Citation Nr: 1011202 Decision Date: 03/25/10 Archive Date: 04/07/10 DOCKET NO. 08-24 434 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to a disability rating greater than 10 percent for tinnitus. 2. Entitlement to an initial disability rating greater than 30 percent for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Georgia Department of Veterans Services ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Paul S. Rubin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active military service from June 1957 to September 1966. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from December 2006 and February 2008 rating decisions issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Atlanta, Georgia. As to the PTSD issue, this issue stems from the Veteran's disagreement with the initial rating assigned in the December 2006 rating decision after the RO granted service connection for PTSD. As to the tinnitus issue, this issue stems from the Veteran's disagreement with the RO's decision to deny him an increased rating in the February 2008 rating decision. The PTSD issue being remanded is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the RO via the Appeals Management Center (AMC), in Washington, DC. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran's service-connected tinnitus is assigned a 10 percent rating, the maximum rating authorized under Diagnostic Code 6260. CONCLUSION OF LAW There is no legal basis for the assignment of a schedular evaluation in excess of 10 percent for bilateral tinnitus. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1155, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 4.1-4.7, 4.21, 4.87, Diagnostic Code 6260 (2009); Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Duties to Notify and Assist With respect to the tinnitus issue on appeal, review of the claims folder reveals compliance with the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5100 et seq. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a). The duty to notify was accomplished by way of VCAA letters from the RO to the Veteran dated in December 2007 and July 2008. Those letters effectively satisfied the notification requirements of the VCAA consistent with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) by: (1) informing him about the information and evidence not of record that was necessary to substantiate his increased rating claim; (2) informing him about the information and evidence the VA would seek to provide; (3) informing him about the information and evidence he was expected to provide. See also Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112 (2004) (Pelegrini II); Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183, 187 (2002). Furthermore, the December 2007 letter from the RO further advised the Veteran of the elements of a disability rating and an effective date, which are assigned if service connection is awarded. Dingess v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473, 486 (2006); aff'd sub nom. Hartman v. Nicholson, 483 F.3d 1311 (2007). Finally, with regard to the additional notice requirements for increased rating claims, the July 2008 VCAA letter was compliant with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court's) recent decision in Vazquez-Flores v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 37 (2008). That is, in this letter, the Veteran was advised of the evidentiary and legal criteria necessary to substantiate a higher rating for his tinnitus disability. In any event, the Federal Circuit recently vacated the Veterans Court's previous decision in Vasquez-Flores, concluding that generic notice in response to a claim for an increased rating is all that is required. See Vazquez-Flores v. Shinseki, 580 F.3d 1270, 1277 (2009). In other words, a VCAA notice for an increased rating claim does not have to be individually tailored to each Veteran's particular facts, but rather only a generic notice is required. Regardless, overall, the Board is satisfied that the RO provided both generic and specific VCAA notice as to the increased rating claim for tinnitus when considering this letter. Thus, the Veteran has received all required notice in this case, such that there is no error in the content of VCAA notice. In fact, in July 2008, the Veteran acknowledged receipt of the Vasquez letter, stating that he had no additional evidence to submit in response. With regard to the timing of VCAA notice, in Pelegrini II, the Court held, in part, that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim for VA benefits. 18 Vet. App. at 120. Here, certain VCAA notice was provided after the initial unfavorable February 2008 AOJ decision. However, the Federal Circuit Court and Veterans Claims Court have since further clarified that the VA can provide additional necessary notice subsequent to the initial AOJ adjudication, and then go back and readjudicate the claim, such that the essential fairness of the adjudication - as a whole, is unaffected because the appellant is still provided a meaningful opportunity to participate effectively in the adjudication of the claim. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 499 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Mayfield IV) (where the Federal Circuit Court held that a Statement of the Case (SOC) or Supplemental SOC (SSOC) can constitute a "readjudication decision" that complies with all applicable due process and notification requirements if adequate VCAA notice is provided prior to the SOC or SSOC. In fact, as a matter of law, a readjudication of the claim after adequate VCAA notice was provided "cures" any timing problem associated with inadequate notice or the lack of notice prior to an initial adjudication. See also Prickett v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 370, 376 (2006). Here, the timing error was cured. After providing the additional VCAA notice in July 2008, the RO again went back and readjudicated the claim in the April 2009 SOC. So each time after providing the required notice, the RO reconsidered the claim - including to address any additional evidence received in response to the notice. So the timing defect in the notice has been rectified. Prickett, 20 Vet. App. at 376. Stated another way, VA's issuance of a SOC in April 2009 following the Vasquez VCAA notice letter cured the timing error. As such, the Board concludes prejudicial error in the timing or content of VCAA notice has not been demonstrated. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696 (2009) (reversing prior case law imposing a presumption of prejudice on any notice deficiency). With respect to the duty to assist, the RO has secured the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs), relevant VA treatment records, as well as VA examinations to determine the current severity of his tinnitus. Notably, the VA examinations also included commentary as the effect of the Veteran's audiology problems on his occupational functioning and daily activities. See Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 455-56 (2007). The Veteran has not authorized the release of any additional private medical records. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has stated that any additional evidence remains outstanding. In fact, in July 2008, the Veteran stated that he had no additional evidence to submit in the present case. As discussed below, the Board is separately remanding the PTSD claim at issue for outstanding VA treatment records dated from December 2007. This remand is based on a December 2009 statement from the Veteran in which he maintains that he has received additional VA treatment since December 2007 for his PTSD. In this regard, VA's duty to assist includes obtaining records of "relevant" VA medical treatment identified by the Veteran. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(c)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(2). However, notably, there is no evidence or allegation from the Veteran he received VA treatment since December 2007 for his tinnitus. As such, any outstanding VA treatment records would not be "relevant" for purposes of showing treatment for tinnitus. Therefore, any VA medical records not currently secured could not alter the ultimate disposition of the tinnitus appeal. VA is not required to search for evidence which, even if obtained, would make no difference in the result. Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 526 (1995) (quoting Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991). Accordingly, there is no benefit to the Veteran in further delaying the final adjudication of his tinnitus appeal by remanding the case to look for VA medical records that do not pertain to the tinnitus claim. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 541 (1991) (declining to require strict adherence to technical requirements and impose additional burdens on VA when there was no benefit flowing to the claimant). Therefore, the Board finds that the duty to assist has been met. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002 & Supp. 2009). Governing Laws and Regulations for Higher Disability Ratings Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), which is based on the average impairment of earning capacity. Individual disabilities are assigned separate diagnostic codes. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1155 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2009). The basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole, or of the psyche, or of a system or organ of the body to function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.10. If there is a question as to which evaluation to apply to the Veteran's disability, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. When reasonable doubt arises as to the degree of disability, such doubt will be resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. Pertinent regulations do not require that all cases show all findings specified by the Rating Schedule, but that findings sufficiently characteristic to identify the disease and the resulting disability and above all, coordination of rating with impairment of function will be expected in all cases. 38 C.F.R. § 4.21. Therefore, the Board has considered the potential application of various other provisions of the regulations governing VA benefits, whether or not they were raised by the Veteran, as well as the entire history of his disability in reaching its decision. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 595 (1991). The Veteran's entire history is reviewed when assigning a disability evaluation per 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. However, where service connection has already been established and an increase in the disability rating is at issue, it is the present level of disability that is of primary concern. While older evidence is not necessarily irrelevant, it is generally not needed to determine the effective date of an increased rating. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994). A recent decision of the Court has added that in determining the present level of a disability for any increased evaluation claim, the Board must consider the application of staged ratings. See Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007). That is to say, the Board must consider whether there have been times when the disability has been more severe than at others, and rate it accordingly. The relevant temporal focus for adjudicating the level of disability of an increased rating claim is from the time period one year before the claim was filed (in this case, September 2006) until VA makes a final decision on the claim. See Hart, supra. See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5110(b)(2) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (2009). Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. Competent medical evidence may also mean statements conveying sound medical principles found in medical treatises. It also includes statements contained in authoritative writings, such as medical and scientific articles and research reports or analyses. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of the facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). In essence, lay testimony is competent when it regards the readily observable features or symptoms of injury or illness. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). Analysis - Higher Rating for Tinnitus Tinnitus is evaluated under Diagnostic Code 6260, which was revised effective June 13, 2003, to clarify existing VA practice that only a single 10 percent evaluation is assigned for tinnitus, whether the sound is perceived as being in one ear, both ears, or in the head. 38 C.F.R. § 4.87, Diagnostic Code 6260, Note 2 (2009). In Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 78 (2005), the Court held that the pre-1999 and pre-June 13, 2003 versions of Diagnostic Code 6260 required the assignment of dual ratings for bilateral tinnitus. VA appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit and stayed the adjudication of tinnitus rating cases affected by the Smith decision. In Smith v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit concluded that the Court erred in not deferring to the VA's interpretation of its own regulations, 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 and Diagnostic Code 6260, which limits a Veteran to a single 10 percent maximum rating for tinnitus, regardless whether the tinnitus is unilateral or bilateral. Subsequently, the stay of adjudication of tinnitus rating cases was lifted. The Veteran's service-connected tinnitus has been assigned the maximum schedular rating available for tinnitus of 10 percent under 38 C.F.R. §4.87, Diagnostic Code 6260. As there is no legal basis upon which to award separate schedular evaluations for tinnitus in each ear, the Veteran's appeal must be denied. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). On a side note, the Board acknowledges the Court's recent holding that a request for a total disability based on unemployability (TDIU), whether expressly raised by Veteran or reasonably raised by the record, is not a separate "claim" for benefits, but rather, can be part of a claim for increased compensation. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447, 453-54 (2009). During the present appeal, the Veteran specifically raised the issue of entitlement to TDIU. See September 2007 TDIU application. But in the February 2008 rating decision, the RO specifically adjudicated the TDIU issue. Significantly, the Veteran did not perfect his appeal of the TDIU issue when he filed his June 2008 Notice of Disagreement (NOD) for the increased rating appeal. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 20.200 (2009). That is, he simply did not mention the TDIU issue that had been specifically adjudicated by the RO. Therefore, the TDIU issue is not in appellate status before the Board at this time. Extra-Schedular Consideration Initially, the Board acknowledges that some of the specific manifestations of the Veteran's tinnitus disability may not be listed by the rating criteria. Thun v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 111, 115-116 (2008). However, the Board finds that his disability does not markedly interfere with his ability to work, meaning above and beyond that contemplated by his separate schedular ratings. Generally, the degrees of disability specified in the Rating Schedule are considered adequate to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or illnesses proportionate to the severity of the several grades of disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1; VAOPGCPREC 6-96. See also, Bagwell v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 337, 338 (1996); Shipwash v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 218, 227 (1995). In this regard, VA audiology examinations conducted in October 2003 and January 2008 indicate that his service- connected hearing loss disability adversely impacts his ability to communicate and listen in occupational and social settings. But there is no specific mention or complaint regarding the impact of his tinnitus alone. Moreover, in his August 2003 and September 2007 TDIU applications, the Veteran states that it is his service-connected hearing loss and PTSD disabilities that impact his ability to work, with no specific mention of tinnitus. Finally, a June 1997 VA examination and a December 2007 VA psychiatrist examination note that the Veteran medically retired in 1993 from his job as an airline loader and ramp worker due to his nonservice- connected back disorder, with no specific mention of tinnitus. As such, there is insufficient evidence that tinnitus markedly interferes with his ability to work. Finally, there is no evidence of any other exceptional or unusual circumstances, such as frequent hospitalizations due solely to his service-connected tinnitus disability, to suggest he is not adequately compensated for his disability by the regular Rating Schedule. VAOPGCPREC 6-96. There is no mention in the record of inpatient treatment due to tinnitus. ORDER A disability rating in excess of 10 percent for tinnitus is denied. REMAND The Board finds that a remand for additional development of the evidence is required before final appellate review of the PTSD issue on appeal. First, the Veteran's VA treatment records on file from the VA Medical Center (VAMC) in Atlanta, Georgia only date to December 2007, over two years ago. Since the Veteran recently stated in a December 2009 statement that he has received additional VA treatment for his PTSD, these records should be obtained. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(c)(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(2), (c)(3). See also Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (1992) (VA is charged with constructive, if not actual, knowledge of evidence generated by VA). Second, since the Board is already remanding the PTSD issue for VA treatment records, it is worthwhile to obtain a more current VA examination to adequately rate the Veteran's service-connected PTSD. His last VA examination for his PTSD disability was in December 2007. Although not unduly remote, the Veteran continues to assert that his PTSD has worsened since that time and that he cannot work. As such, VA is required to afford him a contemporaneous VA examination to assess the current nature, extent and severity of his PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.327(a) (2009). See Palczewski v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 174, 181 (2007); Snuffer v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 400, 403 (1997); see also VAOPGCPREC 11-95 (1995), 60 Fed. Reg. 43186 (1995). Accordingly, the PTSD issue is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Obtain the records of the Veteran's medical treatment from the VAMC in Atlanta, Georgia, since December 2007. All attempts to secure these records, and any response received, must be documented in the claims file. If no records are available, a response to that effect is required and should be documented in the file. 2. Then schedule the Veteran for a VA mental health examination to assess the current severity of his service- connected PTSD. All indicated tests and studies should be performed as deemed necessary by the examiner. The RO should advise the Veteran that failure to report for a scheduled VA examination without good cause may have adverse consequences for his claim. The claims folder should be made available to the examiner for review for the examination and the examination report should indicate whether such review was accomplished. The examination report should include a complete discussion of the Veteran's subjective complaints, findings on mental status examination, and a multi-axial diagnosis with Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score. The examiner should also discuss the extent of the Veteran's occupational and social impairment due to his service- connected PTSD. 3. Then readjudicate the issue of a higher initial rating for PTSD. If this issue is not granted to the Veteran's satisfaction, send him and his representative a supplemental statement of the case and give them an opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2009). ______________________________________________ A. BRYANT Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs