Citation Nr: 1010110 Decision Date: 03/17/10 Archive Date: 03/24/10 DOCKET NO. 08-00 435 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. 3. Entitlement to service connection for back disorder. 4. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESSES AT HEARING ON APPEAL The appellant and his brother ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD D. M. Casula, Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant had active service from September 9, 1968, to October 30, 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a May 2007 rating decision of the above Regional Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) which found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD. This matter further comes before the Board from a March 2008 rating decision in which the RO denied service connection for bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, and a back condition. In January 2010, the appellant and his brother testified at a videoconference hearing at the RO, before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. With regard to the claim to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD, before the Board may reopen a previously denied claim, it must conduct an independent review of the evidence to determine whether new and material evidence has been presented or secured sufficient to reopen a prior final decision. See Barnett v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 1 (1995); 83 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Furthermore, if the Board finds that new and material evidence has not been submitted, it is unlawful for the Board to reopen the claim. See McGinnis v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 239, 244 (1993). The issue of service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. VA will notify the appellant if additional action is required on his part. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The competent and probative medical evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the appellant's bilateral hearing loss is related to his active military service. 2. The competent and probative medical evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the appellant's tinnitus is related to active service. 3. The competent and probative medical evidence of record preponderates against a finding that the appellant's back condition is related to active service. 4. By February 2004 rating decision, the RO found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, noting that the evidence did not show an in-service stressor or that the appellant's PTSD was incurred in or aggravated by service. The appellant was notified of the denial and his appellate rights and initiated, but did not perfect, an appeal to the February 2004 RO rating decision, and it became final. It is the last final disallowance of the claim for service connection for PTSD. 5. Evidence received subsequent to the final February 2004 RO rating decision, regarding the claim for service connection for PTSD, was not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim, and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bilateral hearing loss was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.385 (2009). 2. Tinnitus was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 3. A back condition was not incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). 4. The February 2004 RO rating decision which found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD is the last final disallowance of that claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 3.160(d) (2009). 5. Evidence received since the February 2004 RO rating decision is new and material, and the appellant's claim for service connection for PTSD may be reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Board has thoroughly reviewed all the evidence in the appellant's claims folder. Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no need to discuss, in detail, the extensive evidence submitted by the appellant or on his behalf. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the Board must review the entire record, but does not have to discuss each piece of evidence). The analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claims. The appellant must not assume that the Board has overlooked pieces of evidence that are not explicitly discussed herein. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000) (the law requires only that the Board address its reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the claimant). I. Duty to Notify and Assist The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) enhanced VA's duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits, as codified in pertinent part at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.326(a). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his representative of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), as amended, 73 Fed. Reg. 23,353 (April 30, 2008). This notice must be provided prior to an initial decision on a claim by the RO. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). The VCAA notice requirements apply to all five elements of a service connection claim: (1) veteran status; (2) existence of disability; (3) connection between service and the disability; (4) degree of disability; and (5) effective date of benefits where a claim is granted. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 484 (2006). If complete notice is not provided until after the initial adjudication, such a timing error can be cured by subsequent legally adequate VCAA notice, followed by readjudication of the claim, as in a Statement of the Case (SOC) or Supplemental SOC (SSOC). Moreover, where there is an uncured timing defect in the notice, subsequent action by the RO which provides the claimant a meaningful opportunity to participate in the processing of the claim can prevent any such defect from being prejudicial. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) previously held that any error in VCAA notice should be presumed prejudicial, and that VA must bear the burden of proving that such an error did not cause harm. Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881 (2007). However, the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court) has recently reversed that decision, finding it unlawful in light of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7261(b)(2), which provides that, in conducting review of a decision of the Board, a court shall take due account of the rule of prejudicial error. The Supreme Court in essence held that - except for cases in which VA has failed to meet the first requirement of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) by not informing the claimant of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim - the burden of proving harmful error must rest with the party raising the issue, the Federal Circuit's presumption of prejudicial error imposed an unreasonable evidentiary burden upon VA and encouraged abuse of the judicial process, and determinations on the issue of harmless error should be made on a case-by-case basis. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009). In this case, the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied by way of letters sent to the appellant in March 2001, July 2003, November 2006, and January 2008, and the November 2006 letter and the January 2008 letter were both sent prior to the initial RO decisions in this matter. These letter informed the appellant of what evidence was required to substantiate the claims and of his and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The Board also notes that the RO sent multiple letters to the appellant, including in November 2006, January 2008, and December 2009, advising him of how disability ratings and effective dates are assigned. See Dingess v. Nicholson, supra. Moreover, he has not demonstrated any error in VCAA notice, and therefore the presumption of prejudicial error as to such notice does not arise in this case. See Sanders v. Nicholson, supra. Thus, the Board concludes that all required notice has been given to the appellant. The Board notes that the appellant was not scheduled for any VA examinations to determine whether he has bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, or a back condition, that may be related to service. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4), VA will provide a medical examination or obtain a medical opinion based upon a review of the evidence of record if VA determines it is necessary to decide the claim. A medical examination or medical opinion is necessary if the information and evidence of record does not contain sufficient competent medical evidence to decide the claim but (1) contains competent lay or medical evidence of a current diagnosed disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of disability; (2) establishes that the veteran suffered an event, injury, or disease in service; and (3) indicates that the claimed disability or symptoms may be associated with the established event, injury, or disease in service. The third part could be satisfied by competent evidence showing post- service treatment for a condition or other possible association with service. As delineated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4), a VA examination to address the question of etiology as related to service is required when the claimant presents a claim for service connection in which there was a pertinent event, injury, or disease in service; there is evidence of current disability; the medical evidence of record does not contain sufficient competent medical evidence to decide the claim; and the claimant indicates that the claimed disability or symptoms may be associated with service. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). With regard to the claims for service connection for bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, and a back condition, there is arguable competent medical evidence of current hearing loss, tinnitus, and a back condition. There is, however, nothing in the service treatment records (STRs) showing any report of or finding of hearing loss, tinnitus, or a back condition or injury. Moreover, there no competent evidence of record (other than the appellant's lay assertions) showing that he has bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, or a back disability that might be related to service. Although he has contended that his back condition, bilateral hearing loss, and tinnitus were incurred in service, his lay statements alone are not competent evidence to support a finding on a medical question (such as diagnosis or etiology) requiring special experience or special knowledge. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Thus, the Board concludes that VA examinations are not necessary regarding the claims for service connection for bilateral hearing loss, tinnitus, and a back condition. The Board also notes that in the case of Kent v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 1 (2006), the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) held that VA must notify a claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to reopen the claim and VA must notify the claimant of the evidence and information that is necessary to establish his entitlement to the underlying claim for the benefit sought by the claimant. The VCAA requires, in the context of a claim to reopen, the Secretary to look at the bases for the denial in the prior decision and to respond with a notice letter that describes what evidence would be necessary to substantiate that element or elements required to establish the claim that were found insufficient in the previous denial. In this case, the appellant has been informed of the evidence necessary to establish his eligibility for VA benefits and of the necessity of presenting new and material evidence along with that definition. The Board concludes that the November 2006 letter received by the appellant adequately complied with the VCAA and subsequent interpretive authority, and that he has not been prejudiced by the notice and assistance provided. The Board also finds VA has satisfied its duty to assist the appellant in the development of the claim. The RO has obtained the appellant's VA and private treatment records. As noted above, the appellant did not undergo examinations related to his service connection claims. It appears that all obtainable evidence identified by the appellant relative to his claims has been obtained and associated with the claims file, and that neither he nor his representative has identified any other pertinent evidence, not already of record, which would need to be obtained for a fair disposition of this appeal. It is therefore the Board's conclusion that no further notice or assistance to the appellant is required to fulfill VA's duty to assist him with these claims. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, supra. Accordingly, the Board finds that VA has satisfied its duty to assist the appellant in apprising him as to the evidence needed, and in obtaining evidence pertinent to his claim under the VCAA. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served in remanding this matter for yet more development. Such a remand would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA, with no additional benefit flowing to the appellant. The Court has held that such remands are to be avoided. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). II. Service connection Claims Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for disease that is diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). The Court has held that, in order to prevail on the issue of service connection, there must be: (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disease or injury. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999). Medical evidence is generally required to establish a medical diagnosis or to address questions of medical causation; lay assertions of medical status do not constitute competent medical evidence for these purposes. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992). However, lay statements may serve to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (addressing lay evidence as potentially competent to support presence of disability even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence). The Board initially notes that the appellant in this matter did not serve ninety days or more of active service, and, therefore, he is not entitled to the presumptive provisions which provide that if certain chronic diseases, such as organic diseases of the nervous system (e.g., sensorineural hearing loss) or arthritis, become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation from such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). 1. Bilateral Hearing Loss and Tinnitus The appellant essentially contends that he was physically and sexually assaulted in service, and that during that incident he sustained injuries which caused his bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus. He claims he has had bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus since that incident in service in 1968. The Board notes that in his December 2007 informal claim, the appellant requested entitlement to service connection for "bilateral hearing loss and bilateral tinnitus secondary to acoustic trauma"; however, he later testified that his bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus resulted from the assault in service. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 hertz (Hz) is 40 decibels or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies at 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hz are 26 decibels or greater; or when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. Even if disabling hearing loss is not demonstrated at separation, a veteran may establish service connection for a current hearing disability by submitting evidence that a current disability is causally related to service. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155 (1993). The appellant's STRs are negative for a report of or finding of hearing loss or tinnitus. At enlistment, on September 9, 1968, audiometric testing showed pure tone thresholds for the right ear, in decibels, at 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000 Hertz as follows: 0, 0, 0, and 20, and for the left ear, as follows: 0, 0, 10, and 0. Prior to his discharge, in conjunction with a medical board evaluation on September 20, 1968, audiometric testing showed pure tone thresholds for the right ear, in decibels, at 500, 1000, 2000, and 4000 Hertz as follows: 5, 5, 5, and 30, and for the left ear, as follows: 0, 0, 50, and 30. Thus, the in-service audiometric testing showed basically normal hearing. Post-service, the appellant has submitted a private audiological evaluation conducted in December 2007, which appears to show hearing loss disability on the left. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. On the right, however, it was noted that there was no response with masking on the right side and that the appellant reported that the noise in his head was all the time and never stopped. There is arguably evidence of a current left ear hearing loss disability, but not a right ear hearing loss disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385. The threshold requirement for service connection to be granted is competent medical evidence of the current existence of the claimed disorder. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). As the appellant does not have right ear hearing loss disability, as defined by regulation, service connection cannot be granted for that claimed disability. Id. With regard to tinnitus, the appellant contends he has had ringing in his ears since service. The Board notes that he is competent to testify as to observable symptoms such as ringing in his ears, and tinnitus is the type of disorder associated with symptoms capable of lay observation. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 403 (1995)). What is missing from the record is competent evidence showing that the appellant's left ear hearing loss and/or tinnitus is causally related to service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. While the appellant submitted private audiometric testing, he has not submitted any competent medical opinions to support a link between left ear hearing loss or tinnitus and military service. And, as explained above, the Board has determined that a VA examination is not necessary in order to decide these claims. The Board recognizes that the appellant has sincerely contended that he has current bilateral hearing loss and tinnitus that are related to service. As noted above, lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation, but the Board does not believe that the etiology of hearing loss or the etiology of tinnitus are subject to lay diagnosis. Jandreau, supra. That is to say, the Board finds no basis for concluding that a lay person would be capable of discerning whether current hearing loss disability or tinnitus had an onset in service, in the absence of specialized training, and the appellant has not established any specialized training for such qualifications. The preponderance of the evidence is therefore against the appellant's claims of service connection for bilateral hearing loss and for tinnitus. The benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claims must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). 2. Back Condition The appellant essentially contends that he was physically and sexually assaulted in service, that during that incident he sustained a back injury, and that he has had back problems since that incident in service in 1968. A review of the appellant's STRs shows no report of or finding of a back injury or back problems. Prior to service discharge in October 1968, the appellant underwent a medical board examination on September 20, 1968, which revealed his spine to be clinically normal. Post-service, a September 2005 VA treatment record showed that the appellant had a history of degenerative joint disease, osteoarthritis, and chronic low back pain. The diagnoses included degenerative joint disease and chronic low back pain. Subsequent VA treatment records continue to show that he was treated for his complaints of chronic low back pain. He testified in January 2010 that he had ruptured multiple disks in his back, which were degenerating now, and that he had been told by a doctor that it looked like he had been beat. After reviewing the evidence of record, the Board finds that what is missing in this case is competent medical evidence of a link between a current back disability (i.e., degenerative joint disease, osteoarthritis) and service. In the present case, the appellant has not submitted or identified any medical opinion or other medical evidence regarding an etiological relationship to service that supports his claim. Moreover, as more fully explained above, the Board has concluded that obtaining a VA examination is not necessary to decide this claim. As noted above, the appellant's lay statements may be competent to support a claim for service connection by supporting the occurrence of lay-observable events or the presence of disability or symptoms of disability subject to lay observation. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), 3.159(a); Jandreau, supra; Buchanan, supra. The appellant is certainly competent to report his back was hurt during service and that he has had back pain since then. However, the Board does not believe that a back disability, such as degenerative joint disease or osteoarthritis, as contrasted with back pain, is subject to lay diagnosis. That is to say, the Board finds no basis for concluding that a lay person would be capable of discerning whether he had a current back disability, in the absence of specialized training. The appellant in this case has not established any specialized training for such qualifications. With consideration of the evidence of record, the length of time following service prior to a recorded diagnosis of a back disability, and the absence of any medical opinion suggesting a causal link between a current back disability and service, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim of service connection for a back condition. Maxson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 453 (1999), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (service incurrence may be rebutted by the absence of medical treatment for the claimed condition for many years after service). The benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply, and the claim for service connection for a back condition must be denied. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b); Gilbert, supra. III. New and Material Evidence To reopen a claim following a final decision, the appellant must submit new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108; 38 C.F.R. § 3.156. Amendments to §3.156, changing the standard for finding new and material evidence, are applicable in this case, because the appellant's claim to reopen was filed after August 29, 2001, the effective date of the amendment. 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620, 45,629 (Aug. 29, 2001). New evidence means existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decisionmakers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened, and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a). By June 2001 rating decision, the RO, in pertinent part, denied service connection for PTSD, essentially based on findings that there was no showing of a confirmed diagnosis of PTSD nor was there any evidence or report that a stressful experience occurred in service. The appellant did not appeal this decision, and it became final. By rating decisions dated in August 2003 and February 2004, the RO found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, essentially based on findings that the evidence of record did not show an in-service stressor or that the appellant's PTSD was incurred in or aggravated by service. With regard to the August 2003 decision, the appellant did not file a notice of disagreement. With regard to the February 2004 rating decision, he did file a notice of disagreement and an SOC (statement of the case) was issued; however, he failed to perfect his appeal by filing a substantive appeal (VA Form 9). Thus, the August 2003 and the February 2004 rating decisions became final. The February 2004 rating decision is the last final disallowance of the claim regarding PTSD. The evidence of record at the time of the February 2004 RO rating decision included the appellant's STRs, VA treatment records, and the appellant's lay statements. STRs showed that in September 1968, the appellant was admitted to the emergency room because of bizarre behavior. Subsequent interviews showed he had been a patient at a psychiatric institution in Tulsa. The diagnosis was psychoneurosis, mixed type, as evidenced by anxiety, disassociative reaction, somnambulism, inability to adjust to stressful situations. He was recommended to be presented to the Medical Evaluation Board. A report of Medical Board Proceedings in September 1968 showed that the appellant was found to have psychoneurosis, mixed type, which was not incurred in the line of duty, but rather existed prior to service and was not aggravated by active duty. The Medical Board recommended that due to his nervous condition, the appellant be considered qualified to make his election for separation because of erroneous enlistment since he has a disability which is disqualifying for procurement though not disqualifying for retention. VA treatment records showed that in March 2003, the appellant presented to the clinic as a new patient, and reported he had been seen in Tulsa for PTSD. The assessment included PTSD. Subsequent VA treatment records show treatment for the appellant's variously diagnosed psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, depressive disorder, and mood disorder. In May 2003, he requested continued treatment for what he believe was "PTSD resulting from his 3 months in the military in which he was approached several times by [a] sergeant (sic) for sexual favors". Evidence submitted subsequent to the RO's February 2004 rating decision includes VA treatment records, private treatment records, Vet Center treatment records, lay statements from his mother and friends, the appellant's statements, and testimony from the appellant and his brother. In a March 2004 statement, the appellant's mother reported that since the appellant went into service he had not been the same, and that he was irritable and did not respond to the family. VA treatment records dated from 2004 through 2009 showed that the appellant continued to receive treatment for his variously diagnosed psychiatric disorder, including PTSD and depression. Vet Center records showed that in September 2006 the appellant was seen for intake and he reported that he had been sexually assaulted in service, and was filing a claim and needed to get records. He felt that the incident had changed his life. The appellant did not report for the next appointment, and was discharged from the Vet Center after being seen one time for therapy. In a December 2007 statement, the appellant described his in- service stressor event. He reported that at "Fort Leonard", a "Sgt. Southern" and his corporal were drunk and attacked the appellant while he was on fire duty. He claimed that he was taken to the sergeant's room and beaten, knocked out, and woke up with his pants down and went through the next day hurting. He reported that the next time he was on fire duty, it started again and he was forced into a room, he fought back, lost two front lower teeth, and was hit behind his ears and on the knees and he went down. He claimed he woke up and was being sexually assaulted, and realized he was tied up. He was knocked out again and woke up in his bunk. He claimed he reported the incident to the chaplain and was put in the "NP ward" and was told he had to have his family come get him. In an August 2008 VA treatment record, the assessment included depression, and it was noted that the appellant had suffered military sexual trauma, which was stable. In January 2010, the appellant testified that he was assaulted in service by two assailants, one of which was a corporal. He claimed his mouth was busted open and he lost two teeth, and he was cut up inside his mouth. He testified he reported to the chaplain in the orderly room, and he was taken to the hospital, to the neuropsychiatric unit. He claimed pictures were taken and he talked to another corporal about what happened, and that then they wanted him to sign papers or he would go back to his unit and die because he opened his mouth. At the hearing, the appellant's brother testified that in October 1968 he picked the appellant up from the hospital and signed him out. He testified that the appellant had a little swelling on his face, but he did not pay attention. He claimed the appellant told him he "went through hell" and they did not discuss it. He testified that the appellant was changed after he came out service, and was more hateful and hard to get along with. The Board notes that the various lay statements and testimony from the appellant regarding his reported in-service stressor events, as well as his brother's testimony, are presumed credible for the purpose of determining whether evidence is new and material. Cox v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 95, 98 (1993); Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 510, 513 (1992). The Board finds that the lay evidence from the appellant and his brother is new, and, also, is material to the claim for entitlement to service connection for PTSD, as such statements provide a description of the reported in-stressor events, from which the appellant claims his PTSD stems. Thus, this lay evidence may relate to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. Moreover, the lay testimony raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim, as it pertains to the significant question of whether the appellant's PTSD may stem from a reported in- service stressor event. Thus, the Board concludes that new and material evidence has been submitted since the February 2004 RO rating decision, and the claim for entitlement to service connection for PTSD is reopened. Noting that the RO has yet to consider the appellant's claim for service connection for PTSD on the merits, and in light of recent judicial caselaw (Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009)), the Board finds that this matter must be remanded in order to afford due process to the appellant. ORDER Service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied. Service connection for tinnitus is denied. Service connection for a back condition is denied. New and material evidence having been submitted, the claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD is reopened; to this extent only the appeal is allowed. REMAND As noted above, the Board cannot, in part, go forward to a final decision on the appeal, in light of recent judicial caselaw. The Court has held that claims for service connection for PTSD encompass claims for service connection for all psychiatric disabilities. Clemons v. Shinseki, supra. (scope of mental health disability claim includes any mental disability that may reasonably be encompassed by the claimant's description of the claim, reported symptoms, and other information of record). Based on the diagnosis of depression and depressive disorder in the appellant's VA treatment records, the Board concludes that this matter must be remanded for consideration of this claim pursuant to the Clemons precedent. Also, the issue on appeal must be recharacterized as entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Copies of current treatment records, dated after September 23, 2009, should be obtained and added to the claims folder. After obtaining the necessary consent and information from the appellant, obtain the complete records pertaining to preservice treatment of the appellant at Hillcrest Mental Health Center. 2. Following completion of the above, the appellant should be scheduled for a VA mental disorders examination for the purpose of determining whether the appellant has a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, as a result of his military service. The claims folder must be made available to the examiner for review of pertinent documents therein in connection with the examination. The examiner must indicate in the examination report that the claims folder was reviewed. The examiner should obtain a detailed history from the appellant. While no stressor event or events have been verified to support a diagnosis of PTSD, the examiner should note the October 1968 emergency room treatment of the appellant for bizarre behavior and his current contentions of sexual assaults in service. The examiner should provide an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that any psychiatric disorder present, to include PTSD, is of service onset or otherwise related thereto. A complete rationale must be provided for any opinion offered. 3. Following completion of the above, readjudicate the appellant's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, in light of the holding in Clemons v. Shinseki, supra. 4. The case should then be reviewed and if any decision remains unsatisfactory to the appellant, a SSOC should be issued and he and his representative should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond. The case should then be returned to the Board for further appellate review. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West 2002). ______________________________________________ BARBARA B. COPELAND Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs