran appeared to erect barriers to obtaining employment in that he complained that even if he had a job, he did not have a way to get to it because he had no reliable transportation and could not afford to get any. It was noted that he had requested VA vocational rehabilitation services but had had no response. The examiner opined that it would be more appropriate to provide the Veteran with educational or vocational training rather than enforcing his dependency by granting additional compensation. The claims folder contains VA vocational rehabilitation records showing that the Veteran applied for vocational rehabilitation services in April 1987. It was noted that he had not worked since leaving service and had not been able to find civilian employment with the amputation. He indicated in an October 1987 vocational counseling session that he was looking into the possibility of trying to become trained in a job that would prepare him to become employable as a consumer electronics technician/mechanic. Following completion of the initial evaluation, the Veteran was found to have physical limitations imposed by his service-connected disability that materially contributed to an employment handicap and placed him at a competitive disadvantage in obtaining, retaining, or maintaining employment consistent with his vocational interests, aptitudes, and abilities. The Veteran's vocational counselor noted in the October 1987 counseling report that the Veteran had partial limitations for prolonged lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling, which were all limited to light activity. It was reported that he could not engage in prolonged standing, walking, and treading. The vocational counselor further stated in the report that the Veteran's limitations extended to working in environments where there was extreme cold, vibration, cluttered and slippery floors, high places, and fast-paced work. He further noted that while limited by his disabilities, the Veteran counted as strengths his youth, positive attitude, and a willingness to work, as well as his loyalty and honesty. The vocational rehabilitation status records reflect that the Veteran began a vocational technical training program in October 1987 to train to become a certified electronics technician. He completed the training course in May 1989 and immediately secured employment repairing home and automobile stereos, video recorders, citizen band radios and televisions. A report dated in August 1989 indicated that he liked his job and that everything was going well. In April 1990, the Veteran called to report that he had been fired as an electronics repairman as the result of a personal disagreement with his supervisor. In June 1990, the Veteran reported that he had no major problems with his health. In August 1991, the Veteran reported to his case manager that he had found full-time employment as an electronics technician in October 1990, reporting that he "loves the work" and that his "disabilities do not interfer[e] with his job." His case manager noted that the Veteran was working on commission and was "considered a full[-]time employee." He observed that the position appeared to be "permanent ... for as long as [the Veteran] wants it" and concluded that the Veteran's vocational rehabilitation had been successful. In an application for increased compensation based on unemployability received in March 1998, the Veteran listed a number of jobs he had held between 1988 and 1995, to include work in sales and service, electronics repair, changing flat tires, and as a minor mechanic. He related that he last worked on a full-time basis in 1991 and had become too disabled to work in 1992. Attached to that application was a statement from Bob's Tires, indicating that the Veteran was employed at that business from August 1993 to August 1994, working 45 hours weekly and earning $600 monthly. The Veteran's supervisor, who completed the form, stated that the Veteran performed office work and "changed flats" and that he made concessions for the Veteran's health problems related to his disability. The supervisor further indicated that the Veteran stopped working due to being unable to fulfill the time requirements and because the work was "physically painful." In a similar application submitted in April 2006, the Veteran contended that he worked from 1989 to the first part of 1990 at an electronics store for two to three days weekly and at a different electronics store for a brief period in 1990 before opening his own repair shop, which he operated from 1990 to 1992. He further indicated having worked for unspecified periods of time at two different automotive repair businesses in 1992 and 1993. In an attached affidavit, the Veteran stated that the electronics store jobs were "consignment job[s]" and that he was able to work at them only part time due to his inability to perform the heavy lifting required. He further claimed that he worked at each automotive repair business for only one month and worked only when he "felt up to it." He has further submitted records from the Social Security Administration (SSA) documenting his income in 1989 as $5,572 and showing no documented income from 1990 through 1995. Pursuant to Board remand of May 2005, outpatient records from Reynolds Army Community Hospital dating from 1988 were received showing that the Veteran had been treated for a variety of complaints, injuries and disorders, but was not seen for any symptoms related to left leg amputation until February 2001. Records from the Oklahoma City VA Medical Center (VAMC) further reflect no treatment for complaints of problems with the Veteran's prosthesis during the relevant time period; he was scheduled for an appointment in 2004 for replacement of his prosthesis, but he failed to report for the appointment and did not respond to attempts to contact him via phone or mail. His VA treatment provider noted in May 2004 that there was "no reason why [the Veteran] should not be ambulatory in [a] new prosthesis." Report of the Veteran's May 2008 VA examination reflects that the Veteran reported earning a degree in electronic technology in 1987 and working as an electronics repairman for about five months before being fired "because he could not lift any heavy equipment[]." The Veteran then reported that he worked for his father in a tire shop for only one month until he was fired because his father "did not want to see him in pain." The Veteran stated that he had not worked since that time. He claimed to be having problems with his prosthesis and with depression and anxiety. The Veteran stated that he lives "in the country," where it is difficult to find work, but "he does not want to try anywhere else for a new job." The Veteran further stated that although his left leg amputation was interfering with his ability to work, he also had problems with anxiety, which made him uncomfortable around others. Report of the May 2009 examination reflects that the Veteran did not report for the examination but that the examiner reviewed the Veteran's claims file, to include documentation of his VA vocational rehabilitation, and considered both his employment and medical history. The examiner noted that there was "no documentation of why there are gaps" in the Veteran's employment history aside from the notation in his vocational rehabilitation file that he was fired in April 1990 due to a personal conflict with his employer. The examiner further noted that, although the Veteran's supervisor at Bob's Tires indicated that the Veteran left that job because it was "physically painful," medical records from 1994 document that the Veteran was ambulating independently with the aid of a prosthesis and was not experiencing any problems. The examiner further noted that medical records from 1988 to 1996 document no problems relating to the Veteran's amputation or his prosthesis. The examiner opined that, based on the vocational training and rehabilitation the Veteran had received, it was not at least as likely as not that he was unable to maintain gainful employment during the period in question. In her reasoning, the examiner pointed out that the Veteran had in fact been able to obtain employment in his field of specialization-- electronics repair, and had stated that he enjoyed the work. The examiner noted that the Veteran was limited in his ability to perform heavy lifting and prolonged standing and walking, but concluded that he was nevertheless able to engage in substantially gainful work that did not require such movements based on his training. The Board observes, as noted above, that upon being service connected for left above-the-knee amputation in August 1986, the Veteran's disability rating did meet the percentage requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) because he had at least one disability rated 60 percent disabling. The Board points out, however, that the percentage requirements only constitute the threshold criteria for assigning individual unemployability. The primary question for consideration is whether the Veteran's service-connected disability was sufficient in and of itself to render the Veteran unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment. After careful review of the evidence of record and the contentions advanced by the Veteran and on his behalf, the Board finds that a basis for a favorable decision is not demonstrated. In that connection, the Board has considered the pertinent medical evidence and finds that it does not show that the Veteran's service-connected disability precluded him from securing or following substantially gainful employment. Significantly, when evaluated by the VA psychiatrist in August 1987, the Veteran was observed to maneuver fairly well with his prosthesis; that psychiatrist specifically recommended that he pursue some type of training or education rather than be awarded additional disability. VA vocational rehabilitation records dating from October 1987 show that although the Veteran had a substantial handicap, had certainly been adversely affected by the left leg amputation, and had significant limitations as a result thereof, no untoward clinical symptoms attributable to the service- connected disability were reported. In addition, the Board looks in particular at records from the Reynolds Army Community Hospital dating from 1988 showing that the Veteran was treated for a variety of complaints, injuries and disorders, but was not seen for any symptoms related to left leg amputation until February 2001. Similarly, although outside the date range in question here, VAMC records show that the Veteran was treated at the Oklahoma City VAMC on multiple occasions from 1998 to the present, but did not seek any medical attention for his prosthesis until 2004, at which time he failed to report to a requested appointment for a fitting for a new prosthesis. At that time, the Veteran's VA treatment provider opined that there was no evidence that the Veteran would have any difficulty ambulating with a new prosthesis. Furthermore, the Board finds persuasive the absence of medical evidence to support the Veteran's contention that his service-connected disability rendered him unable to maintain gainful employment during the period in question. In finding that the Veteran's service-connected disability did not render him unemployable from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995, the May 2009 VA examiner points to the lack of any evidence of complaints of or treatment for problems with his prosthesis or otherwise with his disability during the time frame at issue. Further, although the Veteran sought treatment for a multitude of complaints-from hepatitis to a right wrist sprain-at the Columbia Army Hospital during the relevant years, none of those treatment records reflects any complaints with or treatment for problems with his prosthesis or otherwise with his service-connected disability. The Veteran has presented no medical documentation to the contrary, and the May 2009 VA examiner opined specifically, after reviewing the Veteran's medical records, that the medical evidence did not suggest that he was unable to work due to his service-connected disability. The Veteran has submitted no medical evidence to the contrary. There is simply no medical evidence in the record supporting a finding that the Veteran's service-connected disability rendered him unemployable at any time from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. Regarding the question of whether the employment the Veteran held during the time period in question-May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995-was substantially gainful or merely marginal, the Board notes again that the fact that a Veteran may be unemployed or has difficulty obtaining employment is not determinative. The ultimate question is whether the Veteran, because of service-connected disability, is incapable of performing the physical and mental acts required by employment, not whether he can find employment. Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363. Upon review of the evidence, the Board finds that the evidence reflects that the Veteran successfully attended and completed a training course and became fully employed thereafter. He has held a number of other jobs over the years in question, and he specifically reported to his VA vocational rehabilitation case manager in August 1991 that he "love[d] his work" and that his disability was not in any way interfering with his work. While loss of the extremity created certain limitations as noted by those who made vocational assessments, there is no indication that the Veteran was in fact precluded from gainful employment consistent with his background and physical limitations due to the amputation. The Board thus finds, based on the evidence outlined above, that unemployability due to service- connected disability was not demonstrated for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran and his representative have argued that despite holding several jobs over the course of the relevant time period, the Veteran was still unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment because he was only able to work as his disability allows, and his income was below the poverty threshold as set by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. The Veteran and his representative have further argued that the fact that the Veteran was earning income below the poverty threshold means that his employment was necessarily marginal under Moore, supra, and therefore was the functional equivalent of unemployability, warranting the award of TDIU. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran's sole income over the relevant time frame, as identified by the SSA, was $5,572 in 1989-below the poverty threshold of $6,451 as set by the Census Bureau for 1989. The Board further acknowledges that the company for which the Veteran worked in 1993 and 1994 was owned by a relative, rendering it a "family business." See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). However, the Board finds that the Veteran's employment or lack thereof during the relevant time period is not determinative, especially in light of significant inconsistencies in the Veteran's reported employment history. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran's SSA records indicate no income for the years 1990 through 1995. However, the Veteran himself reported that he worked several jobs during those years, including at Bob's Tires, from which he has stated that he worked, variously, for one month in the "winter of 1993" or for one year, from August 1993 to August 1994. The fact that the Veteran was actually employed for more than a year at Bob's Tires is supported by the employment statement submitted by the Veteran's supervisor at that business, who stated that the Veteran worked 45 hours weekly from August 1993 to August 1994, earning $600 monthly and performing both manual labor and office work. The Board, as noted above, acknowledges that as the Veteran was related to his employer at Bob's Tires, this employment might be considered "marginal" under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). However, the salient point to be made is that the evidence does not show that his service-connected disability prevented him from obtaining more than marginal work. That he engaged in what might be considered marginal work, or for that matter no work at all, does not mean that he could not have done more. It is indeed evidence to be considered, but is not determinative. It should be noted that the Veteran reported to his VA vocational rehabilitation case manager in August 1991 that he was employed full time and "love[d]" his job, which he specifically stated was not impeded by his disability. The Board further notes that the Veteran reported at his May 2008 VA examination that he has not worked since 1987-1988. This statement is clearly contradicted by evidence in the record both from the Veteran's VA case manager and from the Veteran's own supervisor at Bob's Tires. The Veteran himself also claimed on his March 1998 benefit application that he became too disabled to work not in 1988 but in 1992; he identified on that application several jobs that he held during the time period in question. The Veteran further stated at his May 2008 VA examination that he was unwilling to look for work anywhere outside of the immediate, rural area in which he lived. In any event, the Board again emphasizes that the Court has established that, in a claim for TDIU, the ultimate question is whether a Veteran, because of service-connected disability, is incapable of performing the physical and mental acts required by employment, not whether he can find employment. Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363. In this case, given the inconsistencies discussed above as well as the medical evidence and the conclusions of the May 2009 VA examiner, which conclusions are not contradicted by any other medical evidence, the Board concludes that the Veteran was not unemployable due to service-connected disability during the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. The Board has considered the Veteran's contention that his service-connected disability rendered him unable to maintain substantially gainful employment for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. The Veteran, however, has not demonstrated that he has any medical expertise or training in vocational matters necessary to render such an opinion. The Board notes that although the Veteran is competent to report his employment history and symptoms of his service-connected disability, he does not have expertise necessary to provide a competent opinion regarding unemployability. See Bostain, 11 Vet. App. at 127, citing Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). (While the Veteran is competent to say when he was employed and when any employment was terminated, he has provided inconsistent reports as to when and for how long he was employed during the time frame at issue here.) As discussed above, the Board finds the information the Veteran provided on his March 1998 application for benefits, as well as statements made to his VA vocational rehabilitation case manager and to his October 1987 and May 2008 VA examiners, to be more accurate because they were contrary to his interest relative to his claim for monetary benefits, and therefore are likely more reliable. Specifically, the Board notes that the Veteran reported on the March 1998 application that he had worked at a variety of jobs from 1989 though 1995, including one he reportedly lost due to a personal conflict, not his disability. Further, the Veteran reported to his case manager in August 1991 that he was employed full time and that he loved his job, which he stated was not at all impeded by his service-connected disability. Moreover, when examined by VA in May 2008, the Veteran said that to the extent he was unemployed during the relevant time period, that unemployment was due not solely to his service-connected disability but also to his anxiety about being around other people. The Veteran further stated at that time that he lived out in the country where work of any kind was scarce but that he was unwilling to look elsewhere for employment. The Board also notes that the May 2009 VA examiner took the Veteran's history into account and nevertheless concluded that the Veteran was not unemployable due to service-connected disability during the time period in question. Here, for the reasons expressed above, the Board concludes that the evidence does not establish that the Veteran's above-the-knee amputation of the left leg, without consideration of any other, non-service-connected disability, rendered the Veteran unemployable for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995. The Board acknowledges that there is evidence that the Veteran's service-connected disability caused pain and discomfort. However, the effects of that disability were contemplated in the schedular rating assigned during the period in question. The record simply does not show that the Veteran was unable to follow substantially gainful employment solely as a result of his above-the-knee amputation of the left leg. In this case, the evidence indicates that the Veteran was physically able to follow substantially gainful employment during the time period in question, given both the Veteran's employment history during that timeframe and the May 2009 VA examiner's findings that the Veteran's disability did not preclude him from working. Therefore, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and a TDIU rating must be denied. The Board has considered the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine, but finds that the record does not provide even an approximate balance of negative and positive evidence on the merits. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Therefore, on the basis of the above analysis, and after consideration of all the evidence, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim. ORDER Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disability for the period from May 19, 1989, through December 31, 1995, is denied. ________________________________ MARK F. HALSEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs