Citation Nr: 1011005 Decision Date: 03/24/10 Archive Date: 03/31/10 DOCKET NO. 06-11 402 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Lincoln, Nebraska THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Amy R. Grasman, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1958 to December 1959 and from October 1961 to August 1962. This appeal comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a February 2006 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Lincoln, Nebraska. The Board notes that additional issues were included in the rating decision; however, the only issue addressed in the Notice of Disagreement and subsequently perfected was the issue of service connection for the right knee disability. Therefore, that is the only issue that will be addressed in this decision. On the VA Form 9, substantive appeal, received in March 2006, the Veteran indicated that he wanted a Travel Board hearing. In April 2007, the Veteran submitted a statement requesting to withdraw his hearing request. As such, the Veteran's hearing request is considered withdrawn and the Board will continue with appellate review. 38 C.F.R. § 20.702 (e) (2009). FINDING OF FACT A right knee disability was noted on the examination prior to entry into service and did not permanently increase in severity during service. CONCLUSION OF LAW A right knee disability was not aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1111, 1131, 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304, 3.306 (2009). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Duties to Notify and Assist As provided for by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), the VA has a duty to notify and assist claimants in substantiating a claim for VA benefits. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2009). Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, VA is required to notify the claimant and his representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, that is necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2009); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Proper notice from VA must inform the claimant of any information and evidence not of record (1) that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) that VA will seek to provide; and (3) that the claimant is expected to provide. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (2009). This notice must be provided prior to an initial unfavorable decision on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ). Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004). Here, the Veteran was sent a VCAA letter in December 2005 that addressed the notice elements and was sent prior to the initial AOJ decision in this matter. The letter informed the Veteran of what evidence was required to substantiate the claim and of the Veteran's and VA's respective duties for obtaining evidence. The Veteran was also asked to submit evidence and/or information in his possession to the AOJ. In March 2006, the Veteran was also sent a letter including the notice provisions pertaining to how VA assigns disability ratings and effective dates as set forth in Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006). Therefore, the Board concludes that the requirements of the notice provisions of the VCAA have been met, and there is no outstanding duty to inform the Veteran that any additional information or evidence is needed. Quartuccio, 16 Vet. App. at 187. Although the VCAA duty to notify was satisfied subsequent to the initial AOJ decision as the March 2006 letter was sent after the rating decision, the Board finds that this error was not prejudicial to the Veteran because the actions taken by VA after providing the notice have essentially cured the error in the timing of notice. Not only has the Veteran been afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the processing of his claim and given ample time to respond, but the AOJ also readjudicated the case by way of a September 2006 supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) issued after the notice was provided. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (where notice was not provided prior to the AOJ's initial adjudication, this timing problem can be cured by the Board remanding for the issuance of a VCAA notice followed by readjudication of the claim by the AOJ) see also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006) (the issuance of a fully compliant VCAA notification followed by readjudication of the claim, such as a statement of the case or SSOC, is sufficient to cure a timing defect). For these reasons, it is not prejudicial to the Veteran for the Board to proceed to finally decide this appeal as the timing error did not affect the essential fairness of the adjudication. VA also has a duty to assist the Veteran in the development of the claim. This duty includes assisting the Veteran in the procurement of service treatment records and pertinent medical records, and providing an examination when necessary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (2009). The Board finds that all necessary development has been accomplished, and therefore appellate review may proceed without prejudice to the Veteran. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993). The RO has obtained service treatment records, DD Form 214's, and VA medical records. The Veteran was afforded a VA medical examination in February 2006. Significantly, neither the Veteran nor his representative has identified, and the record does not otherwise indicate, any additional existing evidence that is necessary for a fair adjudication of the claim that has not been obtained. Hence, no further notice or assistance is required to fulfill VA's duty to the Veteran in the development of the claim. Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000), aff'd 281 F.3d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Dela Cruz v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 143 (2001); see also Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). Analysis The Veteran asserts that he incurred a right knee disability in service, or in alternative that his right knee was aggravated in service. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2009). This may be shown by affirmative evidence showing inception or aggravation during service or through statutory presumptions. Id. To establish direct service connection for a claimed disorder, there must be (1) medical evidence of current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service occurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); see also Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). For the showing of chronic disease in service there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2009). If chronicity in service is not established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge is required to support the claim. Id. Where a veteran served 90 days or more during a period of war or during peacetime service after December 31, 1946, and a chronic disease such as arthritis manifests to a degree of 10 percent within one year from date of termination of such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (2009). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2009). A veteran is presumed to be in sound condition when examined and accepted into service except for defects or disorders noted at entrance into service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (2009). This presumption is rebutted where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service. Id. VA must show clear and unmistakable evidence of both a preexisting condition and a lack of in-service aggravation to overcome the presumption of soundness. Satterfield v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 386 (2005); see Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(citations omitted); see also VAOPGCPREC 3-2003 (July 16, 2003)(69 Fed. Reg. 25178 (2004)). According to 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), the term "noted" means only such conditions that are recorded in examination reports. The existence of conditions prior to service reported by the veteran as medical history does not constitute a notation of such conditions; however, such reports will be considered together with all other material evidence in determining the question of when a disease or disability began. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)(1) (2009). Determinations of whether a condition existed prior to service should be "based on thorough analysis of the evidentiary showing and careful correlation of all material facts, with due regard to accepted medical principles pertaining to the history, manifestations, clinical course, and character of the particular injury or disease or residuals thereof." 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)(1) (2009); see also Kinnaman v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 20, 27 (1993). A pre-existing injury or disease is considered to have been aggravated by active service if there is an increase in disability during service, unless there is a specific finding that the increase in disability is due to the natural progression of the disease. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a) (2009). Aggravation is not conceded where the disability underwent no increase in severity during service based on all the evidence of record pertaining to the manifestations of the disability prior to, during, and subsequent to service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(b) (2009); Falzone v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 398, 402 (1995) (providing that the presumption of aggravation created by section 3.306 applies only if there is an increase in severity during service). Temporary or intermittent flare-ups of a pre-existing injury or disease are not sufficient to be considered "aggravation in service" unless the underlying condition, as contrasted with symptoms, has worsened. Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292, 297 (1991); Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 320, 323 (1991); Jensen v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 304, 306-307 (1993). A "lasting worsening of the condition" or a worsening that existed not only at the time of separation but one that still exists currently is required. Routen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 183, 189 (1997); see Verdon v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 529, 538 (1996). After careful consideration of the evidence, any reasonable doubt remaining is resolved in favor of the veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2009). If the evidence for and against a claim is in equipoise, the claim will be granted. A claim will be denied only if the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2009); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 56 (1990). In this case, the record shows a current right knee disability. The February 2006 VA examination report noted a diagnosis of right knee, status post total knee arthroplasty. The Veteran had a total right knee replacement in 1993. Service treatment records show that the Veteran reported a trick knee at the pre-induction examination in June 1957. That examination report shows that the lower extremities were abnormal, and a history of a right knee sprain one year prior to service was noted. On the Report of Medical History in January 1958, the Veteran reported that he did not ever have/have now a trick or locked knee. In the October 1959 Report of Medical History, the Veteran reported having had/having now a trick or locked knee and right knee sprain was noted. The examination report at that time reflected that the lower extremities were clinically evaluated as normal. On the November 1961 Report of Medical History, the Veteran reported having had/having now a trick or locked knee and there was notation that the knee slips out of the joint. The examination report at that time shows that that the Veteran's lower extremities were clinically evaluated as normal. In February 1962, the Veteran sought treatment for a right knee injury while playing basketball. Subsequently on the Report of Medical History in May 1962, the Veteran reported having had/having now a trick or locked knee and the examiner noted knee sprain prior to service. On the separation examination report in May 1962, the Veteran's lower extremities were clinically evaluated as normal. The February 2006 VA examiner, an orthopedic surgeon, reviewed the claims folder, which included service treatment records and VA treatment records. He noted that the Veteran had both knees replaced, and also noted that the preinduction examination in 1957 revealed a history of a sprained right knee a year prior to service and the Veteran reported a trick knee. The examiner noted treatment for the Veteran's right knee in 1962 after an injury while playing basketball. The examiner noted that the injury did not appear to be significant in service based on the symptoms and treatment he received therein. The examiner considered the surgery to the Veteran's left knee in 1978, 1989, and 1996. He also noted surgery on the right knee in 1993 and 1996. The examiner noted the Veteran's profession after service working in a grain elevator for 36 years which required somewhat heavy labor including walking up and down ladders to check grain bins. The examiner physically examined the Veteran's right knee and reviewed radiographs. The examiner opined that the Veteran's right knee was less likely as not caused by or the result of service. The examiner reasoned that a trick knee was reported by the Veteran prior to service and the injury in service was minimal. The examiner could not indicate that the basketball injury in service was related to his current disability without resorting to mere speculation. The examiner also opined that it was more plausible that the preexisting instability normally seen with a trick knee and working in a grain elevator after service was more likely a cause of the current disability. Additionally, the examiner indicated that without resorting to mere speculation, he could not state that the right knee was aggravated in service. The Board finds that the VA opinion is adequate. It is based upon consideration of the Veteran's prior medical history and examinations, and also describes the disability, in sufficient detail so that the Board's evaluation of the disability will be a fully informed one. See Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 123 (2007). The examiner also provided a rationale for his conclusion. As such, the Board finds the VA examination probative. See Prejean v. West, 13 Vet. App. 444, 448-49 (2000) (noting that factors for assessing the probative value of a medical opinion are the physician's access to the claims file and the thoroughness and detail of the opinion). The Board notes that a preexisting right knee sprain was noted on both service entrance examination reports. The lower extremities were evaluated as abnormal in June 1957, and a trick right knee and a history of sprained right knee were noted. Therefore, the focus of this matter is whether preexisting right knee disability was aggravated during ether of the Veteran's periods of service (i.e. since he does not have the benefit of the presumption of soundness). Regarding aggravation, it is pointed out that the lack of aggravation may be shown by establishing that there was no increase in disability during service or that any increase in disability was due to the natural progress of the pre- existing condition. 38 C.F.R. § 3.306. Service treatment records show treatment for a right knee injury on one occasion in February 1962. However, there were no further complaints related to the right knee in service and the examination reports at service discharge did not indicate any right knee disability. Also, the February 2006 VA examiner indicated that the in-service injury was not significant and was minimal. He could not state that the right knee was aggravated in service without resorting to mere speculation. While the examiner found that it would be a resort to speculation to link the Veteran's current disability to the in-service injury, he found that the Veteran's current disability was more plausibly due to his history of trick knee and post service occupation working for the grain elevator. In fact, the first post-service indication of a disability in the record was not until the February 2006 VA examination report, which was 44 years after service discharge. The length of time without treatment and/or indication of the disability weigh against the claim. Overall, the weight of the evidence suggests that the preexisting right knee disability did not worsen during service. Therefore, without evidence that the Veteran's disability was aggravated in service, the criteria for service connection for a right knee disability have not been met. The Board notes the Veteran's contention that his current right knee disability was aggravated in service. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303, 307-08 (2007); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). However, as noted above, the weight of the evidence suggests that his disability was not aggravated in service. As the preponderance of the evidence is against this claim, and the evidence is not in a state of relative equipoise, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply and the Veteran's claim for service connection for a right knee disability must be denied. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). ORDER Service connection for a right knee disability is denied. ____________________________________________ LANA K. JENG Acting Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs