Citation Nr: 1010116 Decision Date: 03/17/10 Archive Date: 03/24/10 DOCKET NO. 07-38 133 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL The Veteran ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Tiffany Sykes, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1968 to April 1971. This appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from a September 2007 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida, which confirmed a prior March 1981 denial of service connection for bilateral hearing loss. Also in that September 2007 decision, the RO denied additional claims for service connection for tinnitus and hepatitis C. In his September 2007 notice of disagreement (NOD), in response to that decision, the Veteran indicated he was only appealing the claim for tinnitus, so the October 2007 statement of the case (SOC) only addressed this claim. And when subsequently submitting his November 2007 substantive appeal (on VA Form 9), the Veteran again only referred to the claim for tinnitus. So this is the only claim at issue in this appeal. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.200, etc. (2009). As support for this claim, the Veteran testified at a videoconference hearing in November 2009 before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge of the Board. Following the hearing, the Board held the record open for 60 days to allow the Veteran time to obtain and submit additional supporting evidence, which he did in December 2009 through his representative. They did not waive their right to have the RO initially consider this additional evidence. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.800, 20.1304 (2009). But the Board is granting the claim, primarily on the basis of this additional evidence from Dr. D. K. G., Au.D. (a Doctor of Audiology practicing at Hearing Solutions, Inc.). So there is no prejudice to the Veteran in the Board going ahead and considering this additional evidence in the first instance. See, e.g., Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). As will be explained, Dr. D. K. G. etiologically linked the Veteran's tinnitus to noise exposure during his military service. She also linked the Veteran's sensorineural hearing loss to that noise exposure in service. But, as explained, the Veteran did not appeal the denial of his claim for bilateral hearing loss, only his claim for tinnitus. So if he still believes he is entitled to service connection for his bilateral hearing loss, including on the basis of this additional statement from Dr. D. K. G. of Hearing Solutions, Inc., then he has to submit a petition to the RO to reopen this claim on the basis of new and material evidence because, in the absence of an appeal, the RO's September 2007 decision denying this claim has become final and binding on him based on the evidence then of record. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156, 3.160(d), 20.1103. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. VA already has conceded the Veteran was repeatedly exposed to excessively loud noise during service as a helicopter mechanic and, therefore, sustained acoustic trauma in that capacity. 2. According to the medical and other probative (competent and credible) evidence of record, including the recently submitted December 2009 statement from Dr. D. K. G., Au.D. (a Doctor of Audiology practicing at Hearing Solutions, Inc.), it is just as likely as not the Veteran's tinnitus is the result of that noise exposure in service. CONCLUSION OF LAW Resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, the Veteran's tinnitus was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION I. The Duties to Notify and Assist As provided by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), VA has duties to notify and assist claimants in substantiating claims for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2009). Here, though, the Board need not discuss whether there has been VCAA compliance because the claim is being granted, regardless. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (2009) (harmless error). II. Entitlement to Service Connection for Tinnitus The Veteran contends he developed tinnitus due to acoustic trauma sustained in the military from repeated exposure to excessively loud noise while working as a helicopter repairman and from gunfire. Tinnitus is "a noise in the ear, such as ringing, buzzing, roaring, or clicking." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1956 (31st ed. 2007). He says that he has been experiencing this ringing in his ears persistently since service. Because tinnitus, by its very nature, is an inherently subjective condition, he is competent even as a layman to make this proclamation of continuous tinnitus since service. When a condition, as here, may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation. In such cases, the Board is within its province to weigh that testimony and make a credibility determination as to whether that evidence supports a finding of service incurrence and continuity of symptomatology sufficient to establish service connection. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007). Service connection may be granted if it is shown the Veteran suffers from a disability resulting from an injury sustained or a disease contracted in the line of duty, or for aggravation during service of a pre-existing condition beyond its natural progression. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1153; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.306. To establish service connection, there must be: (1) a medical diagnosis of a current disability; (2) medical or, in some cases, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between an in-service injury or disease and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 252 (1999), citing Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A disorder also may be service connected if the evidence of record reveals the Veteran currently has a disorder that was chronic in service or was seen in service with continuity of symptomatology demonstrated after service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b); Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494- 97 (1997). To show chronic disease in service, or within a presumptive period per § 3.307, a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic," is required. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. Id. A layperson is generally incapable of opining on matters requiring medical knowledge. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 186 (1997), aff'd sub nom. Routen v. West, 142 F.3d 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 404 (1998). However, lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when: (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (e.g., a broken leg), (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d. 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In essence, lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness and "may provide sufficient support for a claim of service connection." Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). A determination as to whether medical evidence is needed to demonstrate that a Veteran presently has the same condition he or she had in service or during a presumption period, or whether lay evidence will suffice, depends on the nature of the Veteran's present condition (e.g., whether the Veteran's present condition is of a type that requires medical expertise to identify it as the same condition as that in service or during a presumption period, or whether it can be so identified by lay observation). Savage, 10 Vet. App. 488, 494-97 (1997). In determining whether service connection is warranted for a disability, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise (i.e., about even balanced for and against the claim), with the Veteran prevailing in either event. Conversely, the claim will be denied if the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Here, the medical evidence shows the Veteran received the required diagnosis of tinnitus from Dr. D. K. G., a private audiologist. She submitted a statement in December 2009 in support of the claim, not only listing this diagnosis, but indicating the Veteran reportedly had experienced this condition since returning to the United States from Vietnam. Tinnitus also was diagnosed following an August 2007 VA compensation examination. Consequently, the determinative issue is whether the Veteran's tinnitus is attributable to his military service, as he is alleging, and especially to the type of acoustic trauma claimed. See Watson v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 309, 314 (1993) ("A determination of service connection requires a finding of the existence of a current disability and a determination of a relationship between that disability and an injury or disease incurred in service."). See, too, Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000); D'Amico v. West, 209 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hibbard v. West, 13 Vet. App. 546, 548 (2000); and Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Board finds there is sufficient evidence of record establishing this required correlation. The medical evidence on file contains a positive indication and opinion concerning the etiology of the Veteran's tinnitus, and specifically in terms of it dating back to his military service in the manner he mentioned. Boyer, 210 F.3d at 1353; Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1375. Concerning this, the Board notes that the Veteran's DD Form 214 lists his Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) as a helicopter repairman in the Army for 11 weeks. And, indeed, even when denying the claim in September 2007, the RO readily conceded that he sustained acoustic trauma while on active duty in the military in that specific capacity. So excessive noise exposure in service is established. The Veteran also has provided competent and credible evidence etiologically linking his tinnitus to that noise exposure in service. In particular, Dr. D. K. G. expressly indicated in her December 2009 letter that the Veteran's tinnitus is "more likely than not a result of noise exposure while in service." As previously mentioned, the Veteran also earlier had a VA compensation examination in August 2007. However, that VA examiner stated that he could not "assess the relationship between the Veteran's hearing loss and tinnitus and his military noise exposure without resorting to mere speculation." The examination report refers to an objective clinical evaluation of the Veteran and states the examiner also reviewed the Veteran's claims file for the pertinent history. Statements like this from doctors that are, for all intents and purposes, inconclusive as to the origin of a disorder cannot be employed as suggestive of a linkage between the disorder and the Veteran's military service. See Warren v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 4, 6 (1993); Sklar v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 104, 145-6 (1993). Opinions like this amount to "nonevidence," neither for nor against the claim, because service connection may not be based on speculation or remote possibility. See generally Bloom v. West, 12 Vet. App. 185 (1999) (a medical opinion based on speculation, without supporting clinical data or other rationale, does not provide the required degree of medical certainty). See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (when considering application of the benefit- of-the-doubt doctrine, reasonable doubt is one within the range of probability, as distinguished from pure speculation or remote possibility). Because the VA examiner admittedly was unable to comment on the etiology of the Veteran's tinnitus, in terms of whether it is attributable to his military service, whereas Dr. D. K. G. was, the only medical evidence addressing this determinative issue is favorable to the claim. Certainly then, resolving all reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor, it is just as likely as not his tinnitus is related to the type of noise exposure in service VA already has conceded he experienced as a helicopter mechanic. 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 518, 519 (1996). So service connection for tinnitus must be granted. ORDER The claim for service connection for tinnitus is granted. ____________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs